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Soft Power and Heritage

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Rodrigo Christofolletti
Editor

Soft Power and Heritage

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“No empire—Greek, Roman, French, Ottoman, British—was indifferent to the effects of its soft power resources. In our current information age, however, a wide range of countries, as well as other actors in international relations, have dramatically increased their pursuit of soft power on an unprecedented scale.”

(Fraser, M. apud Ohnershorge, 2020, p.11)

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Contents

1	Actors, Spaces and Borders of Soft Power: The Heritage in Multiple Looks	1
	Rodrigo Christofoletti	
Part I Soft Power Actors		
2	The Supreme Court of History? UNESCO as an Arena for Historiographic Clashes	39
	Bruno Miranda Zétola	
3	Spatial Disposition of UNESCO's Cultural Heritage and Soft Power: A Survey on the Possibility of Reification of Power Discrepancies	53
	Bernardo Hazan	
4	Polycam and the Power of Heritage Registration in the Palm of Your Hand: UNESCO Strategy to Safeguard Memory in Ukraine War	67
	Alexandre Augusto da Costa and Leonardo Rosa Maricato Santos	
5	Culture of Peace, Soft Power and the Russia–Ukraine Conflict: The Shortcomings of Economic Integration as a Conflict Deterrent and the Potential of Diplomacy and Paradiplomacy for a Culture of Peace	83
	Victor Maciel Mendes	
6	Cultural Mercosur: A Regional Vision of Cultural Heritage as Soft Power	97
	Kathia Espinoza Maurtua	
7	Heritage Diplomacy Matters? Brazil's Foreign Policy and South–South Cooperation in Cultural Heritage	113
	Gilberto M. A. Rodrigues and Tadeu Morato Maciel	

8	Cultural Heritage as Soft Power: Brazil in International Politics	137
	Nathan Assunção Agostinho	
9	Brazil's Active and Haughty Policy Toward the African Continent: Between Diplomacy, Soft Power, and Heritage (2002–2008)	153
	Leonardo Rauthier Brandi	
10	Cultural Heritage as a Potential Soft Power Instrument	165
	Lara Elissa Andrade Cardoso	
Part II Soft Power Spaces		
11	Universalism and Diversity: The 50th Anniversary of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention	185
	Leonardo Barci Castriota	
12	Discussions on the Fragility of African Soft Power: An Analysis of Democratic Republic of Congo	197
	Wazime Mfumukala Guy Baudouin	
13	Cultural Experiences of Brazil in Africa: The Management of Intangible Cultural Heritage in the Context of Soft Power	221
	Thamyres Alves Rodrigues	
14	The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: An Important Soft Power Strategy	235
	Fernando Fernandes da Silva	
15	Destruction of Antiquities, Museums and Archaeological Sites in Syria During the War: Methods of Protecting Them	245
	Ahmad Serieh	
16	Two Sides of the Same Coin: Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Goods and Repatriation Toward a New Relational Ethics	261
	Rodrigo Christofolletti	
17	Circulation of Sacred Art in the Internet Underworld	281
	Denismara Eugênia de Oliveira Nascimento	
18	“We’re Back”: Background and Outcomes of Repatriation, Return and Restitution of Cultural Property	295
	Virginia Corradi Lopes da Silva	
19	Colonial Marks in African Museums: Cases from Guinea-Bissau and Senegal	311
	Thiago H. Mota	

Part III Borders Soft Power

20 Cultural Heritage and International Cooperation: Lusophone Diplomatic Strategies	333
Diogo Motta	
21 Between the Power of the Museum and the Power of the Community: Case Studies in Portugal and Brazil	349
Alice Semedo and Leilane Lima	
22 Documentation: A “Tool” of Soft Power in Museums	381
Alexandre Matos	
23 Soft Power and the Rise of the Global South: Chinese Investments in Renewable Energy in Brazil	397
Mateus de Almeida Prado Sampaio and Elisa Pinheiro de Freitas	
24 Creating and Using <i>Tais</i> in Timor-Leste: An Intangible Heritage	415
Thaísa Bravo-valenzuela e Silva	
25 Soft Power and Brazilian Music Diffusion	429
Bruno Aragão Cardoso	
26 Collective Memory of Public Space: A Path for Preservation Through Affective Appropriation	441
Cesar Bargo Perez	
27 Soft Power, Global Governance and the International Role of Brazilian Youth Against the Climate Crisis	455
Patricia Silva Zanella	

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Chapter 1

Actors, Spaces and Borders of Soft Power: The Heritage in Multiple Looks



Rodrigo Christofolletti

Metaphorically, power is like standing in front of a half-open door: if you push it, it's like hard power, if you pull it towards you, it's like soft power: distensions and attractions depend on the action performed.
(Christofolletti 2023).

Abstract The central objective of this text is to illustrate how the concept of soft power encompasses and problematizes the multiplicity of topics on the contemporary international agenda, focusing on one of its least discussed elements: the universe of international cultural heritage and the relationship between preservationist actors and actions in the globalized world. This text initiates a critical dialogue between interdisciplinary fields that straddles the boundaries of heritage and seeks to contribute a wide range of academic perspectives and case studies (national and international). While cultural heritage incorporates different values and can be used to serve different economic, social, and political objectives within development contexts, the past becomes a cultural bargaining chip when it is seen as indispensable to human life. There is an interesting causal link to be analyzed here, namely, the legacy of peoples and their past: beacons for understanding the present.

Keywords Soft power heritage · New themes of heritage · International relations

Although heritage has never been widely discussed, the field of international relations has remained at a distance from this topic. Similarly, despite the fact that we have observed an increase in discussions about cultural heritage in different areas to the extent that some analysts suggest we are experiencing “heritage inflation,” in certain academic spaces, such as international relations, the discourse on broadening preservation policies, or what is called heritage diplomacy, and on managing the maintenance and use of cultural assets as soft power is still underdeveloped, which

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is reflected in the noticeable imbalance between studies of hard power, to the detriment of topics involving “soft power.” Given this landscape, publications that seek to diversify approaches to this topic will help bridge the divide between cultural assets and international relations.

In the late twentieth century, classical topics arising from the dominance of the realist approach—such as discussions on the polarity of the international system, balance of power and security, among others—gave way to new theoretical approaches, leading to a proliferation of intellectual contributions addressing new subjects in international relations (Vigevani 1994, 45). This new approach focused on subjects that were more reflective of the contemporary reality, such as regimes, human rights, the environment, diversity and sustainable development, in addition to promoting increasingly interdependent discussions in economics and international relations. In parallel, cultural issues came to the fore, connected to these new concerns for international security (Barão 2014, 14).

The broadening of the range of subjects associated with the cultural universe, in particular, cultural heritage, has expanded to include subjects that transcend the mere preservation of heritage as a family legacy. Consequently, wider issues have begun to be addressed, such as debates on the trafficking and repatriation of artworks and cultural assets; the disastrous wave of heritage destruction initiated by radical ethnic and religious groups around the world; the increasingly important dimension of intangibility in the universe of cultural assets; the use of this instrument by nation-states; the presence of other actors in the production, maintenance and management of heritage, including cities, public and private institutions and NGOs, among others; and the increasing number of comparative studies among member states of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the criteria used to select, adopt, ensure compliance with and enforce international policies for cultural heritage and cultural assets: these approaches are the result of the recent dialog between international relations, history, geography, architecture, tourism, museology, the environment, international law and diplomacy, among other areas.

At the multilateral level, efforts to institutionalize new principles and practices for these issues in international relations have been made on a larger scale since the late 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century, primarily by UNESCO. Certain documents have underpinned these efforts at institutionalization, such as the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972), the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001), the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003), and the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005).

We have learned over the centuries that the circulation of cultural ideas has the power to influence an agent’s decision-making process (Martins 2022, 34). Joseph S. Nye Jr. notes the difference between cultural products and the power of attraction in and of itself. Cultural products are resources that may or may not become soft power. Everything depends on the context, and to endow cultural products—be they popular or sophisticated—with the power of attraction, they must translate values that are universal or that are widely shared by the international community (Galdioli

2008, 23). An example of the transformation of cultural products into soft power is the considerable influence of culture and world heritage preservation. This observation led to the organization of this book, a task that considered both the awareness of the low visibility of this topic in international academic discussions and the need to broaden the scope of the subject. This text is intended to do just that: it aims to deepen knowledge about the international preservation policies of different multi-lateral actors involved in the universe of cultural assets as soft power agents, taking Brazil as a starting point.

Heritage as a mirror of soft power emerges as a symbol that reveals ethos, actors, entities and manifestations: frontiers of preservation and dialogue. This wide-ranging metaphor, full of meanings, represents the new field into which international relations have recently ventured: the path of heritage as soft power. In line with this metaphor, there is a consensus that the preservation of the “heritage” category has weathered the phase of uncertainty. There is a positive agenda for heritage preservation, and this book is part of that agenda. It is now understood that preservation is *un parti pris*. However, there are also collateral effects of this widely accepted statement that must be addressed. One of them is that, although there has never been much discussion about heritage, the multiplicity of approaches to the subject has trivialized it to the point that, as mentioned above, it has become a platitude. A mirror’s reflection broadens horizons. A mirror reveals. This understanding enabled this book to embrace a certain pioneering spirit, as it is very likely to be the first publication in Brazilian literature (despite being written in English) with these characteristics, concerns and scope, namely a detailed examination of the relationship between cultural assets and international relations as soft power. It has therefore earned the subtitle that naturalizes it, i.e., a mirror: a metaphor full of meanings, representations of a pluriverse that international relations have recently begun to discover.

Despite claims regarding the power of cultural heritage in today’s geopolitics to mediate sustainable development and the identity of peoples, the relationship between heritage and international relations has received little academic scrutiny. As such, only recently have major academic works designated cultural heritage within the scope of international relations as a promising topic. Influenced by this trend, cultural heritage as a key to new sociocultural and diplomatic approaches merits more contemporary and in-depth study from scholars. The result of this verticalization comes at a *sui generis* moment: We are witnessing perhaps the worst cultural heritage crisis on a global scale since the Second World War, with the crimes perpetrated by Islamic State radicals being considered war crimes. In the case of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the plea is even more poignant because since 2014, it has been systematically and deliberately targeting significant portions of the material culture of ancestral peoples in front of television cameras, destroying statues and monuments that do not fit its radical interpretation of Islam. Not even the erstwhile Taliban or the dreaded Al Qaeda attained such an atrocious radicalism.

However, radicalism is not the only problem confronting heritage on a global scale. Other examples provoke astonishment and dismay: the material degradation of heritage around the world; the lack of awareness of certain states regarding the

safeguarding of their cultural assets; and, above all, the smuggling of artifacts, which has now (more so than in the past) become big business, constituting the third largest illicit activity worldwide in terms of financial transactions, second only to drug and arms trafficking, generating more than \$6 billion per year, according to UNESCO sources. All these developments have heightened the challenge of repatriating these artifacts, although this challenge has become more approachable over the last decade, both in Brazil and internationally.

The central objective of this text is to illustrate how the concept of soft power encompasses and problematizes the multiplicity of topics on the contemporary international agenda, focusing on one of its least discussed elements: the universe of international cultural heritage and the relationship between preservationist actors and actions in the globalized world. This book initiates a critical dialog between interdisciplinary fields that straddles the boundaries of heritage and seeks to contribute a wide range of academic perspectives and case studies (national and international). While cultural heritage incorporates different values and can be used to serve different economic, social, and political objectives within development contexts, the past becomes a cultural bargaining chip when it is seen as indispensable to human life. There is an interesting causal link to be analyzed here, namely the legacy of peoples and their past: beacons for understanding the present. In international politics, power is considered both a means and an end, through which a relationship develops in which one party dominates the other, granting one party the power to determine the behavior of the others, in pursuit of its interests. In the context of international relations theories, “the intellectual response from realist theory to the challenges of theoretical proposals and nascent international issues in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly constructivist theory, was the development of the concept of soft power, by the theorist Joseph S. Nye Jr.” (Barão 2014, 89), which drew on classical realist arguments related to the ability to convince, persuade and attract, organizing these arguments within a new theoretical framework.

The expression “soft power,” coined in the early 1990s in the book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* by Nye (1990), began to be used by academics and the specialized media (as in *Foreign Affairs*), particularly during the last few decades. Nye Jr. conceptualizes as follows: “soft power is the ability to influence others to do what you want through attraction rather than coercion. Coercive power would be military ostentation and economic sanctions, classified as raw power, while cultural, ideological and political identity would constitute soft power” (Nye 2004a, b, c, 19).

The success of an international actor in world affairs would depend on the ability not only to coerce compliance through the economic or physical influence of hard power but also to attract admirable values, which Nye Jr. calls “soft power,” considered legitimate by the person or company concerned, where the “persuasiveness” of certain “intangible elements”—such as institutions, ideas, values and, of course, culture itself—is in line with the established “tangible elements, such as strength and money,” nearly always associated with hard power. This power of attraction arises from the culture, ideals and policies adopted by a country (Nye 2004a, b, c, 86).

This thesis was broadly assimilated by the Western academic world and began to determine that the deployment of soft power guaranteed that the United States would have international influence beyond conventional mechanisms (military, economic or political). The definition serves as a leitmotif to broaden our understanding. Soft power, unlike military or foreign currency reserves, is not a commodity that a country can stockpile at will in the pursuit of specific objectives. By its nature, “soft power” is a relative and intangible concept, inherently difficult to quantify. The relational nature of soft power produces a substantially complex comparative plane, in which transnational comparisons become complicated and difficult. What is loved in one country may be loathed in another.

Often refuted by writers and scholars in the field who see soft power as merely a powerful means of maintaining the US status quo, the concept must be understood in its entirety. As our focus is the ability to live together peacefully through heritage preservation and issues related to the cultural universe, we do not consider soft power in a naive guise—that is, we do not advance an ingenuous empowerment of the concept. Despite being a tool seldom used in the field of international relations (IR), soft power has been addressed in other terms by critical theorists, such as Marxists, for example (the subject of one text in this volume). For this reason, critiques of the term’s use (most of them well-founded) do not evade our scrutiny. There is no naivete in this book’s approach, for we are aware of how controversial the concept is, and we thus agree with the expression coined by Christopher Layne in his provocative book *American Empire: A Debate*: “In international politics, benevolent hegemonies are like unicorns” (Layne and Thayer 2007, 68).

Despite critiques of the term, such as those of Niall Ferguson in his book *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire* (2005), which presents his perspective on the influence that the United States exerts in the world by exercising hard power, we cannot fail to lay the foundations for this third path, which makes it possible to open up channels for mediation as alternatives to the imposition of military and economic force. For their part, Gail Lord and Ngaire Blankenberg, in organizing *Cities, Museums and Soft Power*, published in 2015 by the American Alliance of Museums, address different manifestations of the use of soft power in the development of various regions. They focus on the use of museums as a vector of this influence, exemplifying a critical and mindful treatment of the term.

The concept of soft power is frequently misused as a synonym for anything other than military force. Critiques aimed at the theory’s creator, Joseph S. Nye Jr., often exceed the bounds of conceptual intolerance. An example of this approach can be found in the provocative article in *The American Prospect* entitled “It’s Time to Stop Talking about Soft Power,” written by Ilan Goldenberg, policy director of the National Security Network. In the article, he states that although the concept is one of the most popular and influential in progressive foreign policy circles and is noteworthy for being “a country’s ability to convince others that its cause is their cause without having to resort to economic or military threats” its ability to accurately describe the world we live in is in dire need of a fresh perspective (Goldenberg 2008, 1).

The power of example, the power of attraction through culture, in other words, a country’s power to attract through its culture and the political values of its foreign

policy, i.e., soft power, emerges partly because of the government and partly in spite of it. For the Indian political activist Shashi Tharoor, to wield soft power, it is necessary to be connected, and the interaction, management and dissemination of heritage can be seen as an exercise in soft power.

1.1 Visions on Soft Power: How Did History, International Relations and Heritage Incorporate It?

In international politics, power is considered a means and an end through which a relationship of domination of one party over the other is developed, which guarantees one of the parties the possibility of determining the behavior of the others, in the pursuit of their interests. The definition serves as a stimulus to broaden the understanding of the proposed object. By its very nature, soft power¹ is a relative and intangible concept that is inherently difficult to quantify. The relational character of soft power raises a substantially complex comparative plane, in which transnational comparisons become complicated and difficult. As already said: what is loved in one country may be disgusted in another.

Sometimes opposed by columnists who see soft power only as a powerful current to maintain the North American status quo,² the concept needs to be understood in its entirety and cannot be understood in a naive way.

At the confluence, there is a long list of human endeavors that come to mind first when thinking about modern diplomatic concerns: economics, military affairs, crime, health, the environment, terrorism, among others. On the other hand, the generic theme of international cultural heritage has hardly been seen in the list of such diplomatic concerns. The importance of his knowledge is obliterated by other issues of greater general interest, such as contemporary humanitarian crises (refuge, civil wars, and field experiences), new trends in foreign policy, contemporary issues of urgency, global politics, negotiations and conflicts, among other topics considered more burning. This means that cultural heritage still seeks a stronger mention in the literature on diplomacy and, by extension, international relations.

¹ Throughout the twentieth century, some of the best-known examples of contemporary soft power are: Russian ballet, the North American and Indian film industries, French fashion and analyzes the impact of lesser-known manifestations such as the Japanese culture of manga, anime and games. Brazilian and Mexican telenovelas, some musical genres such as Bossa Nova and Tango and even African and Chinese arts, etc. (Christofoletti 2017, 14).

² Some critics of the concept popularized by Nye are quite vehement: Niall Ferguson argues that “the problem with soft power is that it is, well, soft. (...) Soft power is just a velvet glove hiding an iron hand.” Ferguson, “Think Again: Power,” p. 21. For his part, Kostas Ifantis, on a comparable note, argued: “There seems to be a tendency to call anything attractive, “soft power.” Kostas Ifantis, “Soft Power: Overcoming the Limits of a Concept,” in Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft, ed. B. J. C. McKercher (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), p. 445. (Apud: Ohnesorge 2020, 96).

Although there is a perception that this is an abstract theme, there is, in direct proportion, a propositional agenda in the case of the preservation of cultural heritage, and it is in this agenda that this research is inserted. The broadening of the spectrum of topics related to the cultural universe, especially cultural heritage, moved to broader topics, such as the debate on trafficking and repatriation of cultural assets; the wave of heritage destruction sponsored by radical ethnic and religious groups around the world; the increasingly protagonist dimension of immateriality in the universe of cultural goods; the presence of other actors in the production, maintenance and management of heritage, as well as the intensification of comparative studies among UNESCO member states: the result of the recent dialogue between different areas of knowledge and the concept of soft power.

In the western world, despite the expansion of discussions on cultural heritage reaching several areas, the practice of policies for the preservation and use of cultural assets as examples of these policies remain little studied. In this scenario, the central theoretical framework of this research discusses the concept of soft power, propagated by the American theorist Joseph Nye Jr., who recovered arguments from classical realism related to the capacity for conviction, persuasion, attraction and organized them under a new theoretical framework. The term “soft power” in the early 1990s came to be used by academics as the “ability to influence other people to do what you want by attraction rather than coercion. Coercive power would be military ostentation and economic sanctions, power classified as gross, as a cultural, ideological and political identity, derived from a kind of ‘cooptive behavior’ would be soft power.” (Nye 1990, 134) This premise forms an integral part of the notion of soft power.

Craig Hayden, for example, simultaneously identified that the “potentiality of culture, political ideals and the legitimacy of foreign policy” would form the three constituent resources of soft power (Craig 2012, 29). Culture has often been considered one of its main pillars. At the same time, however, it was also observed that culture does not lend itself to clear analytical determinations: questions of definition, origin, transmission, reception and long-term impact remain unclear, after all “culture” is notoriously a difficult word to define, for it is impregnated with many shades of understanding. In fact, in the human sciences, “culture” is perhaps as contested and controversial a concept as “power”; consequently, we can understand culture as “a broad concept that means many different things to different people” (Trommler 2004, 67).

In order to understand the interface that brings together cultural heritage and international relations, the expression “soft power” helps us to scrutinize paths that are still little trodden. In international politics, power is considered a means and an end by which a relationship of domination of one party over the other is developed, which guarantees to one of the parties the power to determine the behavior of others, in the pursuit of their interests. (Ferguson 2003, 18). This definition serves as a leitmotif to understand the role of cultural heritage preservation in international relations. Hand in hand with the increase in perceived interest in the existence of soft power, the visibility of this topic in the academic world grows as much as in practice in the political arena. In line with these sentiments, it can be said that there is probably

no broader and more well-accepted concept among policymakers in international relations than that of soft power.³

The term soft power, therefore, has been applied in various understandings, some of which have taken unrecognizable forms in comparison with the concept. Joseph Nye himself recently admitted: “Over time, I realized that concepts like soft power are like children. As an academic or public intellectual, you may love and discipline them when they are young, but as they grow up, they move away and seek out new companions, good and bad. There’s not much you can do about it.” (Nye 2015b, 14) We understand that the use of the concept of soft power in the struggle to preserve cultural heritage is in line with this simple observation. In this case, like a poet who finishes a poem, a composer who finishes his lyrics or a painter who finishes his work, creation no longer belongs to the creator, as it will undergo reappropriations in its trajectory as art. The concept of “soft power in cultural goods” is one of these possibilities of appropriation in the face of such a flexible concept. It is from this boundary point that we start to contextualize the object in question.

In his early writings on soft power, Nye argued that the “universalism of a country’s culture and its ability to establish a set of favorable rules and institutions that help govern areas of international activity are critical sources of power” (Nye 2004a, b, c, 234) For this reason, soft power “tends to arise from resources such as cultural and ideological attraction, as well as the rules and institutions of regimes (...) it is the ability of a nation to structure a situation for other nations to develop preferences. or define their interest so as to accord with its precepts” (Nye 1990, 191).

At the multilateral level, efforts to institutionalize new preservation practices have been carried out on a larger scale since the mid-1970s, emanating mainly from UNESCO. Some documents guided these efforts, such as the Convention for the Prohibition of the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970), the Convention for the Protection of the World, Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972), the Universal Declaration on the Cultural Diversity (2001), the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003) and the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005). The large-scale use of these legal mechanisms of preservation has potentiated the creation of a trend: cultural heritage as a key to new socio-historical-cultural approaches that have been deserving constant updating by scholars.

Due to this “thematic novelty” character, there are still few systematic studies in the field of History, on the connection between international relations, cultural diplomacy and cultural heritage, and currently there is no general consensus regarding the definition of this new domain. However, what is perceived is that this new field has acted in the understanding of varied themes, functioning as ambassadors of new global demands. From this derive other objects of study, not yet incorporated by the area, such as: the large-scale understanding of major sporting events, such as the

³ In 2022, a Google search substantiates these widely shared estimates, as the term “soft power” generates 4,730,000 results with the search engine overall, 187,000 with Google Books, 149,000 with Google News, and 104,000 with Google Scholar. Updated from (Su Changhe Apud Ohnesorge 2020, 30).

World Cup, the Summer and Winter Games and the Olympics; football as a mark of an increasingly globalized soft power; the great artistic and musical festivals around the planet and those of lesser expression, given that they are regional, as they often make explicit the identity of peoples practically unknown to the mainstream; the languages and their borders; the dynamics of ranking the themes and criteria established by UNESCO's advisory bodies; these are fundamental themes, but which we will not dwell on in this research. They serve as footprints on the way to our object.

A wide range of historical examples is designed to illustrate the effects of soft power on the preservation of cultural heritage in the context of international relations, but the essential focus of this work falls on two special areas: (a) the critique of the cartography represented in the list of world heritages and of World Heritage Sites linked to UNESCO⁴ and (b) the growing action around international trafficking and repatriation/return of cultural goods, as well as the universe of so-called illicit criminogenic collectibles.⁵ Thus, this research faces a central task: to show that the connection between cultural heritage, international relations and soft power is relevant and, therefore, seeks to document significant examples for this purpose, choosing Brazil as a comparative field with international examples. Given the importance built around this category of analysis, it seems opportune to offer possibilities of investigation into the functioning of soft power (a concept questioning the margins of History), thus providing a conceptual basis and rigorous methodological approaches on its aegis.⁶

In line with the assumptions of these historiographical currents, the analytical dimension that conceives cultural heritage and soft power as living categories, in constant transformation, strengthened the notion of heritage as an expanded synonym, making clear the theoretical–methodological affiliations that mark this work: Riegl (2006), Babelon and Chastel (1994), Le Goff (1984), Jeudy (2005), Choay (2010), Poulot (2009), Fonseca (1993), Meneses (2005), Arantes (2005). On the other hand, contemporary scholars from different areas that transit through the field of cultural heritage as soft power have become active interlocutors of this research: Basu and Modest (2015), Huntington (2001), Lane (2013), Leke and Kersel (2012), Mark (2009), Meskell (2011, 2018a; b), Winter (2014), MAcClory (2010, 2018, 2020), (Christofoletti 2019, 2020), (Ballerini 2017), (Ohnesorge 2020), (Rodriguez 2022) and, above all, Nye (2004a, b, c, 2011, 2016, 2020), to name

⁴ In very general terms, the concept of world heritage or heritage of humanity (the first used more frequently to stamp out material heritage and the second to distinguish immateriality) has gained relevance and faced clashes and debates in recent decades.

⁵ The denomination illicit trafficking in cultural goods will be treated here as international trafficking in cultural goods, as the redundancy in the nomenclature, the result of a flawed translation of Italian law, explains that the word “traffic” ended up being translated as “trafficking”—to take on one side to another; hence the idea of taking it from one place to another illicitly).

⁶ For further details on the distinction, see the Introduction to the books: Christofoletti, R. & Olender, Marcos. (Org.) *World Heritage Patinas: action, alerts and risks*. Switzerland. Springer, 2021; Christofoletti R. & Botelho, Maria Leonor. *International Relations and Heritage: patchwork in times of plurality*. Switzerland, Springer, 2021 and Malig Jedlicki, Christofoletti and Oosterman: *Colonial heritage, conflict and contestation: Negotiating decolonization in Latin America*, Switzerland, Springer 2023.

just the most accessed, authors who move with ease through the discussion on the performance of soft power, in the interface with other related topics. It is in the wake of the discussions encompassed by these authors that we intend to work on the proposal.

In order to understand the research overview and the topics related to the universe of cultural heritage preservation highlighted in this book, it is essential to circumscribe some basic questions. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, classic themes worked in the scope of internationalism, such as the polarity of the international system, balance of power, security, among others, gave way to other theoretical lines, which multiplied their productions on themes more reactive to contemporary reality, such as human rights, environment and diversity. In this scenario, cultural and heritage preservation issues came to the fore due to concerns about international security.

In response to a pluralization of views on heritage preservation and a growing multilateralism of the protagonists of these debates, the three selected topics, in addition to representing the emergence of crucial themes for the delimitation of soft power in the globalized world, are connected by the universal demand of preservation of memory, precisely because we believe that it is necessary to master the polysemy of memory to understand the personal and collective relationship with heritage. In short, memory mechanisms were associated with heritage from an early age, a link that precedes and accompanies the evolution of the nomenclature itself. It is ancestry and the right to memory that support the action of soft power, and this, in a boomerang effect, helps to maintain memory policies and identities around the planet.

Criticism of the cartography represented in the list of world heritage sites and heritage of humanity linked to UNESCO; the growing action around illicit trafficking, recovery/repatriation/return of cultural goods and the presence of actors (extra State) in the management of heritage with the increasing presence of themes that escape hegemonic Europeanism and Americanism, form the thematic tripod addressed in this project. The expansion of the relevance of these themes is in line with the change in observable configurations in international relations. From this change derive what Joseph Nye points out as two different but interdependent dimensions: the transition of power between states and a diffusion of power from all states towards non-state actors. New protagonists emancipate themselves on this board, part of which we intend to analyze in this text.

As the new century lays bare, the radiography of these power relations reveals new actors, spaces and representations. Cultural heritage has become an increasingly important actor/theme in multilateral dialogues and, as such, is part of the broadening of actions within the scope of international relations. From this derive other objects of study, still little incorporated by the theme: the marks of an increasingly multilateralized soft power. As can be seen, all the themes listed in this project made sense in a world without social restrictions, compulsory isolation and fighting a lethal virus. The themes listed in this book had a meaning and were inserted in a given reality prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, which still plagues the planet. Concerns, needs and objects responded to a complex world, but whose rules of the game were all known. Now, faced with this new alignment, everything changes, including the preservation

of heritage and international relations. For this reason, we believe that this research can collaborate to unite the two worlds: that of previous concerns and new needs. We do not do futurology about the universe of heritage preservation in the world, but a considerable change in public policies, in financing and in the projection of new rules for a game that we still do not know how to play.

It is motivated by this new reality that we present this proposal having as a horizon the expectation that international relations will never be the same after the pandemic and, by extension, the universe of heritage and its management will also not be as before. Finally, it is understood that this project can generate new approaches and resolve comparative gaps, enabling a more vertical understanding of the dilemmas, actions and behaviors of multilateral actors in the treatment, use and questioning of the soft power concept. The result of this understanding is the formulation of a double questioning: how can this concept be operationalized and how can the impact of soft power on cultural goods be empirically studied? Taken as a whole, a kind of “taxonomy of the concept of soft power” (Ohnesorge 2020, 37), the literature on the concept, offers a comprehensive understanding of the operationalization of the concept.

In view of this and what has already been presented, among different categorizations and meanings attributed to power, Hendrik W. Ohnesorge, in the second chapter of his work entitled *Soft Power—The Forces of Attraction in International Relations*, pointed out that his objective prevailed to broaden the discussion about power, claiming to be the result of inconclusive research given its high complexity of mechanisms and processes. To illustrate in a playful way, he even highlighted a speech by Paul Pierson, which is presented as follows: “Power is like an iceberg; at any given time, most of it is below the waterline.” (PIERSON apud Ohnesorge 2020, p. 24).

The broad use of the concept of soft power requires further specification, as any term that becomes increasingly encompassing tends to lose its analytical validity. Soft power is an analytical concept, not a theory. This suggests that terms such as “concept”, “idea”, “phenomenon”, “notion” in relation to soft power are better accepted than the idea of “a theory of soft power”. In this sense, this taxonomy would lend itself to variations and empirical implications, thus making future soft power studies more structured and comparable.

Luke and Kersel (2012) argue that the connection between cultural heritage and international relations are not exactly “well known”. According to the authors, there is a long list of human endeavors that first spring to mind in relation to modern diplomatic concerns: economics, military matters, crime, health, the environment, terrorism and so on. Even within the list of established international cultural heritage zones, the general topic of heritage hardly looms large. It is eclipsed by other issues that are considered more pressing and of greater interest to the international relations student, such as contemporary humanitarian crises (refugees, civil wars and field experiences), new trends in Brazilian foreign policy, contemporary global political issues, the ramifications of international law, negotiations or conflict management,

among other topics. As proof of this fact, while there is a lively literature on how the United States uses its ultraexported icons as a cultural bridge for forging international relations, cultural heritage has yet to receive a more forceful mention in the literature on diplomacy. Accordingly, this book undertakes a central task, namely to demonstrate that the connection between cultural heritage, international relations and soft power is salient to the practice and understanding of the internationalist vision, with the help of relevant examples.

The importance of his knowledge is obliterated by other issues of greater interest to the student of international relations, such as contemporary humanitarian crises (refuge, civil wars and field experiences), new trends in Brazilian foreign policy, contemporary issues of global politics, the derivations of International Law, negotiations or conflict agencies, among other topics considered more burning. As proof of this, while there is a lively literature around the fact that the United States uses its ultra-exported icons as a cultural bridge to its international relations, cultural heritage still seeks a stronger mention in the diplomacy literature. Thus, this book faces a central task: to show that the connection between cultural heritage, international relations and soft power is relevant to the practice and understanding of the internationalist vision and seeks to document relevant examples for this purpose.⁷

Authors who were concerned with the cultural bias as a soft power variable appear as protagonists between the lines of this compilation: Samuel P. Huntington, in the book *The clash of civilizations and the recomposition of the world order* (2001), states that, in the post-War world Cold, the most important distinctions between peoples are not ideological, political or economic, but cultural. Huntington, in partnership with Lawrence Harrison, edited the book *Culture matters* (2002) and defended with more arguments the importance of culture in the maturation and development of a society. For these authors, the definition of culture occurs in purely subjective terms, such as the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations and underlying assumptions that predominate among the members of a society.

For Jonathan McClory,⁸ in *The new persuaders: an international ranking of soft power*, edited by the UK Institute for government, the top of the soft power pyramid is clearly dominated by established world powers. These countries are supported by historic global connections, long-standing networks of influence and traditionally strong cultural production. But, as McClory (2010, p. 43) states, “as the old guard collectively enters a period of sustained austerity, soft power assets will be among

⁷ Taken together, Nye’s work on soft power serves as a partriss and theoretical-conceptual reference for the project in question. Although introduced in the discourse of international relations by Joseph Nye after the end of the Cold War, soft power resumes an ancient tradition. The concept of soft power still raises a high degree of discussion about its supposed imprecision, demanding a complete re-examination by the historiography that studies it. For further details on the topic, see: Ohnesorge 2020, 91. Some contemporary scholars have highlighted the importance of “soft power” in International Relations: Basu and Modest (2015), Huntington (2001), Joseph (2015), Lane (2013), Luke and Kersel (2012), Mark (2009), McClory (2010), Meskill (2011), Nye Jr. (1990) and Winter (2014), Ohnesorge (2020), among others, move with ease through the field of International Relations and cultural heritage such as soft power, cultural diplomacy and other related topics.

⁸ See too: Soft power 30. Available in: <https://softpower30.com/>

the most tempting budget items to cut—as evidenced by the recent revision of the UK expenditure”. The author asks: “how much longer will the soft power hegemony of traditional Western powers last? The emergence of other emerging countries in the world is taking steps to increase their reserves of soft power and build the capacity to take advantage of them” (p. 45).

Another author who questions the validity period of this policy toward richer countries is Phillipe Lane, who in a recent book on scientific and cultural diplomacy discusses several elements that influence a country, in addition to the strength of its economy, its strategic/military power and its place in the global institutions of governance. The British professor asserts that other power factors must also be considered, such as ideas, knowledge and culture (Lane 2013, p. 190). The texts presented in this book dialogue with the premise that culture and heritage, more than heritage and tradition, serve as a bridge to the present and future of all nations on the globe. Thus, to be successful in the contemporary globalized world, actors, as well as countries, must develop soft power resources such as cultural bias. For Joseph S. Nye Jr., the actor whose focus is only on military or economic strength unidimensionally underutilizes his analysis. This approach is evidenced in Ronaldo Guimarães Gueraldi’s master’s thesis, entitled: *The application of the concept of soft power in Brazilian foreign policy* (2010), a text that builds a very useful role for our purpose.

It is, therefore, linked to these authors that this book supports its theoretical-methodological and ideological positions, although we are aware of the tendency, increasingly common, to the almost intellectual apoplexy of proposals similar to this one, which carry in themselves little representation of examples and experiences from less visible and even silenced geopolitical spaces around the globe. Therefore, it is important to note that compilations such as this one are relevant exercises given the scarcity of works on the subject.

In an article published in the *Bulletin of the World Heritage Centre/UNESCO* in October 2012 titled “World Heritage and Sustainable Development,” Giovanni Boccardi argues that heritage can be the connection that upholds an inalienable human right: the right to inherit. The ability to access, enjoy and care for heritage is essential for creating a culture of what the 1998 winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics, Amartya Sen, called the “capability of individuals to live and to be what they choose.” Receiving and conserving the diversity of cultural and natural heritage, fair access to it and an equitable sharing of the benefits arising from its use enhance a feeling of place and belonging, mutual respect for others, a sense of purpose and the ability to maintain a common good, all of which contribute to the social cohesion of a community, along with individual and collective freedom of choice and action.

Undoubtedly, the protection of cultural assets around the world can be considered an intrinsic contribution to human well-being. However, beyond their inherent value for present and future generations, heritage can make a significant instrumental contribution to sustainable development in all its different dimensions. “[...]As a storehouse of knowledge, a well-protected World Heritage property may contribute directly to alleviating poverty and inequalities by providing basic goods and services, such as security and health, through shelter, access to clean air, water, food and other key resources” (Boccardi 2016, 3).

With the appropriation of cultural heritage for commercial and political purposes within economies across the globe, heritage conservation now plays an important role in cultural diplomacy, elevating its status from a mere diplomatic strategy of good neighborly relations to an elaborate soft power tactic in countries around the world. Analyses of heritage governance in the early years of this century have focused primarily on intergovernmental bodies, such as UNESCO, to the detriment of offering a critical reading of the role of nation-states and paradiplomacy itself, which continue to play key roles in the international governance of heritage conservation (Winter 2014).

Throughout the twentieth century, blatant examples of US soft power (explicitly criticized by subjugated countries), such as the Marshall Plan in Europe, the Good Neighbor policy in Latin America, cultural exchanges with students from all over the world beginning in the 1950s through Senator Fulbright's initiative, as well as the inspiring of dreams and desires in thousands of people sparked by the images circulated on cinema and television, stand in stark contrast to the presence of cultural institutes from different countries around the world, such as the Confucius Institute from China, the Goethe Institute from Germany, the Camões Institute from Portugal, the Cervantes Institute from Spain, the Dante Alighieri Society from Italy, the Alliance Française, the British Council from the United Kingdom, or even the expansion and visibility of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the sector-based presence of the Indian film industry, known as Bollywood. In the case of Asia, potential vehicles for soft power are the art, fashion and cuisine of their ancestral cultures. China, for example, has tripled its economic power over the past 20 years, advanced universal values such as the market economy and human rights and improved the quality of its reputation and its soft power. This cultural exchange has strengthened Japanese soft power, which, with economic robustness, financed and stimulated the development of countries in the region, such as the Asian Tigers (Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan) (Gueraldi 2010, p. 91).

Considering the World Heritage list managed by UNESCO, the increasingly frequent rotation of member state representatives from different parts of the world (not only from the regions consecrated as economically developed) and the expansion/capillarization of the map of sites given the "World Heritage" label around the world are, analogously, significant examples of the expansion of soft power as an instrument of power, although for some, a more balanced and representative World Heritage list seems to be a mirage as long as most classification processes depend fundamentally on the role of national states and world heritage is overly associated with an image of symbolic distinction—an important resource for places seeking to become more competitive and media-friendly.

More recently, however, international politics observers have suggested important shifts in interpretations of what has been occurring in regional and global culture flows. Perhaps most notable and of particular relevance here is the rise of East Asian and Latin American developing countries as cultural exporters, which helps call into question the ever-critiqued Westernization of the globe's northernmost meridians. Within this perspective, a steady stream of specialized articles and books has considered the ambivalence of the successes and failures of international agencies

such as UNESCO, the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) (agencies for the preservation of cultural heritage, museums, sites and natural areas) over the past five decades. Less critical attention is being paid to the enduring role of the nation-state in the international governance of the cultural past. This omission is significant, as most projects embedded within national funding environments, be they universities, nongovernmental bodies or state-based foreign aid programs, will continue to play a key role in the future of heritage management, as signaled in Logan (2012) and Meskell (2011, 2013).

Consequently, some observations are warranted: (a) international relations must open itself up to a deeper and more critical understanding of soft power; it is necessary to create mechanisms to address and keep up-to-date with the problems and demands arising within preservationist topics, which means increasing the visibility of soft power in international negotiations and in the university curriculum; (b) it is vital to demystify the idea that only politics and economics *stricto sensu* drive diplomatic relations and international demands; (c) the cultural element is clearly no longer associated with the easiest part of knowledge, metaphorized in “intellectual perfumery,” and there are five factors that help solidify the assertions listed above, three of which are mentioned in Winter’s (2014) text, and two of which result from the perception that the international relations programs currently offered in Brazil remain at a distance from this topic.

The first factor concerns the increasing incorporation of cultural heritage into other areas of international discourse. International organizations have recently begun to view heritage more broadly, seeing it as part of the discourses and agendas that comprise contemporary global governance. Whether it is related to the idea of sustainability, the fight against policy extremism related to access to citizenship and tradition, cultural heritage now has a much greater visibility and plays an important role; preservation agencies are more present at the negotiation tables for international policies than ever before.

The second factor refers to the pluralization of heritage discourses. There are increasingly contentious statements about the Eurocentric legacy in the implementation of preservation policies considered to be homogenizing the preservation of world heritages. Across Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, critiques of Eurocentrism and Americanism have given rise to different methodologies and approaches to the curation of preservation. The specific and the general seek their own spaces (Winter 2014, 334); (Kwanda 2009); (Silva and Chapagain 2013).

The third factor alludes to the growing economic and political power that countries with preservationist agendas hold on the international stage. Unlike five decades earlier, when only economically powerful countries dictated the rules of preservation and what could be understood as exceptional universal value (just follow the trajectory of many UNESCO signatory countries in the last two quarters of the century), the current landscape is different. Much attention has recently been directed to the rise of the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), given their nontrivial political influence resulting from non-Western regional alignments, and to the arrival of newly industrialized countries in world decision-making forums.

This substantial shift in the vector of leadership has helped create a broader platform for the interplay of forces in the international arena. All these developments support the proposition that soft power enacted through culture, the exchange of traditions and cultural diplomacy has become a dynamo of change in international relations. Fundamentally, this fact means that new powers are influencing and proposing diverse agendas that respond to their actual domestic and local needs.

Cultural heritage is a key element in this new international agenda, and a careful examination of the new geopolitical map of the world, and even the cartography of the heritage considered world heritage by UNESCO, helps to reinforce this perception, which does not prevent a critical reading of it. cartography. A recent and contradictory example is the action of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to sponsor concerts by the Saint Petersburg Symphony Orchestra in the ruins of the city of Palmyra, to celebrate—as a soft power—the retaking of the city by the Syrian military in mid-March, 2016. The same Putin throws the dice in a dangerous game with the invasion of Ukraine in a war that has generated considerable international problems.

The fourth factor is local in scope but no less important: it concerns the change taking place in how academia (particularly international relations programs) approaches the issue of culture and heritage, i.e., heritage questions. A necessary critique must be made concerning the fossilization of the curricula of undergraduate programs in the area of international relations (including the lack of basic curricular guidelines) in Brazil. The curricula of these programs largely continue to contain material substantially based on the hard power agenda. Accordingly, administration, marketing, business, foreign trade, economics, law and, in particular, politics are the foundation of students' education. In many cases, students receive a typical, sector-specific education, often focused on Europe or the United States (geopolitically oriented) and almost always concerned more with issues related to business and foreign trade than with international relations.

This brief, admittedly somewhat acidic analysis, argues that alternative forms of theorizing, teaching and researching international relations must be constructed on the foundations of the desacralization of Global North academic and intellectual production and that the definitive burial of the notion that the “non-Western” can enter the modern world only to the extent that it emulates the norms established in Western Europe and the United States (Ferabolli 2015, 4). This argument therefore corroborates the need for the internationalist's education (given its intrinsic generalization) to expand its boundaries beyond the narrow domains of hard power. This point does not mean ignoring the latter; to the contrary: it is the foundation of politics, economics, law, negotiations, organizations, theories, etc., that will show students that culture is the mortar that cements all areas of internationalist knowledge.

Finally, the fifth factor is enhanced by the need to expand the field of knowledge on heritage within international relations. Most literature on heritage relations as soft power, or even on heritage diplomacy and tangible and intangible culture at the national and international level (from a corpus of hundreds of brochures and articles published, primarily in English, in the last decade alone—which still represents a cultural imposition of a dominant language), has essentially been concerned with property disputes based on the claims of museums and private collections.

However, the participation of nation-states in the development of international heritage and curatorial governance and preservation and their practices in fields such as archeology, paleontology and the fine arts have recently experienced a blurring of boundaries.

To better grasp the significance of the connections between heritage conservation and international relations, it is vital to understand that, today, most democratic governments around the world embrace the strategic values of culture, science and education as high priority areas for their development. As the new century unfolds, the x-ray image of these power relations reveals new actors and spaces. All these developments take time to appear in classroom discussions, and we therefore consider this factor to be the fifth essential factor for ensuring that the issue of heritage as soft power is better addressed in international relations programs. According to (Snow 2009 apud Winter 2014, 335), the ways in which cultural diplomacy and its related subjects have been analyzed by academia suggest a preference for studies on culture as a mobilizing currency, but always starting from a sociopolitical agenda. The cultural element is always incidental, secondary, never the protagonist.

In addition to the theoretical usefulness of the concept as well as the list of specialists who are concerned with disseminating it and expanding its reach, this book offers texts by experts in the preservation, management and skilled use of heritage, in conjunction with multidisciplinary articles (hence, the presence of authors from different areas, such as journalism, tourism, geography, anthropology, architecture, history, paleontology, museology, information technology, law, political science, diplomacy and, of course, international relations). The chosen topic offers wide-ranging understandings, with an emphasis on comparative studies. The ideas developed by the authors explore culture in general and heritage in particular as key variables for achieving economic development and political prominence. They understand cultural values as capable of fostering human progress, peaceful coexistence and respect for diversity.

Arguably, then, cultural heritage has become an increasingly important contributor to multilateral discussions and, as such, is part of the broadening of actions within the scope of international relations. In this sense, archaeological and paleontological sites, museums, cultural spaces, landscapes, international preservation agencies, nation-states, paradiplomacy actors, the intangibility of heritage (which is thriving) and the dichotomy between heritage inflation and destruction, among other elements, form a cartography of influence that has been in constant transformation. For all these arguments, the publication of a collective work whose guiding principle is a multifaceted understanding of heritage is expected to represent a considerable contribution to broadening these still insufficiently understood concepts.

Another objective is to briefly present some relatively recent concepts in the field of international relations. In a scenario interconnected by the circulation of information, the concept of cultural diplomacy is an area to be debated. Due to this "thematic newness," there are still few systematic studies in the field of cultural diplomacy, and there is no general consensus regarding its definition.

What the literature does indicate is that the cultural diplomacy carried out by states is based on political strategies that combine the use of public diplomacy, i.e.,

a type of diplomacy that seeks to influence international public opinion, with the use of soft power, whereby culture could be used as a power strategy.

In this perspective, the definition that seems most appropriate to us makes it possible to more clearly delineate the practice of cultural diplomacy. This perspective suggests that its dynamics are nothing more than “the deployment of a state’s culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy” (Mark 2009, 43). Importantly, the concept of cultural diplomacy to which we refer here does not mean (as Mark stresses) the pure and simple promotion of cultural policies, but rather, the instrumentalization of culture or the implementation of policy strategies aimed at the cultural sector to promote the foreign policy or diplomatic aims of a country, group of countries or region. Despite involving different actors, which are often independent, this practice is carried out by governments and has the official role of promoting an image or idea of common values, which constitute the essence of a country or institution. In short, cultural diplomacy is a type of public diplomacy that operates in the realms of soft power and includes the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture between nations and their peoples to promote mutual understanding (Waller 1995, 78).

As an illustration, Brazilian diplomacy promotes the dissemination of Brazilian culture and arts in their multiple dimensions, seeking to foster cultural cooperation and the teaching of the Portuguese language. While it emphasizes the uniqueness of Brazilian culture, it also reveals the affinities that connect it to other peoples—which are particularly important since Brazil has welcomed migratory flows with the most diverse origins. In this sense, soft power is not constant, but varies according to time, place and context. “Brazil is seen as exercising soft power when it attracts foreign students (Latin Americans and Portuguese-speaking Africans), provides funding to less affluent countries to help them solve economic and governance crises, leads humanitarian aid groups and endeavors to put proposals to fight hunger on the international agenda” (Gueraldi 2010, p. 98), and domestically, when it places a high value on its portfolio of tangible and intangible heritage at an international level, making this heritage an element of cultural export (beyond musical rhythms, aesthetic artists or sports modalities).

According to Yoselin Rodriguez, whose recent doctoral thesis analyzes UNESCO’s cultural diplomacy policy in Latin America and the Caribbean, for UNESCO, “cultural diplomacy” equates to “soft power”. However, the term “soft power” encompasses both “cultural diplomacy” and “public diplomacy”. These two terms, which have very different meanings, are soft power strategies. cultural diplomacy of Member States. As the only UN organization responsible for culture, it seems to play the role of arbiter that imposed the rules of the game of cultural legitimacy, and especially in the area of heritage, from the creation of several international conventions. Through its different mechanisms, especially through lists, UNESCO recognizes and justifies the inscription of certain goods—cultural and natural—spaces and cultural manifestations, as heritage concerning all humanity.” (Rodriguez 2022, p. 496).

UNESCO points out that soft power seeks to promote the exchange of lives and ideas, encourage a better knowledge of other cultures and build bridges

between communities. We can therefore say that, for UNESCO, soft power is a “peaceful power”, because “it aims, ultimately, to encourage a positive vision of cultural diversity, conceived as a source of innovation, dialogue and peace” (Rodriguez 2022, 488).

It should also be mentioned that UNESCO itself has soft power resources. Since its inception it proclaims that “the wars that arise in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of Peace must be erected”. Certainly, the founders of UNESCO understood that the “hard power” alone could not keep the peace. In this sense, the “soft power” of culture therefore proved to be necessary. Cultural diplomacy has long been used by some countries as a foreign policy strategy. After the two great wars that took place in the twentieth century and, more specifically, during the Cold War, culture was placed alongside security and the economy and recognized as a “third pillar” of relations between States.

According to Rodriguez, Saddiki and Montiel, it is from the emergence of the concept of soft power and, particularly, after the events of September 11, 2001, that the importance of the cultural component in the foreign policy of States, which aim to maintain their condition of power, even more pronounced. However, it should be noted that culture is never neutral, that its versatility and plasticity become strategic elements of the first order, since “it acts in the perceptive field of consciences and behaviors” (Saddik 2009, 108).

There are differences to be studied between soft power and cultural diplomacy, two terms that are often confused. Between ties and differences, the relationships between soft power and cultural diplomacy are fundamental to understanding the weight that this category of analysis had. If we think of soft power as the ability of states to use their ideological and cultural resources to directly or indirectly influence the interests of other political entities, public or private, we see that there are three resources on which soft power is based: culture, political values and foreign policy. Practiced by three actors that promote this practice: the government, civil society and organizations the effective action of soft power, or the effectiveness of any source of power will always depend on the context.

Critics of the traditional definition of soft power, created by de Nye maintain that the focus given to the United States and the acceptance of the exceptionally American seems to restrict their understanding of universalism” would diminish the effectiveness of the category in other spaces. Indeed, Nye—by coining the term soft power and developing its concept—“highlighted the importance of influence in international relations”. However, this widely studied term is also criticized, mainly for its Americanization.

For the Peruvian intellectual Edgar Montiel, the term created by Nye “can be assimilated to an immaterial power or a versatile power”. Montiel even suggests a correlation to the category. During the “Andean Meeting of Cultural Diplomacy” held in Bogotá in 2007, he introduced a new term: “multifaceted power”, with which we agree. This means that soft power can have different interpretations, as they relate to specific elements of each region or cultural group. For example, for Meng Meng,

Chinese soft power, “Confucianism”, has a broader interpretation than the definition given by Nye. In Chinese discourse, this term focuses on the country’s internal reality.

Apart from the dialog between this text and other contemporary ones, topics transversal to those presented here could further deepen the scope of this conversation. They would certainly be part of other similar volumes, given their relevance to the field of international relations and heritage as a cornerstone of soft power. Among these topics, we would like to highlight major sporting events, such as the World Cup, the Summer and Winter Olympics; soccer as a symbol of an increasingly globalized soft power; major artistic and musical festivals around the world, as well as those of lesser importance, given that they are regional, since they often express the identity of peoples who are virtually unknown to the mainstream; languages and their borders; artistic events; the existence of theoretical sources concerning the restoration, preservation, rehabilitation and use of built spaces; the dynamics involved in prioritizing the topics and criteria established by UNESCO’s advisory bodies and institutions; the presence of topics addressing “Africanness,” “Asianness,” “Latinness” and “Orientalisms” (so rarely explored by Brazilian researchers); the Lusophone dimension as a compass of cultural interaction, particularly through Brazilian literature and journalism with an international reach; Brazilian television dramas (as a clear vector of the Brazilian way of life); the operations of airlines and transatlantic sea cruises; the reach of the state media; the reach of the state itself; foreign correspondence in spaces such as universities and cultural mobility; the number of foreign correspondents in the country; and the number of tourists who visit the country every year. Perhaps those who follow in our footsteps will be able to delve into these topics at greater length.

It starts, therefore, with a rhizomatic, multifaceted design that meets some demands of the theme in focus. This is why the texts presented here have specificities, but also common elements: they all deal with the issue of heritage from their local experiences, but always in connection with the world. The ethos of each text (i.e., the place from which it is spoken) revealed reciprocity in the recorded experiences: the dynamics of international actors in the field of culture and heritage. The role of supranational actors and cultural dissemination and diffusion entities around the globe; illicit trafficking in works of art, artifacts and pieces (whether archaeological, paleontological, anthropological or historical); museological preservation actions; topics related to cultural diplomacy; to tourism; to geopolitics; the comparative studies between Brazilian and foreign counterparts, and the different examples of heritage preservation actions, as soft power, are some of the cardinal points of this compilation.

It was decided to define three groups of texts that will cover related and border areas. In the first part, texts will be presented whose themes discuss the connection between actors, organisms and cultural manifestations; the second part presents texts that discuss spaces as a locus and ethos of soft power. The third part discusses the borders of soft power. Methodologically, the division of texts into border groups worked as a compass guiding the diversification of themes, which could even be more diverse, but the division into four congruent groups seemed to us the most appropriate way of dialoguing with the themes. Didacticism was avoided, potentiating a

more capillarized reading, which will make it possible to understand the premises, dilemmas, discrepancies, agreements and eventual existing blunders.

It is one of the most difficult challenges to discuss the proposed themes, because there is always the risk of either “gilding a pill that has already been evaluated”, or hurting susceptibilities, so that writing a critical reasoning about the texts presented in this collection is, rather, an exercise in dialogue with peers whose admiration and respect qualified them to be present in this collection. Therefore, it is a matter of respectful dialogue with colleagues who participated in this endeavor, although sometimes disagreement is present. Therefore, without “corporate etiquette”, as Ulpiano Bezerra de Meneses would say, it is understood that the writings presented brought fields, depths and styles of different approaches, as well as significant points of disagreement, despite the convergences overcoming the divergences. Even so, it is worth emphasizing how healthy the confrontation of these premises is in the domain that interests us.

For all these reasons mentioned above, in the first part of this book, **Soft power actors**, the authors present texts that discuss the roles played by plural actors that pendant between the mainstream and the soft power universe. In: **The Supreme Court of History? UNESCO as an arena for historiographic clashes**, Bruno Miranda Zétola presents like built after the ruins of World War II, UNESCO was conceived from a broad concept of culture. Aimed at countering the powerful national political propaganda machines that emerged in the interwar period, whose primary goal was to project abroad their ideals of civilization, the UNESCO conception project rejects considering culture as an epiphenomenon of the political fact or an ideological superstructure depending upon the economic infrastructure of an era. Contrary to these politocentric perspectives, the signatory states of the UNESCO Charter conceived it with the hope that culture could play a relevant role as a structuring element of the political world. Over time, however, this international pact was eroded, allowing the constitution of internal dynamics that ended up configuring it as a great Tribunal of History, in which some narratives are legitimized or rejected, certain historiographical conceptions are reinforced or rejected, and a universal history imposes itself over Universal History. Moving away from the ideal of constituting a forum to promote concord, knowledge and understanding among nations through culture, UNESCO has come to represent a new battleground for the projection of the soft power of States, via cultural diplomacy. The current research aims to shed light on some of the main historiographical clashes between states for the legitimization of their narratives in the instances of UNESCO.

In: **Spatial disposition of UNESCO's Cultural Heritage and Soft Power: a survey on the possibility of reification of power discrepancies**, Bernardo Futuro Hazan shows that concurrent with the development of the above-mentioned legal-political system, there was the development of an international organization whose main objectives are the exchange and promotion of highly praised cultural and scientific achievements, and the protection of Cultural Heritage of peoples, the UNESCO; this legal, international and bureaucratic structure is also an economic burden that may hinder poor states to apply to the list. For all the above said, in its essence

UNESCO's World Heritage list is a public statement of success and cultural relevance of a country. Its analysis could unveil the state of Soft Power distribution among states, as the inclusion on the list is also a way of participating on the official and international list of tokens of cultural relevance.

Alexandre Augusto da Costa and Leonardo Rosa Maricato Santos, in: **Polycam and the power of heritage registration in the palm of your hand: unesco's strategy to safeguard memory in Ukraine War**, detail an absolutely current topic. The Ukraine war, which began in February 2022, differs from those conflicts that preceded it in recent decades, such as Iraq (2003) and Syria (2011), in terms of the actions promoted by UNESCO. On the other hand, a new horizon, accessible to individuals and provided by the ongoing digital technological revolution, also appears as a new expression of soft power. This is the Backup Ukraine project, created in partnership with the creative agency VICE, Virtue Worldwide and Blue Shield Denmark, a group that helps protect global cultural heritages, under the seal of UNESCO's Danish National Commission. Through the Polycam application, the user fills in an online form and has their location verified by GPS. From there, it becomes possible to scan images or objects in augmented reality, from mosaics and public statues of the Kiev, Lviv and Kalynivka to scenes of everyday life and traditions of collective memory and share them on the platform's social network. This provides a resource that allows individuals in conflict regions to participate in the dissemination and preservation of goods and memories, a responsibility previously restricted to the role of states and institutions. Such resource was appropriated by Ukrainians and has been enabling the preservation or survival both of cultural and heritage assets of their country, as well as the particular memory of their lives. In view of this situation, the paper aims to: (1) contextualize the phenomenon of modern war between states and the perspective of just war in relation to cultural heritage assets; (2) analyze the UNESCO conventions for the protection and safeguarding of heritage in times of conflict; (3) identify how the concepts of identity and tradition are triggered, recognizing how the soft is expressed in the Backup Ukraine project, in the wide dissemination and sharing of objects or memories which reinforce the cultural values of humanity, facing the conflict in Eastern Europe.

Victor Augusto Mendes explores in **Culture of Peace, Soft Power and the Russia-Ukraine conflict: the shortcomings of Economic Integration as a conflict deterrent and the potential of diplomacy and paradiplomacy for a Culture of Peace** the effectiveness of Economic Integration theory for conflict prevention and resolution and presents the potential of Soft Power and a Culture of Peace solutions to prevent violent conflicts. The conflict between Ukraine and Russia is used as case example where economic integration failed to prevent violent escalation. The essay examines the role of Soft Power for nonviolent conflict resolution using paradiplomacy and Peace Awareness as case examples for Soft Power. Through a literature review of specialized research and conceptual definitions of relevant theories, the essay argues for the importance of Soft Power approaches involving individuals and decision makers directly and personally in peace awareness programs such as in initiatives promoted by the Mayors for Peace network, organized by the Prefecture of Hiroshima city and cited as model example of Soft Power's potential. The essay

concludes arguing that the international community must invest in Culture of Peace initiatives and nonviolent alternatives for conflict resolution with the same level of economic commitment and investment as Hard Power assets to ensure a more peaceful and stable future.

Kathia Espinoza Maurtua discusses in: **Cultural Mercosur: a regional vision of cultural heritage as soft power** than the work that the international agency MERCOSUR has been carrying out in the field of cultural heritage of the associated States and members that compose it. In this sense, MERCOSUR CULTURAL from its Commission on Cultural Heritage and its respective committees on Museums, Prevention and Combat against Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Goods and Heritage and Tourism are your focus. Being one of the main achievements of this specialized agency the creation of a list that recognizes from a regional approach the “material and immaterial goods as heritage” this geographical characteristic that transcends the national borders imposed as a result of the colonialist distribution is the starting point for a decolonial analysis of existing patrimonies and their potential candidates.

In: **Heritage diplomacy matters? Brazil’s foreign policy and South-South Cooperation in cultural heritage**, Gilberto M. A. Rodrigues e Tadeu Morato Maciel presents an essential element for the constant recurrence of cultural themes in the foreign policy of several countries in recent years: the relevance acquired by the concepts of cultural heritage (and cultural assets). As the diffusion of cultural heritage to a large part of society is still limited, there is an urgent need for cultural policies that guarantee access, usufruct and the means of production related to this subject. Issues such as citizenship, public policies, cultural rights and socio-economic development increasingly benefit from discussions on cultural heritage. In this scenario, this research aims analyzing Brazil’s heritage diplomacy in its foreign policy framework.

In: **Cultural heritage as soft power: Brazil in international politics**, Nathan Assunção Agostinho explore in this article the concept of soft power and its relationship to the concept of intangible cultural heritage. Its main points of reference are therefore the 2003 UNESCO Convention on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, as well as the Soft Power 30 ranking. The recent development of governmental and academic mechanisms aimed at promoting national heritage in Latin American countries opens up a new space for international cooperation and competition in ways that are directly linked to the political power relations between States. What motivates these countries to accelerate their efforts to promote their cultural heritage internationally? Are these dynamics different from how cultural heritage is constructed and used in Latin American countries? This study conceptualizes heritage as “soft power” in terms of culture, values and foreign policies, and by focusing on Brazil, the largest nation in Latin America in terms of economy, population and political power and examines the ways and reasons for the use of cultural heritage as a soft power. The purpose of this article is, therefore, to determine whether there is a factual relationship between the position of the Brazilian State in the international arena of cultural heritage (UNESCO)—defined mainly by the number of inscriptions it has accumulated on the Representative List of Cultural Heritage of Humanity—and the position it occupies in the soft power rankings.

The text of Leonardo Rauthier Brandi, **Brazil's active and haughty policy towards the African continent: between diplomacy, soft power and heritage (2002–2008)**, aims to deepen the deliberation on the concept of soft power and its relation to Brazil's cultural, ideological and political characteristics with the African continent, based on the policies adopted by President Lula's government from 2002 to 2008. From the perspective of heritage and soft power, it is possible to illustrate the multidimensionality of the ties established by Brazilian foreign policy, which beyond technical positions that involve economic issues, diplomacy with Africa affects the entire perception that Brazilians may have about themselves, as for example, the lost pardon of President Lula on the island of Gorée, Senegal in 2005 that was highlighted by the famous diplomat Celso Amorim in his book *Brief Diplomatic Narratives* (2013). This concept, coined by the political scientist Joseph Nye in the 1990s, seeks to understand the changes from coercive policies he called hard power, military operations and economic actions, to a less tangible international policy, which highlights the cultural dispute that involves the distinct forms of resistance, identity affirmations and the struggle for rights, thinking the material and immaterial heritage of the great international powers.

In: **The possible paths of power: soft power on the agenda**, Lara Elisa Cardoso discusses "soft power" in its categorical plurality as a political tool of persuasion, and as such, it will be analyzed through the conjunctures described in the texts of the selected newspapers, seeking references especially aimed at the preservation of cultural heritage. For this purpose, it seeks to establish an intersection between the fields of history and international relations, demarcating a trajectory also in correlated areas in order to establish a relevant theoretical basis. Newspapers operate in the investigative study of the positioning and use of "soft power" in national diplomatic policy according to the historical context, through interference resulting from governmental developments, thus enabling the repercussion of the concept in the media itself, that is, as the newspapers articulate to approach its most representative elements. While a partial demonstration "The possible paths of power: soft power on the agenda" aims to contextualize and develop the research theme, as well as its objectives, purpose, delimitation and relevance, with a deepening of the theme in order to pluralize and illustrate it in different positions in order to clarify its nuances, meanings and attributions, while power is connected with the perception of the cultural heritage as a collective identity of the various social groups, with the potential to fulfill the role of a soft power instrument for the whole humanity, if applied with discernment.

In the second part of this book, **Soft power spaces**, the authors examine the different spaces in which soft power can be implemented, with special attention to the already established places of action, which play relevant roles in understanding the phenomenon.

For Leonardo Barci Castriota, three institutions are fundamental for the preservation of heritage, in twentieth century: UNESCO, ICOMOS and ICOM. Together, have played a central role in the internationalization of cultural heritage by establishing global doctrines, methodologies and standards for professional practice. For this motive, in: **Universalism and diversity: the 50th anniversary of the UNESCO**

world heritage convention, Castriota discusses this effect is propitiated by a series of actions, ranging from the elaboration of doctrinal documents, which serve as true codes of conduct, to the imposition of common methodologies for conservation, through training programs and international seminars, as well as the availability of consultancies and funding mechanisms. As a result, today we have, for the first time in human history, the existence of a world heritage system, with the institutionalization of a uniform standard to deal with pre-existences, which, sometimes, with its insistence on universal values and international standards, conflicts with local and particular visions.

Clement Animam Akassi in: **Decolonizing the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. A question of rupturing the perpetuation of hierarchy of memories and knowledge** show that in 2022, the UNESCO celebrate the 50th Anniversary of its Convention for the Protection of World Heritage, Cultural and Natural. Precisely, in light of this celebration or in lieu of It, signals a thorough look or reflection will incline to question the aforementioned “protection.” At least, as far as cultural and natural African and African Descents/Diaspora heritage are concerned. Thus, this work will attempt to decolonize all the discourse about tangible and intangible heritage. For Akassi, if we take into account the fact that despite of the universal legacy of Egypt left to the human kind, this country’s heritage is ranked behind most of the (imperial) western countries including USA which is a relatively new nation, are either considered valueless “remains” or are ambiguous heritage invisibilized by the colonizer’s memory or knowledge.

Wazime Mfumukala Guy Baudouin discuss in: **The African soft power—The caso of RDC**, a topic little studied in the world environment. In order to clarify the issues in the debate on soft power, we shall review the genealogy of this concept by introducing Nye’s initial theory and considering its subsequent evolution and spread around the world. From an American-centered perspective to the analysis of the rise of emerging powers and from a state-centered theory to the emphasis on the role of non-state actors, the various uses of the notion of soft power have demonstrated its malleability. In order to clarify the issues in the debate on soft power, the author reviews the genealogy of this concept by introducing Nye’s initial theory and considering its subsequent evolution and spread around the world. It is precisely in this context that Wazime discusses yours analysis about the luck of Soft Power in Africa and how that impact on the underdevelopment of the continent and in particular on the empowering of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In: **Cultural experiences from Brazil and Africa: the management of intangible cultural heritage within the scope of soft power**, Thamyres Alves Rodrigues discuss that in a global scenario in which cultural experiences are increasingly shared—not just from a north–south movement, driven by traditional western powers in towards other emerging countries in the world, but also by a south-south influx (McClory 2010; Lane 2013), provided by the economic and cooperative advance between the two shores of the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean—to scrutinize the ways in which these sharing happens becomes relevant, especially when one intends to understand the cultural bias as a soft power variable. Given this scenario, Rodrigues propose a study of the state of the art of policies aimed at the Intangible Cultural

Heritage of Humanity implemented in Brazil and Africa, their points of contact, their preservation actors in the face of international relations and their main holders. In order to do so, start from a notion of global history, whose transnational analogies, or solidarities, are encouraged as a way to demand the nation, and not abandon national affiliation. Finally, in addition to this survey, which aims to identify the way in which elements of immaterial culture are managed and disseminated, we also seek to highlight the discrete struggle of isolated actors that works as the cement of the most elaborated through which they are putting to the test the limits of cultural hegemony, increasing, together with the responsible state bodies, the reserves of soft power and its consequent instrumentalization.

Fernando Fernandes da Silva discusses in: **The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: an important soft power strategy** a brief overview on the protection of the underwater cultural heritage according to the rules of the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage. The main purpose of this convention is to protect “all traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or archaeological character” which have been under water for over 100 years (art. 1°). Furthermore, the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage stems from articles 149 and 303 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which obliges States to protect the historical and archaeological objects for the benefit of mankind. Therefore, the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage is adopted by the international Community, on behalf of mankind, to prevent acts of piracy and looting. Therefore, the cooperation between States and International Organizations for the promotion of cultural exchange of underwater cultural properties, through exhibitions or to compose the museums collections, for example, is an important soft power strategy.

Ahmad Serieh presents in: **Destruction of antiquities, museums and archaeological sites in Syria during the war: methods of protecting them**, like Syria constitutes one of the most important regions of the Middle East, when it comes to archaeological sites. For almost 4 years and half Syria has been witnessing painful events that have negatively affected the details of the lives off/all Syrians as well as all sectors including the archaeological sectors; for example, a lot of old Syrian cities have been subject to damage and destruction and many castles as well many archaeological buildings that are significant. Not only the history of Syria but also the history of mankind have been affected as well. In addition many of the archaeological site have been subject to serious violation and fierce excavation some of which where carried out in systematic fashion by armed gangs of antiquities due to the absence of the concerned governmental institutions and the archaeological authorities in many part of Syria that contains an exceptional cultural heritage and relics of ancient world civilizations, which appear in cities. The current state of the country's cultural heritage raises serious concerns: Many among the historical and archaeological sites, among them are the World Heritage Sites and the Heritage Guidance List World class, it has been affected by violent clashes or occupation by armed groups where it was reported. He reported numerous acts of looting of ancient sites and museums. In this article, Serieh presents the latest events involving the destruction

of heritage in Syria, based on the assumption that the world heritage is definitively lost with the end of heritage in Syria.

Rodrigo Christofolletti discusses repatriation as a historical background. In: **Two sides of the same coin: illicit trafficking of cultural goods and repatriation towards a new relational ethics**, Christofolletti presents a positive view of the return of cultural goods. Combating attacks on archaeological, historical and artistic riches requires international cooperation, both in preventing infringements and in ensuring the restitution of stolen goods. This work aims to address this type of illicit trafficking, suggesting that the international route of trafficking in works of art has in Brazil one of the least studied points of capillarity. Understanding this missive helps to understand how the illicit trafficking of cultural goods and works of art is now the third most important in financial volume in the world, moving more than 6 billion dollars in the last decade, according to the FBI, Interpol and UNESCO. In this sense, the policy of repatriation of trafficked goods poses a challenge to contemporary States, a factor that makes the study of this theme relevant.

In: **Circulation of Sacred Art in the Internet Underworld**, Denismara Eugênia de Oliveira Nascimento define the illicit trafficking of cultural goods is a recurring practice in the world, as it has a high commercial value. When they are targeted by robberies and thefts, the artifacts are inserted into this illegal trade route and are sold in antiques houses, auctions, fairs or go directly into the hands of collectors. In Brazil, sacred art is one of the most trafficked types of cultural goods. Religious works present mainly in churches and chapels. Due to the high price of Brazilian art in the international market, the state of Minas Gerais in its last decade had a significant increase in thefts and thefts of sacred works. Mainly due to the high value attributed to these goods in the illicit market, this heritage became the target of highly specialized gangs. A significant part of this collection ends up in the hands of thieves, receivers and antique dealers. The fetish for these works indicates a large number of people with an interest in pieces from the past, leading to the impoverishment of the country's cultural legacy. Currently, it is noted that antique dealers have been promoting their pieces on the Internet. This new space has allowed quick and direct access to users. In this sense, it is understood that the performance of this type of criminal action can occur in another layer of the Internet, in a more hidden base where these criminals act. In this perspective, the main objective of the work is to analyze these crimes in the various networks constituted by the Internet: "surface web", "deep web" and "darknet". In some of these networks, users have access to functions in which they can share content with a high degree of anonymity and security, promoting illegal activities and restricting content that is not found in normal searches. In this way, we try to identify the script of these networks and understand how sacred art is shared in these little explored regions of the Internet.

News about repatriation, return or restitution of cultural property taken from their countries of origin in dubious circumstances has become increasingly common. In May 2022, Germany returned to Namibia a collection of 23 pieces, allegedly taken from this country during German colonial times. In December 2021, Spain returned to Egypt 36 archaeological pieces that would have been looted through illegal excavations in Saqqara and Mit Rahina. In an open dialogue with Christofolletti's text,

Virginia Corradi, In: **“We’re back”: Background and outcomes of repatriation, return and restitution of cultural property**, presents a few examples among many others, but from them it is possible to observe that the political dimensions of certain objects go beyond the conditioning factors related to their preservation, and that a common element among the cited cases is the narrative power that the circulation itself it has. The looting of objects denotes the dynamics of subjugation of one country over another; on the other hand, restitution, return or repatriation indicate, at least symbolically, a willingness to engage in a dialogue of historical reparation. It is possible to observe that the circulation of cultural property has its contours as an agent of soft power, being used as an element to influence or establish the tone of political dialogue. But to what extent have the repatriation, restitution and return of cultural property sought to strengthen the proactive dialogue between the parties involved? And how do these diplomatic conducts seek to reconcile the different heritage preservation activities in the countries of origin, including local museum policies? In this article, the author proposes an analysis of the political motivations, agents and outcomes of certain cases of repatriation, restitution and return of cultural property, in order to contribute to the discussions on current models of management for the preservation of movable heritage, specifically in the exercise of soft power derived from its circulation regimes.

Thiago Henrique Mota, in: **African museums in the face of the debate around the decolonization of museums: cases of Senegal and Guinea-Bissau**, will analyze two African museums facing the debate on the decolonization of collections: the National Ethnographic Museum (MEN), from Guinea-Bissau, and the Museum of Black Civilizations (MCN), from Senegal. From these two institutions, representations of African religions will be discussed, a topic dear to the African diaspora around the world, based on the following question: how pieces with a religious profile, coming from different ethnic, national or continental African communities, were recontextualized in museums? Their characterization as art or religion can be enlightening about the role that museums attribute to the cultures portrayed into them and to the people who produce and live that culture. After all, what is valued is the point of view of the makers of culture or is it the foreign views on them? This proposal stems from the debate around the decolonization of museums around the world that, in most cases, has been applied to Western museums, particularly European ones. Restitution policies for African countries are being proposed, and new arrangements for African collections in the West are presented by curators who are concerned about the importance of rescuing the historicity of these museums and pieces that portray once colonized societies, their cultures and forms of expression. What is the role of African museums in today’s world? How do they participate in this debate? This is the theme of this chapter.

In the final part, **Soft power borders**, we present the borders from which soft power has expanded, and how in several cases this category of analysis/concept has broken imaginary lines that condition international relations, increasingly expanding its scope, performance and relevance.

Diogo Tavares Motta, discusses in: **Cultural heritage and international cooperation: Lusophone diplomatic strategies** a specialized look at the CPLP’s position

amidst criticism and applause. This chapter aims to examine how the elaboration of a cultural cooperation project around the theme of heritage emerges as an important diplomatic strategy for CPLP's member countries, in the deepening of their relations as well as in the consolidation of the community in the international sphere. The analysis assumes that cultural heritage management and diffusion occupy, currently, an important role in foreign policies, acting as a powerful instrument of Soft Power, that is, the ability to project power and influence others through co-option rather than the use of coercion. CPLP, through its multiple cultures spread across the globe, symbolizes the value of diversity, which legitimizes its pluricultural character. In this way, the cultural heritage represents a very important aspect in the constitution of the community policies and in the very *raison d'être* of the bloc. The production of an analysis focused on the cultural heritage of these countries, reinforces the importance of seeing the cultural diversity, so present in the community, as a foundation for integration and cooperation, and not as a source of threat.

Alice Semedo and Leilane Lima, in: **Between the power of the museum and the power of the community: case studies in Portugal and Brazil**, seek to explore the role of museums in society by employing the notion of *soft power* as the focus of discussion and using a critical/cultural approach to support the investigation of the relationships established between museums and community. The first part of the text focuses on a discussion of this concept, analyzing its relationship with museums and its potential as a methodological approach. The second part presents two case studies: a project developed in 2015 by the Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga (MNAA), in Lisbon, Portugal, which had a great national impact, and another, developed since 2009 by the Arte Marginal collective, in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil. We propose a critical reflection on the different forms of power exercised by museums in the light of these two experiences, their motivations and possible impacts, namely through documentary analysis and interviews.

Alexandre Matos presents in: **Documentation: as a "tool" of Soft Power in Museums** the idea that museums were always seen as holders of knowledge, institutions that we could trust to give us a good answer about our past. This perspective about museums has changed in the last years, because in the age of information, with a wide access to information, people started to look critically into museums and confronted them with issues like misrepresentation of original cultures, eurocentric perspectives about other cultures, lack of inclusion, illegal appropriation, language colonization and many other important subjects. To keep their relevance for the future, Museums should address these issues by continuing their role as seekers and keepers of knowledge, but the must do it including others (people, communities, institutions, etc.) in reviewing processes and methodologies that allow the creation of documentation systems that represent different perspectives (scientifically proven, of course) and empower others voices to be listened to. In many ways, the museum documentation sector is aware of this challenge for a few years, and we are making a significant effort to change the current status quo. In this chapter, Matos will investigate the efforts carried out to build this tool and the ammunitions needed to use it.

Mateus de Almeida Prado Sampaio and Elisa Pinheiro de Freitas wrote in **Soft power and the rise of the Global South: Chinese investments in renewable energy in Brazil**, the Sino-Brazilian relationship than has intensified greatly in the last two decades, especially the trade of commodities in which Brazil, to meet the demand of the Chinese economy, specializes increasingly in exporting natural resources to China and imports from this the industrialized products. It is reiterated that the focus of this chapter will be the relationship between the two countries in what refers to the generation and supply of electricity, an essential element to keep in operation any productive system. China has exponentially expanded its presence in Brazil in this market, acquiring and deploying new generating plants of various productive matrices, namely: hydroelectric, thermoelectric (biomass, coal and petroleum), wind and photovoltaic. At the epistemological level, the analysis will be supported by theoretical models linked to geopolitics and the use of soft-power, as well as by statistical data related to location, type of capital employed, capacity and power granted for each of the 270 projects identified. The central finding is that the presence of Chinese capital in the Brazilian energy market is increasing. On the one hand, this expands and modernizes the national productive park, and, on the other hand, also expands the dependence of this system in relation to the determinations coming from the great eastern nation.

Thaís Bravo Valenzuela e Silva, analyzes in: **Creating and using Tais in Timor-Leste: an intangible heritage**, two decades of independence as a sovereign State of Timor-Leste, conquered after centuries of colonial rule, a quarter of a century of foreign dominion, occupation and a war of resistance. They are traditional fabrics used to welcome newborns, as well as for traditional ceremonies and festivals. The colors and motifs used in its manufacture may include several colors, bear geometric designs and represent anthropomorphic figures and are also symbols of representativeness. In March 2020, the Government of Timor-Leste registered the appointment of Tais as an Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity and obtained its recognition in December 2021. Due to the positive result, the Executive Secretary of Timor-Leste for UNESCO, Francisco Barreto, promised to carry out training activities for Tais weaving, in order to foster the creative industry of the country and disseminate this technique internationally. So in this chapter the objectives are to understand the policy of protection and preservation of Tais fabric, in the post-restoration period of independence, as the first intangible heritage of humanity registered by Timor-Leste and its potential as Timor's soft power instrument internationally.

The chapter of Bruno Aragão Cardoso is divided into four parts, and the first one is about the Soft Power concept proposed by Nye (2004a; b, c). The first part of the **Soft Power and Brazilian Music Diffusion** initially focuses on the survey conducted by McClory in 2011, which is cited to measure how Soft Power was exercised by 30 countries. Further on, two researches are addressed: The first one relates Soft Power to the Fulbright Scholar Program, and the second one describes a link between Soft Power and the translation of Brazilian music lyrics into English. At this point, the translations of Bossa Nova lyrics are discussed, and, therefore, some articles published by the New York Times in the 60's about Bossa Nova and Brazilian music are cited. The second part relates Soft Power to cultural diplomacy and reports

two diplomatic actions: The Year of Brazil in France in 2005, and a summary of the OCIAA's cultural actions in the 40's. The third part examines the history of Brazil's cultural diplomacy through music between the 30's and 70's, emphasizing musical diffusion.

A visit to the semiological methods of heritage evaluation: this is the part of Cesar Bargo's text, **Collective memory of public space: a path for preservation through affective appropriation** which discusses how the city is seen through the prism of its potential effect on human narratives. A humanist vision of the integration of affective memory in a territory to generate momentum and promote the preservation of heritage. Culture as an axis for breaking the paradigm of deterioration of urban areas is the category from which all searches are defined. Based on these premises, Bargo is concerned with discussing how the city can and should become a living being in people's lives and how this can be understood as a soft power in the search for an appropriation and preservation of heritage.

Ends the book the text of Patricia Zanella, **Soft power, global governance and the international role of Brazilian youth against the climate crisis** that presents, based on the soft power and global governance, the movements of Brazilian youth to face the climate crisis and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at national and international level, putting globalization into perspective, the context of the Global South, the barriers faced by Brazilian youth and the impacts of the environmental dismantling that took place in Brazil during the years of the Bolsonaro government (2018–2022). The analysis focuses on how youth organizations and mobilizations are gaining prominence in the mainstream media and implementing communication tools, such as social networks, to guide decision-making, influence organizations, companies and governments and, above all, act on the international stage in international UN conferences, such as the Conference of the Parties (COP). This chapter is not intended to make a scientific assessment of the climate emergency we are experiencing, but to focus on the social and political role that Brazilian youth are playing in raising awareness about the climate crisis and with national and international pressure from governments, companies and institutions.

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All these texts allow thinking about the different relationships that this soft power had with the so-called hard power and with the notion of preservation. Finally, if the manifestation of power is linked to the responsibility of those who exercise it, to what extent has the meaning of soft power been a consensus among the different social agents in the world, since this perception may depend on the place they occupy in society on a scale of potency. After presenting the discussion points of this text, opposing, agreeing and evaluating the dissonances, it is important to mention that what is allowed to meditate on soft power is by definition abstract.

Existing measures of soft power are based primarily on public opinion polls, as opposed to metrics comprising multiple indicators. Consequently, there is no defined methodology for measuring soft power beyond public opinion. Nevertheless,

the literature on soft power contains extensive discussions about the constitutive elements that lead to its creation. When government institutions effectively support values such as transparency, justice and internal equity, they are naturally more attractive to foreign audiences. The top of many tables measuring soft power is clearly dominated by the established world powers because of economic and geopolitical structures that have been in place since the twentieth century. These countries are bolstered by historical global connections, networks of influence and long-standing traditionally strong cultural production. However, what if, by some factor unknown to forecasters, the tendencies toward old Western soft power networks were reduced? Emerging powers will undoubtedly seek to fill the vacuum left behind. The selection of the topics listed here reinforces the relationship between international relations and cultural assets and offer a broad panorama on the subject. Plural in its essence, this compilation is open to dialog, suggestions and critiques, making it a vital instrument for dialog among peers.

To conclude, we recall the teachings of André Chastel, the seminal author and pioneer of discussions on cultural assets, who stated: “heritage is revealed by the fact that its loss constitutes a sacrifice and its preservation requires sacrifices.” Between loss and preservation, the understanding of the particular and its broadening, the play on words evoked by this statement must be repeated often, for only repeated discussion will make it possible for heritage to occupy a place on the agenda and in international relations discussions. Soft power therefore represents a critical turn and should be seen as an alternative to the monothematic concepts connected to hard power. Finally, the “kaleidoscopic” relationship, from which emerge a plurality of representations regarding the topics addressed in this book, makes it possible to visualize a twofold path: heritage as the cornerstone of soft power and soft power as a vector for the preservation of culture. The topics proposed in this collection thus play important roles, as they not only facilitate a more fluid transit between hard power doctrines but also signal the prominence of soft power in reading the different interpretation of internationalism.

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Part I

Soft Power Actors

Chapter 2

The Supreme Court of History? UNESCO as an Arena for Historiographic Clashes



Bruno Miranda Zétola

Abstract Built after the ruins of World War II, UNESCO was conceived from a broad concept of culture. Aimed at countering the powerful national political propaganda machines that emerged in the interwar period, whose primary goal was to project abroad their ideals of civilization, the UNESCO conception project rejects considering culture as an epiphenomenon of the political fact or an ideological superstructure depending upon the economic infrastructure of an era. Contrary to these politocentric perspectives, the signatory states of the UNESCO Charter conceived it with the hope that culture could play a relevant role as a structuring element of the political world. Over time, however, this international pact was eroded, allowing the constitution of internal dynamics that ended up configuring it as a great Tribunal of History, in which some narratives are legitimized or rejected, certain historiographical conceptions are reinforced or rejected, and a universal history imposes itself over Universal History. Moving away from the ideal of constituting a forum to promote concord, knowledge and understanding among nations through culture, UNESCO has come to represent a new battleground for the projection of the soft power of States, via cultural diplomacy. The current research aims to shed light on some of the main historiographical clashes between states for the legitimization of their narratives in the instances of UNESCO.

Keywords Heritage · UNESCO · Historiography · Memory

Built from the ashes of World War II, UNESCO was conceived to counter the powerful national political propaganda machines that emerged in the interwar period, whose primary goal was to use culture and knowledge to project their ideologies abroad. UNESCO framework was designed from a broad notion of culture, taken from the Anthropology, and to reject treating culture as an epiphenomenon of political life or an ideological superstructure. Contrary to these perspectives that emphasizes the subordination of the field of culture to the one of politics, the signatory states of

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the UNESCO Charter conceived it with the hope that culture could play a relevant role as a structuring element of the political world (politics), as stated in its preamble:

since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed. (...) For these reasons, the States Parties to this Constitution, believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives. (UNESCO 1945)

Aware that certain historical narratives carried great weight in the mobilization of conflicting nationalisms, UNESCO's constituent States gave it the mission of promoting a broad exchange of information and knowledge among States, in the most diverse ways. Aware of the power of history as an element of legitimation for contemporary political action, they believed it was necessary to foster a plurality of historical perspectives in order to come closer to what they defined as "objective truth".

Over time, however, this international pact eroded, allowing for the constitution of internal dynamics that ended up configuring UNESCO as a Supreme Court for History, in which certain narratives are legitimized or rejected, certain historiographical conceptions are reinforced or rejected, and a universal history imposes itself over The Universal History. In this way, UNESCO soon resumed the model of showcase of civilizations that had been consecrated by its predecessor, the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation (IICI).

Therefore, the use of culture as a vector of soft power for the States, avidly fought against in Unesco's Constitution, ended up becoming embedded in the logic of the relationship between the Secretariat and the member states. Moving away from the ideal of constituting a forum to promote compromise, concord, knowledge and understanding among nations through culture, UNESCO came to represent a new battlefield for the projection of soft power of States, via cultural diplomacy.

In a way, the Organization itself has endorsed this ontological transition, since "it defines itself today as a laboratory of ideas and a standard-setting institution to weave universal consensus on emerging ethical issues" (UNESCO 2004, 33). Given that UNESCO's mission is to be a point of convergence that allows for dialogue and consensus among different perspectives, and that States grant it such legitimacy, the recommendations and records issued under the aegis of the organization carry an international seal of approval. UNESCO holds, therefore, a discourse of authority. This is the crux of the most heated disputes among member states—to receive UNESCO's authoritative discourse in favor to their national interests. Its seal of approval has become particularly precious, and for this reason, it is the object of demands from Member States in order to make hierarchies of symbolic goods attached to the Organization prevail. It thus becomes a broad field of dispute for symbolic goods, which are not insignificant and do not exist, in fact, in unlimited quantities.

Examples of the use of UNESCO as an element of legitimization of narratives can be found in different programs and initiatives, starting with the Organization's headquarters itself. Conceived by Bernard Zehrffuss to project universalism and concord, UNESCO's headquarters is the object of dispute and appropriation among countries that want to decorate it with national elements in order to project, in this universal microcosm, their national cultures. In this sense, when the Brazilian landscaper Roberto Burle Marx was invited by the Director-General of UNESCO, René Maheu, to design the patios of the Organization, precisely because he had a universal style, the Brazilian ufanistic press of the time celebrated in jubilation that, "for Brazil, this was worth more than a wall in the Louvre" (Maurício 1963).

The most natural site of symbolic power dispute, however, are the historiographical clashes within the committees of the cultural conventions. Holding the mandate for the shared management of world cultural heritage, UNESCO's six conventions have various mechanisms to promote safeguarding, cooperation and promotion in matters ranging from the protection of cultural property in armed conflicts to the enhancement of cultural diversity. In the constellation of cultural conventions signed under the auspices of UNESCO, the 1972 World Heritage Convention shines unrivalled. It was drawn up in the context of international mobilization to safeguard the Egyptian heritage that was put at risk by the construction of the Aswan Dam. The commotion generated by the risk of losing these heritage elements created an awareness in the international community that there were historic properties of exceptional universal value. To this end, the World Heritage List was created, which, while safeguarding the sovereignty of States, aimed at delimiting those properties worthy of attention from the whole international community.

The project has been very successful, and the List now represents a widely accepted international endorsement that a site has the so-called Outstanding Universal Value attributed for UNESCO. For this reason, and a victim of its own success, the List has been the subject of inter-state disputes to include, and in some cases bar, certain nominations in the service of national narratives. To a large extent, the resulting cartography ends up replicating, with few changes, the status quo of the most economically active countries in the world. Consequently, the List, in some cases, may be counterproductive to UNESCO's mandate of promoting conciliation and mutual knowledge. The List sacrifices the plurality of historiographic interpretation at the altar of patrimonialization.

The World Heritage List inaugurated, in any case, a model of legitimization of soft power via UNESCO that would be replicated by Member States in other themes and mechanisms of the Organization. The same process can be seen, for example, in relation to the Representative List of the Intangible Heritage, related to the 2003 Convention. Although this is a list where there are usually fewer controversies than the World Heritage List, there is also a dispute among States to include more and more national items.

Once States realized that the 1972 and 2003 lists of Conventions had become elements of (mechanisms for) legitimizing historiographical narratives built around national heritage and traditional knowledge, they emulated the same logic of

endorsing the universal historiographical narrative for a new frontier—that of documentary heritage. They found there propitious material to register their narratives in an auspicious UNESCO program that aimed to protect and foster the international documentary and archival heritage—the Memory of the World (MoW).

2.1 The Memory of the World Program

The origins of the MoW date back to the Balkan War, when there was a strong commotion over the destruction of the Library of Sarajevo and the consequent loss of millions of books, including many rare works. The tragedy prompted the then Director-General of UNESCO, the Spaniard Frederico Mayor, to design a program to protect the world's potentially endangered biographical and archival heritage. Launched in 1992, the MoW was structured around three main objectives: to facilitate the preservation of the world's documentary heritage; to foster universal access to documentary heritage; and to increase public awareness of the importance of documentary heritage.

The Memory of the World is among UNESCO's most appreciated programs, appreciation shared by Member States and by experts. Its strengths include: the small and agile support structure within the Secretariat; the recognized technical competence of the selected specialists; the successful promotion of international cooperation in the documentary heritage; and the objectivity of the process of evaluation of nomination and inscription of documentary heritage on the Memory of the World Register.

As an instrument for managing, monitoring and implementing the MoW, UNESCO established an International Advisory Committee (IAC), governed by statutes approved by the organization's Executive Council. The IAC met for the first time in 1993, in the city of Pultusk (Poland). On that occasion, an Action Plan was elaborated, underlining UNESCO's role in coordinating the initiatives of governments, organizations and international foundations, as well as in promoting partnerships and seeking sponsorships for specific projects. In subsequent meetings, the IAC elaborated its rules of procedure and approved the two documents that structured the implementation of the MoW—the General Guidelines and the Registration Manual. The IAC is composed of 14 international experts, appointed in their personal capacity by UNESCO's Director-General. From these 14 experts, a Bureau of 5 members (chair, rapporteur and 3 vice-chairs) is elected for a four-year term. The members maintain regular virtual coordination and meet formally every two years.

Among the themes of greatest reverberation within the MoW, the “Memory of the World Register” is the most prominent. This instrument confers universal historical relevance, through technical evaluation of applications by the IAC (in biennial cycles) and their eventual inscription in UNESCO's register as a documentary heritage of humanity. In the beginning of the MoW, however, not only Member States, but also NGOs and even individuals could submit applications for the inscription of documentary sets on the Register, with the analysis being conducted by IAC specialists

and submitted to the approval of UNESCO's Director-General. Once admitted to the Register, the items are invested with the title of documentary heritage of unquestionable universal value, regardless of their format, ranging from stone engravings, clay tablets, scrolls, to recent audiovisual recordings. Although the application mechanism was endorsed by national and regional MoW committees, the application process was entirely under the control of the Organization's Secretariat, with little formal involvement of member states. Guided by the IAC's expert-driven approach, and the free submission of documents by representatives of museums, national archives, civil society and academia from all geographic regions, the final decision to accept registrations was considered the prerogative of the Organization's Director-General.

Its management is thus less intergovernmental than the other lists, and this has caused much controversy at the time of its implementation. Whereas the World Heritage List and the Representative List of the Intangible Heritage are underpinned by specific conventions, with thorough rules and procedures, the Memory of the World Register, by contrast, represents a program within UNESCO's Communication and Information Sector, and its legal framework is more susceptible to regimental fluctuations. Without the possibility of guiding nominations to be submitted or decision-making on dossiers, countries were only aware of nominations. For this reason, despite the successful activities of the MoW, the Memory of the World Register has been systematically criticized by some member states for the relative lack of transparency of the nomination evaluation process and the lack of dialogue in the diplomatic level.

2.1.1 The Document as a Monument

The Memory of the World program probably the most refined apparatus that exists for transforming documents into monuments. The process of monumentalizing the document was masterfully explored by Jacques le Goff, who rightly pointed out: "the document is a monument. It results from the effort of historical societies to impose on the future—voluntarily or involuntarily—a certain image of themselves. In the end, there is no such thing as a document-truth. Every document is a lie. It is up to the historian not to play the role of the naïve." (Le Goff 1978, 42).

The triumph of positivism, which has in Fustel de Coulanges its greatest apologist in the field of history, is also a triumph of the document. By proclaiming that history cannot be made without documents, the positivists equated the role of the document with that of the monument as an element of perpetuation of the collective memory of a historical society. The historiographical criticism that was traditionally made of documents was limited to the question of their authenticity. As long as its dating was assessable, the document was taken for its intrinsic content, rather than for its production context.

From the late twentieth century on, a deeper critique of the notion of document has arisen. March Bloch registers in a very insightful way the deception of considering the document as a faithful witness of the historical fact, by stating that its presence

or its absence in the back of archives, in a library, in a plot of land, depend on human causes that in no way escape analysis, and the problems posed by its transmission, far from being merely the exercises of technicians, touch, themselves, on the most intimate life of the past, for what is thus put into play is nothing less than the passage of memory through generations (Bloch 1949, 29).

What March Bloch implied is that the process of transmitting collective memory through documentary testimony is not neutral or disinterested. The production of documents is therefore tributary to certain power relations. And it is precisely at this moment, in its use by power, that the document becomes a monument. Therefore, the document is not something that is left to the past, it is a product of the society that produced it according to the power relations that held power there. Only the analysis of the document as a monument allows the collective memory to recover it and the historian to use it scientifically, that is, with full knowledge of the facts (Le Goff 1978, 40).

The characteristic of the document as a monument of a particular collective memory seems to have escaped the formulators and managers of Memory of the World at its inception. In its General Principles, it was stated that in order to achieve its objectives, the MoW Program recognizes that “history is a never-ending dialogue between the present and the past” or, in other words, the eternal loop between primary sources and their ongoing interpretation. The concern of the MoW Program is with the preservation and accessibility of primary sources, not with their interpretation or the resolution of historical disputes. This is precisely the domain of historians, researchers and other interested parties (UNESCO 2021a).

This is a naïve perspective, Le Goff would say, which goes back to nineteenth century historiographical criticism and casts an idyllic eye on the mechanisms of a document’s production. For it is precisely in the process of applications to the Memory of the World Register where the process of monumentalization of documents operates, allowing proponents to polish the form of a given document to converge with a given narrative (Pereira Filho 2020, 5). In this sense, the process of sustaining the dossier often assumes greater relevance than the proposed documents. The application goes beyond the mere analysis of the documents, and the proponents’ strategy unfolds in mobilizing an arsenal of convincing arguments for the evaluating body.

If the UNESCO Secretariat believed it could consider the documents apolitical and that their documental importance derives from the technical criteria attained, the member states, on the other hand, would soon ground it to reality, turning the Program into a new stage of power struggle, with a view to making a certain historiographical narrative prevail through documents registered in the MoW.

2.1.2 Disputed Memories

The prelude that the then-current format of Memory of the World would transform it into a veritable historiographical battleground for member states occurred in 2013,

on the occasion of the application submitted jointly by Bolivia and Cuba around the dossier “Life and work of Ernesto Che Guevara: from the original manuscripts of adolescence and youth to Bolivia’s campaign diaries.” (UNESCO 2013a). The application received a positive evaluation from the IAC and was the object of intense campaigning to the contrary by the United States Delegation to UNESCO, which even appealed to the Director-General at the time to prevent the approval of the dossier (Brazil 2016). Despite the American protests, the IAC upheld the technical opinion of the sub-committee of records, and the Director-General approved the inclusion of the item as a documentary heritage of humanity (UNESCO 2013b). The fact generated a strong reaction from the United States, which was already on a path of attrition with the organization since the inclusion of Palestine as a member in 2011. Much of the North American press and historians positioned themselves against UNESCO in the episode, which became another friction that would lead the United States to withdraw from the Organization at the end of 2018.

The most important thing to retain from the episode is how the dossier clearly and unequivocally revealed to member states that the Memory of the World list had become a rubber stamp (quality label) for historical narratives. Both the Cuban-Bolivian proposal and the intense US articulation were aimed at making a certain historiographical narrative prevail. The episode revealed that the Program, conceived with technical and universal purposes, had unfolded into a new arena of confrontation for the soft power of the member states.

Given its nongovernmental management model, the troublemakers (disputes) could often come from NGOs or even individuals. Thus, when a Japanese war veteran proposed immortalizing the kamikazes’ farewell letters in Memory of the World in 2014, it generated strong reaction from China and South Korea. Statements from China’s Foreign Ministry claimed that the glorification of Japanese militarism and aggression were incompatible to UNESCO’s purpose of seeking world peace. This position was echoed by Korean newspapers, stating that Japan wanted to glorify symbols of a cruelty (a cruelty symbol) born of (from the) Japanese emperor fascism.

Although it was later withdrawn, the dossier of the kamikazis turned the MoW into a new battleground between Asian countries over the memory of World War II. In the next round of nominations, a series of controversial dossiers were submitted. China succeeded in inscribing the “Documents of the Nanking Massacre” (UNESCO 2015a). As pointed out by an analyst, in several passages of the application formalized by the Chinese (China one can perceive the clear intention to condemn Japan for the tragic episode.) one can perceive the tone of denunciation and the clear intention to condemn the Japanese for the crimes committed (Pereira Filho 2020). The narrative describes a series of details that seek to attest to violence against civilians, especially women. In this sense the label “Memory of the World” was used as a symbolic mechanism to remember and bear witness to something almost always forgotten internationally, and to repair the collective pain of the Chinese.

China had also submitted, in 2014 the “Comfort Women Papers” application, which covered records of women forced into prostitution and sexual slavery in Japanese military brothels during World War II. The application was deferred by

the IAC in view of the complexity of the topic and the plurality of possible stakeholders. For the next cycle, it was expected that the candidacy would be resubmitted as a multinational dossier, proposed by 14 entities from eight countries.

In the same year, Japan, for its part, succeeded in approving the dossier “Return to Maizuru Port—Documents related to the Internment and Repatriation Experiences of Japanese (1945–1956)”, about the imprisonment of Japanese troops in Siberian labor camps by the Soviet Union after World War II and their repatriation (UNESCO, 2015c). Japan chose to ignore the inconsistency of commemorating the registration of these documents and criticize the registration of the documents on Nanjing, initially claiming that Russia had not objected to the Japanese registration request. The Russian authorities issued a formal declaration stating that « the decision of the Japanese Government to present such a politicised submission to the Memory of the World register contradicts the spirit and goals of this programme and does not facilitate the strengthening of trust and mutual understanding among the UNESCO member-states. We believe that dialogue on this subject should be conducted only through official channels. Meanwhile, Japan has not only avoided such a dialogue but also crudely violated the terminology of bilateral documents that the sides had meticulously introduced on the basis of a balance of their positions on the issue.(...)This case calls into doubt once again whether Tokyo recognises the full extent of its responsibility for its aggressive actions in WWII (Russia 2015)».

The records of the 2015 meeting of the International Advisory Committee of the Memory of the World program reveal some of the tensions experienced in the institution during the assessment process; there has been strong pressure exercised on the UNESCO Director-General, on UNESCO staff and on RSC members in favor and against some of the submitted nominations. This pressure came from UNESCO ambassadors and other insiders as well as from external groups and media. (...)At the meeting the RSC expressed its concern about the growing pressure and observed that it could potentially harm the integrity of the MoW Programme (UNESCO, 2015b).

The Japanese government reacted strongly to the inscription of the “Nanking Massacre” dossier and voiced its discontent in the international press, publicly questioned UNESCO’s neutrality, and said it was interested in reforming the Memory of the World Program to prevent its “political use” (Brazil 2015). The country also suspended payment of its regular contributions to UNESCO, a measure that was interpreted by member states as retaliation for the decision of the DG and the IAC. The Japanese gesture resembled that of the US and Israel, which have not made their payments since 2011, as a result of Palestine’s entry as a member state of the organization. The “Japanese protest”, as it was called by some delegates, alarmed the Secretariat, which found itself in a situation of “financial asphyxia”, due to the absence of resources from Japan, the country that occupies (occupied), in practice, the position of main contributor to UNESCO.

Although Japan soon resumed the payment of its contributions to UNESCO, it echoed within the MoW its discontent with the guidelines of the Program. The country submitting (submitted) six applications in the 2016/17 cycle, all sophisticated weapons of war for the battle of narratives that has become the MoW. On the one hand, there were applications such as “Papers on Joseon Tongsinisa/Chosen Tsushinshi:

The History of Peacebuilding and Cultural Exchanges between Korea and Japan from the 17th to the 19th Century” (UNESCO 2017), an application shared by Japan and Korea with a view to showing some concord between the countries regarding the Program, which was eventually included in the record. On the other hand, there were clearly provocative dossiers submitted by Japanese and US NGOs, such as the “Tongzhou Massacre” (“Tungchow mutiny” or “Tongzhou incident”), which refers to the massacre of Japanese and Tibetans by Chinese forces, and the photographs of the “Unknown Rebel in Heavenly Peace Square” (“Tank Man”—Tiananmen Square).

More interesting, however, was a Japanese application regarding the “comfort women” themselves, submitted by Japanese and American NGOs. Although the documentary archive was to a large extent the same as the Chinese dossier, the definition was sophisticatedly different: while one defined “comfort women” “as a euphemism for women and girls forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese army from 1931 to 1945,” another considered the term “a euphemistic expression about prostitutes who were engaged in the enterprise of legal prostitution regulated by the Japanese army in the war period from 1938 to 1945” (Suh 2020, 100). It was incontrovertible proof that the idyllic perception of the UNESCO Secretariat regarding the neutrality of the documents within the MoW would not hold.

In addition to the Asian disputes, other particularly sensitive applications loomed over the Program, such as the “Holodomor” (Great Famine of 1930), opposing Russia and Ukraine, or the Armenian Genocide, a subject of high importance for Armenia and of strong sensitivity for Turkey. The complexity of the issue, on the one hand, and the relevance of the program, on the other, led the member states to organize a Working Group to discuss mechanisms to improve the MoW. Throughout the reflection process, the argument put forward by Japan focused attention not on the merits of the case itself, but on the need to guarantee the intergovernmental character of the process of submitting applications and analyzing/deciding on them, as well as greater transparency and the non-politicization of the mechanism. Other countries, such as South Korea and China, took a contrary position to the Japanese observations, under the argument that the transfer of the decision-making process to an intergovernmental instance would lead to the unwanted politicization, to the extent that member states would have to manifest themselves on the merits of specific cases (Brazil 2017).

On the occasion of the 211th Session of the UNESCO Executive Board, after four years of intense negotiation process, the Working Group responsible for revising the Statutes of the International Advisory Committee and the General Guidelines of the MoW reached a consensus solution, maintaining the balance between expert contributions and strengthening the intergovernmental nature of the program (UNESCO 2021b). Although the reports continue to be produced by the IAC, the prerogative for their adoption has shifted from the Director-General to the Executive Board, ensuring greater participation of States in the process. The National Commissions for UNESCO have also been involved in the reflection exercise, and their endorsement is now necessary to follow up on the dossiers, thus preventing private individuals or NGOs from having the prerogatives of States. With respect to the contestation mechanism in case of registration involving more than one member state, an intermediate solution prevailed, in which proposals submitted may be contested by an interested

party, appearing under a specific heading in the MoW (“contested proposal and/or under review”) subject to a parallel consultation process (in the form of discussions between the affected parties or recourse to mediators), without the program being completely paralyzed. Thus, the MoW was resumed, with acceptance of new submissions, upon adoption of its new format at the 41st General Conference.

2.1.3 From Dystopia to Utopia

In his dystopian 1984, George Orwell weaves a society based on disputes for the hegemony of historical narrative. “Whoever controls the past, controls the future. Whoever controls the present, controls the past” (Orwell 1949, 44). His classic work of fiction carries, however, much of reality and contemporaneity. When analyzing the dynamics of some preservation and valorization processes of cultural heritage at UNESCO, it can be seen that when the Organization patrimonzes documents, sites or knowledge that activate sensitive memories, it makes room for Member States to seek to appropriate the institution’s seal of approval to legitimize their narratives, as if it were the Supreme Court of History. The process of monumentalizing documents, as well as the other world heritage lists, brings an apparent paradox to UNESCO. Would not the opening of these spaces for the soft power of Member States be counterproductive to the Organization’s own mandate? In other words: given that MoW proves that document is monument; that culture is power; that the one who controls the present controls the past and the one who controls the past controls the future, would it therefore be full proof of UNESCO’s failure to enforce its original concept of culture?

The answer is subjective. And dynamic. It is worth pointing out that the conflict over narratives and memories, within UNESCO, is not only about academic controversies among historians, but mainly about the political instrumentalization of historical elements by member-states. Aware of this dynamic, as well as of the limitations and problems in its mechanisms, the Organization has made efforts to try to get out of these traps. Thus, UNESCO is increasingly noticing (launching) reflections on the need to relativize the idea of becoming a forum of technical consensus, while recognizing the importance of adopting cross-cutting policies that allow a plural and holistic approach to the themes of its mandate. In the field of heritage, this has become very evident, as the Organization itself recognizes:

UNESCO has determined that it should, as an international organization, adopt policies ensuring an interdisciplinary approach across sectors at all levels, but in reality it has not fully initiated the relevant links in all programmes. Memory of the World has had some limited success, for example, with its slave archives campaign, but no attempt has been made to link it to the “Places of Memory, the Route of the Enslaved” project within the World Heritage Program. Similarly, obvious synergies with the Intangible Cultural Heritage and the International Communications Development Program have not been addressed and remain unexplored. They all

have the potential to be mutually supportive, complementary rather than competitive (UNESCO 2008).

On another level, Le Goff's maxim that every document is both true and false has been taken on board, and that it is up to historiographical criticism to shed light on the conditions of production and to show in what ways the document is an instrument of power. The plurality of opinions and interpretations of historical fact is increasingly present within the Organization, which has encouraged international conferences on interpretation of world heritage, the creation of interpretation research centers, and reflections regarding how recording sites of memory can contribute to reconciliation and healing of old wounds (UNESCO 2021c). Ultimately, the success of such efforts depends more on the States Parties than on UNESCO's Secretariat.

Within the Organization, the goal of heritage interpretation is not to reconstruct the historical fact, but to reconcile, to avoid future conflicts, and to devise interpretation strategies that mitigate rather than prolong disputes between peoples. There are good examples in this direction, such as the case of Culloden, in Scotland, a battlefield between Scots and Englishmen in 1746, where the opposing views of Scotland and England are displayed. Another example is the Tower Museum in Derry, Northern Ireland, which adopted the same conciliatory approach to narrate both versions of the conflict between Ulster Protestants and Catholics. Equally relevant is the narrative of the Chilean ship museum *Huascar*, which, according to the Chilean Navy, was designed to equally dignify Chilean and Peruvian combatants in the Pacific War. In the same vein, a very controversial case for which UNESCO's mediation role was fundamental refers to the interpretation of the Meiji Era Sites, in which the World Heritage Committee managed to accommodate divergent versions to placate intense controversy between Japan and the Republic of Korea, due to the use of forced labor of Korean nationals in some of its facilities during World War II (UNESCO 2021c). These are examples that indicate that the Organization and, above all, the Member States are moving to follow the historiographic criticism of the valorization of a neutral document/monument to that of its contextualization through plural interpretations.

In an organization that embraces Woodrow Wilson's ideal of international governance of one vote per country, without vetoes, Memory of the World represents a great opportunity for dialogue and the equalization of power asymmetries. The dossier that perhaps best represents the strength of the program and the importance of the document and historical narrative as an element not only of power but, above all, of empowerment, is the archives of Max Stahl, recorded by Timor-Leste (UNESCO 2013c).

The collection of audiovisual records on the birth of the nation of Timor-Leste consists of documents considered key to the events that transformed the fate of a community far (away) from the centers of power and vested interests into a cause shared by the entire international community. Through the widespread media dissemination of documentary images and stories of hardships few could have imagined, East Timor became the first nation to liberate itself through the power of audiovisual images and was a milestone in the development of the critique of the document as an element of power.

There will always be those who say that UNESCO is a utopia, that its mandate is chimerical, and that the prospect of separating culture from politics is fanciful. This is not a faithful truth. Nor is it an absolute lie. Perhaps the most correct is to consider it as a necessary utopia (Azala et al. 2005) and remind us, as Cervantes did through Quixote, of the role of utopias. Fernando Birri, in a conversation with Eduardo Galeano, was perhaps the one who best defined its essence: “Utopia is there on the horizon. I get two steps closer, it moves two steps away. I walk ten steps and the horizon runs ten steps away. No matter how far I walk, I will never reach it. What is utopia good for? It is for this: so that I don’t stop walking” (Birri et al. 1994). (This necessary) Utopia will benefit so much to the extent that UNESCO progressively abandons the pretension, albeit involuntary, of constituting itself as the Supreme Court of History.

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Chapter 3

Spatial Disposition of UNESCO's Cultural Heritage and Soft Power: A Survey on the Possibility of Reification of Power Discrepancies



Bernardo Hazan

Abstract With the development of the International System of Power Governance embodied in the myriad of international organizations such as United Nations on the onset of the Second World War, the strategic recourse to settling conflict of interests through war and military might has decreased considerably, as long as the five permanent members have sustained the system. Russia's ongoing military presence in Ukraine and China-US collision course into Taiwan is the biggest challenge to the Pax Internationalis, but there is no reason to ignore that during the prolonged time of systemic peace among nations, power struggles never ceased but changed its nature, as Soft Power, or cultural might. Concurrent with the development of the above-mentioned legal-political system, there was the development of an international organization whose main objectives are the exchange and promotion of highly praised cultural and scientific achievements, and the protection of cultural heritage of peoples, the UNESCO. Despite the universalist ideal behind this institution, there is the general respect to the sovereignty of States, which works as a barrier to defining some cultural good as heritage contrary to the will of the ruling government. It is, nonetheless, a possibility to self-determination of what is locally considered to be of cultural value, in opposition to universalist hierarchy of values. This legal, international and bureaucratic structure is also an economic burden that may hinders poor states to apply to the list. For all the above said, in its essence, UNESCO's World Heritage List is a public statement of success and cultural relevance of a country. Its analysis could unveil the state of Soft Power distribution among states, as the inclusion on the list is also a way of participating on the official and international list of tokens of cultural relevance. In this fashion and considering the possible confounding variables described above, this survey intends to use statistical tools to understand the state of affairs and power dynamics incorporated on the World Heritage List, without recurring to preconceived theories of distribution of power relations, as Marxism, Anticolonialism, Postmodernism, or others. Soft Power is a reference frame that has an ontology of power (Soft Power itself), but it does not ascertain a priori who are the

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owners of the power and their dynamics, so we use it in this research. Data itself shall guide the conclusions of the study, which may support a posteriori any theoretical perspective.

Keywords Soft power · Cultural heritage · Cultural representation

Because soft power has been hyped as an alternative to raw power politics, it is often embraced by ethically scholars and policymakers. But soft power is a description, not an ethical prescription. (...) If I want to steal your money, I can threaten you with a gun, or I can swindle you with a get-rich-quick scheme in which you invest, or I can persuade you to hand over your estate as part of a spiritual journey. The third way is through soft power, but the result is still theft.

(Nye, 2006)

Niccolò dei Machiavelli (1469–1527), author of “The Prince” and recognized founder of modern Realism in Political Science, had already pointed out the easiness in which the Sovereign could maintain grasp of power on a Ecclesiastical State, whose main characteristic is the fusion of Temporal Power (worldly power) and the Religious Power (Machiavelli 2006). Such a state would have both the bodies and souls of its subjects, granting the Sovereign easy reign and stability in power. Nye’s above quote illustrates how religiosity can be one of the expressions of *Soft Power*. Despite the recent formal conceptualization of *Soft Power*—Foreign Affairs magazine, its origins are traced to the end on the 1980’s, when Nye published his homonymous book (Nye 2004)—its implications on the power dynamics have already been present in the science and practice of politics.

In his own short review of the concept of Soft Power, Joseph Nye defines it as “the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion” (Nye 2004). That definition, which mostly regards the field of study of international relations, when confronted with the Marxist concept of ideology, shows some convergence on practical terms.

Without the aim of discussing the multifold interpretations and theoretical uses of the concept of ideology in the Marxist tradition, its most basic definition—or its strongest definition, as considered by Stroppino (1998)—is the ruling class’s universe of signification that acts onto the ruled class in a way of imposing itself, therefore realizing the will of the former on the latter, which is alienated to its class interests: *Ideology as fake consciousness*. This definition entails, thus, the capability of persuading others to do what is your interest without force or coercion. If one is to swap the terms “ruling class”, “ruled class” and “class interests” for “country”, “others” and “self-interest”, one would have a definition closely resembling Nye’s.

On one hand, Soft Power would be the influence of the culture of a Nation-state on members of another Nation-state, with the aim of persuading the latter to act according to the interest of the former. On the other hand, the Marxist concept of ideology would be the influence of a class culture (bourgeois culture) on another class culture (proletariat culture) with the same objective. If one should consider the class culture, international or subnational is a term of debate, although Marxist revolution

was mostly considered to have an international scope. The essence of there being a “false consciousness” is present in both.¹

Althusser (1980), in his essay *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, differentiates State's repressive apparatuses (SRA) from State's ideological apparatuses (SIA): the former work mostly through violence; the latter, mostly through ideology. Both apparatuses would work to maintain the Bourgeois State, as they allow the reproduction of the relations of production.² Nonetheless, there is a difference between SRA and SIA that sets them apart: State's repressive apparatuses are public (the Police and the Armed Forces, for example), while State's ideological apparatuses are controlled by the private sphere, but function on behalf of the State (for example, the school, the church, the family, the media, labor unions, etc.).

In this context, what secures the homogeneity of SIA, according to the Althusser (1980, pp. 48–ff.), is the ideology of the ruling class. With the aim of sustaining homogeneity, the ruling class ideology would occasionally use repressive means, the SRA, alienated into it. This author, nonetheless, does not sufficiently discuss how, in practical terms, the SIA would be regulated by the State. Just the recourse to general “ideology of the ruling class” or the eventual use of repressive force does not fill the void. In the current Nation-state, many of the above-mentioned SIA are or were given explicit directives, as national/regional obligatory curriculum in schools, official State religion or permitted religious practices, media regulation or speech limitations, etc. But not only the contents of a SIA can be explicitly defined by the State, but apparently neutral rules that define what is admissible as a political party, as a collective, as a school, also regulate potential SIA. The economic burden of any social enterprise, which is partially part of the nature of things, can also be a consequence of State regulatory requirements and taxation. It could be—but not always is—manipulated as a tool to select and exclude.

We do not share Althusser's perception that the private sphere and its social organizations are always SIA tied firmly to the dominant ideology,³ but one should not ignore that there are varying levels of Authoritarianism among States. Clearly, more repressive regimes would directly define the contents of the SIA, explicitly

¹ That, nonetheless, leaves open the question of what is the “real interest” hidden behind the “false interest”, the “false conscience”. In a way, this kind of analysis of real/false consciousness needs the presupposition, or theoretical imposition, of good and bad. Any conscience of something is felt as real, attuned to the interests and dear to the bearer. It is not pleasant to have a third party telling you what you should want or what are your real interests. Completely different is to consider what would make you wealthier, stronger, etc., objectives that could avoid the previous moral prejudices present in some theories.

² The relations among economic classes that structure the Capitalist system and its production of goods.

³ As usual to many Marxists, Althusser's quotes Gramsci to disregard even the distinction between public and private. On his words: “(...) as the conscious Marxist he was, Gramsci has already highlighted that the distinction between public and private is a distinction internal to Bourgeois Law, and valid on the areas (subordinated) where Bourgeois Law exerts its < powers > . The State is out of its reach, for it is < beyond the Law > : the State, which is the State of the ruling class, is not public or private, it is on the contrary the condition of all distinction between public and private. We can say the same thing about our State's ideological apparatuses”. (translated by the author).

selecting and excluding.⁴ Going up the ladder toward less authoritarian, there would be the selection through excluding regulations and economic burdens, up to the theoretical point perfect freedom association and self-determination.

The definition by the State of its official historical heritage—be it cultural immaterial, cultural material and even natural—protected through official government bodies is one of the main ways a government can, without direct recourse to the private sphere, determine ideological apparatuses. Althusser has not considered it, but those official tokens of culture are formative of the imaginary of the citizens of every nation. Material cultural sites are visited by school-aged children and tourists of every kind. Immaterial cultural heritage is protected and promoted on public festivities and show up on the media. They are part of some people's collective past, but they may become State sanctioned means of shaping hearts and minds. Nonetheless, they are not the totality of the past, but that part has become officially protected. As in the above discussion, one can envision direct governmental imposition of cultural heritage or a system of rules and procedures that, in some degree, limits, selects or excludes the recognition of heritage.

In the international system, UNESCO's World Heritage system is analogous to National-State's Heritage protection, although it is a place where Nation-states sit as legally equals without an overhanging supranational power (while there is vertical power dynamic between Nation-state and citizen). The UNESCO system depends on the non-imposition of the International Heritage Sites on the States, so the authoritarian way is ruled out. But there is still the possibility of the system being rigged in favor of the powerful states through rules, procedures and economic burdens that would limit and select official International Heritage Sites.

Apart from the material gains from tourists flocking to see official International Heritage, those sites are places of reference that are valued as places or cultural expressions worth protecting and that become influential as cultural references. It can be a way of bringing otherwise strangers closer to the cultural references of your country, conquering their hearts and minds, exerting *Soft Power*.

If UNESCO's International Heritage is a means of exerting Soft Power, material power imbalances between countries should be observable upon closer inspection on the international distribution of UNESCO's World Heritage Sites. In that case, one would expect less prevalent countries to be underrepresented and powerful ones to be overrepresented.⁵ What are the determinants of the number of officially recognized International Heritage Sites? If there is some prevalence of National Soft Power, one would expect that the number of heritage sites would have a strong correlation with hard features of a country (wealth, political relevance and military power), is it the

⁴ Although the real States are usually a mess of different levels of regulations on different topics. Many countries, like Brazil, have national school directives defining what should be taught. Apart from clearly authoritarian theocracies, as Iran, some countries even have awkward regulations on religion, for example, Argentina is constitutionally a Catholic State (article 2nd of its Constitution).

⁵ Bear in mind that countries need to apply themselves to the World Heritage List and that there are economic costs associated with applying and maintaining those sites, there could still be a difference in representation, especially among the poorest countries, in spite of there not being a rigged system.

Table 3.1 Member-states without heritage sites

Bahamas	Maldives
Bhutan	Monaco
Brunei Darussalam	Niue
Burundi	Rwanda
Comoros	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Cook Islands	Samoa
Djibouti	Sao Tome and Principe
Equatorial Guinea	Sierra Leone
Eswatini	Somalia
Grenada	South Sudan
Guinea-Bissau	Timor-Leste
Guyana	Tonga
Kuwait	Trinidad and Tobago
Liberia	

case? Considering the political prevalence of Western countries, does UNESCO's Heritage system treat Western Heritage and non-Western past civilizations equally? We now proceed to consider UNESCO's World Heritage List, with the objective of confronting some of the hypotheses we made before.

3.1 UNESCO's World Heritage List

3.1.1 Descriptive Statistics

The World Heritage List (UNESCO), in 2023, recognizes 1199 heritage sites—Cultural, Natural or Mixed—in 167 countries. There are 194 States-parties of the World Heritage Convention, while 27 of those countries have no heritage sites recognized. Those countries without sites are in Table 3.1.

The list makes a distinction between Transboundary Heritage Sites and National Heritage sites. There are five countries with only Transboundary Sites,⁶ 100 countries with only National and 62 with both National and Transboundary (Fig. 3.1).

Next graph shows the proportion of total number of sites which are Transboundary and National (Fig. 3.2).

We can see the prevalence of National Heritage Sites, which would help the argument the list is a promoter of national interest through Soft Power, as it is a presupposition for it.

Every heritage site is one of three: Cultural, Natural or Mixed. The following is the proportion of each category (Fig. 3.3).

⁶ Guinea, Lesotho, North Macedonia, Moldova and Zambia.




Fig. 3.1 Venn diagram of members-states transboundary and national sites




Fig. 3.2 Pie chart distribution of heritage sites among transboundary and national

From the above, we can notice the prevalence of National (on the axis National–Transboundary) and Cultural (on the axis Cultural–Natural). Table 3.2, we have the ranking of the ten countries with biggest number of heritage recognized.

We are setting below a plot with the distribution of the countries divided on the axis Transboundary–National, colored by their geographical region (y/x)⁷ (Fig. 3.4).

⁷ For matters of clarity, we labeled only those countries with higher number of heritage sites, which are set apart from the bulk countries near the origin on the graph.




Fig. 3.3 Pie chart of categories

One can clearly see a group of countries on the top right which are all big European countries, all with a lot of both National and Transnational Sites. China, the second country with most heritage sites, has a considerable amount of National, but only one Transnational Site, as so does India, Mexico and Iran.

On the following graph, we zoom into National Heritage, as this sets countries apart in the Soft Power relations, dividing it into Cultural and Natural (Fig. 3.5).

We can one more time recognize the group of European countries on the top left. Here, it shows they disproportionately have more Cultural Heritage than Natural Heritage. One should note, though, that one country of western culture, but with earlier constitution, Australia, is well represented, with 16 sites, but is considerably more Natural than Cultural. United States as well, the biggest power, only counts with 21 sites, at a proportion of Cultural 11:10 Natural.

Table 3.2 Top-ten countries in total number of heritage

		National			Subtotal	Transboundary			Subtotal	Total
Row labels	Cultural	Mixed	Natural			Cultural	Mixed	Natural		
Italy	48		3	51	5			2	7	58
China	37	4	14	55	1				1	56
Germany	40		1	41	8			2	10	51
France	38		5	43	4	1		1	6	49
Spain	41	1	3	45	2	1		1	4	49
India	31	1	7	39	1				1	40
Mexico	27	2	6	35						35
United Kingdom	26	1	4	31	2				2	33
Russian Federation	17		9	26	2			2	4	30
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	24		2	26						26
Top 10 total	329	9	54	392	25	2		8	35	329
World total	873	36	202	1111	79	6		52	137	1248




Fig. 3.4 Scatter plot of national–transboundary




Fig. 3.5 Scatter plot of national, cultural–natural axis

3.2 Descriptive Statistics in Time

For the following graphs, we grouped all countries into five geographical regions, whose division is already present in the list, and we plotted it in total number and in percentage across time and divided by Natural and Cultural Sites⁸ (Figs. 3.6 and 3.7).

3.3 Inferential Statistics (Multilinear Regression)

Aside from the general overview given by general descriptive statistics, it is essential to test the hypothesis that the heritage sites recognized by UNECO’s are Soft Power (thus reflecting world’s Hard Power dynamics). One way to test it is through multilinear regression, where the dependent variable is the number of heritage sites on the list per country and the independent variables are *hard power* variables. If those variables translate into a country having more heritage inscriptions, then there is a greater possibility UNESCO’s world heritage is politics by other means, *Soft Power*. Nonetheless, a better hypothesis may consider the weight of both the Soft Power and the relevance of historical complex civilizations, so to weight out the relevance of each.

⁸ Mixed sites were too few for this graph.




Fig. 3.6 Number of heritage inscriptions per year, per region




Fig. 3.7 Percentage of heritage inscription per year, per region

For the following analysis, we selected three control groups of countries, to test a few hypotheses: would the strongest players of the International System, the five permanent members of United Nations’ Security Council, translate their power into their presence on the list? Would Western Civilization’s Roman-Greek and Christian civilization be more represented than the bedrock of other non-Western past Civilizations?⁹ (Table 3.3).

⁹ There could have a question regarding the choosing of the groups, as, apart from Egyptian Civilization, no other African civilization was considered. There are thousands of ethnicities, past and current, but only some civilizations technically complex enough to leave a considerable number of build structures—such as buildings, statues and artifacts—and sustain dense urban political

Table 3.3 Control groups

United nation's security council	Western civilization	Other civilizations
China	Greece	Egypt
France	Israel	India
Russia	Italy	Iran
United Kingdom		Mexico
United States		Peru

Table 3.4 Date of information

Date of information	Real GDP	Population	Military expenditure
2015 (estimated)	1	0	0
2017 (estimated)	2	0	0
2018 (estimated)	1	0	0
2019	0	0	1
2019 (estimated)	2	0	8
2020 (estimated)	0	0	2
2021	0	0	1
2021 (estimated)	141	0	86
2022	0	0	3
2022 (estimated)	0	147	46
Total	147	147	147

With this aim, we have used data available publicly at the CIA World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency), which provides, among other information, data on the Real Gross Product of countries (GDP corrected to the purchased power parity), military expenditure, area and population. Information on those variables can have different dates of input depending on the country, see Table 3.4.¹⁰

In the following table, only 147 countries were considered, as 20 countries had missing information on the independent variables.

We have run a multilinear regression, in which the dependent variable is the total number of registered heritage per country and the independent variables are Gross Domestic Product at Purchasing Power Parity (trillions of US dollars), military expenditure (trillions of US Dollars), area (millions of square kilometers) and population (millions of people). We have also controlled for presence in groups quoted above (Table 3.3), which have no overlap. We took as theoretical supposition that area and

centers. Those buildings are anchors of cultural and material sites recognized on the list. There is no judgement value or moral comparison to be taken out of the selection.

¹⁰ "Area" has no date of information.

military presence would have some relevant interaction, considering that sovereign control of land demands physical presence on controlled areas. Table 3.5 summarizes our findings, which were statistically relevant.

With considerable statistical relevance (99% certainty, p -value < 0.01 for all variables), the picture one can make on the current version of UNESCO's World Heritage List is that the number of heritage inscriptions can be related to the independent variables according to the formula:

$$H = 3.122 + 19.713 * UNSC + 18.168 * WC + 11.55 * OHC \\ + 4.729 * GDP + 1.117 * ME \\ + 1.988 * A - 0.029 * P - 0.263 * ME * A$$

where

H = number of Heritage inscriptions.

UNSC = dummy variable of being a permanent member of United Nations' Security Council.

WC = dummy variable of being country which was located in a foundational civilization of the Western Culture.

Table 3.5 Inferential statistics

Residuals					
Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max	
-16,129	-2259	-0.930	1438	35,954	
	Estimate	Std. error	t value	Pr(> t)	
(Intercept)	3.121646	0.605592	5.154704	8.62E-07	
Permanent Member of UN's Security Council (True)	19.71346	4.102516	4.805212	3.98E-06	
Western Civilization Heritage Country (True)	18.16817	3.532909	5.142553	9.10E-07	
Other historically relevant Civilizations (True)	11.54968	3.045646	3.792195	0.000223	
GDP at Purchasing Power Parity (Trillions of US Dollars)	4.728853	0.674454	7.01138	9.60E-11	
Military Expenditure (Trillions of US Dollars)	1.117129	0.36472	3.062976	0.002636	
Area (Millions os square Kilometers)	1.987739	0.351376	5.657012	8.55E-08	
Population (Millions)	-0.02868	0.006421	-4.46689	1.64E-05	
Interaction between Military Expenditure and Area	-0.26291	0.033616	-7.82119	1.22E-12	

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 5.985 on 138 degrees of freedom

Multiple R -squared: 0.7195, Adjusted R -squared: 0.7033

F-statistic: 44.25 on 8 and 138 DF, p -value: < 2.2e-16

Note: * p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p <0.01

OHC = dummy variable of being a country which was in located other major human civilizations.

GDP = Gross Domestic Product in Purchasing Power Parity (trillions of US dollars).

ME = Military expenditure (trillions of US dollars).

A = Area (millions of square Kilometers).

P = Population (millions of people).

From this, we can consider that there is mixed influences of effective historical relevance and power politics. For example, the sole permanent membership on United Nations Security Council, all other hard variables being equal, predicts almost 20 additional inscriptions on the heritage list. At the same time, countries where past civilizations were in the past also entail approximately additional 18 and 12 inscriptions, on the Western and Other Civilizations, respectively.

The non-dummy independent variables GDP, ME and area had a positive relation with the number of inscriptions. For example, each additional trillion dollars account to around five additional inscriptions. Note that population and the interaction between military expenditure and area had a negative relationship. That could be explained theoretically as, all things being equal, bigger populations for the same GDP imply smaller GDP per capita, which can be a proxy for economic productivity and overall welfare of citizens. Military expenditure and area interaction having negative effect on heritage inscriptions might indicate that the State's resources for Soft Power might be firstly implicated in Hard Power (first physical presence in landed area, then heritage), as resources are limited.

Despite being statistically relevant, our inferential analysis is just a picture of current state of the Heritage List, but this list was not built at once. It was a process that took decades. The Hard Power variables used as independent variables also changed considerably for each country throughout this time length. We do not state we found the atemporal formula of Soft Power. Even if it were possible (on Heritage List's inscriptions), it would have to consider the historical variation on the variables side by side with the inscriptions on the list. We have a panel data analysis in mind. We hope a competent researcher take this research project forward.

3.4 Conclusions

There are theoretical reasons to consider that UNESCO's World Heritage List is the playing field of Soft Power power dynamics. Heritage sites can also be means of conquering hearts and minds. In contrast with the original theoretical appraisal of State's Ideological Apparatuses (Althusser 1980), although ideological, the definition of heritage sites is a State's prerogative that is less dependent on society's private sphere. Being the fact that international law considers all Sovereign States as equals, there should be no vertical imposition of heritage site inscriptions in

UNESCO's system. But there is always the possibility of procedural rules and budget requirements (and not the say just political pressure) affecting the outcome of the list.

We intended to give an overall description of the current state of the list using descriptive statistics and to test hypotheses regarding the relationship of Hard Power variables and the number heritage sites inscribed on the list. Despite some limitations pointed out above, we found a strongly relevant statistical relationship that indicates there would be both political (power politics) and historical reasons behind the current state of UNESCO's World Heritage List.

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Chapter 4

Polycam and the Power of Heritage Registration in the Palm of Your Hand: UNESCO Strategy to Safeguard Memory in Ukraine War



Alexandre Augusto da Costa and Leonardo Rosa Maricato Santos

Abstract The conflict in Ukraine, which started on February 24, 2022, is the continuation of the process of Russian expansionism in this country, after the Euromaidan protests in the capital Kiev, with the consequent removal of the then pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovich. But it differs from the conflicts that preceded it in recent decades, in other countries and contexts, such as Iraq (2003) and Syria (2011), regarding the actions promoted by UNESCO. In these, measures known and elaborated by the UN agency for Education, Science and Culture were in force in order to safeguard the cultural and heritage assets of a people and culture during large-scale warlike conflicts. These are: the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague (1954), the Convention on Measures to be Adopted to Prohibit the Import, Export and Unlawful Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Paris (1970), the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris (1972), the Recommendation concerning the International Exchange of Cultural Property, Nairobi (1976), the Declaration on the Responsibility of Present Generations for Future Generations, Paris (1997), the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Paris (2003), the Charter for the Preservation of the Digital Heritage, Paris (2003), and the most recent, the Convention on Cultural Diversity, Paris (2005). However, there is a potential new horizon accessible to citizens of countries in conflict, in this case Ukraine, provided by the ongoing digital technological revolution, and also as an expression of soft power, to contribute to this invaluable effort. This is the Backup Ukraine project,

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created in partnership with the creative agency VICE, a branch of Virtue Worldwide, and Blue Shield Denmark, a group that helps protect global cultural heritage, under the umbrella of the Danish National Commission of UNESCO. Through the Polycam application, the user fills out an online form and has his location verified by GPS. From this, it becomes possible to digitize images or objects in augmented reality, from mosaics and public statues of cities like Kiev, Lviv and Kalynivka to scenes of everyday life, or traditions of collective memory, and share them on the platform's social network. With this, a resource is available that allows individuals to actively participate in the dissemination and preservation of goods and memories, a responsibility previously restricted to sectors of the States and transnational institutions, or specialized organizations. This resource was appropriated by the Ukrainians and has enabled the preservation, or survival, of both their country's cultural and heritage assets, and the particular memory of their own lives. Given this scenario, the work aims to: (1) contextualize the phenomenon of modern war between states (Waltz, 2004) and the perspective of just war (Walzer, 2003) in relation to this resource, as a response to aggression; (2) analyze in summary the different UNESCO conventions for the protection and safeguarding of heritage in times of conflict; (3) identify how the concepts of identity (Hall, 2015) and tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1997) are triggered, recognizing how soft power (Nye 2005) is expressed in the Backup Ukraine project, in the wide dissemination and sharing of objects or memories, which reinforce the cultural values of humanity, in the face of the conflict in Eastern Europe.

Keywords Heritage · Memory · Soft power · Ukrainian war

4.1 The Set

With the euphemism “special military operation,” Russia invaded Ukraine on a conventional war front, whose geopolitical movement was considered outdated: a war fought over territories. The new stage of the intervention and annexation process initiated over the last few years (Georgia in 2008, Chechnya between 1995 and 2000) took place in Ukraine in 2014, during the Euromaidan, with the consequent removal of the then pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovich. The invasion and annexation of Crimea that took place, with migratory flows of civilians of Russian origin, and infiltrated pro-Moscow paramilitaries, fueling the growing separatist movement in these border regions, especially Donbass, prepared the ground for now culminating in full Russian domination. Apparently, the détente movements were insufficient, declaring the regions “independent” from Kiev (which intends to take them back diplomatically) and the Minsk Peace agreement, in 2015. This is how the history of the conflict has dragged on since then, in a progressive escalation of forces throughout these regions, tensioning the world political scene, and impacting Europe, more directly, especially in the energy aspect, and the whole world indirectly, by the inflation of commodities, i.e., fuel and food.

Russian actions, in addition to usurping International Law with renewed aggressions against Ukrainian sovereignty, boosted Ukraine's intentions to join the European Union (EU), as well as to be part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). If joining the EU will bring economic and social development advantages to the Ukrainians, joining NATO will provide the organization's military protection, which is absolutely unwanted by the Russians, since they are the biggest, if not the only, reason for the existence of this organization, despite the end of the cold war. Historically, the invasions of Russia from western Europe were mainly carried out by Ukraine, which until then, from a buffer state, came to be predicated by the Kremlin leaders as "Nazi", or historically "belonging to Russia", as the former "satellite states" of the Soviet era. And since there is a long history of conflicts that took place in the vastness of its territories, with the most varied litigants and at different times, pre and post-Soviet, Russia also had as a cause for "iconic" victories, not only military power, but also the climate, with the famous "General Winter", which from the eighteenth century with Peter the Great, against Charles XII of Sweden, through Napoleon in the nineteenth century to Hitler in the 20th, ensured Moscow's victory.

Now, that it, Russia, is the invader, despite apparently not even the winter, not being again by its side as in the other times (Beevor 2022), there are no foundations in the historical or political allegations, favorable to the pretensions of the "warlord" Vladimir Putin. These are facts with historical ballasts, which, to some extent, equally relate the history and culture of both, Russians and Ukrainians, in their formation. If the "targets" of the conflict are throughout the Ukrainian territory (and also Russian, although the Ukrainian counter-offensive is very limited), in the regions where the Russian forces predominate, the nature of the interests that are economic becomes evident more than security guards or any other, although the increase in territory always implies greater security. And also, geostrategic with multiple potential, given the importance of Crimea and its maritime routes on the Black Sea. With the invasion, the renewed proof of the classic concept of Clausewitz, for whom "war is therefore an act of violence destined to force the adversary to submit to our will" (Clausewitz 2003: 7) Russia, which it contravenes international agreements and treaties to which it is a signatory, it has been persistent in the expediency of unilateral military interventions in defense of its interests that result in the current scenario, with long-lasting consequences as the conflict lasts and the extent of the destruction it causes. In such interventions, his allegations fit the analysis made by Waltz, who observes the recourse of certain nations to the allegation that "(...) they did not reach their 'natural' defenses, that these borders are necessary for their security, that the war aimed at extending the State to its deserved dimensions is justified or even necessary" (Waltz, 2004: 104). In this way, the ongoing war operates under such an allegation, making alive the Latin maxim of *Inter arma silent leges* (in times of war, the law is silent).

However, the time is past in which complicity, indifference or late mobilizations in which States and Nations witnessed everything and did nothing (or little) as happened throughout history, particularly throughout the twentieth century, increasingly emptying the principle of the classic Hobbesian theory of "all against all", whose essence is still present in the (more apparent) anarchy of the international

system, as advocated in particular by the realist theories of International Relations. These are not always updated in the development of the historical processes of the same system, or of the extra system dynamics, in itself that shelters the legal and moral apparatus, although formal of restricted and limited effectiveness, focused on the phenomenon of war. The same that can be fair or unfair is regardless of whether they are conventional in their ways and means, or of any other kind in their intricacies. And although those of a nuclear atomic nature on a large scale are not known in fact among equivalent forces in such an arsenal nature, but whose predicted effects are fully known and even measurable, threats and insinuations of their use, returned to official speeches. However, despite not deterring the Russians from its potential use, as they insinuate they will do, with an eventual degree of support to the opposing forces alongside Ukraine, by NATO member countries. Internationalist theories and security doctrines aside, there is, in terms of ideas, a whole long tradition initiated by respectable philosophers about “just wars”, whose interpretations (of a propositional nature) unfolded into two distinct currents: *jus ad bello*, justice of warring, and *jus in bello*, justice in warring. Walzer claims that:

it is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought unfairly and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the rules. (...) It is a crime to commit aggression, but the war of aggression is a rule-governed activity. It is right to resist aggression, but resistance is subject to moral (and legal) limitations. The dualism of *jus ad bello* and *jus in bello* is at the heart of all that is most problematic in the moral reality of war. (Walzer 2003: 34-35).

It is important to consider what we have going on in the conflict: changes where outdated means of operating the force and rationality that think it, reflecting and responding, in an asynchronous temporality with the mentality of those who promote and operate it, are mixed and confused. Incidentally, as always, in the still fragile and unstable balance and balance of power. And in the set of those who work for the solution of the dispute, armed with the principles of the UN Charter, there is an opposing force that has support and resources to guarantee heritage preservation, not armed, but cultural (with technological resources in action in the field), despite the risks of a major conflagration that goes beyond all limits and borders. For both fronts, the UN, for one of them, UNESCO.

In the face of a “war by proxy” that prolongs and worsens, accumulating complications whose repercussions alter economic structures and destabilize demographic structures, with disorderly migratory flows and major humanitarian impacts, it also slides into environmental ones that in view of the reactivation of highly polluting energy production such as coal, by not supplying Russian gas to EU countries, although they are determined to free themselves from such dependence, as they have already begun to do. The responses to each of these demands by the countries of the international community together stimulate and inspire human ingenuity in the spirit of cooperation, guaranteeing, in addition to lives, Ukrainian culture and tradition, the elements that give it meaning to exist and reasons to keep. They are thus fair elements, for an unjust war, in view of the adaptation of available resources to the dimensions of life, essential, such as memory and identity, culture and tradition, in the diverse scales that, from individuals to communities and society, are affirmed

and renewed. All are affected by the conflict but equally legitimate in their responses and reactions.¹

4.2 UNESCOs Concern to Safeguard and Protect Memory

Since its creation in 1945, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) had, as a founding element, the fertilization and preservation of the culture of peace. After the disaster of the Second World War, which decimated millions of people, provoked a capillary and complex diaspora,² fractured values and cultural heritage, redrawing the geopolitical map of Europe and dragging societies around the world into an acute recession, it became imperative to guarantee the peace, a new pact involving the main actors of the international community. The fear that such horrors would be repeated has inspired, since then, a profound effort of intellectual and moral solidarity across the globe for the cultivation of peace and the protection of Human Rights (Portela 2005). The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague (1954), clearly stated that the armed conflicts of the first quarter of the twentieth century caused great damage to the heritage of peoples, which required, at that time, the creation of an international protection network to ensure the safeguarding and protection of each country's cultural assets.

This orientation also extends to Article 7 regarding military measures. In times of peace, States Parties undertake to “instill in the minds of the personnel of their armed forces respect for the culture and cultural property of all peoples” (UNESCO, Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague 1954). The document also deals with Chapter II, Article VIII, Paragraphs 1 (items a, b) and 2, regarding Special Protection. Shelters should be recognized as those places intended to protect movable cultural property in the event of an armed conflict, which have monuments or other immovable cultural property of paramount importance,³ or even areas of a temporary nature, which are not used for military purposes and which do not come being damaged as a result of bombing.

¹ The Memory of the World Registration Program is an international initiative being developed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization with the purpose of identifying and preserving documents and archives that will compose the historical heritage of humanity.

² To get an idea of the size of this emptying caused by the war, in June 2022 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that the number of refugees from Ukraine exceeded 4 million people. Available at: <https://noticias.r7.com/internacional/numero-de-refugiados-da-ucrania-chega-a-432-milhoes-aponta-acnur-27062022>. Accessed on 14 Jul 2022.

³ In 1999, Unesco launched the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention. The document provides for the demarcation with an indicative sign of real estate, transport vehicles and makeshift shelters and names the International Blue Shield Committee as an advisory institution of the Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.

These first recommendations were essential to recognize and seek alternatives to institute guarantees for the protection of peoples' cultural assets and to promote peace and mutual respect. In the following years, in a context of heightened Cold War tension between the USA and the USSR and the outbreak of the Vietnam conflict, it became necessary to establish new guidelines in the international community, such as the Convention on Measures to be Adopted to Prohibit Imports, Export and Transfer of Illicit Ownership of Cultural Property, Paris, UNESCO (1970). In Article 1, the convention expresses that "cultural assets" are those that, for religious or profane reasons, have been recognized by States as fundamental to "archeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science".

The 1970 Convention held in Paris had a central concern with the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. Article 2 emphasizes that illicit trafficking in cultural goods impoverishes the cultural heritage of the countries of origin of such goods and that it is up to the Member States to adopt measures to curb this practice. Article 11, on the other hand, warns that the export or transfer of ownership of cultural goods, which result directly or indirectly from the invasion of a country by a foreign power, will be considered illicit (UNESCO 1970).

Heritage at risk, the precarious situation of cultural assets and the rising understanding that each culture has contributions to strengthening the common values of all humanity led UNESCO to carry out the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972). It clearly established criteria for identifying, recognizing and safeguarding cultural assets, bearing in mind that the values of each people are essential to preserving the memory and history of the entire international community. In addition, the Convention took care of creating a protection mechanism in the midst of different risks through the "List of World Heritage in Danger". This document configures all those properties on the List of Cultural and Natural Heritage that are under serious threat and at risk of disappearance due to:

[...] accelerated degradation, large-scale public or private undertakings, accelerated urban and tourist development, destruction due to changes in use, deep alterations for unknown causes, abandonment for any reason, armed conflict already started or latent, calamities or cataclysms, fires, earthquakes, landslides, volcanic eruptions, changes in water levels, floods and tsunamis. (UNESCO, Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris 1972).

Finally, the Committee warns that, at any time—in case of emergency—it may include a property that is under imminent risk, on the List of World Heritage in Danger and proceed with immediate disclosure and publicity. Four years later, the Recommendation on the International Exchange of Cultural Goods, Nairobi, UNESCO (1976) would ratify the idea that cultural goods are all those objects of expression and testimony of human creation. Furthermore, Chap. 1, paragraph c, points out that international exchange comprises any transfer involving ownership, custody or use of cultural property by States of different countries in the form of loan, deposit, sale or donation made under equal conditions between the parties involved.

For the purposes of the Recommendation, Chap. 5 emphasizes that cultural exchanges between the Member States and the international community will allow the competent bodies to have greater cooperation in preventing, identifying and

combating illicit trafficking, so that these efforts inhibit criminal practices and promote the full cultural appreciation of peoples.

The concern to foster an environment of peace and avoid war in the present and in posterity was the main constituent element of the Declaration on the Responsibility of Present Generations towards Future, Paris, UNESCO (1997). According to Article 1 of the document, “The present generations have a responsibility to ensure that the needs and interests of present and future generations are fully safeguarded”. In this sense, it is essential that the current generations respect human rights, individual freedoms and that they recognize and preserve cultural diversity. “Present generations have a responsibility to identify, protect and safeguard tangible and intangible cultural heritage and to transmit this common heritage to future generations”, stresses Article 7 of the Declaration. Only by respecting these principles would it be possible to promote an environment of peace. Article 9, items 1 and 2 unquestionably indicate that present generations must ensure, “[...] that both they and future generations” live together in peace, security, with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms established in international law. To this end, present generations must assume a commitment to avoid exposing to future generations the harmful consequences of war and armed conflicts, as well as other forms of aggression and use of tools that disrespect humanitarian principles. The path to preserving peace must be based on education, training, information and respect for the ideals enshrined in the Declaration, and it is the responsibility of the United Nations, the States Parties and inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations to promote these principles and ensure its effectiveness (UNESCO 1997).

With the technological revolution provided by information and communication technologies (ICTs) at the beginning of the current millennium, which impacted the forms of apprehension, transmission and registration, sowing various manifestations and practices of digital culture, UNESCO promoted the expansion of the concept of heritage with a view to identification, development of strategies and public policies, among other proposals that ensure preservation in the face of the new reality. At the 2003 General Conference, in line with the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, through the Memory of the World program, the entity launched the Charter for the Preservation of Digital Heritage. The document expresses an acute concern of the entity in establishing norms and conducts in the preservation of documents that, many times, are produced, exclusively, in the digital medium—thus being vulnerable, to being lost in time—or even, in the latent lack of adequate supports safeguarding this information. Article 2 of the Charter establishes that these digital materials comprise “[...] texts, databases, still and moving images, audio, graphics, software and web pages, among a wide and growing range of formats” and have an ephemeral, which requires intentional maintenance and management for its preservation.

Another latent concern in Article 2 of the Charter (2003) concerns public access to digital heritage:

[...] access to digital heritage materials, especially those in the public domain, must be free of unreasonable restrictions. At the same time, confidential and personal information must be protected from any form of intrusion. (UNESCO, Charter on Digital Preservation, 2003).

Member States should also demonstrate a willingness to cooperate “with relevant organizations and institutions to promote a legal and practical environment that maximizes the accessibility of the digital heritage” (UNESCO, Charter on Digital Preservation 2003).

Collaboration is essential, says the document, for the longevity of information, and it is urgent that measures be adopted throughout the life cycle of digital information, from creation to access (Article 5). “Long-term preservation of digital heritage begins with designing reliable systems and procedures that will produce authentic and stable digital objects”. The importance of digital heritage is widely defended in the Charter because of its unlimited character in time, geography, culture or specific formats, and because it is accessible to many people around the world. This support is fundamental for minorities to be able to communicate to majorities and other audiences, “[...] in order to ensure over time the representation of all peoples, nations, cultures and languages” (Article 9). Once again UNESCO reinforces the role of partnerships and cooperation. Article 11 warns that, given the dangers of the digital divide, it is necessary for States, the media and information industries to maximize dialog, technical cooperation and knowledge.

The entity reinforces its role of responsibility, in Article 12, paragraph (a), when pointing out that it is up to UNESCO, “[...] to promote its implementation in the United Nations system and by non-governmental, intergovernmental and international organizations concerned with the preservation of digital heritage” (UNESCO, Charter on Digital Preservation 2003).

The document, finally, seeks to provide the various nations with normative and legal support for conducting and implementing public policies that safeguard the due safeguard and promotion of digital heritage.

4.3 Memory as Access to the Cultural Diversity of Peoples

Cultural assets are constituted as a complex web of threads that interconnect different cultures in temporalities, which articulate the position and understanding of subjects in their relationship with themselves and with the world. In this sense, there are two fundamental points that are salutary to the debate: collective memory (Halbwachs 2013) and places of memory (Nora 1993). The first concept is the main key to understanding the present in the understanding of Halbwachs (2013). If the past is articulated around a particular person in the private aspect, in the collective memory access is shared and limited to the lived experiences of a particular group or society. These two dimensions go hand in hand, since when accessing a memory, the individual needs to resort to other people’s memories. “Memory is enriched by contributions from outside which, after taking root and having found their place, are no longer distinguishable from other memories” (Halbwachs 2013: 98). The places of memory, notably in current times, have as their main characteristic to gather in the same space, the encounter of the past and the present.

As people, especially in Modernity, record and delegate which memories should be safeguarded to generations, we are no longer in the field of memory, but of history. The challenge that arises then is to understand how individuals appropriate these memories and the way in which they are articulated, or framed, to give meaning to the world. In this way, memory would then be “[...] identity in action”, in Candau’s understanding (2011: 18). This movement is what would authorize the subject to take possession of the images of the past to affirm a new identity position in the present (Candau 2011). This assumption is in line with what Hall (2015) stressed, to the Post-Modern discussion, when he says that: “The very process of identification, through which we project ourselves into our cultural identities, has become more provisional, variable and problematic” (Hall 2015: 12), he argues.

If identification is a moving process, especially in an increasingly globalized world, with more connection and communication networks, a fertile soil is being plowed for the complexification of the subjects’ experiences and sociability. In this occasion, if nations had the purpose of organizing the values and symbolic references of subjects such as territorial and linguistic, with globalization, this property is broken, as the borders of yesteryear are now shaken by the overcoming of space and time. In this context, it is convenient to resort to what Benedict Anderson already advanced when he contested the idea of nation. For the social scientist, this formulation would be nothing more than an arbitrary sign,

[...] because even the members of the smallest nations will never know most of their fellows, meet them, or even hear them, even if in the minds of each one there is the image of their communion [...]. Indeed, all communities larger than face-to-face contact villages (perhaps even in these) are imagined. Communities must be distinguished, not by their falsity/authenticity, but by the way they were imagined (Anderson 1983: 6).

In Anderson’s understanding, Modernity revealed that borders are no longer able to explain the complex relationships and cultural exchanges that societies establish.

This understanding brought consequences to the very understanding of the idea of nation, especially if we consider that national identities are grounded in values and practices that can often be configured in invented traditions. More closely, in this direction, the symbolic conformations around norms and conventions or in the cult of heroes and rites are intended rather to “[...] inculcate certain values and norms of behavior through repetition, which automatically implies, a continuity in relation to the past” (Hobsbawen and Ranger 1997: 9), re-appropriated in the present.

The debate about the dispute over memories gains broader proportions when what is at stake is the cultural hegemony of a people. The movement of the pieces on the board does not only occur in the traditional forms of hard power such as war and economic sanctions, but in the persuasion and influence of cultural, ideological and political identity, called soft power, in the opinion of Joseph Nye (2005). Historian Rodrigo Christofolletti (2017: 15), when analyzing this concept, argues that cultural products only have attractive power when they translate universal values, that is, those “[...] widely shared by the international community”. This is even more evident in the understanding of the activist Shashi Tharoor, highlights Christofolletti (2017: 18), when he argues that, to obtain soft power, “[...] it is necessary to be connected, and

the interaction, management and dissemination of assets can be seen as exercises in soft power action”.

Globalization has tensioned the controversy of the symbolic cohesion of nations and of the relations and cultural practices that societies establish. This became even clearer when we observe the evolution of UNESCO’s understanding over the course of the twentieth century and, notably in the twenty-first century, in the expansion of the concepts of cultural goods and heritage (natural, material, digital, immaterial and their multifaceted expressions cultural) and how different peoples, of the broadest hues, are fundamental in building peace, sustainability and preserving the memory of present and future generations.

However, even the efforts of UNESCO, the Member States, public and private organizations and civil society in articulating international support and cooperation (technological, diplomatic and economic) are often threatened by conflicts between peoples. In this context, the ongoing digital technological revolution has proved to be a great ally, generating broad possibilities for cooperation.

If for a long time the concern against forgetting collective memory occupied the center of attention of antiquarians and preservationists, nowadays it can at least be said that, given the virtual, digital and technological possibilities of reproducing information, the issue of preservation becomes more physical than symbolic (Christoforetti 2017: 18).

The Ukraine war is the most recent example. Since the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, ordered, on February 20, 2022, the invasion of the east of that country (with disproportionately superior strength and military power), the conflict has caused the death of soldiers, civilians, in addition to the destruction of buildings, streets and places of memory of the Ukrainian people. To exacerbate this situation, the war started a deep economic recession around the world with the increase in the price of commodities and the skyrocketing of inflation. In the midst of this storm, a beam of light appears that raises hope in the preservation of monuments, memories, places and expressions of Ukrainian culture. This is the Backup Ukraine project, an unprecedented action, at the service of the entire international community and put into practice during the course of the war.

4.4 The Polycam App at the Service of the Soft Power of the West

The war in Ukraine that started on February 24, 2022, not only endangers the lives of the civilian population, but also threatens the preservation of the country’s cultural assets. The recommended instruments of international law seem not to be able to reach the Russian missiles, launched daily in several Ukrainian cities. But perhaps the speed of the Internet at the service of international cooperation will manage to avoid an even greater disaster: the erasure of the memory of present and future generations. With that in mind, UNESCO put into practice an ambitious and modern plan for the identification, registration and promotion of cultural assets. This is the Backup

Ukraine project, a partnership between the entity and the Vice Media Group, specialized in creative economy actions, Blue Shield Danmark—Danish arm, the Heritage Emergency Rescue Initiative of Ukraine, the National Museum of the History of Ukraine and the Polycam—company versed in 3D modeling technology. Through the Polycam application—which can be downloaded onto a smartphone and works as a social network—users scan the object they intend to register and publish it in the cloud, with comments and hashtags. In Polycam’s social network, you can find everything from antique artifacts, statues, monuments, works of art, destroyed Russian tanks, even the registration of animals or people scanned. The company ensures that all publications will be stored in the cloud for a period of five years.⁴

To get an idea of the inestimable damage caused by the conflict, only by the end of May 2022, the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine recorded 367 war crimes⁵ against cultural heritage, with the partial destruction of 29 museums, 133 temples, 66 theaters and libraries and a centenary Jewish cemetery. While there is no damage caused by the war to UNESCO-sanctioned world heritage sites in Ukraine, such as Saint Sophia Cathedral in Kiev and the historic center of Lviv, there is destruction in other locations. Kharkiv, a city under intense fire from Russian troops, accounts for the damage caused to the Holocaust Memorial, the National Theater of Opera and Ballet and the Museum of Art, among others. In a desperate move, residents wrapped the statue of Taras Shevchenko in sandbags. The poet was one of the first intellectuals to write in Ukrainian in the nineteenth century. Kiev University is named after him.

Odessa, a city of 1 million inhabitants, located on the shores of the Black Sea, which is home to the largest seaport in the country—essential for the export of grains—and one of the main tourist destinations—being the scene of the film “The Battleship Potemkin” (1929), by Serguei Eisenstein—is empty.⁶ The streets were taken over by barricades, and the population tries to defend itself as they can.

In an interview with the ANSA⁷ Italian News Agency, researcher Izabela Tamaso, a professor at the Federal University of Goiás and a specialist in heritage preservation, warns that Ukraine’s cultural assets are threatened not only by gunshots and bombs, but also by “fraying of symbolic and cultural fabrics”. This concern is aggravated when one takes into account that this prolonged scenario in the medium and long term, in addition to the deaths that can account for an even greater number, tend to weaken the transmission of knowledge and values of masters, artisans and elders and cause a cultural hollowing, unprecedented, in the identity of Ukrainians, warns Tamaso. In an extraordinary meeting held by the UNESCO committee on July 1, 2022, the

⁴ The service is free only for users located in Ukraine. Subscriptions range from \$6.99 a month to \$54.99 a year. Specifications can be found in the Terms of Service on the Polycam website under the Backup Ukraine tab. Available at: <https://polycam.ukraine>. Accessed on 14 Jul 2022.

⁵ Available at: <https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/internacional/como-ucrania-usa-tecnologia-3d-para-proteger-artefatos-culturais-de-ataques-russos/>. Accessed on 14 Jul 2022.

⁶ Available at: <https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/internacional/moradores-de-odessa-na-ucrania-temem-ataque-a-patrimonio-cultural/>. Accessed on 14 Jul 2022.

⁷ Available at: <https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/ansa/2022/05/06/guerra-coloca-em-risco-patrimonios-culturais-na-ucrania.htm>. Accessed on 14 Jul 2022.

entity included the Ukrainian soup (known as Borshch)⁸, even under strong protests from Moscow, which claims to be the owner of the dish, on the list of heritage at risk and stressed that the good needs “urgent safeguarding”. The tradition was already on the list of probable assets that could be recognized by UNESCO in 2023. The war, however, anticipated the protective measures, at the request of Kiev. As the note warns:

In that decision, the Intergovernmental Committee states that the armed conflict is threatening the viability of the element. Displacement of people threatens the practice, with people no longer able to cook or plant the vegetables for borsch, but also no longer able to come together for the practice, which undermines the social and cultural well-being of communities.⁹

But all is not lost, the ongoing international cooperation with the implementation of the Backup Ukraine project sponsored by UNESCO, with the support of government entities, companies specialized in technology and the involvement of Ukrainian citizens with the use of the Polycam application in the 3D recording of cultural goods tries, at least to some extent, to reduce this damage to the memory of Ukraine.

Iain Thomas, creative director of the Virtue Worldwide group and co-creator of the project, reported that around 150 volunteers have committed to registering at least ten pieces or cultural objects per day, and around 6,000 people have already downloaded the application by Polycam. As Thomas reports in an interview with CNN:

We set a precedent here in terms of protecting cultural artifacts and a model, a system that people can use in the future as conflict develops [...]. One of the most amazing things is that people are scanning monuments, statues and sculptures, but they are also scanning small aspects of their lives – things they own, value and cherish. (How Ukraine uses 3D technology to protect cultural heritage from Russian attacks. CNN Brasil, 2022¹⁰).

As can be inferred, without false pretensions, Backup Ukraine establishes a new way of registering and interacting with memory, both for present and future generations. On the one hand, the initiative is in line with the fabric that weaves together a series of traditional hard power measures, such as economic sanctions and military escalation, while at the same time affirming soft power based on Western cultural values, to which Ukraine identifies. On the other hand, the international cooperation effort, which goes beyond international organizations and counts on the contribution of companies, NGOs and communities from the most varied nations, tries to contain a movement (which seems to be inescapable), of geopolitical reordering, led, notably, by China, Russia, and other BRICS members such as India (a trading partner that has taken advantage of the crisis to acquire Russian oil at a low cost). By placing the decision-making power over what should be kept in the hands of civilians, UNESCO

⁸ The beet-based dish varies from region to region and may include cabbage, mushrooms, pepper or fish.

⁹ Available at: <https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/ansa/2022/05/06/guerra-coloca-em-risco-patrimonios-culturais-na-ucrania.htm>. Accessed on 15 Jul 2022.

¹⁰ Available at: <https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/internacional/como-ucrania-usa-tecnologia-3d-para-protetor-artefatos-culturais-de-ataques-russos/>. Accessed on 14 Jul 2022.

initiates a profound revolution (why not?) in policies for safeguarding and preserving cultural assets, previously granted to an institutional relationship between specialized organizations and governments and local populations.

4.5 Conclusions

Being a natural fact of war, the “collateral effects” are inevitable. As much as the actions are planned, there is a risk of losing control of the consequences. The loss of military and civilian lives, the destruction of the environment and heritage, the erasure of ways, customs, traditions and heritage ... everything that forges the identity and national history of nations and peoples, parts of “humanity”, are at risk in armed conflicts.

Seeking to contain, at least to some extent, this attack, Backup Ukraine configures itself not only as a shield that adds to the barricades set up by residents to protect historic buildings and monuments, but as a high-precision tool that can alternate, to some extent, power relations and enable civilians to define what heritage is. In addition, with the use of the Polycam social network, residents and visitors in Ukraine have indicated escape routes and temporary shelters, giving wide publicity among users of the application of the safest places. With this power in hand, civilians put into practice the assumptions of the First and Second Protocols of the Hague Convention (1954, 1999), such as the restriction of illicit trafficking in cultural goods and the demarcation—in an innovative way—in blue, of the heritage in risk, which until then was the exclusive competence of the International Committee of the Blue Shield (Blue Shield). It also affirms a commitment of the present time with future generations expressed in the Paris Declaration (1997), Article 7, when it advocates that present generations have the duty to “identify, protect and safeguard the tangible and intangible cultural heritage and to transmit this common heritage to future generations”.

The symbolic character of many of these records made and shared daily in the Polycam application can reveal much more than affective captures of everyday life. It establishes a new way of accessing collective memory by allowing future generations to have access to this temporality affected by the horror of war—which meets the concerns of the Charter on Digital Preservation (UNESCO 2003). This sign raises an alert for public access to digital heritage, as set out in Article 2 of the Charter (2003), when it expresses that these documents, notably those in the public domain, must be free of restrictions, reserving, of course, only the confidential and private information of citizens. At the same time, the democratization of the registration of cultural assets using the Polycam application allows collective memories and places of memory to remain “alive”, “unaltered” (Halbwachs 2013; Nora 1993), even when destroyed, since it is possible to make a copy, rich in details, of what is registered.

The present has never anticipated the future in such a way. However, all this optimism surrounding new technologies has its limits. Inflation of assets, the organization of records many volunteers perform the scanning but do not include location details

and historical data about the objects, and storage. Polycam has committed to storing the data in clouds on its servers for a period of 5 years. After the deadline, what will become of this data? Who will pay for the subscriptions? This concern increases even more with the common practice of services for storing digital information in clouds, by changing, year after year, in a manner that is often monocratic, the Terms of Service Provision, forcing the consumer to assume the costs of new values and changes in contracts, under penalty of losing data. The path of an environment of cooperation of collective intelligence so acclaimed by Pierre Lévy (1993) that could lead humanity to the emancipation of rights and promotion of human virtues seems to be even more difficult than imagined. Wars oblige everyone to seek new routes of solidarity among peoples, far beyond the interests of capitalism and the geopolitical affirmation of values of a culture to elect itself superior to another.

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Chapter 5

Culture of Peace, Soft Power and the Russia–Ukraine Conflict: The Shortcomings of Economic Integration as a Conflict Deterrent and the Potential of Diplomacy and Paradiplomacy for a Culture of Peace



Victor Maciel Mendes

Abstract This essay delves into the effectiveness of Economic Integration theory for conflict prevention and resolution. Additionally, it explores the potential of Soft Power and a Culture of Peace as critical assets in designing solutions to prevent violent conflicts and the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is a case example in which Economic Integration failed to prevent violent escalation. Through a literature review of specialised research and conceptual definitions of relevant theories, the work assesses the role of Soft Power for nonviolent conflict resolution, highlighting paradiplomacy and Peace Awareness initiatives as exemplary manifestations of Soft Power. Furthermore, it underscores the significance of directly engaging individuals and decision-makers in Peace Awareness programs such, as initiatives promoted by the Mayors for Peace network, organised by the Prefecture of Hiroshima city, and cited as a model example of Soft Power in action. The essay concludes that the international community must invest in Culture of Peace initiatives and nonviolent alternatives for conflict resolution with the same economic commitment and investment as Hard Power assets to ensure a more peaceful and stable future.

Keywords Soft power · Culture of peace · Russia–Ukraine conflict · Paradiplomacy

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5.1 Introduction

This essay seeks to examine the theory of Economic Integration and the potential role of Soft Power in fostering a Culture of Peace. This role is significant in resolving conflicts and, more importantly, preventing large-scale violent confrontations. It is argued that Soft Power and a Culture of Peace can promote nonviolent solutions to conflicts and provide alternatives or supplements to Hard Power approaches, making these critical assets in the design of solutions to prevent and also resolve violent conflicts.

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia serves as the basis for analysing and challenging concepts, as the essay argues that Economic Integration between Russia and the European Union countries came short of preventing violent escalation. Current scholarly research shows the potential of Peace brought by Economic Interdependence and Integration, while acknowledging its risks but can be scrutinized as one Hard Power asset with specific roles, potentials and deficiencies to further the discussion about other approaches that extend beyond a purely economic and interdependence framework. Paradiplomacy and Peace Awareness are used as case examples for Soft Power. In both instances, the explorations are conceptual, and empirical evidence is presented through the literature review of specialised research, supported by the conceptual definitions of the relevant theories on a Culture of Peace, Peace Education, paradiplomacy and underlying International Relations Theories.

It is essential to provide an overview of the conflict used as a basis in this conceptual exploration. The violent developments between Russia and Ukraine began in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine, citing historical and ethnic ties to the region. This move was met with condemnation from many countries part of the international community, especially sanctions from Western countries. The conflict then escalated as pro-Russian separatists declared independence in eastern Ukraine, leading to a violent conflict between Ukrainian government forces and separatist groups.

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a special military operation—as named by Russia—or a full-scale invasion of Ukraine—as defined by other countries critical to Russia’s move. This was a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict that began in 2014. Intelligence Reports alongside Russia’s official declarations support that Russia planned to invade Ukraine over a short period and thereafter occupy the country to enable annexation by August 2022.¹

According to the Institute for the Study of War, in 2022, Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev confirmed on July 5 that the Russian military operation in Ukraine would persist until Russia met its objectives, including protecting civilians from “genocide”, “denazify” and demilitarise Ukraine. Patrushev’s remarks echo the goals announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his February 24, speech justifying the war, which also included obliging Ukraine to remain permanently neutral between Russia and NATO. However, Ukraine resisted and received support from NATO and other countries. The war became a prolonged conflict causing tens

¹ ISW Institute for the Study of War (2022).

of thousands of deaths on both sides and instigating Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II.²

As of March 2023, the war is still ongoing and has reached a stalemate. Ukraine regained territories and is holding on to its major cities but still has lost control of much of its eastern territory in regions that are now claimed to be Russian territory following annexation and local referenda organised by Russian authorities—these territories are still militarily contested. Russia is facing international sanctions and diplomatic isolation, mostly from Western Countries, but has not backed down from its initial objectives. The prospects for a peaceful resolution are still distant, and the threats of nuclear escalations are present, and albeit unlikely, they are not impossible.³

As this essay explores Soft Power and the concept of a Culture of Peace for conflict prevention and resolution, it is important to consider and challenge the importance of finding nonviolent solutions to conflicts.

Therefore, from a reflective perspective, it is essential to specifically challenge why would a nonviolent conflict resolution be more interesting than violent solutions and vice-versa. Assuming the rationality of actors and using the concept of Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), originally used by Fisher et al. (2011),⁴ it is reasonable to conceptualise that the BATNA chosen by the involved parties in the Russia–Ukraine conflict is large-scale military mobilization, with heavy costs in terms of human lives which translated not only in the morally inestimable loss of human life but also a heavy economic burden that will affect all involved countries and its population's as well as affecting adjacent countries.

It is reasonable to consider that the parties directly involved will still bear consequences for at least the next few decades. Still, if the directly involved actors would hypothetically be purely rational—and consider a certain degree of loss of human lives necessary or reasonable as a means or consequence for pursuing their goals—it could be argued that they assessed the economic and political costs as reasonable investments when faced with the potential gains of the military incursion, the violent “solutions” or violent alternatives—this applies for both Ukraine's defence, via military (violent) means, and Russia's as a pursuer of its goals by the military (violent) means.

While still useful, these considerations treat the countries—and other collective actors such as international organisations—as monolithic entities for simplification as is a known limitation of many international relations analyses, and in addition to being monolithic, they are conceptually and hypothetically purely rational in this example. Putnam (1988) provides a complementary view when theorising that international relations and negotiations are shaped by the domestic political environment in which the policymakers, as individuals, operate. Therefore, successful international negotiations require policymakers to be aware of the domestic political climate, understand how it can affect the negotiation process, and develop effective strategies

² ISW Institute for the Study of War (2022).

³ ISW Institute for the Study of War (2023).

⁴ Fisher et al. (2011).

to manage these challenges. Overall, Putnam's (1988) two-level games theory highlights the critical role of domestic politics in shaping international negotiations and emphasises the need for policymakers to navigate both the domestic and international levels of the negotiation process to achieve successful outcomes.⁵

If we are to consider Nation-states and their foreign policy strategies as products of internal processes with their own political struggles, led by individuals, the aforementioned "rationalistic" considerations gain a new facet; it can be argued that *some groups and individuals* were capable of leading or supplanting the concurrent interests of other less powerful groups internally, thus evaluating the economic and political costs as reasonable investments and translating the internal political struggles into a foreign policy that leans towards violence instead of nonviolence in order to maximise their goals. For specific internal groups, the collective "greater-good" economic, social and political benefits of nonviolent solutions could be less interesting, or less desirable, from a rationalist perspective—e.g. the groups in power consider it better and are willing to incur high collective costs than to have their group seen as weaker and potentially lose the internal political struggle; or even make use of a high-cost foreign policy—i.e. violence and military action—to solidify a dominant position in the internal power struggle or a longer-term political plan, international or domestic.

From the above considerations, we may extract that, supposedly, nonviolent conflict resolution tends to not always be in line with the interests of *some individuals or groups with relevant decision-making capability* within domestic power struggles; leading to them becoming willing to choose and consider violent solutions over nonviolent alternatives. However, when this logic is applied to a collective perspective, nonviolent conflict resolution can be considered as more often than not aligned with key diffuse collective interests and rights of and to physical safety, sustainability and sustainable economic and social development—efficient use of resources—e.g. countries not at war or afflicted by violent conflict tend to be more economically prosperous⁶ and have a higher life expectancy, more so for nations experiencing a peaceful or more peaceful context, which is not defined only the lack of war.⁷

For Ukraine, a nonviolent solution to the conflict may not bring these benefits or as much of them as would make a nonviolent approach more interesting in their perspective for responding to this conflict, pushing them to consider violent solutions for self-defence (military defence) and, therefore, lean towards other options which include sacrificing collective interests and rights, whereas for Russia, the decision-making groups in power may be willing to pursue their interests at the cost of these diffuse collective rights and/or interests.

⁵ Putnam (1988).

⁶ Slathia (2019).

⁷ For broader definitions on peace see Galtung (1969).

As for empirical evidence to support these claims, deeper analysis and research on the morale of individuals part of the conflict between both Ukraine and Russia may shed light on this when asking, for example: up until which conditions are certain individuals and/or groups—military or civilian—willing to sacrifice or invest their own individual or group's rights to physical safety, to sustainable development and peace in order to uphold the country's Right to self-defence?

The example above brings the analysis to an approach centred on individuals, the base unit of groups—these groups being political parties, administrative teams of cities, diplomatic/foreign policy ministries of countries and the head-of-state individuals themselves. In a conflict context, are individuals with less decision-making power and more vulnerable to collective costs more or less willing to sacrifice collective rights and interests to pursue violent solutions? And, would individuals, such as a head of state with decision-making power be more willing to sacrifice collective rights to pursue political power goals, when they are supposedly less vulnerable to the costs they can choose to incur?

While it is outside the scope of this essay to seek empirical evidence to answer the questions posed above, regardless of scientific feasibility these questions still fill the role of exploring research pathways and provoking considerations that focus on the role of individuals in internal power struggles and the willingness to choose nonviolent or violent alternatives for conflict resolution. The main supposition is that individuals matter in the design of international relations and politics and they are responsible for assessing the risks, costs and opportunities of defending a specific international action and bringing it to the internal policymaking struggle so that it may, or may not, be finally translated into the official position of their Nation-state or group.⁸

After these considerations, we shall revisit the one initial question of this subsection; what would then be the importance of finding nonviolent solutions to conflicts, according to the reflections herein presented? This importance lies mainly in an effort to safeguard specific collective interests and rights, some of which can be defined as part of the most famous broad examples of Third Generation Human Rights, such as the right to self-determination, the right to a safe environment, the right to economic and social development and most importantly the Right to Peace,⁹ last of which is interrelated and can be considered a prerequisite to the other rights or interests herein listed, especially for the most vulnerable individuals and those without or with less decision-making agency, or power.

⁸ While theoretical rationality is presupposed, it is undeniable that human beings are also emotional, but for the sake of simplicity, rationality will be assumed during this work. Contributions that consider emotional factors and human psychology are always welcome; however, in this work, the main idea stands that individuals matter in the internal domestic struggles and they translate these power struggles into foreign policy action, conflicts and the final decisions to wage a war or not.

⁹ Council of Europe (2023).

5.2 Considerations on Economic Integration (Hard Power) as a Conflict Deterrent

As per Oliver and Cali (2015), the opportunity cost effect theory suggests that a rise in income due to trade would lead to a reduction in the likelihood of conflicts. Although there is a lack of support for this idea in the cross-country data, case studies conducted on Nigeria and the Palestinian territories provide evidence to back this theory. In the context of fragile countries, the authors understand that international trade can have an outsized influence—positive and negative—on the risk of conflict relapse.^{10,11}

Basri (2022) argues that Economic Integration plays a crucial role in fostering peace and security by reducing the opportunity cost of interdependence, which ultimately lowers the probability of war. He supports this argument by citing various studies, including research conducted by Oliver and Cali (2015) which suggests that countries are less likely to engage in conflict when trade results in higher incomes. Another study by Lee and Pyun (2009) using a vast panel data set from 1950 to 2000 also confirms that increased bilateral trade interdependence significantly contributes to promoting peace. Basri maintains that enhanced bilateral interdependence and global trade openness are fundamental factors in advancing peace.¹²

It is paramount to consider the role of bilateral and multilateral economic interdependence as relevant to peace; as well as how it could also be a double-edged sword, as mentioned by Oliver and Cali, an outsized influence—positive and negative—on the risk of conflict. In the Russia–Ukraine context, Russia’s energy trade with European Countries could not only have had a role in the development of Russia’s economic capacity for a resource-intensive conflict but could also have created an encouragement that, if the interdependence exists, other states would be less likely to intervene for peace and jeopardise essential energy resources in the process; which is what essentially happened when sanctions were escalated and European Countries compelled to seek energy alternatives in order to enforce the economic responses¹³—this is without going in-depth about likely economic interests of other economic actors, including private actors, about new business opportunities arising from the violent conflict. Regarding sanctions, while this essay does not explore the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of economic warfare and sanctions in this context, an in-depth analysis of the Economic Costs of the conflict can be further studied in the work by Liadze et al (2022).¹⁴

¹⁰ Oliver and Cali (2015).

¹¹ Lee and Pyun (2009).

¹² Basri (2022).

¹³ Mbah and Wasum (2022).

¹⁴ Liadze et al. (2022).

5.3 Soft Power: An Unexplored Potential for Building a Culture of Peace?

Soft power in International Relations, as per Nye's conceptualisation, refers to the ability to influence others through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or force. It is the ability to shape preferences and delineate power through non-coercive means such as culture, values, and ideas. Soft Power is commonly contrasted with Hard Power, which can be in short defined by the use of military and economic strength to achieve influence and delineate power.¹⁵ In the context of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Soft Power could have played an essential role in preventing the conflict, but may still contribute to resolving or at least assisting in deescalating the conflict, without resorting to further violent escalation. Soft Power tools such as diplomacy, negotiation and cultural exchange can be used to build trust and foster understanding between the parties.

It can be argued that Hard Power assets have been and are still being used as the main response pathways or the backbone of the responses in the case of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, namely military support, economic sanctions and escalation threats—from Russia with the threat of the use of nuclear tools to safeguard Russia's integrity and NATO military escalation if certain lines are crossed, such as nuclear tools or regional nuclear contamination.¹⁶ According to SIPRI (2022), since 1990, World Military Expenditure was never below 1000 billion US dollars, in 2022 the figures passed the 2 trillion US Dollar mark, of which the United States, China, India, the United Kingdom and Russia account for 62 per cent of these expenditures.¹⁷ These figures alone illustrate the weight given by the main international actors on military defence and military dissuasion, and the current conflict is encouraging more military build-up worldwide. In comparison, the budget of UNESCO, an organisation of which building a Culture of Peace is a priority, did not exceed 150 million dollars annually in 1999.¹⁸

It can be argued that despite the various existing diplomatic meetings and international fora built as venues of Soft Power since the end of World War II, Hard Power via Economic Integration and military build-up, from NATO, Russia and other countries, even in times without major international conflicts, had the spotlight for the past two and a half decades after the cold war.

These considerations prompt the following question as a thought exercise; what could be the effects if, as much—or a bigger fraction—of what is invested in Hard Power, was also invested in Soft Power for a Culture of Peace and Peace Education Awareness, such as hypothetical massive cultural exchange and Peace Education programs between populations—civilian leadership, regular citizens, civil officials and military individuals? If we are to consider that individuals matter in the design

¹⁵ Nye (1990).

¹⁶ Siebold and Stewart (2022).

¹⁷ SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2022).

¹⁸ Williams and L'Homme (1999).

of international relations and politics and they are responsible for assessing the risks, costs and opportunities of defending a specific international action and bringing it to the internal policymaking struggle so that it may—or may not—be finally translated into the official position of their Nation-state or group, then it is reasonable to consider individuals could be prone to be more understanding and less belligerent towards disagreeing parties provided that they at least had the chance to meet and exchange Peace Awareness experiences with these parties before violent alternatives are considered or implemented.

Schultze-Kraft (2022) explores Conventional and Critical Approaches to Peace Education stating that promoting pro-peace attitudes and values can be achieved through social and material support, as well as peace education; “pro-peace attitudes, beliefs, behaviours and values can be proactively fomented in individuals if and when they are supported by, and reflected in, their broader social and material environment”¹⁹—in sum, a theoretical spill over effect, starting with individuals to social structures and potentially politics. Peace Education is understood to be a prominent method for promoting reconciliation and conflict resolution, preparing students, and individuals, to live in an era of peace. However, it is important to consider that, while positive feedback and reconciliation processes can occur in stable environments, Schultze-Kraft (2022) states the uncertainty of whether this applies to communities affected by high levels of violence and polarisation as research suggests that there is no convincing evidence supporting the effectiveness of peace education in unstable, conflict-ridden contexts. Yet, with evidence of reconciliation processes occurring in stable environments, Peace Education can be a prominent tool in preventing violent conflict before certain thresholds are crossed, and violent solutions are chosen over nonviolent options. Still, Schultze-Kraft’s (2022) work is just one example of existing research on Peace Awareness, and it displays how individuals partaking in such initiatives can potentially affect their broader social environment.

A Culture of Peace can be defined as a social and political environment that promotes non-violent conflict resolution. It emphasizes the cultivation of attitudes and behaviors that promote peace and harmony, encompassing a commitment to education, Peace Awareness, Human Rights, social justice and sustainable development.²⁰ Such a Culture can only be achieved via the consistent and ongoing, engagement of individuals with decision-making capabilities in politically safe discussion environments to encourage frank candid positioning and exchange between parties.

Still, it is undeniable that Hard Power is relevant, since military and economic assets do have their relevance for safeguarding peace, the economy via interdependence and the military via deterrence, but they are not sufficient, and it is reasonable to argue that, in a context involving nuclear superpowers, a single nuclear escalation can signify global costs too high to be risked with “good enough” structures. If the international community wants the best chances to prevent catastrophic escalations, other concrete options better than “good enough” must be considered beyond promises, discourses, interest in business and profit for economic interdependence

¹⁹ Schultze-Kraft (2022).

²⁰ Galtung (1969).

and military-industrial complexes that feed deterrence—these still relevant, even though counterintuitive and perhaps contradictory. In short, a “good enough” International scenario, led by Hard Power military and economic interdependence, was in fact not enough to prevent large military escalations involving modern armies in the twenty-first century, and a relevant international Soft Power for a Culture of Peace, just as in military modernisation and economic development and cooperation, would require time and substantial economic investment; such that was never attempted with a comparable scale of importance and investment given to Hard Power by Nation-states and International Relations Actors.

The city of Hiroshima serves as a reminder of the devastating consequences of war and nuclear tools as the atomic bombing of the city in 1945 led to the deaths of around 140,000 people, and its aftermath continues to impact the lives of survivors and their descendants. The Prefecture of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have emerged as symbols of peace and reconciliation through efforts to promote a Culture of Peace via paradiplomacy initiatives; they can be considered models with international outreach.²¹

Paradiplomacy initiatives involve the engagement of subnational actors, such as cities and regions, in international relations. Through the Mayors for Peace network, partnerships with cities and regions have been forged around the world to promote awareness of peace, disarmament and the elimination of nuclear tools. These efforts have included grants for the cultural exchange of young leaders and academics, of which the author of this essay took part in 2017, but the initiatives also involve city officials and serve as a model for other subnational actors seeking to contribute to the promotion of a Culture of Peace and as starting point for further research on the impacts of promoting Peace Education awareness to individuals and their groups. However, it is evident that these initiatives are too few specially when compared to the importance and financing of Hard Power assets in the world, as previously discussed. More initiatives such as Hiroshima’s must be considered with equivalent commitment, seriousness and investments compared to Hard Power options, and then properly assessed as to their impacts if the international community would be willing to build a Culture of Peace and encourage nonviolent conflict resolution; what can only be done with the direct personal involvement of individuals responsible for decision-making process, in an ideal scenario. As cities and subnational actors seem to be more willing to attempt such initiatives, they present themselves as alternatives to the inertia of Nation-states as international political units in the global arena.

²¹ Miyazaki (2021).

5.4 The Role of Paradiplomacy Initiatives in Building a Culture of Peace

This essay will not delve into or introduce new case studies on Paradiplomacy for a Culture of Peace in conflict contexts. Instead, it contributes by hypothesizing that, given the advantage of hindsight, future research could further explore this in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Notably, evidence from numerous Russian cities, particularly reports of political opposition vocal to the war in Saint Petersburg, has reached Western media and independent Russian news outlets. Such reports indicate significant stances regarding the conflict, which are especially notable given the suppression of public demonstrations and opinion related to the conflict within Russia.²²

While this essay draws inspiration from monolithic and non-monolith actor approaches, it underscores the argument that individuals, part of groups or factions, significantly affect the policies of administrative divisions, Nation-states and international organisations. This is especially relevant considering that the core unit of any group is, fundamentally, the individual.

It comes as no surprise that cities in countries part of NATO or the European Union officially display their positions regarding the war. Still, it is remarkable to consider that such positions may arise even in a context in which they are unwelcome or repressed, such as what is reported to be happening in Russia according to Western Media sources and independent Human Rights organisations such as Reporters Without Borders (RSF).^{23,24,25} The evidence from these sources that end up reaching armchair researchers mainly comes from reports of charges and repercussions against Russian politicians, journalists or any individuals presenting views or interpretations “alternative to the official discourse”, regardless of the intensity of their anti-war stance. Still, this is evidence that the sentiment exists internally in Russia, from the part of individuals with a certain degree of influence, and, with the benefit of hindsight, it may be possible to uncover more of them in the future and how they may have transferred from the sphere of individuals, as actor “units”, to group-structures such as internal domestic divisions, cities or organisations. Ultimately, understanding this transition-from actor-units to group structures-might shed light on its influence over foreign policy decisions and potential strategic consequences.

²² The Moscow Times (2023).

²³ According to RSF, Russia stepped up the repression of journalistic coverage of protests and journalists that present a different version of events other than official sources. We may consider that, at the very least, since repression is reported to have been intensified, then this came as a response to increased protests or a more aggressive approach towards individuals discussing other versions of the events or critic the war.

²⁴ RSF Reporters Without Borders (2022a, b).

²⁵ RSF Reporters Without Borders (2022a, b).

In this sense, while correlation does not imply causality, it is fair to mention that St. Petersburg is part of the Mayors for Peace Network and has sent representatives to the International Youth Meeting for Peace in the Future in the past.²⁶ This means that, at some point, the city had individuals undertaking these paradiplomacy initiatives and exposure to Culture of Peace efforts; it must be recalled that local governments are composed of individuals, which are part of internal struggles to translate discussions and power disputes into official positions. Therefore, if individuals were engaged in Culture of Peace and Peace Awareness movements, this leads to a potential clue for further inference. Drawing from Putnam's thesis on the relationship between domestic and international politics, official positions are not monolithic. Instead, they can be viewed as outcomes of the interaction and politics of these individuals within the internal realm, which end up affecting the international sphere. By extension, this can also be applied to cities and their relationships with other governmental structures, such as other cities, departments, prefectures, country-level federal politics, and, ultimately, internal-international ramifications (e.g. cities from other countries and Organisations with international reach).²⁷

When analyzing the root causes of the conflict and the interests of the involved parties, the relevance of their justifications is evident from a Soft Power standpoint, irrespective of their actual merits. For instance, the entities frequently cited in Russia's justifications, such as the USA, NATO, and various Western and Eastern European nations, possess a certain responsibility to address these claims. This holds true whether these claims serve as a façade for other intentions or are integral to the reasons prompting Russia's resort to conflict. The mere acts of presenting a motive in international forums imbues it with intrinsic Soft Power relevance. Even if it diverges from the genuine underlying causes and is used merely as a discursive smokescreen, its inclusion signals its perceived value in the broader narrative.

One key example of this is the claim that Russia, in the Ukraine conflict, is acting in self-defence due to the West's (European Union) or NATO's expansion eastward or mere consideration of Ukraine's wishes to become a NATO or European Union member. Even if these claims are dismissed on the basis that Ukraine is a sovereign nation and a sovereign nation not a part of these organisations (Russia) is not entitled to commenting or governing the actions of other sovereign countries or these organisations, Russia's alleged motives must be considered and listened as the international community and specially the countries and organisations cited by Russia still bear some shared responsibility in allowing these allegations to be relevant in the first place. In conclusion, while the justifications presented by conflicting parties may not necessarily be the root cause of the conflict, they still hold significant importance from a Soft Power perspective. The fact that they are presented and assessed as relevant in international forums means that they hold some degree of weight in shaping global perceptions and attitudes towards the conflict.

²⁶ Mayors for Peace (2022).

²⁷ Putnam (1988).

5.5 Conclusion

This essay argued that Soft Power and the building of a Culture of Peace can pave the way to promote nonviolent solutions to conflicts, offering alternatives or complements to traditional Hard Power approaches in international relations. These concepts emerge as vital tools in the design of nonviolent conflict resolution or prevention pathways. While the essay critically examines the sole reliance of Economic Integration theory as a Hard Power mechanism for averting conflicts, it doesn't deny its importance, and sheds light on the potentials of Soft Power strategies, like paradiplomacy and Peace Awareness. This is exemplified by initiatives like the Mayors for Peace network led by the Prefecture of Hiroshima city.

The Russia–Ukraine conflict potentially reveals that economic interdependence can also be a double-edged sword, as it can create an encouragement that other states would be less likely to intervene for peace and jeopardise economic assets, such as energy resources.

While Economic Integration as a Hard Power asset is not a one-size-fits-all solution to preventing conflicts and securing peace, it is argued that the international community places heavy emphasis on Hard Power assets when compared to Soft Power and Peace Awareness alternatives as evidenced in part by the increase in military investment and the apparent lack of large-scale Culture of Peace Awareness programs worldwide. Hard Power and military investment are not denied as necessary in some contexts; however, it is evident that alternatives of Soft Power for a Culture of Peace are not backed by as much investment and international commitment when compared to the trillion US dollar mark of worldwide military investments and the budgets of organisations dedicated for building and finding pathways for a Culture of Peace, such as UNESCO.

In short, while hard power, such as military and economic assets, still have their relevance, they are not enough to ensure lasting peace and stability in the international community, especially when nuclear states are involved. The initiatives of the Prefecture of Hiroshima, through paradiplomacy, provide one model for other actors seeking to contribute to the promotion of a Culture of Peace and this work emphasises the role of individuals in such initiatives and how they may affect a country's foreign policy as per Putman's two-level games theory. However, more initiatives like these are needed, and they must be considered with equivalent commitment, seriousness and investments compared to Hard Power assets, which do retain their importance especially because they are also essential in addressing root causes of conflicts in other contexts such as poverty and lack of basic resources. If the international community is willing to invest in promoting peace and encouraging nonviolent conflict resolution, there is hope for a more peaceful and stable future.

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Chapter 6

Cultural Mercosur: A Regional Vision of Cultural Heritage as Soft Power



Kathia Espinoza Murtua

Abstract In this article we will study the work being done by the international agency MERCOSUR in the field of cultural heritage of the associated states. This thematic agenda is organized by MERCOSUR Cultural and its Cultural Heritage Commission. Being one of the main achievements of this agenda the creation of a list that recognizes from a regional approach the “tangible and intangible goods as heritage”, this geographical characteristic that transcends the national borders imposed because of the colonialist distribution is the starting point for a decolonial analysis of the existing patrimonies and their potential candidacies. Thus, it seeks to recognize the benefits and conflicts inherent in the transversal inclusion of the places and states where this particular type of regional cultural heritage is developed. The ability to influence development in a complex way, understood as the improvement of the living conditions of singular social groups and not as mere economic growth from an ultra-past Western vision, although still valid, invites us to think of regional cultural heritages in Latin America as *soft power*. This concept indicates that a political agent can make use of culture as a tool to influence another or other political agents, consequently we find in this list of cultural heritages, little known if we compare it with that of the UNESCO, a viable tool of *soft power* regional and at the same time a matter of analysis for decolonial studies starting from the transversal element of its composition.

Keywords MERCOSUR cultural · Soft power · Cultural heritage · Decolonial studies · Regional heritage

There is an obvious link between the concept of *power* and *decolonial thought*, if we briefly define the latter as: the flight from the hegemonic bases of *power* to an epistemic alternative from non-hegemonic social groups. Thus, *decolonial thought* confronts *hegemonic power* by exposing the needs of new social configurations, while constructing alternative paths based on historically marginalized epistemologies. Put

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this way, it seems that the limits of this dispute are clear. However, neither the concept of *power*, even less of the exercise of hegemonic *power*, nor the scope of *decolonial thought* are finished matter, on the contrary, they are in constant transformation-expansion.

Over time, the meaning of the concept has expanded beyond these particular decolonisation processes, and now refers to a variety of different ways in which coloniality and hierarchical relations of power that characterize the present world order societies might be undone and replaced in different spheres of contemporary life, including education, media, economy and political systems, as well as science and academic knowledge. (see e.g., Laako, 2016; Seppala et al. 2021, p. 17)

In our view, this is because the ways of exercising *power* are not static, so their confrontation through *decolonial thinking* requires the same constant renewal so it extends, as Seppala points out, to the most diverse circles of life in society. In this way, both the concept and the exercise of *decolonial thought* are in constant renewal, in the same way that happens with the concept of *power* whose understanding and exercise, too, are unfinished matter.

Consequently, while over the centuries many thinkers and writers have offered various definitions of and approaches to the five-letter word, building on their respective predecessors, rejecting some aspects and adopting others, there is still no general agreement of what power is and how it works. (Seppala et al. 2021, p. 25)

Thus, it can be said that *power* has the capacity to take multiple forms. In that sense, during the twentieth century, Bertrand Russell, established the difference between *direct physical power* and *influence on opinion*, while, Joseph Nye, several decades later, will think this difference from the categories of *hard power* and *soft power* (Ohnesorge 2021). So the author separated the coercive power of tools and money from the ability to influence others through cooperative means, from positive persuasion that makes it possible to obtain expected results; in addition Nye identified three resources of soft power: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye 2011, p. 84). To a certain extent, this division makes present the fact that *power* is not condemned to be an exclusivity of hegemonic social groups, i.e., the holders of *hard power*.

However, according to this perspective, Culture as a resource of power, of *soft power*, should not be understood in advance as a “positive” question: “Like any form of power, it can be wielded for good or bad purposes. Hitler, Stalin, and Mao all possessed a great deal of soft power in the eyes of their acolytes, but that did not make it good” (Nye 2011, p. 82).

As an example, consider actions in the field of Culture that may seem “positive”. During the last two decades the fight against the illicit traffic of cultural property found a remedy through the demands for restitution and repatriation of cultural property in Latin America giving shape to a type of *soft power* linked to culture, so that, with the return of the cultural property, the beneficiary state recovers, also, its role as owner and guardian of the cultural heritage of the various social groups attached to its territory. However, we observe that the national administrations in

charge of managing these claims adopt subordinate attitudes during these processes when, for example, they justify and appreciate the forced “guardianship” of their heritage or infringe on their own sovereignty by accepting conditions on the way in which they will take care of the recovered material in the future. Meanwhile, the defendant counterparty justifies the possession of the cultural heritage of others by disqualifying the ability of the counterpart to take care of its own heritage, alleging petty political interests, and even diminishing the importance of the cultural heritage in question (Maurtua 2020).

These contradictions expose the need to compose a contemporary paradigm of cultural heritage from a decolonial perspective that critically addresses the permanences of colonialist thought in the field of Culture, being that these ideas, at present, permeate the institutions linked to the preservation, management, and consumption of cultural heritage, so that the complaints against the illicit trafficking of cultural property and the potential demands that arise for its return have as their main objective the historical reparation of the plundered communities. Because they are the ones who should be the main beneficiaries of their usufruct.

Returning to this example, we confirm that *soft power* is not in itself good or bad, as expressed by Nye, so in our view, in Latin America it will be from a decolonial approach that this ability to attract and influence the opinion of others will favor the construction of a more equitable society.

Also, recalling that Culture is a resource of *soft power*, in this work, we will analyze the actions that the international agency MERCOSUR Cultural has been carrying out in the field of cultural heritage from its Commission on Cultural Heritage, and more specifically, we will analyze, its main achievement, the creation of a list that recognizes from a regional perspective the “tangible and intangible goods as heritage”, that is, the List of Cultural Heritage of Mercosur (LPCM). However, before starting to discuss these issues, it is useful to understand the need to study cultural heritage from a decolonial approach in Latin America. To do this, we begin by explaining what we mean when we point out the existence and continuity of the colonial discourse in the region that would demand the need for this approach.

6.1 It Is Still About the Negation of Rationality

Frantz Fanon (1965) points out that the path to decolonization is to return to the “settler” the rationality that has been denied. In Latin America, there is an urgent need to recognize the current existence of functional, complex, and important structures of thought, whose origin is not Western; despite the obviousness of this statement, the effectiveness of the dissemination of colonialist discourse that discredited indigenous and African worldviews (including the diaspora)—treating them as “irrational”, “proto-rational”, primitive, etc., clarification is necessary.

This denial of rationality in Latin America begins in the fifteenth century, with the beginning of the colonial period in the region from two major processes: the first, consists of activities related to the extraction of resources to move them to

Europe; the second, refers to the beginning of a process of acculturation on oppressed societies. Milton Santos endorses these statements through the recognition of three historical models of territorial organization in Latin America, dedicated to satisfying the interests of the metropolises, which had continuity during the Republican period.¹

On the other hand, the acculturation process was based on the demerit of American cultural expressions from their comparison with the Western cultural model. According to Santos Herceg, the ideas of Juan Gines de Sepúlveda demonstrate this “foundational lack of respect” against native American civilizations.

The latter [Juan Gines de Sepúlveda] is for Latin America the author of what could be called the “foundational” lack of respect, alluding to the reasons that would be behind the right of the Spaniards to conquer in the New World. The fundamental argument of the jurist will be the “undeniable” fact that the inhabitants of this New World were barbarians. This being “barbarians” implies their “clumsiness of understanding” and their “inhuman customs” (1996: 82–83). These “little men” – as he calls them – on the one hand, lack culture, science, writing, history, have no written laws, which demonstrates their lack of rationality (1996: 105–113) and, on the other hand, they are anthropophagous, they make human sacrifices, they have impious cults of idols, which proves that their customs are inhuman (1996: 133). From there the war of conquest would be rationally justified. (Santos 2010, p. 140)

In the same way it happens, in the case of the indigenous populations in Latin American and the new social groups that were formed from the arrival of Africans enslaved. Through a strategy of denial of African humanity, as Santos Herceg explains:

This strategy of denial of humanity has its origin in an inferiorization of the African that, better than in anyone, is reflected in Hegel’s words about Africa: blacks have not yet developed a consciousness of objectivity, they represent the natural man in his greatest degree of barbarism and violence, characterized fundamentally by being “untamed”. so they have no possible salvation. The African is, according to Hegel, “a man in the rough. [...] This way of being of Africans explains why it is so extraordinarily easy to fanaticize them” (1995: 198–201, Cf.: 218, 231–234). (Santos 2010, p. 140)

Thus, backed by the discourse of modernity and progress. “Progress is set in motion and expands, as a practice and theory, from the West to the whole world” (Burga 2005, p. 42), the acculturation process did not end with the beginning of the Republican period, since the idea of Western superiority remained in the American imaginary. Indeed, the changes caused by the independence processes did not affect the racist social structure formed during this period. Because the educated elite emulated and spread ideas that marginalized the bulk of the populations, indigenous and black, of the former colonies. Thus, they were separated from national political projects because they were, according to them, bearers of the backwardness caused by their degenerate races.

The institutionalization of prejudice against these populations is evidenced in recent political discourses as we will detail below. But what should we understand by prejudice? According to Allport: “Prejudice is defined as a hostile attitude toward a group, which is based on false, simplistic, exaggeratedly generalized or unconscious beliefs” (1954 apud Thorp and Paredes 2011).

¹ For more information see: “Ensaio About A Urbanização Latin American”.

In that sense, we highlight statements by political candidates for the presidency or presidents of Latin American states, who during times of electoral contestation or during social conflicts used the old discourse of degenerate races to justify attacks against indigenous peoples and African matrix in the region.

In 2017, Jair Bolsonaro, ex-president of Brazil, as an electoral promise, declared: You can be sure that if I get there, there will be no money for the NGO (...). There will not be a centimeter demarcated for an indigenous reserve or for a quilombola. Where there is an indigenous land, there is wealth underneath it (VEJA 2017). In addition to the kilombos, he said: “I went to a quilombo. The lightest African descendant there weighed seven arrobas (arropa is a measure used to weigh cattle; each one is equivalent to 15 kg). They don’t do anything. I don’t think it’s even useful for breeders anymore. More than BRL 1 billion a year is spent on them” (VEJA 2017). In addition, it should be mentioned that currently the ex-president of Brazil Jair Bolsonaro is being investigated “for crimes of genocide” against the Yanomami population.

For his part, Alan García who was twice president of Peru (1985–1990/2006–2011) in 2009 made statements to the detriment of the Amazonian peoples Awajún, Wampis and Shawis, who at that time had been protesting for a month against the promulgation of Legislative Decrees (DL) 1064(4) and 1090(5) which favored extractive companies. On June 5, García said:

It’s good enough for these people [referring to indigenous populations]. These people have no crown, these people are not first-class citizens who can say 400,000 natives to 28 million Peruvians: you have no right to come this way. In no way is that a very serious mistake and whoever thinks that way wants to lead us to irrationality and primitive regression in the past. (VILLANUEVA 2019, online resource)

On the same day the Peruvian army entered the Awajún territory to end the strike by force, the official result of this action was 10 Awajún Indians killed and 40 wounded, in addition to 23 fallen policemen. However, according to the Awajúns themselves, “more than ten indigenous people were killed, and their bodies disappeared, throwing them into the Amazon River” (SERVINDI 2019). According to the Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Jungle, the real toll was more than 40 natives killed, including two children and 155 wounded.

The aforementioned attacks are examples of the attacks currently suffered by indigenous and African populations in Latin America, they also represent a sign of the institutionalization of a prejudice based on colonialist marginalization. And, finally, they are permanences of a process of secular acculturation that has not stopped and that must be confronted from *decolonial thought*.

Grounding these continuities in the field of culture and more specifically on the creation of a list of heritage from various countries requires analyzing the List of World Heritage Sites of the UNESCO. For its role as a predecessor of this type of initiative and for being, from our perspective, a means for the continuity of the remnants of the colonialist discourse that threatens historically subalternized societies.

6.2 The UNESCO World Heritage List

At the end of World War II, in the face of material devastation, the letter written in the city of San Francisco was ratified, an action with which the United Nations Organization was officially inaugurated as an associated sub-organization the UNESCO is created; with the aim of strengthening links between societies and nations through “intercultural understanding through the protection of heritage and support for cultural diversity”.

However, the first participation of the American States in UNESCO meetings took place in 1964, almost 20 years after the inauguration of the institution and more than 30 years after the first conference in favor of the conservation of the world’s artistic and archaeological heritage, which gave rise to the Athens Charter (1931). On the occasion, Mexico and Peru were summoned to express their concerns, exclusively, about cultural property of colonial origin (Choay 2015, p. 34).

We can certainly point out that in the seventies, the UNESCO carried out its most important intervention in the field of cultural heritage with the creation of a World Heritage List during the convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage of 1972. This list involves the realization of a catalog and an exclusive fund of heritage declared of universal interest, divided into the categories of cultural and natural heritage. The first group included the ensembles of architectural constructions, architectural, archeological monuments, etc. The second group considered the natural monuments and geological formations that constituted the habitat of endangered species; also, by the strictly delimited places and natural areas.

However, in 1992, Mechtild Rössler, current Director of the UNESCO World Heritage Center, in recognition of the unequal relationships in the list of world heritages, argued that the integration of the category of cultural landscape to the World Heritage List was an attempt to solve the omission suffered by “local and indigenous cultures” (Rössler 2002). Because the spaces with cultural values were classified as natural heritages since the categories of natural heritage and cultural heritage did not meet the needs of non-European spaces. It should be perceived that, in the absence of a category with criteria that considered the characteristics of indigenous cultural heritage, it was impossible to register it in the list of World Heritage Sites, thus continuing to exercise the old colonialist practices that by conviction or omission threaten the existence of indigenous societies, now, established in the international field of cultural heritage.

Returning to the debate that prompted the creation of the cultural landscape category, it should be noted that a year later, at the meeting in Schorfeide (Germany) aimed at evaluating the functionality of the three categories (natural heritage, cultural heritage, and cultural landscape) throughout the world, they did not convene any representative from the Latin American and Caribbean region, negligence that Rössler herself recognized (Rössler 2002).

In this same period, the late 80s and early 90s, i.e., almost two decades after the creation of the World Heritage List, UNESCO, which to date had concentrated its

efforts on the protection of tangible cultural heritage, began a phase in which it will amend more strongly this first monumentalism segregating approach, introducing intangible cultural expressions to the debate until the creation of a parallel list.

To this end, in 1989, the recommendation on the safeguarding of traditional culture and folklore was created, which defined “traditional and popular culture” as part of the universal heritage of humanity, pointing to its importance for the affirmation of “cultural identity” and the rapprochement of social groups. In this document, traditional and popular culture is defined as: “the set of creations emanating from a cultural community founded on tradition, expressed by a group or individuals and which recognize the expectations of the community as an expression of its cultural and social identity” (UNESCO 1989). In addition, it adds that: “norms and values are transmitted orally, by imitation or in other ways. Its forms include, among others, language, literature, music, dance, games, mythology, rites, customs, crafts, architecture, and other arts” (idem).

However, it will not be until 2003, through the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, that two lists are created: Representative list of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity and the list of intangible cultural heritage in need of urgent safeguarding. Belatedly attending to the demands of countries like Brazil, which had faced more than a decade ago the prevailing need to recognize the cultural expressions of social groups segregated by the scheme of monumentality and European art.

Today, the UNESCO list presents a clear imbalance when we compare the number of sites declared as World Heritage compared with those declared in Latin America. Likewise, three decades after the creation of the cultural landscape category, an analysis by region reveals the same inequality. In addition, the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003), which was considered as: “the first significant change in the cultural field that does not refer only to historical experience and Western jurisprudence” (Poulot 2017, p. 120). Arguing that the new emphasis on intangible heritage would reverse the unequal distribution of assets declared of global interest has not yielded the expected results in Latin America, although there is a shift in favor of Asian countries.

The above issues briefly showed the process that developed the UNESCO World Heritage Lists, in relation to the delayed process of inclusion of cultural heritage in Latin America. Due to what in our view represents a Eurocentric orientation that needed several decades to expand its horizons and that even so today has not overcome its limitations even though it aims to be a representative list of global character since its creation.

6.3 The MERCOSUR List of Cultural Heritage (LPCM)

Since 1995, MERCOSUR Cultural has been in charge of the block agenda in the field of culture, through its twelve permanent work instances. But it will not be until 2012 that the Common Market Council decided to create the category of Cultural

Heritage of MERCOSUR (PCM) and inscribe the cultural assets recognized in the List of Cultural Heritage of MERCOSUR (LPCM).²

This new list presents differences compared with its predecessor that is obvious, while the list of World Heritage of UNESCO was born in consideration of the danger of loss that fell on a select group of heritages and, therefore, as a resource for their conservation. The LPCM saw the regional cultural heritage not as an object to be rescued but rather for its potential on the road to the integration of Latin America, considering:

That cultural heritage contributes to the recognition and enhancement of regional cultural identity.

That cultural property constitutes elements of understanding of references, principles and values present and shared among the countries of the region.

That the recognition of a cultural asset beyond the borders of a country represents an important factor for regional integration. (MERCOSUR 2013)

This fact will influence another of its differences in relation to the selection criteria of cultural heritage. The World Heritage List of the United States presents ten selection criteria that address ideas such as “raw work”, “last testimony”, “singularity”, “unique human settlements”, “works with universal values”, “aesthetic importance”, etc.—without counting the criteria of the list of intangible cultural heritage of this organization. Meanwhile, the LPCM focuses on exclusively identifying cultural heritage that serve as bridges and windows of regional dialogue. This fact is reflected in the conditions necessary for the inclusion of the good, whether tangible or intangible:

- (a) manifests values associated with historical processes linked to movements of self-determination or common expression of the region before the world;
- (b) express the efforts of unity among the countries of the region;
- (c) is directly related to cultural references shared by more than one country in the region;
- (d) constitute a factor in promoting the integration of countries, with a view to a common destiny.

A third difference should be noted in this regard. The LPCM, does not continue with the traditional division between tangible and intangible heritage, overcoming the delayed process of UNESCO about the recognition of intangible heritage. Because although the LPCM is much more recent than its predecessor, the latter still maintains a clear division between tangible and intangible heritage, grouping them into different lists or special categories such as cultural landscape as we observed above.

However, the most striking difference between one list and another is undoubtedly that the LPCM includes common heritage among its MERCOSUR member countries, thus distinguishing the regional cultural heritage as a whole. From a decolonial perspective, this singularity corrects to some extent the consequences of colonialist distribution, bringing together the cultural heritage of indigenous social groups and

² Approving to this end the Regulation for the Recognition of Cultural Heritage of MERCOSUR” and attributing its application to the Commission on Cultural Heritage (CPC).

the African diaspora, even evoking independence times, always based on a recognition that unites the memories of the past and the present. It is therefore appropriate to review the cultural heritages inscribed in the LPCM.

6.4 Cultural Heritage Registered in the LPCM

To date, the LPCM registers eight cultural heritages within its five Mercosur member states: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. Among these, Venezuela has suspended activities and Bolivia is in the accession process; the scope of these recognitions of cultural heritage transcends the borders of these countries towards some of their associated states such as Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru and even reaches other Latin American countries further north.

The eight cultural heritage sites of MERCOSUR, the year of their inclusion, and countries in which they maintain a presence, respectively, are: (1) The Barón de Mauá International Bridge, 2013 (Uruguay-Brazil); (2) La Payada/La Paya 2015 (Uruguay, Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Mexico); (3) Itinerary of the Guaraní, Moxos and Chiquitos Jesuit Missions 2015 (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay); (4) Mercosur-Montevideo Building 2016 (Uruguay); (5) Chamamé 2017 (Argentina and Brazil); (6) Cumbes, Quilombos and Palenques 2017 (Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia); (7) Guaraní Cultural Universe 2017 (Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile) and (8) The Cultural System of Yerba Mate 2018 (Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile).

With “presence” of the PCM we refer to the fact that these patrimonies exist, either materially, as in the case of the Barón de Mauá International Bridge located between the border of Uruguay and Brazil, or intangibly as in the case of Yerba Mate, consumed in six countries; or as in the itinerary of the Jesuit Missions Guaraníes, Moxos and Chiquitos that presents “ethnographic, historical, landscape, urban, architectural, artistic and archaeological values” (MERCOSUR 2013) throughout five countries. This clarification is not an attempt to divide heritage into material, intangible, or suggest a mixture of both, but rather to consider the unique characteristics of each. As we mentioned earlier, in our view, the LPCM was born having already overcome the old debate, which gave greater importance to tangible heritage by disregarding the existence and importance of intangible heritage, by including them in a single list. Although it should be noted that LPCM candidacies differentiate between:

cultural goods of a material nature, more specifically real estate, urban or rural complexes, natural sites, cultural landscapes, cultural itineraries and archaeological and paleontological sites

cultural goods of a material nature, more specifically movable property, collections and archaeological and paleontological objects

cultural goods of an intangible nature, more specifically celebrations, knowledge, forms of expression, places and languages. (MERCOSUR 2013, p. 8–9)

This differentiation will establish the limits of cultural goods of a material nature, will locate movable collections, as well as the contexts of the location of intangible cultural property, guaranteeing for the last two cases the description of “access and conditions of appropriation”.

These requirements will be reflected in the dossier of the candidacy, in accordance with the regulation for the recognition of cultural heritage of MERCOSUR, while for all categories of cultural property it is required: (1) Name of the property, (2) Location, (3) Owner(s) or responsible(s) for the property, (4) Justification, (5) Legal protection, (6) Guidelines. Although, there is no parameter that determines the exhaustiveness of presentation of this information so that we find dossiers with less than twenty pages to those that exceed one hundred. In this sense, we can assume that the greater the details, the information such as how the cultural property would be managed would be clearer.

These candidatures are prepared by one or more of the states parties, whether associated with one or more of the associated states for submission to the MERCOSUR Commission on Cultural Heritage. Next, we will review three of these candidacies, these being: The Barón de Mauá International Bridge, La Payada/La Paya, and the Yerba Mate Cultural System. This choice corresponds to the ease of access to the dossiers of these candidacies; however, they are a good example of diversity of cultural heritages inscribed in the LPCM.

6.5 The Barón de Mauá International Bridge (Uruguay-Brazil)

Brazil and Uruguay share a past of colonial domination by different metropolises, an event that triggered a subsequent Brazilian occupation in eastern lands that gave way to a unique exchange of economic and political interests that resulted in the construction of the Barón de Mauá International Bridge: “*Bridge built through union efforts between two countries of the region, which, in the past, was financed due to a war division, and which symbolizes today an asset of peace*” (MERCOSUR 2013, p. 90).

Located between the Municipality of Yaguarón, Brazil, and the Department of Cerro Largo, in the Municipality of Rio Branco, Uruguay and: “*built on the Jaguarão River, between 1927 and 1930, to link the cities of Jaguarão, not Brazil, and Rio Branco, not Uruguay. First work erected between the countries of the region*” (idem).

The Barón de Mauá International Bridge was the first cultural asset included in the LPCM (2013) during the Pro Tempore Presidency of Uruguay.³ The nomination of this, according to the offices responsible for cultural heritage in Brazil

³ Although, the oldest recognition as a National Monument (Decree-Law number 25/1937), took place in Brazil, seven years after the completion of the work, in 1937; for its part, in Uruguay this recognition was given several decades later in 1971 (National Historic Monument/MHN, Law Number 14.040/1971). Also, in 2012, the Brazilian government registered it in the “livro do Cop

and Uruguay, responds to its condition of: “*witness of the particular binational cross-border dynamics, as well as a symbol of the vocation of integration between the countries of the region*” (idem), commitment to the development of common management and the observation of cultural heritage: “*as a tool for social inclusion and as a motor for territorial development*” (idem).

The candidacy of this bridge represents the intention of most Latin American States in relation to building economic, political, social, and cultural ties, being that: “*Cultural heritage constitutes a part of this vision, understanding culture in its integrative capacity to promote sustainable development*” (MERCOSUR 2013, p. 89). This will of the Brazilian and Uruguayan state makes sense in the common intention to improve the living conditions of their populations and to promote a “regional cultural identity”.

Thus, MERCOSUR Cultural heritage assets should be those assets that tend to the integration of peoples, that recognize the processes of social inclusion, that serve as an example for thought and action in the region and that can be observed with admiration, installing them if in the imaginary constructed in our countries. (MERCOSUR 2013, p. 90)

In this sense, the candidacy of the bridge contemplates the urban fabric of the polygon of action and comes to the care of: “*Luso-Brazilian architecture, eclectic architecture from the end of the 19th century and vernacular architecture*” (MERCOSUR 2013, p. 99). It also considers the natural floodable area on the eastern side important for recreation, education, and research. In addition, part of its management guidelines contemplates citizen participation actions.

The dossier of the candidacy The Barón de Mauá International Bridge shows the effort and commitment of the representatives of both countries in the registration of the property in question, in compliance with the requirements of the PCM regulation present a management proposal that, establishes the limits and contexts of the property, as well as the management guidelines for urban and environmental preservation, citizen participation, research, awareness and promotion of this cultural heritage.

As mentioned above, in our view, the patrimonies inscribed in this regional list have the capacity to positively impact the realities of indigenous populations and African matrix either through their valorization as elements in Latin American history or in a practical way from actions in defense of this heritage that come to favor these social groups, as long as they are guided by decolonial criticism and, even more, when we consider as expressed by Nye that culture is indeed a resource of *the soft power*. The inscription of this good comes to extend this potential impact to other social groups, because it is a modern construction, a debt of war, a symbol of the need for integration of the past and the present. Therefore, it is more than anything a way of twinning countries with a complex past based on the construction of a regional identity.

Historic”, “Livro do Cop Ethnographic Archaeological and Landscape” and “livro do Cop das Artes Aplicadas”.

6.6 La Payada/La Paya

The second good registered in the LPCM was registered in June 2015 during the Pro Tempore presidency of Brazil. With this good, the LPCM becomes a space for the recognition of indigenous cultural expressions as one of the possible social groups that contributed to its creation. The Payada⁴ represents various forms of improvised singing that according to the dossier of the candidacy appears before the constitution of the states in the region (s. XVIII) and is similar to the states of MERCOSUR.

The Uruguayan musicologist, Coriúm Aharonián, expresses that La Payada could have received very diverse contributions, for example: the troubadour art of Occitania, those of culture of the Arab Muslim empire, those of the griots of Aguisimbia or Sub-Saharan Africa, or also of the indigenous cultures of America, the Alpujarra trovo and the Cuban repentismo (MERCOSUR 2015, p. 3)

Different from the recognition of a material asset such as the Barón de Mauá International Bridge, the material nature of the Payada extends its location to “the peoples of Latin America”, this question already presents us with the particular importance of intangible heritage in the constitution of a “regional identity” mentioned, also, in the dossier of the previous good. At the same time, it recognizes the singularities inherent in the production of this heritage by so many and diverse social groups. “*There are repentista singers of mestizo culture in territories as varied as Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, Peru, northeastern Brazil, and Chile. The phenomenon extends throughout almost all of Latin America, with varied denominations: troveros, troubadours, repentistas, copleros, etc.*” (MERCOSUR 2015, p. 4).

On the occasion the presence of the art of the Payada was concentrated in the area of Río de la Plata that brings together the countries of Uruguay and Argentina, in these areas the producers of this tradition are known as Payadores: “*The Payador is a poet-singer who intones verses improvising them on a poetic reed, with rhyme and at the same time on a musical scheme, which is usually a pre-established melodic formula. It is accompanied by a guitar*” (MERCOSUR 2015, p. 5).

Another interesting element of this tradition points to its omnipresent presence in the region during emancipatory conflicts and, later, during episodes of dictatorship, in these complex contexts La Payada was a vehicle to publicize messages that exalted ideas about democracy and freedom.

On the other hand, this tradition previously reserved for men since 1970 introduces female artists and today has young representatives and “includes references, principles and values present among our countries, expresses the efforts of Mercosur union, in an expression of identity of the region before the world, which reminds us of our shared origin” (MERCOSUR 2015, p. 8).

⁴ La Payada has several recognitions both in Argentina and Uruguay. In that sense, in 2010 Uruguay recognized “The Art of the Payador” as intangible cultural heritage. Argentina for its declaration on different occasions “The Day of the Payador” and in 2012 Deliberative, declares the Payada as intangible cultural heritage of the party of San Vicente (Resolution No. 576 of the Honorable Deliberative Council).

Regarding their management plan, the states propose varied and integrated activities, with institutional support in communication with the Payadores, as well as emphasis on the dissemination of these activities to promote the integration of new repositories of the tradition. This communication aims to raise general awareness among the population about the need to safeguard La Payada.

The dossier of La Payada, is a short document that, unlike the previous dossier, does not allow us to access detail how the management of this cultural asset will happen. And, however, it presents us with another element that guides the use of cultural heritage as an integrating element of the region when it repairs the use of Payada during emancipatory periods and in moments of risk for democracy to spread a message that exalted the values of freedom and democracy. Considering that to create a dialogue it is necessary to start with the recognition of the meeting points, La Payada present during these episodes acts as a reminder of its existence; thus contributing to the construction of a regional identity. It is also worth mentioning that the recognition of the contributions of historically subordinate populations such as indigenous peoples in Latin America in a cultural heritage that is currently not linked to it at first sight is also a valuable element to exploit in these candidacies whose main objective is regional integration.

6.7 The Cultural System of Yerba Mate

The seventh cultural patrimony entered the LPCM in 2018 during the Pro Tempore Presidency of Uruguay. This candidacy proposed the concept of “system” to refer to consumption, social significance, production, and processing techniques, as well as the universe of objects related to Yerba Mate in recognition of its historical and cultural value in the region.

Under the name of Cultural System of Yerba Mate, material and immaterial components are contemplated, among which are mentioned the modalities of use and forms of consumption; cultural identity traits linked to practices; the round of mate and tereré; traditional production; the techniques of elaboration of objects associated with use and production. (Dossier, 2018, p. 1)

This herb is native to three countries in the region: Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil; however, it is also consumed in Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile. Being in Paraguay the most consumed drink; this species of Yerba Mate is known as yerba de los Jesuitas or KA A.⁵

Yerba mate (*ilex paraguariensis* or ka'a), is a vegetable whose consumption dates back to the night of time, ka'a was par excellence a plant used in Guaraní rituals, who considered it a magical plant, which allowed it to communicate with the gods and in its origins, its consumption was only reserved for shamans. According to a Guaraní legend, the use of

⁵ The Yerba Mate has several recognitions, among this, in Paraguay it was declared cultural heritage and national drink (Law 4261/2011), the Pohaña (medicinal type of Yerba Mate) was recognized Intangible Cultural Heritage to the Culture of Pohaña of Paraguay (SNC Resolution N° 994/2014).

yerba was taught to them by the famous Pa'i Tumé or Santo Tomé, a white man who came on mission to these lands many years before the arrival of the Spaniards. (MERCOSUR 2018, p. 5)

During the colonial period the Jesuits became interested in this plant that existed in its natural state and was collected by the Guarani Indians. This due to its stimulating properties, so they encouraged its production ensuring with this an increase in the hours of work to which the Guarani were subjected and for being a substitute for alcohol; from the intervention of the Jesuits in the production and consumption of Yerba Mate its use is popularized: “from Paraguay and the Jesuit Missions to almost all the southern regions of South America” (MERCOSUR 2018, p. 7). By the beginning of the twentieth century the plantations of Yerba Mate in Paraguay were organized.

This candidacy represents the recognition of a cultural heritage of indigenous origin whose popularization takes place due to the search for means for Guarani exploitation, this issue is little elaborated in the candidacy of the good, being rather enlivened by the role of the Jesuits in the subsequent massification of the production of Yerba Mate. Even so, the dossier justifies the candidacy based on the importance of the transmission of knowledge from the Guaraní worldview for Paraguayan and regional identity.

6.8 Final Considerations

Let's start with the fact that *decolonization* is a process in constant transformation as well as the discourse of *power* that it faces. This issue becomes evident in the field of cultural heritage when we question mechanisms that have gained notoriety such as the demands for restitution and repatriation of cultural property because they are seen as ways of restoring the dignity of peoples plundered during schemes of domination and that nevertheless continue to repeat paternalistic schemes that question the very capacity of states to manage their own patrimony.

For this reason, we affirm that the paths of decoloniality do not walk in a straight line but rather zigzag before the adequacy of hegemonic power discourses and subaltern behaviors. Likewise, the concept of *power*, also, has been adopting multiple meanings, during the last century, among these stand out its ability to influence through persuasion; called by Nye as *soft power*, to which this author attributes culture as a resource or a means to seduce the other. However, this ability to influence the other is neither good nor bad. On the other hand, before beginning to articulate a debate on *decolonial thinking* and *soft power*, we find it pertinent to discuss the remnants of hegemonic discourses based on colonialist ideas that recently justified attacks against indigenous and black populations treating them as “degenerate races”. Having identified the background of the problems facing *decolonial thinking* in the region, we set out to think about the use of these concepts associated with the reality of Latin American cultural assets.

Therefore, we articulate a discussion around the MERCOSUR List of Cultural Heritage, which compared with its predecessor the UNESCO World Heritage List, presented differences in relation to the objective of its existence, the criteria for choosing the cultural property, the integration of tangible and intangible heritage, and the transversal regional origin of these assets. On the choice to integrate tangible and intangible cultural heritages into a single list, we point to progress toward the recognition of intangible heritage that escapes, to some extent, the ultra-outdated European monumentalist vision. Also, in our view, regional intangible heritage is of particular importance since it more easily encompasses a greater number of countries involved with the recognized cultural asset. So, its integrating strength starts from this advantage.

Finally, we note the diversity of patrimonies that make up the LPCM, which, as expected, meet the criteria set by MERCOSUR, i.e., they are material for the creation of a regional cultural identity. Among some reasons, for: constituting examples of ways to overcome the regional conflicts of old conflicts, appealing to a regional brotherhood; for championing moments of strong turmoil such as the emancipatory process in Latin America or, later, dictatorial processes; and for being a means for the dissemination of indigenous worldviews. These are the reasons that drive reflection on the constitution of a Latin American *soft power* oriented by this constant process of formation and scope of decolonial thinking on the goods registered in the LPCM.

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Chapter 7

Heritage Diplomacy Matters? Brazil's Foreign Policy and South–South Cooperation in Cultural Heritage



Gilberto M. A. Rodrigues and Tadeu Morato Maciel

Abstract Cultural diplomacy had an important role in Brazil's foreign policy in the last decades. This role has been strengthened by the expansion of Brazil's external projection in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The greater diversification of Brazil's international agenda was, in part, made possible by the increase in South–South cooperation as a Brazilian foreign policy strategy. In the same period, the work of the Ministry of Culture (and other governmental and non-governmental actors in the cultural area) became almost inseparable from the actions in the cultural sphere carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, in the second decade of the twenty-first century there was a gradual breakdown of this expansion, culminating in the freezing of these actions during the Bolsonaro administration (2018–2022). Based on this context, this study aims to analyze the Brazilian South–South cooperation in cultural heritage between 2003 and 2022. The importance conferred by cultural diplomacy in Brazilian foreign policy will be discussed. Some projects in which Brazil was a provider of bilateral cooperation on issues of cultural heritage (during Lula's and Dilma's governments) will also be presented. Changes implemented in the diplomacy of the Temer's and Bolsonaro's governments will be analyzed. The authors explore the hypothesis that heritage diplomacy matters for Brazil's foreign policy despite its growing decline since 2016.

Keywords Cultural heritage · Cultural assets · Brazilian foreign policy · South–South cooperation · Cultural diplomacy

An essential element of cultural themes in the foreign policy of several countries in recent years is the relevance gained by the concepts of cultural heritage and cultural assets. In a global scenario in which the inflation of heritage assets is advancing

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(Choay 2001), debates on the subject have gone beyond the conservation practices of the material result of historical heritage. International relations' actors in the field have given more attention to topics such as the repatriation of cultural goods; discussions on the economy of culture and the creative economy; the destruction of cultural heritage in conflict scenarios; the training of professional experts in the field of cultural heritage; the increase in studies and actions promoted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); as well as the establishment of common international criteria and policies for heritage and cultural goods.

Foreign policy strategies are increasingly aware of these debates. For example, there is a more assertive understanding that cultural diversity needs international cooperation mechanisms that guarantee, among other issues, a balance in the international exchange of cultural assets and services and the recognition of the rights of traditional populations over their knowledge (Oliveira 2014). Gradually, debates that emphasize the relation between cultural heritage and their public utility were expanded (Vives 2007).

However, the diffusion of cultural heritage to a large part of society is still limited, and there is an urgent need for cultural policies that guarantee access and usufruct of production related to this subject. As Throsby (2001) warns, in addition to the economic issue, there are values (aesthetic, spiritual, social, historical, symbolic) that for a long time were neglected in the definitions of cultural assets. Issues such as citizenship, public policies, cultural rights and socioeconomic development need to be more connected to discussions on cultural heritage. Based on this context, this research aims analyzing the recent Brazil's diplomacy in cultural assets and heritage.

According to Article 216 of the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988, the cultural heritage is composed of tangible and intangible goods, carrying reference to identity, action, memory, ways of creating and living of different groups in Brazilian society. This definition is in line with the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, ratified by Brazil in March 2003, which defines as intangible heritage: "the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage" (UNESCO 2003, p. 4).

Brazil has expanded its know-how in the management of heritage and cultural assets, providing knowledge and experience that can be useful for other countries. In addition, the country has a vast cultural heritage in common with several of its international partners. Attempts to expand Brazil's external projection and diversify its international agenda highlighted the cooperation offered in matters of cultural goods as a strategy of Brazilian foreign policy. Although the cultural dimension does not receive the same attention as other themes that guide Brazil's international insertion (Cervo 1992; Suppo 2003; Milani 2018), at the beginning of the twenty-first century this issue gained more space as an option for a more holistic foreign policy.

The expansion of Brazil's external projection and the diversification of its international agenda at the beginning of the twenty-first century were influenced by the increase of South–South cooperation as a strategy of Brazilian foreign policy. In the

same period, the efforts of the Ministry of Culture (and other governmental and non-governmental actors) became inseparable from actions in the cultural sphere carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hence, there was a potential synergy between Brazil's foreign policy strategies, especially regarding South–South cooperation actions, and its interest in cultural goods and heritage.

Thus, the authors propose an analysis of Brazilian South–South cooperation on issues of cultural assets and heritage between 2003 and 2022, during the governments of Lula da Silva (2003–2010), Dilma Rousseff (2010–2016), Michel Temer (2016–2018) and Jair Bolsonaro (2018–2022). The scope of cultural diplomacy in Brazilian foreign policy in that period is discussed as well as some bilateral cooperation projects on cultural assets and heritage presented. The authors' hypothesis is that cultural diplomacy matters for Brazil's foreign policy despite its decline since 2016. A case study of the association between cultural assets/heritage and international relations completes the article.

7.1 Culture and International Relations

The current dynamics of the multifaceted phenomenon of globalization demonstrate the centrality of culture in contemporary times. This statement does not exclude the essentiality of cultural issues in other historical periods. However, the ways in which modern societies are organized enable a growing demand for economic and cultural exchanges (Ribeiro 2011). One of the most visible characteristics of the contemporary world is the fact that culture moves beyond the borders of the cultural field, inserting itself in other dimensions of social life. Multiculturalism, interculturalism and hybridism, as well as the advancement of information technologies in areas such as communications, service production and transport, have expanded the role of culture in the world dynamics. Nowadays, culture has gained space in the collection of the so-called high politics, alongside vital themes for relations between States, such as foreign policy, trade, development and security (Oliveira 2014).

The cultural element received greater attention from International Relations analysts during the second half of the twentieth century. Marcel Merle (1981) was one of the first authors to emphasize the importance of the cultural dimension for understanding international relations. From the 1980s onward, post-positivist perspectives (such as critical theory, constructivism and postcolonialism) in the field of International Relations Theories (Lapid 1989), also broadened the debate about culture as an important element for understanding the influence established by the various actors in the international arena. In the same period, there was the emergence of important debates involving culture and power in the field of traditionalist International Relations Theories, as was the case of the “soft power” concept, proposed by Joseph

Nye (2004),¹ or the controversial debate on the “clash of civilizations”, proposed by Samuel Huntington (1994).²

In the mid-80s, there was a broad development of the economy of culture, with the expansion of the global market of symbolic-cultural goods and services. This production represented more than 7% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) in the mid-2000s (UNESCO 2005). At the same time, the perception that the cultural factor would become a matter of influence and friction among international actors also increased. In this context, governments have reinforced their ability to use cultural elements as a way of international insertion, which includes the dissemination of their values, ideals and power projects.

Thus, cultural productions are not only carried out with a focus on the internal public, but also have the potential of transmitting a positive image of the country abroad, supporting more favorable power relations at the global level. “The cultural prestige of a country is a basic component of soft power whose importance is fundamental for the construction of an international image favorable to national interests” (Soares 2008, p. 56). Such dynamics demand from diplomacy the task of reflecting on new perspectives for action, with emphasis on the cultural element. There is a growing interest, both from state institutions and non-governmental organizations, in the cultural diplomacy carried out by states in recent years. The analysis of cultural diplomacies can contribute to a deeper understanding of their international insertion strategy. Therefore, political and economic purposes are decisive when a State uses culture (heritage, assets, services, practices, values) in its foreign policy.

Edgar Telles Ribeiro (2011, p. 33), a Brazilian diplomat expert in cultural diplomacy, says that “cultural diplomacy refers to the specific use of the cultural relationship to achieve national objectives that are not restricted to culture, but are also political, commercial and economic goals”. Thus, cultural diplomacy refers to the use of “cultural factors to achieve objectives related to foreign policy, assuming the achievement of goals established by a certain national development project and/or international projection” (Lessa et al. 2011, p. 97). From this perspective, the difference between the terms cultural imperialism and cultural diplomacy is highlighted. “The former tries to manipulate and reduce the existence of other cultures; this is a legitimate foreign policy instrument available to countries to make themselves known, understood and even admired by others” (Rodrigues 2009, p. 115).

International cooperation can be considered one of the essential instruments for the implementation of cultural diplomacy strategies. Indeed, cooperation in the cultural sphere gains emphasis as an expression of soft power in international relations. For many countries in the Global South, for example, this type of cooperation would facilitate the connection of regions, populations, mentalities and ways of life, in addition to opening up opportunities for political and economic actions by States

¹ From Nye’s perspective, soft power means “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and national and foreign policies” (Nye 2005, p. 11).

² In the book “The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order”, Samuel Huntington (1994) argues that, in the post-Cold War period, the predominant sources of conflict would be of a cultural nature, and no longer for essentially ideological or economic reasons.

(Froio 2010). The different forms of cultural cooperation could avoid stereotyped views about other societies, contributing to the demystification of the “other” and elucidating similarities and differences among multiple social realities.

Several Global South countries use South–South cooperation (SSC) as an important tool for international insertion (Kraychete and Milani 2022). In this scenario, cultural cooperation in the South–South context is considered an indispensable instrument for deepening the reciprocal recognition of common challenges between Global South countries. In contemporary times, the lack of knowledge of the sociocultural reality of other countries tends to inhibit the establishment of relationships based on reciprocal confidence. The identification of common advances and challenges in the cultural field would allow countries to link their rich historical, economic, political and social experiences through cultural cooperation projects.

Hence, it is important to verify whether Brazil has combined its South–South cooperation in the field of culture, specifically in cultural assets, with a more autonomous international insertion strategy. It is worth analyzing, therefore, whether Brazil has used international cooperation as a way of demonstrating a real interest in identifying and strengthening cultural affinities with other countries in the Global South.

7.2 The Role of Culture in Brazilian Foreign Policy

Despite the limitations for culture to ascend as a central element of State policy (Cervo 1992; Ribeiro 2011; Suppo 2003), the role of culture in foreign policy evolved during the 2000s. During this period, the function of culture was emphasized as a constituent element of a country's national identity and an important part of its project of international insertion. At the same time, culture was also perceived as a fundamental issue for Brazilian socioeconomic development. In his speech at the launch ceremony of the Brazilian Film and Audiovisual Program, in 2003, President Lula (2003–2010) said that culture should be seen “in all its dimensions, from the symbolic to the economic”, which would also be “invested with a strategic role, in the sense of building a more socially fairer country and our sovereign affirmation in the world” (Ferreira 2010).

These presidential guidelines provided a stimulus for Brazilian cultural diplomacy, in line with a broader plan for the insertion and affirmation of the country in international relations. In operational terms, such positioning resulted not only in the dissemination of national culture abroad, but also in actions to preserve cultural assets and defend cultural plurality. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs retained a central role both in disseminating Brazilian culture and in attracting partnerships that would contribute to build a cultural policy that would assist in the socioeconomic development of the country.

The originality of this position was not only due to the interest of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) in the subject. During the governments of Getúlio Vargas (1934–1945; 1951–1954), for example, there was already a commitment to exploring

the relationship between culture and foreign policy. However, during the governments of Lula da Silva (2003–2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016), both from the Worker's Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*—the most important leftist party in Brazil), there was an attempt to intensify the relationship between culture and foreign relations, aiming to search for new areas of action, with new actors involved in this process. Evidence of this dynamic was the closer connection between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture (MinC) in the formulation and execution of Brazilian cultural diplomacy. Another evidence was the presence of themes related to cultural assets and heritage in international cooperation actions in which Brazil participated as a partner.

The Ministry of Culture, working in areas within its competence, such as the national culture policy and the protection of historical and cultural heritage, played a prominent role in the field of cultural diplomacy. Some actions of the Lula government serve as example, such as the presence in several international platforms: in the International Network of Cultural Policies (RIPC), in favor of the approval of the UNESCO convention; in the Agenda for Development, aiming to establish a program within the framework of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); in the creation of the Mercosur Cultural seal and in the Specialized Meeting of Cinema and Audiovisual of Mercosur (RECAM); in the Conference of Intellectuals of Africa and the Diaspora (CIAD); in the Inter-American Commission on Culture of the OAS and in the creation of the International Center for Creative Industries (CIIC) (Lessa et al. 2011).

The synergy between the MRE and the MinC in the first years of the Lula government (2003–2010) was related to the convergence of ideas by diplomat Edgard Telles Ribeiro (then Head of the Cultural Department at MRE) and the Minister of Culture Gilberto Gil (succeeded by Juca Ferreira, who kept the same policies). The collaboration between these Ministries was based on the perception that culture should not be seen only as a symbolic expression of national identity, but also as a promising economic sector and as a catalyst for new forms of development and citizenship. “This perception of culture was incorporated into foreign policy and influenced by a democratic and humanist vision of the culture agenda, which defends cultural diversity and the broad development of the culture economy” (Lessa et al. 2011, p. 110).

In the Lula government (2003–2010), both foreign policy and culture were indispensable tools for social inclusion as a guideline for the public policies developed by the Brazilian State. There was, therefore, an essential link between social and cultural inclusion. According to the Minister of Culture, Gilberto Gil, the production, preservation and dissemination of cultural assets by the State alone would not be enough, with the need to create conditions to increasing the production, dissemination and enjoyment of these goods by society (Gil and Ferreira 2013). Consequently, solidarity (national and international), socioeconomic inclusion and new alternatives for development were common motivations for expanding the cultural dimension both internally and externally, especially with African and Latin American partners. In

this way, the cultural plan emerged as an instrument of approximation and strengthening of ties to achieve broader purposes, such as regional integration, the search for new forms of development and the consolidation of historical and cultural ties.

Regarding more specific priorities and efforts of Brazilian foreign policy for the preservation of cultural assets and heritage, it is essential to highlight not only the actions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture, but also those developed by the National Historical and Artistic Heritage Institute (IPHAN), a federal agency linked to the MinC, responsible for the promotion and preservation of Brazilian cultural heritage, in addition to representing the country in international relations in this area. Responding to the demand for international partnerships, the Institute diversified and expanded the establishment of International Technical Cooperation projects. "The international cooperation embodied by IPHAN encompasses heritage protection initiatives defined by it as instruments to promote national development and also to strengthen diplomatic relations" (Silva and Rangel 2015, p. 16).

In 2011, Dilma Rousseff took office as President, promising the development of projects that aim to democratize the production of cultural assets without neglecting respect for Brazilian diversity (Brasil 2012), thus continuing his predecessor's cultural policies. Rousseff's third Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mauro Vieira, had even occupied the position of assistant to the head of the Cultural Department of the MRE. However, in the face of a less stable national and international scenario, the volume of actions verified in the Lula government did not occur in the same way in the Dilma's government, especially in her second presidential term, as will be demonstrated in the last topic of this article.

In terms of foreign policy, the role of culture was re-dimensioned during the 2000s, "by creating bonds of identity and recognition of roots, strengthening regional blocs and bringing countries and strategic regions closer to the development of South-South cooperation" (Lessa et al. 2011, p. 105). In addition, from a more economic point of view, there was the growth of the so-called creative industry³ and the way in which these actions have adapted to the needs of diversification and expansion of the country's exports (Firjan 2014).

However, between 2016 and 2022 the importance of culture in Brazilian public policies was at stake. For example, the Bolsonaro government promoted permanent clashes with the cultural sector. There were initiatives such as the extinction of the Ministry of Culture (which became just a secretariat within the Ministry of Tourism), designation of disqualified people to occupy central positions in the sector (in the Secretariat of Culture and in bodies such as the Audiovisual Technical Center, the National Historical and Artistic Heritage Institute and the National Arts Foundation), moral harassment against civil employees, scrapping of cultural public devices, and restrictions on accountability for projects associated with culture incentive laws.

³ The creative industries are formed by sectors related to elements such as creativity, capacity and individual talent, encompassing not only the actions of cultural industries, but also activities involving cutting-edge technology to issues such as heritage and cultural assets.

According to Lula's third-term transition report (Brasil 2022), the Bolsonaro government increased the lack of a coherent strategy of cultural foreign policy. This report criticizes the idea that cultural diplomacy is carried out by funding random events abroad. Without clear formulation guidelines and without defined execution criteria, these actions tend to be dominated by individual preferences and devoid of a long-term perspective. In addition, the hostile treatment given by the Bolsonaro government to the cultural agendas did not favor the necessary progress in cultural foreign policy. The disregard for the cultural sector at home and the far-right ideological profile of foreign policy, especially during the period of the first minister of Foreign Affairs in the Bolsonaro government, Ernesto Araújo, generated impacts on the role of culture in Brazilian foreign policy.

7.3 Cultural Capital and the New Possibilities for Brazil's International Insertion

The use and appreciation of Afro-Brazilian cultural capital in diplomatic relations between Brazil and several countries on the African continent stands out as an example of the culture as a way of providing new forms of international insertion. Afro-Brazilian culture was used in the establishment of cooperation agreements, exchanges and partnerships in several areas, but also in the search of common positions and support in negotiations in multilateral institutions. During the Lula (2003–2010) and Rousseff (2011–2016) governments, there were even contributions from the Brazilian Black Movement to the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy for the African continent (Amorim and Silva 2021).

Similar to the interaction with African countries, Brazilian South–South relations with Latin America, especially South America, were also permeated by new attempts to enhance the cultural issue. Within the Mercosur scope, for example, since the mid-90s meetings of Ministers of Culture of Mercosur have been held, resulting in important cultural integration initiatives (Lessa 2010). Examples include the Mercosur Cultural seal, the music documentation center, an inventory of historical and artistic heritage, the Specialized Meeting of Cinematographic and Audiovisual Authorities of Mercosur (RECAM), in addition to decentralized cooperation agreements in culture among municipalities and states member countries.

Despite the wide potential of cultural issues in a regional integration process such as Mercosur, the advances obtained are still incipient due to the discontinuity of many projects. The cultural heritage of each Mercosur member is still not widely disseminated among them. In this sense, “citizens are superficially aware of the cultures of their own countries and are almost totally unaware of the historical, material and intangible heritage of their neighbors” (Soares 2008, p. 54). Despite the initiatives idealized especially in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the ostracism that still marks actions in the cultural field in Mercosur denotes the lack of long-term policies, with actions often related to favorable political-economic periods.

The obstacle in trading cultural assets extends to South America as a whole. In addition to disparities in the consumption of culture by the population and the budget problems for institutions in the field of culture, this region has challenges in disseminating its cultural assets. Although the region concentrates 9% of the world's population, it represents only 3% of world exports of cultural assets, demonstrating a low level of South American cultural goods in the international market (Lessa et al. 2011). A challenge for governments in the region is to fill the gap among the cultural potential of these countries and their participation in the international economy of culture.

In Brazil, although Lula and Rousseff governments have provided greater space for the cultural sphere in foreign policy, culture has not acquired a position as a central pillar of State policy, compared with what happens in other countries. At the end of the 1980s, Ribeiro (2011) already warned of the unfavorable disproportion between Brazil and France in spending on cultural dissemination projects and technical assistance. According to the author, the difference between these two orders of magnitude has not changed even during governments that favored the cultural scope in the South American country. Like most middle-income countries, Brazil has other priorities that end up draining investments in cultural policies, especially in periods of political and economic instability, as has occurred since 2015.

As will be presented in the following topics, after the second Rousseff government, the scenario for Brazilian South–South cooperation in the cultural field became even more dramatic. Hence, despite the advances during the governments of the so-called “pink wave”,⁴ remains the challenge of overcoming the obstacles of Brazilian cultural diplomacy. In the task of providing culture with a more effective space in foreign policy, equivalent to Brazil's dimensions and ambitions, international cooperation can be seen as a strategic tool. However, this option was really weakened after the problematic impeachment of President Rousseff in 2016.

7.4 The State-of-the-Art of Brazilian South–South Cooperation

In the first years of the twenty-first century, there was an increase in the participation of some states of the South in global governance processes. As one of the main examples of this dynamics, South–South cooperation (SSC) was expanded as an important form of international insertion by the Brazilian state. Brazil has offered South–South cooperation since the mid-70s. Based on a favorable international scenario and new concepts that engrained the idea of development during the 2000s, South–South

⁴ The term “pink wave” was used to describe the turn to the left of South American governments in the early 2000s. The American journalist Larry Rohter emphasized this term when described the election of Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay, stating that this administration wouldn't be linked to the “red” communism, but would be a shade of “pink”, to indicate the rise of social-democratic ideals.

cooperation was used to provide new paths for the country's international insertion. Consequently, the cooperation offered by Brazil was strengthened as a strategic instrument of foreign policy, contributing to the expansion of the country's political, cultural and commercial relations in the South–South dimension.

The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) acknowledged the establishment of “solidarity diplomacy” in Brazilian foreign policy during the 2000s as one of the elements that explained the expansion of South–South cooperation offered by the country (Brasil 2013). The intention to reduce economic and social asymmetries between countries through international cooperation was already present in Lula da Silva's first speech as president (2003). According to President Lula, Brazil should put into practice a development project that was, simultaneously, national and universalist, linked to a humanist perspective of foreign policy, understood as an instrument of development (Brasil 2003). As a result, principles such as solidarity diplomacy and non-indifference guided the South–South cooperation especially with African and Latin American countries.

The use of “solidarity diplomacy” and the principle of “non-indifference” was seen by the Brazilian government as a way of increasing the country's alignment with the objective of a global partnership for development. The emphasis given by Brazil to South–South cooperation reflected the articulation between public policies implemented domestically and the international agenda in health, education, human rights, environment, fight against poverty, etc. Consequently, in the 2000s there was a more consistent synergy between the guiding principles of Brazilian South–South cooperation and proposals on development within the UN system, especially from the Millennium Development Goals (2000–2015), later replaced by the Sustainable Development Goals (2016–2030).

During the Lula and Rousseff administrations, the cooperation offered by the country shared know-how and best practices only when there was a demand from the partner countries. According to Brazilian diplomat Daniel Pinto (2015, p. 137), the global demand for Brazilian cooperation was on the rise at the beginning of the twenty-first century in synergy with the positive results of the country's social programs. In this scenario, “Brazil could not avoid responding to this demand”, having to respond to it “until the end, under the penalty of losing credibility as a partner, and even as an actor on the international stage” (Pinto 2015, p. 137).

However, the intense obstacles faced by Brazilian democracy since the second government of Dilma Rousseff (2014–2016) brought serious risks of reversal of what had already been achieved by Brazil in South–South cooperation, including the cultural area. The Congress' coup against President Rousseff, in 2016, was the breaking of an already weakened continuity of a set of policies applied in the previous administration. Foreign policy was clearly affected by the changes made by the “new” political actors in power, which included a reduction of South–South relations that marked the Lula and, with less emphasis, Rousseff administrations (Milani 2018). In his inauguration speech, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of Michel Temer's government (2016–2018), José Serra, stated that the South–South cooperation carried out by Brazil in the previous 13 years was “practiced with advertising purposes, scarce economic benefits and large diplomatic investments” (Brasil 2016).

The next president, Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022), still in the presidential campaign, when approaching the relationship with other countries in the Global South, stated that there would be “suspicious agreements that were clearly unviable and reinforced the idea that our country was covertly serving as a source of income from ideologically aligned parties in Latin America, with our sovereignty giving way to true ideological submission” (Globo 2018). In December 2018, before taking office as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ernesto Araújo promised to review Brazilian foreign policy, including the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, especially regarding South–South cooperation. In such governments, South–South relations in regional integration processes were also weakened in several areas, as occurred in Mercosur and Unasur.

Foreign minister Ernesto Araújo produced a radical and unprecedented change in the guidelines and internal structure of the Brazilian Foreign Policy (Rodrigues 2019). The incorporation of those changes led by the renewed global extreme right showed the strength of the ideological element of this change (Foster and Chowdhury 2019). The discourse that defends the risks of the so-called “globalism”, the distancing from multilateral institutions such as the UN and the conviction that global warming is a Marxist plot, added to the various decisions aimed to transfigure the Brazil's international profile.

This posture was made explicit in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic in Brazil and the deforestation of the Amazon, among several other examples. Taking advantage of the fact that foreign policy in Brazil is a subject that is very much centered on the executive branch, in which the need for composition of forces with Congress is nuanced, Bolsonaro managed foreign policy as an instrument of rhetoric that helped to retain his most loyal electorate (Lima and Albuquerque 2019). Consequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs distanced itself from its innovative role for normative proposals and possibilities for collaboration in the North–South and South–South spheres, becoming a defender of obscurantist ideologies (Hirst and Maciel 2020).

According to the transition report of the elected presidential candidate Lula (Brasil 2022), during the Bolsonaro government, there was a vertiginous drop of technical cooperation projects signed and carried out by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency. Between 2018 and 2020, only 22 new projects were signed. According to this report, the Bolsonaro government favored humanitarian cooperation initiatives, which are an important instrument to offer relief to crises and emergency situations. However, the execution of such initiatives to the detriment of technical cooperation projects favored an immediate treatment of cooperation, which does not value the building of capacities in the host country and cooperation considered “structuring”.

Therefore, at the beginning of the third term of the Lula government (2023–) there are obstacles to implement Brazilian South–South cooperation as a structured public policy. Some difficulties are latent, such as budget limitations, the lack of a permanent staff at the Brazilian Cooperation Agency and the absence of a legal and regulatory framework. A careful analysis of the current obstacles to Brazilian South–South cooperation shows that this practice remains very sensitive to internally and externally unfavorable scenarios (Milani 2018). In this context, it is pertinent

to reproduce the statement of former foreign minister Celso Amorim, who emphasized that “friendships between countries are not created (or strengthened) without cooperation in the most varied fields”, and “obviously this cooperation has a cost, which is very low when compared to other State activities. In addition to political gains, which are difficult to measure, cooperation often ends up generating returns, including financial ones, for the country” (Amorim 2015).

Considering the ups and downs of Brazilian South–South cooperation in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, it is important to describe some projects in which Brazil is a provider of cooperation in cultural matters. Focusing on the area of cultural assets and heritage, this analysis aims to show both the rise of culture during the dynamization of Brazilian South–South cooperation and the period of lesser use of this instrument of international insertion, as well as to outline future expectations of the relevance of cooperation on cultural issues as an instrument of Brazilian foreign policy.

7.5 Brazilian South–South Cooperation in Cultural Heritage and Cultural Assets

Since 2003, the country carried out important cooperation projects in the cultural area, both in the North–South and South–South modality, through bilateral, trilateral and multilateral actions. Nevertheless, here the emphasis is on South–South cooperation related to bilateral projects in cultural heritage and cultural assets. It is intended to demonstrate the relevance and limitations of this aspect of cooperation as an instrument of Brazilian foreign policy.

The heritage field in Brazil was historically influenced by debates and cooperation initiatives idealized in multilateral spaces of international organizations, mainly by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). However, the scenario of greater incidence of South–South cooperation projects in the cultural area at the beginning of the twenty-first century could represent a “turning point in Cultural Heritage, which has always been guided (or, at least, strongly influenced) by international organizations headed by central countries, i.e., from the Global North” (Silva and Rangel 2015, p. 4).

As a rule, all international cooperation projects negotiated at the federal or local level (under the umbrella of the Union) are evaluated by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), which follows the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ foreign policy guidelines. This does not include the scope of paradiplomacy developed by subnational entities without the Union’s participation or intervention. Projects carried out within a general agreement (instrument that legalizes cooperation actions developed between Brazil and other entities) as well as those idealized as an isolated activity are

regulated by the ABC. For this reason, the ABC project research website was used as the main source for surveying the bilateral actions of South-South cooperation carried out by Brazil in the cultural sphere.⁵

The following description of some projects allows the analysis of priority partners and the scope of actions developed. For example, the African continent received most of the initiatives, with Angola being one of the most active partner countries. This country is among the African partners, the one with strongest cultural ties with Brazil. In addition, in recent years exchanges, business and cooperation projects between these countries have been intensified.

For example, in May 2005, within the scope of the VI Brazil-Angola Joint Commission, cultural issues were identified as a priority for future cooperation projects. The objective was to prepare technical cooperation projects (including training and qualification of technicians and managers) with the Ministry of Culture of Angola, the recovery of the country's audiovisual collection (with a focus on recovery films of historical and documentary value) and cooperation in historical archives (covering the exchange of data and training of specialized personnel).

As a way of identifying Angolan needs in the areas mentioned above, project BRA/04/044-A030 (Identification of Angolan needs in the areas of Culture Management, Recovery of Audiovisual Collection and Historical Archive) was created. The ABC website says that this project began in March 2006 and was completed in April 2006. The Brazilian institutions that participated in the project were the Ministry of Culture, the National Institute of Historical and Artistic Heritage and the Federal University of Bahia.

In the subsequent period (between 2008 and 2010), Angola received the project BRA/04/044-S126 (Strengthening the Preservation of Memory and Audiovisual Production in Angola). In this project, Brazilian cooperation supported the development of the preservation, cataloging and dissemination sector of film collections in Angola, as well as the planning and dissemination of public cultures and methodologies for the development of the audiovisual cultural chain in that country. Around 60 Angolan professionals were trained in the sectors of management, preservation, restoration and dissemination of recovered collections, and in the management, creation, production, finalization and dissemination of audiovisual pieces.

Yet between 2008 and 2010, the project BRA/04/044-S127 (Strengthening the Management of Cultural Heritage in Angola) was developed by both countries. In this case, the Angolan Ministry of Culture sought Brazilian cooperation to carry out training workshops for officials involved in the management of the Angolan cultural heritage. Topics such as identification, registration, safeguarding and documentation of cultural heritage and document management, protection, conservation and promotion of material goods that constitute cultural heritage and museum management were addressed.

⁵ In the research process, conflicting information was found between sources from the Brazilian Cooperation Agency itself, such as project start and end dates, active projects and project descriptions. In addition, there are conflicts with other databases such as COBRADI reports from the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA). Thus, only the consultation of projects by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency was adopted as the database.

Another African country that has strong cultural ties with Brazil is São Tomé and Príncipe. To reinforce this relationship, some actions were carried out (BRA/04/044-A415, BRA/04/044-A711, BRA/04/044-A446, BRA/04/044-A298) to develop the three phases of the “Support for the Development of Handicraft Production in São Tomé and Príncipe”, between 2009 and 2011. The objective was to support handicrafts through the organization of groups of local artisans, considering the peculiarities and vocations of each group of work. The aim was to provide a source of income for the community, with traditional crafts as the main product, without commercialization implying the loss of local roots. On the Brazilian side, ABC received assistance from the support service for small and medium industry (SEBRAE) to carry out the actions, while the government of São Tomé and Príncipe designated the Youth Institute of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sports for the same objective.

Still on the African continent, but within the Saar region, a partnership was developed between Brazil and Algeria, from 2010 to 2015, through the project BRA/04/044-S180 (Knowledge Transfer for the Production of Lapidated Gems, Jewels and Mineral Crafts). A partnership with the Brazilian Association of Gems and Jewels (aBraGeM) was made to set up a pilot school and a local cooperative in Tamanrasset. The choice of this city was justified by the economic difficulties of southern Algeria, the fact that the region is rich in precious stones and other mineral resources, and because crafts represent an important source of income for the local population. Within the scope of this project, there was Brazilian participation in the International Handicraft Salon in Algiers, in March 2010, and the seminar “Knowledge Transfer for the Production of Lapidated Gemstones, Jewels and Mineral Crafts”, in Tamanrasset, in May 2010.

The projects described above started during the President Lula governments and the first President Rousseff administration. Three cultural cooperation initiatives with countries of the African continent were subsequently carried out between 2015 and 2022. Project BRA/13/008-A066—(Brazil-Africa Approaches through Cinema) was started during the second Rousseff administration, in 2015, and completed in 2016. The objective was to carry out a training course in audiovisual for technicians from African countries in the community of Portuguese speaking countries (CPLP) and Senegal, in Dakar and Midelo, aiming at advanced professional improvement in audiovisual and improving the quality of local TV in CPLP African countries.

During Michel Temer’s government (2016–2018) only one proposal was initiated, according to the Brazilian Cooperation Agency. The BRA/13/008-S322 project (Strengthening the BNCV’s capabilities in terms of library and archival science) started in 2018 and ended in 2022. The main objective of the project was to develop the technical skills of the National Library of Cape Verde (BNCV) to contribute to the preservation and dissemination of Cape Verde’s cultural heritage. To this end, the provision of technical assistance and training for BNCV technicians were planned, through technical visits and exchange of information in loco and virtual assistance, to improve and diversify the services provided by the Library.

Similarly, but even more scarce, during the whole Bolsonaro's administration (2019–2022), only one initiative was implemented. Project BRA/13/008-A222 (Mission for Joint Prospecting of South–South Technical Cooperation Projects) was initiated and completed in 2019, between Brazil and Benin. The objective was to prospect the continuity of actions in several themes, such as in sickle cell anemia, improvement of the technical team in the cotton sector and use of the cashew fruit in the industrial sector of Benin. Among these objectives was the cultural area, through the management of historical parks, training of artists and artisans, and restoration and preservation of architectural heritage of Brazilian origin in Ouidah and Porto Novo.

In the Asian continent, it is possible to mention the cooperation offered to Timor-Leste, through the project BRA/04/043-S074 (Training of Television Technicians in Timor-Leste). Between 2008 and 2013, efforts were made to institutionally strengthen Timorese radio and television (RTTL), as a way of contributing to the process of reintroducing the Portuguese language as one of the two official languages of East Timor. The training of RTTL professionals dealt with the use of technological resources, the design and implementation of programs, and TV management. The process took place both in Timor-Leste and on visits to Rio de Janeiro (at the Canal Futura building), through a partnership with the Roberto Marinho Foundation (FRM). The project also carried out the exchange and joint production of journalistic articles, interprogram series, documentary programs and episodes of the *Globo Ecologia* series, an important TV program in Brazil.

In the Middle East, there was a cooperation carried out between Brazil (by Brazil Communications Company—EBC) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), with the project BRA/04/044-A280 (Support to the Palestinian Media Center). In 2009, the Secretary General of the PLO, Yasser Abed Rabbo, requested Brazilian assistance for the conclusion of the Palestinian Media Center, an entity created in November 2001 and directly subordinated to the PLO. This entity expressed interest in receiving Brazilian technical cooperation to finalize the construction of the center's headquarters.

Examples of partnerships in Central America include project BRA/04/044-S040 (Conservation of Traditional Architecture in Historic Centers and their Cultural Landscape), developed with the government of El Salvador between 2006 and 2008. The objective of this initiative was to train and qualify Salvadoran specialists in techniques for preserving earth-based building systems. The scope of the project also included the elaboration of a manual for the conservation of the country's traditional architecture, after obtaining more effective information on the national construction systems.


In the South American sphere, there was a cooperation initiative between Brazil and Bolivia through the project BRA/04/044-S199 (Exchange of Experiences and Knowledge for the Management of Cultures). This initiative, carried out between 2010 and 2014, addressed broad themes related to the preservation of cultural assets in both countries, focusing on specific actions, such as the most effective way to promote the development and updating of capacities. Among the project's objectives was the attempt to adapt models for using the economic potential and social inclusion

of culture to the Bolivian reality; the implementation of joint actions to combat the illicit traffic of cultural assets, supported by the agreement signed between these countries for this purpose, in 1999; the challenge of contributing to the formulation of an action plan for the protection of Bolivia's cultural heritage; and the presentation of the Brazilian experience on the management of cultural heritage.

Finally, there are also examples within the scope of Mercosur members. An example was the project BRA/04/043-S030 (Training in Museology), carried out between Brazil (through National Historical and Artistic Heritage Institute—IPHAN) and Paraguay, from 2007 to 2009. This initiative sought to strengthen the Paraguayan museological sector through the sharing of knowledge and techniques about the Brazilian model for the sector. In the same period, the project BRA/04/043-S031 (Exchange of Knowledge on Integrated Conservation Systems and Cultural Heritage) was carried out with Paraguay. The objective was to expand the exchange between IPHAN and the National Secretariat of Culture of Paraguay (SEC) in relation to knowledge on cultural heritage management, through the exchange of experiences on preservation of Guaraní culture and on the Brazilian model of management of cultural assets. Finally, still within the scope of Mercosur, there was a cooperation initiative between Brazil and Uruguay, through project BRA/04/043-A542 (Mission of the Director of the Cultural Heritage Commission of the Nation of Uruguay—CPCN), carried out between 2011 and 2012. This was a restricted action that aimed to collaborate with the institutional strengthening of Uruguay's cultural heritage commission.

The information on the projects above allows understanding that international cooperation in the field of cultural assets accompanied the turn to the South of Brazilian foreign policy. However, bilateral South–South cooperation initiatives in that area still suffer from problems common to Brazilian South–South cooperation as a whole, such as: very specific actions (lack of medium and long-term projects), high sensitivity to political scenarios and unfavorable economic conditions, budget constraints, absence of regulatory frameworks, fragility of the institutional structures that manage the cooperation process (specifically in the ABC), etc.

According to information available on the ABC website on the classification of Brazilian South–South cooperation projects by segment between 2000 and 2014, a period considered the highest level of this type of cooperation in Brazil in the twenty-first century, it is possible to verify that only 1% of the total of the actions carried out in this period was linked to the cultural sector. Just as a way of comparison, in the same period the agriculture sector received 19% of the projects, the health sector received 16%, public security about 11% and education received 11% of the total projects in South–South cooperation (Brasil 2014).



Source Prepared by the authors based on information from the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Brasil 2014)

Based on a survey carried out on the ABC project research page, information was found on approximately 2268 South-South cooperation projects carried out between 1999 and 2022. Among all these projects, there are only 25 actions linked to the culture sector, which are listed in Table 7.1. The analysis of the more specific categories of these initiatives in the field of culture demonstrates that 16 of these projects are in the “Historic and Artistic Heritage” subsector, 6 are classified as “Handicrafts”, 2 are included in the “Restoration” subsector and only 1 is classified as “Traditional Populations”.

This table also allows us to verify that all 24 projects in cultural area have already been concluded in January 2023. In other words, when started his third administration in the federal government, President Lula did not find any South-South cooperation project in the cultural area in execution. Most of the projects started between 2006 and 2011, and were completed between 2006 and 2012. This dynamic coincides with the period in which more project initiatives were added to the ABC’s South-South cooperation agenda (Brasil 2015a). Not by coincidence, in the same period there was also a greater evolution in the financial execution of ABC projects (especially in the years 2010 and 2011) (Brasil 2015b). The decrease in new initiatives and financial execution by ABC, from that period, is consistent with the decrease in cooperation projects in the cultural area in the second Rousseff government and in the Temer and Bolsonaro administrations.

In more favorable political-economic periods, the number of bilateral South-South cooperation projects in the cultural area was low in relation to the total number of actions in more priority sectors. In times of political and economic instabilities, this disparity becomes more evident, demonstrated by the fact that there were only three cultural cooperation projects initiated between the second Rousseff government and the end of the Bolsonaro administration. This scenario demonstrates the low priority that the culture sector has had in the general scope of Brazilian foreign policy during the last years, despite the advances made in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The survey of projects on the ABC website also allows us to verify that there are

Table 7.1 South–South cooperation projects in the culture sector (2003–2022)

Title	Situation	Start date	End date	Sub-sector
BRA/04/044-A030—Identification of Angolan needs in the areas of Culture Management, Recovery of Audiovisual Collections and Historical Archives	Concluded	01/03/2006	04/17/2006	Historical and artistic heritage
BRA/04/044-S040—Conservation of the Traditional Architecture of Historic Centers and Complexes and their Cultural Landscape	Concluded	06/09/2006	06/09/2008	Historical and artistic heritage
BRA/04/043-S030—Training in Museology	Concluded	06/15/2007	06/15/2009	Historical and artistic heritage
BRA/04/043-S031—Exchange of Knowledge on Integrated Conservation Systems and Cultural Heritage	Concluded	06/15/2007	06/15/2009	Historical and artistic heritage
BRA/04/044-A234—Mozambican participation in the National Meeting of the Mocambos Network	Concluded	7/3/2008	09/03/2008	Traditional populations
BRA/04/044-S126—Strengthening the Preservation of Memory and Audiovisual Production in Angola	Concluded	09/29/2008	06/30/2010	Restoration
BRA/04/044-S127—Strengthening the Management of Cultural Heritage in Angola	Concluded	09/29/2008	06/30/2010	Historical and artistic heritage
BRA/98/004-A077—Exchange of Experiences in the Cultural Area in Brasília	Concluded	10/16/2008	12/16/2008	Craftsmanship
BRA/04/043-A137—Mission for Prospecting and Preparing Technical Cooperation Projects in the Cultural Area	Concluded	12/05/2008	12/12/2008	Historical and artistic heritage
BRA/04/043-A245—Participation of Brazilian Specialists in Project Follow-up Mission in Integrated Conservation Systems and Cultural Heritage in Paraguay	Concluded	05/02/2009	7/2/2009	Historical and Artistic Heritage
BRA/04/044-A280—Support for the Palestinian Media Center	Concluded	02/09/2009	12/31/2009	Restoration
BRA/04/044-A298—Mission to define Phase II of the Project “Support to the Development of Handicraft Production in São Tomé and Príncipe”	Concluded	10/22/2009	01/30/2010	Craftsmanship
BRA/04/044-S180—Transfer of Knowledge for the Production of Lapped Gems, Jewels and Mineral Crafts	Concluded	01/29/2010	12/01/2015	Craftsmanship

(continued)

Table 7.1 (continued)

Title	Situation	Start date	End date	Sub-sector
BRA/04/044-A415—Mission to Support the Project to Support the Development of Handicraft Production in São Tomé and Príncipe	Concluded	03/15/2010	04/15/2010	Craftsmanship
BRA/04/044-A432—Mission for Prospecting and Projects on Museums and Archeology in Saudi Arabia	Concluded	01/04/2010	07/31/2010	Historical and artistic heritage
BRA/04/044-S199—Exchange of Experiences and Knowledge for Crop Management	Concluded	09/04/2010	12/31/2014	Historical and artistic heritage
BRA/04/044-A446—Support Mission for the second phase of the Support Project for the Development of Handicraft Production in São Tomé and Príncipe	Concluded	04/15/2010	09/05/2011	Craftsmanship
BRA/04/044-A711—Negotiation mission for the Project to Support the Development of Handicraft Production in São Tomé and Príncipe—Phase II and III	Concluded	02/10/2011	04/10/2011	Craftsmanship
BRA/04/043-A473—Technical Support in the Tourism Area	Concluded	7/3/2011	10/03/2011	Historical and artistic heritage
BRA/04/043-A542—Mission of the Director of the Cultural Heritage Commission of the Nation of Uruguay—CPCN	Concluded	09/29/2011	03/30/2012	Historical and artistic heritage
BRA/04/043-S186—Diagnosis of Regional Development Potentials in the Restoration Area of Built Heritage IF Sul/IFMG/CETP—UTU	Concluded	12/31/2011	12/31/2012	Historical and artistic heritage
BRA/04/044-S445—Plural São Tomé and Príncipe: its people, its history, its future—Programmatic actions in Communication and Culture	Concluded	08/16/2012	06/30/2017	Historical and artistic heritage
BRA/13/008-A066—Brazil-Africa Approaches through Cinema	Concluded	04/11/2015	04/11/2016	Historical and artistic heritage
BRA/13/008-S322—Reinforcement of the BNCV's capacities in library and archival matters	Concluded	09/10/2018	06/30/2022	Historical and artistic heritage
BRA/13/008-A222—Joint Prospecting Mission for South-South Technical Cooperation Projects	Concluded	01/04/2019	12/31/2019	Historical and artistic heritage

Source Prepared by the authors based on information from the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC 2023)

records of only eight trilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives in culture, in addition to the 25 bilateral South–South cooperation projects in the last two decades. This leads to conclude that, although actions in the cultural sector are still limited, there was emphasis on the development of bilateral projects in the South–South scope, more than in other forms of international cooperation.

The consultation of cooperation projects coordinated by ABC demonstrates the active participation of governmental institutions (such as Ministry of Culture and National Historical and Artistic Heritage Institute—IPHAN) and non-governmental institutions (i.e., universities, media and the private sector) in the formulation and implementation of cooperation in the cultural area. Although it is not a topic covered by the authors here, the growth in the participation of federal states and municipalities in cultural actions with international projection is also noteworthy. As Rodrigues (2020) pointed out, cultural paradiplomacy has a great potential of development in Brazil. However, it is important to encourage the participation of new actors in the foreign policy agenda in the cultural field, because the promotion and safeguarding of a country's cultural assets is not materialized only from the performance of an isolated entity.

Solidarity diplomacy, developed during the 13 years of the Lula and Rousseff governments, proposed a different view of hard power and soft power strategies, compared with what characterizes diplomacy considered more traditional (Rodrigues and Maciel 2017). In line with the activation of the internal cultural policy, Brazil increased its expressiveness in the regional and world cultural field. However, the analysis of South–South cooperation projects demonstrates that progress is still needed in valuing soft power strategies in the cultural field in Brazilian foreign policy.

Although Brazilian diplomacy has aimed to intensify cultural exchange with regions considered strategic for Brazil's international insertion, the country still struggles to make investments so that culture overcomes its restricted role in Brazilian foreign policy. The intention is not to neglect the progress of the country's cultural diplomacy since 2003, but it is a fact that in the Temer and Bolsonaro governments, efforts in South–South cooperation in the cultural field were quite fragile. An important symptom is that these governments started only one project each in this type of cooperation (both with African countries as counterparts).

Brazil and other countries in the South need to improve their internal cultural heritage policies and increase their use as an instrument for international action. There is an urgent need to overcome the lack of coordination between its heritage policies. Such countries are rich in collections, traditions, rituals, etc., which are undervalued as targets for strategic public policies. Only with the elaboration of more structured cooperation policies will these countries be able to use their potential to expand exchanges and participation in international flows in the cultural heritage area.

The expansion of the cultural sector in Brazilian South–South cooperation can be an extremely efficient instrument for establishing or strengthening identity ties with different societies. However, it is necessary to create more robust institutional mechanisms that allow Brazil to use its rich cultural heritage to benefit its image and

prestige abroad. “Only foreign cultural policies, with strong support from the states, with clear objectives and with qualified cultural operators, can put national cultural capital at the service of relations with the outside world” (Soares 2008, p. 58).

7.6 Conclusions

In this research article, the authors aimed to analyze how Brazil is part of a worldwide trend of valuing cultural issues as an important form of soft power in international relations. Within a broader context of the strengthening of cultural diplomacy, at the beginning of the twenty-first century there was a dynamization of the synergy between culture and foreign policy. Specifically, the intention of Brazil in the Lula's governments and in the first administration of Dilma Rousseff to strengthen relations with representatives of the Global South, also generated opportunities for South–South cooperation in cultural assets and heritage.

Despite the increase in projects and financial volume for cooperation in cultural goods, it is possible to recognize that the results achieved are still timid in view of the promising possibilities for dialogues that Brazil can carry out in this area. After the restriction of financial resources and projects related to this type of cooperation in the Temer and Bolsonaro governments, viable alternatives must be sought to strengthen cooperation in the cultural field with Africa, Latin America and other countries in the South–South sphere. Removing culture from its still limited role in Brazilian foreign policy is an essential step for the country to deepen cultural exchange with regions considered strategic for its international insertion.

Finally, there is an important demand for further research about cultural assets and international relations, to broaden the understanding of how the link between these two dimensions affects the external behavior of countries. In the case of Brazil, studies that analyze the importance and potential of the area of cultural assets and heritage for national development and the country's international insertion should be expanded. The scarcity of Brazilian literature on the subject helps to illustrate the still marginal aspect of cultural issues in the country's foreign policy, despite the advances achieved at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

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Chapter 8

Cultural Heritage as Soft Power: Brazil in International Politics



Nathan Assunção Agostinho 

Abstract This chapter aims to present a historical perspective of Brazilian diplomacy in its attempt to conquer a prominent role on the international scene. Using imagery references from Brazil, there is no denying that the Zé Carioca complex is still present in the international imagination. Cordial par excellence, bon vivant, lover of a hearty table, good music, football trickery and carnival animation, the figure of the Brazilian, when the subject is international politics, becomes, more and more, also correlated to an image of seriousness in dealing with important issues for the contemporary world agenda. Thus, the country has sought equitable and peaceful development, through representatives who defend, as an action strategy, the importance of considering the multiculturalism existing among nations and the need to create bases for dialogue that take this diversity into account, cultural and heritage. To this end, the Itamaraty has been betting on a strategy to promote Brazilian culture abroad since 1930, as a mechanism for promoting soft power, which we call, in this case, cultural diplomacy, which has the prospect of expansion through policies of repatriation and restitution of cultural goods as a long-term agenda of the state.

Keywords Cultural heritage · Cultural diplomacy · Internacional relations · Nation building

8.1 Introduction

It is up to intellectuals to deepen their perception of social reality in order to prevent the irrational stains that feed political adventurism from spreading; it is up to them to shed light on the nooks and crannies of history where the crimes committed by those who abuse power are hidden; it is up to them to hear and translate the anxieties and aspirations of social forces that still lack their own means of expression.

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A priori, it is worth mentioning that the end of the Cold War and the effects of the globalization process led Brazil to adjust to the new international reality, leave its isolationism behind, and seek a more relevant role in the external scenario. As soon as the trajectory of Brazilian foreign policies becomes more and more the object of analysis by national and international historiography, as the field of study points to the paths chosen by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) for the formulation of a country's action strategy in the international context from the perspective of culture. Therefore, it is evident that studies focused on this aspect were, for a long time, predominantly internal to the Brazilian diplomatic or governmental body, elucidating, above all, the diplomatic history of traditional biases. Furthermore, the theme received an academic perspective from the 1970s onward, when university departments in Brazil began to concern themselves with the study of international relations as a way of understanding their place in the world, such as unveiling the vision of the other, in this case, Europe and the United States, about you.

In this perspective, the themes focus mainly on the strategies of the federal governments in promoting the Brazilian insertion in the international scenario through Portuguese culture and language. For this reason, topics related to Brazil's participation in the context of regional and international security, foreign trade and definitions of the world economy and, more recently, related to the post-Cold War international agenda are addressed, in which issues such as the environment, the fight against hunger and the promotion of human rights in an inclusive and combative way. Thus, Brazil, in an attempt to stand out in the international scenario, anchors itself exactly on the themes related to this international agenda, which are mediated by precepts of soft power, insofar as it deals with social themes, moving away from the debate common to International Relations, which involves military power associated with coercive economic power.

At the end of the day, the Brazilian development of the last two decades, combined with Brazil's growing interest in producing large programs to eradicate hunger, leadership of the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, participation as an IMF creditor, production and dissemination of biofuels, among others, are backed by a foreign policy aimed at ever-increasing insertion in the international scenario. Consequently, the number of international partners increases exponentially every day, which shows the need to consolidate new partnerships. Therefore, based on this more proactive external insertion, it is necessary for the country to promote other mechanisms that can contribute to the achievement of the goals outlined in its foreign policy, as well as its commitment to the United Nations seals and, thus, cultural diplomacy emerges as one of the most complete tools capable of consolidating Brazil's position in a prominent place on the international scene, as it allows for an exchange between political, economic and cooperation gains.

Based on these assumptions, the objective is to analyze how Brazil, in this attempt to occupy a prominent place in the field of International Relations, starts to produce and convey a discourse based on the defense of cultural diversity, sustaining the defense and promotion of cultural heritage material and immaterial, in view of the alleged growth of illicit trafficking in cultural goods. During the first two governments, President Lula da Silva (2003–2011) adopted the tone of continuity of the

government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2003) in terms of cultural foreign policy, and it was possible to verify the achievement of national objectives, highlighting if the participation of specialized bureaucracies in the formulation of a specific foreign policy, with concrete results in the use of a tool and specific guidelines that are configured as beacons of a new milestone in the history of Brazilian foreign policy, which has been disseminated in the most diverse countries of the globe. In this way, the notion is supported that the country seeks to know the elements that constitute the cultural identity of its potential partners, as well as conveys the elements that constitute the Brazilian cultural heritage, in a clear attempt to open doors for the promotion and repatriation of cultural assets, as well as understanding differences.

8.2 Culture, Identity and Representations

Based on these assumptions, the objective is to analyze how Brazil, in this attempt to occupy a prominent place in the field of International Relations, starts to produce and convey a discourse based on the defense of cultural diversity, sustaining the defense and promotion of cultural material and immaterial heritage, in view of the alleged growth of illicit trafficking in cultural goods. During the first two governments, President Lula da Silva (2003–2011) adopted the tone of continuity of the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2003) in terms of cultural foreign policy, and it was possible to verify the achievement of national objectives, highlighting if the participation of specialized bureaucracies in the formulation of a specific foreign policy, with concrete results in the use of a tool and specific guidelines that are configured as beacons of a new milestone in the history of Brazilian foreign policy, which has been disseminated in the most diverse countries of the globe. In this way, the notion is supported that the country seeks to know the elements that constitute the cultural identity of its potential partners, as well as conveys the elements that constitute the Brazilian cultural heritage, in a clear attempt to open doors for the promotion and repatriation of cultural assets, as well as understanding differences.

Therefore, it is notorious that the flows of relationships between societies have always existed, in various fields of interaction, such as economic, political and cultural, and, over time, have become more complex, dynamic and important. As this interaction became inevitable, it became clear that what was happening in other societies also influenced the internal context, in the domestic dynamics of each people, and that the actions taken internally, by the various command bodies, would have repercussions in other societies (Pecequillo 2004, p. 13). To this set of actions that we allow ourselves to call International Relations, which took place between States, their actors par excellence, international organizations, multinational companies, higher education institutions, with the exchange between professors and students, non-governmental organizations are situated whether in what we call soft power today, in a context of globalization, culture and diplomacy.

Soft power is a concept defined by Joseph Nye in the late 1980s and aims to facilitate understanding of the approach taken by US foreign policy. Nye, argues

that soft power is “[...] the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power increases” (Nye 2004, p. 14). The so-called soft power uses persuasion and attraction to achieve objectives, and the instrument used for such an undertaking would be cultural attraction and attraction to political and ideological values, highlighting an attractive culture and ideology, serving as a framework for that other countries accompany him in his actions. In this way, the existence of a theoretical framework leads to the production of tangible forms of culture transmission: objects, symbols and technologies which represent this content, because it is the cultural representations that, together with the objectives, are presented as promoters of processes broader aggregation of interests and creation of identities within social actions of various natures (Bourdieu apud Furtado 1997, p. 123). In this sense, if there is no way to have access to a faithful copy of reality, we can at least deal with an attempt to read the real world from a construction based on this cultural reference. Thus, the cultural representations of a given society express themselves, in this way, the way in which the historical processes of world social transformation were received and worked within that society, their effects and results. The set of representations translates the way society perceives itself in relations with the objects that experienced it, revealing itself in a vivid way, through its acts, costumes and sensations, creating a circulating social imaginary.

Several authors have emphasized the importance of collective representations and the social imaginary in the constitution of national identities. For Hobsbawm (2004), it is from the invention of national traditions that States have sought, since the eighteenth century, to create mechanisms of cultural cohesion and identity unity among citizens, because by making references to the past, it is possible to understand the present and project the common future, which will be public knowledge, going beyond national borders. From another perspective, Elias apud Schwarcz (1994), maintains that “identity can be a particularly revealing theme for some countries – almost a matter of national conscience - and, paradoxically, practically insignificant for others”. In this sense, whatever the weight that collective identity is considered to have a priori, the role of governments should not be overlooked in the elaboration of identity traits since, it is precisely through the State machinery and in its determination to circulate a national identity that underlies its power that myths and rites will be produced and disseminated, forging a solidarity that transcends barriers of class and religion, among others.

Thus, the cement of the social structures, which build the imagined community, rests on the government which, in turn, is dependent, on a pre-existing imaginary, on the cultural representations that create a sense of shared reality among individuals. Politically, this imaginary will be important to give legitimacy to governments, by creating links between them and citizens. Thus, as Motta considers:

The processes of political legitimation go through the establishment of an imaginary that summarizes and symbolizes, at the level of the popular mentality, the messages and values of power. Power needs, in addition to bureaucratic structures, in addition to representative and/or coercive institutions, the creation of images that immediately reach the hearts and

minds of the population; often more hearts than minds. The establishment of the elements of a political culture, notably at the level of the symbolic imaginary, plays a fundamental cohesion role on social organizations. (Motta 1996, p. 89)

When we consider this aspect, it is easy to understand why, in many cases, the Brazilian State highlights the foundations of national popular culture as a way of guaranteeing the adhesion of the international public. Still dealing with the case of Brazil, for example, to the extent that popular music, in this case, samba and MPB, in addition to carnival and football, are perceived as emblematic elements of national culture, these symbols of popular culture make images of Brazilian identity that are created, easily recognized abroad as Brazilian products par excellence. That is why most Brazilian governments, from 1930 onward, were able to refer to such symbols internally and externally, as elements of sociopolitical cohesion, and in terms of foreign relations, as marks of the notion of a cordial and peaceful identity of Brazilians.

8.3 The Culture of Brazil Projected to the World

Questions about Brazilian national identity have been the object of study since the nineteenth century, with the creation of the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute (IHGB), which proposed to write the history of Brazil, considering that there is no country without history and past common. The first issue of the magazine features the thesis that has been part of all debates on Brazilian identity since then: the Brazilian reality is based on a history of miscegenation, in which the three human races are placed side by side in the formation of the Brazilian people, as defined by the German Von Martius, in the founding article of the IHGB magazine. It is notorious, however, that the identity of people is forged in opposition to the other. It may be illustrative of this, even if we consider that the first analysis published by the IHGB is exactly the external look of a German, which contributes to understanding the importance of the other's look for the formation of Brazilian identity, and it is worth noting that academic productions of Brazil today, are still permeated by a strong concern with the foreign view of national issues.

Still on miscegenation, sometimes treated as a stain, sometimes exalted as a benefit, the issue later transformed into a myth of the three races, became the main element to deal with Brazilian identity in the twentieth century. From the 1930s onward, with the writings of Gilberto Freyre and Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, this issue becomes the subject of debate within the academy, with a constant rearrangement of the heterogeneity of the Brazilian population, romanticized by Freyre in the myth of the three races, by creating the festive, hard-working and pacifist Brazilian, contrasted with the identity elaborated by Holanda, which is based on the notion of the Weberian ideal type, in which the cordial man, who would be the Brazilian by distinction, who presents himself as an amalgam of contradictions, as it is the result of a personalistic and patriarchal culture, in which all forms of ritualization

of behavior that endanger simple and direct human relationships are systematically ignored. These elements, highlighted by Freyre and Hollanda, will be, from then on, perceived as constitutive of Brazil's culture, politics and foreign relations.

On the other hand, since the beginning of the Republic of Brazil at the end of the late nineteenth century, what would later become a Brazilian soft power *par excellence*, was constituted through a calendar of festivals considered important for the Brazilian tradition, in which the feeling of national solidarity should be combined with international fraternity, in an attempt to create continuity with the past that would remove the feeling of ground zero of the Brazilian tradition, as well as the idea of a ground zero of the social body of the nation and, once inspired by external facts, there are several events promoting the Brazilian cultural heritage, worth highlighting the Week of Modern Art in 1922 and the Book Biennial of São Paulo, in 1951. State for the historical and artistic promotion, *pari passu* is rehearsed the forging of Brazilian traditions, in order to affirm a popular culture, which would contribute to the creation of a certain identity throughout the territory, permeating samba, football and carnival as cultural heritage of Brazil, which were part of the European imagination about the nation since the mid-twentieth century, reaching capoeira, feijoada and telenovelas as a kind of second generation of Brazilian symbols, which was established mainly from the 1990 onward.

The historical and recurrent representation of certain symbols points to the existence of a preponderant imaginary of what the Brazilian is, making certain values remain present in our society, even in contexts of political and social change, as was the case of the period dictatorial and political reopening. In this context, internal policy becomes decisive for foreign policy, since in the internal field, a dialogue with different layers of society is necessary, aiming to guarantee ever greater cuts of representation, regardless of whether its execution is under the responsibility of the State, capital or grassroots social movements. Thus, cultural diplomacy must start from national interests to become more representative, as for its success it is necessary to create harmony between national and international projects, in which the dynamics of organizations is the unifying focus. Considering the historical structural cultural persistence existing in Brazilian society and which end up marking out the foreigner's imagination about Brazil, it will now be sought to understand how Brazilian culture is used in the international scenario, as a tool for disclosing Brazil abroad.

8.4 The Export of the Cordial Brazilian Man

Officially born in the Vargas Era from the perspective of a state propaganda instrument, Brazilian cultural diplomacy arrived in the s is characterized by great emphasis on the political approach, something particularly visible, for example, in the installation of the Panels of Portinari at UN headquarters, in collaboration with the São Paulo Art Biennial for its internationalization, in the construction of the Brazilian Pavilion in Venice or in the sending of professors to Paraguay and Bolivia, in the

latter two cases to contain intense propaganda from Buenos Aires. Still according to Zétola (2021), although it is not an easy task to define the field of cultural diplomacy, due to the number of meanings, it is noted that the identification of a national culture adequate to meet the objectives of foreign policy is the element that confers coherence to the field of cultural diplomacy, regardless of the different perspectives regarding what this national culture would consist of and how it could produce effects in international relations.

From this perspective, the Brazilian matrix of foreign relations, along with those belonging to other pacifist countries, is guided by non-confrontational practices based on the good coexistence of cultural differences. An example of this would be the historic attempt by Brazilian representatives to participate, at the international level, in the majority of international decision-making bodies that have peaceful negotiation as their main axis. Alluding to the capacity of Brazilians to face adversities, these representatives seek, in speeches and in international plenary sessions, chances for Brazil to reach full visibility. This pacifist tendency—although often illusory when observing the protectionist relationship with its Latin American neighbors—became part of the international imagination, being incorporated into the features of national culture and becoming part of the Brazilian discourse on the international scene. Thus, in view of all these pacifist efforts by Brazil, which in 1947, during the opening of the first General Assembly of the United Nations, inaugurated the tradition that, perpetuated, confers a certain status to Brazil within the United Nations, while the Brazilian representative is the first speaker at the international forum.

In other international strongholds, realizing the possibility of creating visibility for Brazil based on the richness of the country's culture, representatives began to defend cultural heritage as a mechanism for insertion, as occurred in the case of a demand for safeguards still in the 1930s with the creation of SPHAN.¹ In this same period, the Intellectual Expansion Service aimed to discreetly promote Brazil's literary values abroad, removing any possibility of alluding to an attempt at official propaganda: what should be done was to create a positive image of the country and the creation of a network of foreign intellectuals who love Brazilian literature and cultural life. In this way, although of an official nature, any action put into practice should be received as an unofficial attempt, a strategy that meets some of the dichotomous requirements of cultural diplomacy. As Zétola (2021) points out, it was necessary to take advantage of Brazil's chance of projection, so that an air of civility and modernity could be created for the country. Later, the creation of exchange programs that would allow the dissemination of Brazilian culture abroad and bilateral institutes of high culture² would ensure the continuity of such policies.

Thus, based on the article in *Carta Internacional*, a scientific journal of the Brazilian Association of International Relations, it appears that there are evident characteristics related to the Brazilian model of carrying out cultural diplomacy,

¹ National Historical and Artistic Heritage Service (SPHAN) was the first name of the federal agency for the protection of Brazilian cultural heritage, today the National Historical and Artistic Heritage Institute (IPHAN).

² On Brazilian actions in this regard, see Dumont and Fléchet (2009).

which are observed in their scope and meaning, marked by: (a) a social construction; (b) expression of historicity; (c) inclusion of a positive message; and, (d) production as a requirement of the methodological order with respect to truth and rigor (Cervo 2008, p. 6). These characteristics are in line with the postulates of this work, since they were described and now ratified, it is also worth noting that the work *Raízes do Brasil*, by Sérgio Buarque de Hollanda, understands cordiality as the aversion to social ritualism, in the sense of being, our ordinary social form, the opposite of politeness, a mask for the individual, a disguise that preserves sensibilities and emotions (Buarque de Hollanda 1995, p. 147). The cordiality that appears in the way of engineering cultural diplomacy, for Cervo (2008), has as its central trait, the “purpose of accomplishing in common, adding good intentions and good will to concrete initiatives and provoking the growth of civilization in all areas”, countries, for the benefit of each one” (2008, p. 204). Resuming, for Buarque de Hollanda (1995), cordiality is a mask that manages to maintain the supremacy of the individual before society (Buarque de Hollanda 1995, p. 147). Cervo (2008) wants to explain a paradigm of conduct of the Brazilian Chancellery, which is more about the State, Buarque de Hollanda talks about the contribution of the Brazilian people to civilization.

Therefore, considering the aspects that characterize the national culture and heritage, as well as the cultural diplomacy of Brazil, both authors mentioned above agree on the use of the word cordiality. If, for Cervo (2008), the paradigm of official cordiality is based on the perception of national greatness, for Buarque de Hollanda (1995), cordiality is the liberation from the fear of living with oneself, of relying on oneself, and this fear reduces the Brazilian to the social and, therefore, cordiality would be “living others”. Buarque de Hollanda (1995) and Amado Cervo (2008) understand cordiality in different ways, despite both wanting to express a style of being Brazil in the world, each in their own way. Furthermore, the cordiality that qualifies the official status of the Brazilian cultural chancellery is based on “the values, interests and standards of the emerging countries” (Cervo 2008, p. 24). Added to this, outside the field of international relations, there are studies on the psychological elements of Brazil, which, to a large extent, are intertwined with research in the social sciences on concepts of Brazil. In those studies, welcomed here with a certain interdisciplinary generosity mediated by sociology, history and international relations, there are data that can be related to the debate proposed in this chapter. Roberno Gambini (2000), states that what will make the Brazilian identity mature will be “the ability to look at the unconscious dimension, which despises and inferiorizes the other and his peculiar way of being” (Gambini 2000, p. 178).

Thus, one can see a concern with building a positive image of Brazil abroad, as the universe of cultural diplomacy is of great breadth and richness, being directly related to the cultural capital of the countries. However, a rich historical past or recent cultural development are not enough as a starting point for a foreign cultural policy, while it is also necessary for countries to be able to use this capital for the benefit of their image and prestige. In this sense, cultural diplomacy “promotes or disseminates the culture, cultural programs, cultural or scientific institutions, ideas or authors of a country” (Lessa 2002, p. 17), its main motivation being the use of the country’s cultural capital in benefit of its external relations for the purpose of its own and

specific interests. Therefore, cultural diplomacy cannot have as its main objective to promote the country or its external relations, as in the case of academic exchanges, but to create an image or brand of the country, as this format of diplomacy does not aim to achieve cultural, economic or political results of any kind, short term, nor the return on investments made, considering that its objective is precisely to build positive and attractive images of the countries, which articulate in a consistent and modern way, their cultural capital and the development and cooperation projects intertwined with them.

Therefore, the exchange of people, combined with the promotion of art and artists, the teaching of the Portuguese language, the integrated distribution of promotional material, support for intellectual and technological cooperation projects, together with integration and mutuality in programming (Ribeiro 1989), are some of the means by which Brazil has developed cultural diplomacy. To do so, however, it is necessary for the country to be committed to articulating the aforementioned means of strengthening cultural diplomacy as long-term State policies, not governments, in order to create forms of shielding authoritarian subjects, such as Jair Bolsonaro, who governed Brazil between 2019 and 2023, leaving behind a gigantic dismantling of the state apparatus for promoting culture, defending heritage and raising the Brazil brand abroad, operating through institutional actions which did not advocate public funding for the culture area. Thus, instrumentalized culture as a policy for the distant future, also taken as an assumption of international relations, starts to play a consolidated role in the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy.

8.5 Cultural Diplomacy: Brazil, a Cordial Power?

Based on a model considered French, as a significant part of Brazil's intellectual and political production, the national State assumed the responsibility of promoting Brazilian culture abroad, becoming the iron state machine of cultural diplomacy, not only through the channels of Itamaraty, but also through the Presidency of the Republic and other State ministries in the last two decades. In this sense, it seems promising to propose the repatriation and restitution of illicitly trafficked cultural goods as a cultural diplomacy tool, in view of the prestige already enjoyed by Brazil, making them a mechanism for updating Brazilian cultural diplomacy. Therefore, it is worth stating *a priori* that the international traffic in cultural goods and works of art moves six billion dollars a year, according to official sources, clarifying that all countries seek to improve their legislation to make this type of transnational crime more difficult (Christofoletti 2017, p. 116). Currently, in view of this scenario, France has consolidated itself as the country with the most progressive legislation regarding safeguards, the repair and restitution of plundered cultural assets, which can serve as a parameter for Brazil, considering that French intellectual production is present as a theoretical framework for Brazilian social thought. In addition, it is extremely important to mention that the repatriation process has been developing effectively all over the world, with the direct intervention of Interpol and its counterparts, whose

websites provide public access to a database with several works that were stolen, or found but without owners, as well as works that have been stolen and returned to their original owners.

In this way, Interpol enables public knowledge of these works, which facilitates their recognition, as well as international competence in the repression of trafficking. Furthermore, by analyzing this problem closely, we will see that the changes in the structural composition of organized crime in the network, with widely diversified forms of action, and increasingly sophisticated interoperability, rank Brazil in the list of the ten countries that present the highest number of robberies of cultural artifacts. Indeed, the Database of Cultural Assets Wanted, created by the National Institute of Historical and Artistic Heritage (IPHAN), diagnoses this fact, as it listed, still in 2008, approximately 898 missing cultural objects cataloged as part of the national heritage (Christofoletti and Augustine 2020, p. 91). With regard to the most emblematic crimes involving cultural heritage in Brazil, part of the collections of the National Library, the Museu da Chácara do Céu and the Pedro Calmon Library of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) stand out, which occurred respectively in July 2005, February 2006 and May 2017, placed the state of Rio de Janeiro at the forefront of illicit trafficking in cultural goods (Christofoletti and Agostinho 2020, p. 92).

In this perspective, despite the evident progress of Brazil in relation to the mapping of cultural goods lost and entered in the illicit trafficking of cultural goods, associated with the strengthening of the Brazil brand abroad through culture, Cardoso and Agostinho (2021) support the existence of lack of knowledge about the memorial value of such artifacts, in addition to the parallel indifference of various sectors of society and the Brazilian State regarding the problem. Therefore, it is not intended to question the importance of the advances made by Brazil in relation to the conquest of soft power through culture in recent decades, as well as the strengthening of its image as a diverse nation, since the present work advocates that the heritage collections subject to of re-entry into the Brazilian territory are feasible support for the construction of narratives of the past that provide the construction of memory and that, in this case, are generators of a lasting cultural diplomacy, strongly anchored and with social ballast. And, for that, we go back to 2002, when the change of government in Brazil also brings an attempt to reorganize Brazilian foreign policy, which would involve the search for the resumption of former partners and the constitution, from a more of Brazil at the international level, of new partnerships.³ At that moment, the

³ There is a return to the historic partnership between Brazil and France, which had been abandoned since the 1980s. This new partnership, based on mutual support for the aspirations of countries in the international arena, on joint decision-making on strategic issues (such as hunger, trade and development) was further strengthened, in the field of cultural diplomacy, by the various events that swept France and Brazil throughout the Lula government, especially in 2005 and 2009, Year of Brazil in France and Year of France in Brazil, respectively. Thus, one can see not only a Brazilian attempt at rapprochement but also a French desire and initiative to approach the government that was established in Brazil with the departure of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. With regard to new partnerships, there is a strategic approach with developing countries, such as South Africa and India (strengthened by the formation of IBSA), China and Russia.

foreign policy of Lula da Sila's first administrations (2003–2011) was based on the perspective of change, present in his positions during the presidential campaign, as well as in his very progressive inauguration speech. In the end, the set of initiatives of the then President of the Republic aimed at closer and more incisive political coordination with underdeveloped and emerging countries, which, for our investigative work, demonstrates a somewhat significant change in the Brazilian position.

As Amorim (2004) considers in his speeches, the diplomatic action of the Lula da Silva government is conceived as an instrument to support the country's social, cultural and economic development project, also having a humanist dimension, which is projected in the promotion of cooperation international for development and peace, with a kind of national arrangement, without ceasing to be international. In essence, these are actions that require a rapprochement between peoples and societies, through art, culture, the multiplication of opportunities for linguistic contact, based on the vocation for dialogue with the most diverse actors on the international scene from the perspective of soft power. It can thus be seen that culture and foreign policy have been, since the beginning of the Lula government, determined by a political project in which national development passes through the discourse of cultural diversity. To this end, there was a certain connection between the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the creation of a political strategy based on international cultural relations with broad participation of cultural diplomacy, taking advantage of an openness to Brazilian culture internationally, insofar as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs begins to establish, more urgently in the Lula government, a strategy based on this format of diplomacy, given that culture is seen as a way of strengthening ties in order to achieve Brazil's projection on the international scene.

This way, we begin to value Latin American culture, to value the legacy of artists, scientists and black citizens who contributed to the originality and diversity of Brazilian culture. With this policy, there is also the promotion of artistic and cultural events in Brazilian embassies and cultural centers spread around the world, with the participation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture which, personalized by former minister Gilberto Gil, an influential name in national music in Brazil and with international projection, during his six years of ministry, between 2002 and 2008, he was concerned with actively participating in events that promoted Brazil abroad.⁴ On these occasions, it is important to consider that the then Minister of Culture, Gilberto Gil, sought to emphasize that the international action of the Brazilian government was not only for the promotion of Brazilian culture, both symbolically and economically, but, mainly, in a broader perspective, would be guided by the defense of cultural diversity, in order to combat the systemic asymmetries of the world affected by globalization.

Resuming the debate about Brazilian soft power, the use of cultural values and ideological principles posited in the 1988 Constitution, as well as the prestige of domestic policies for the insertion of minorities and an increasingly proactive international insertion in the regional scenario, also guided the Brazil's search for a greater role in other instances of the international community. In this second moment of the

⁴ 2004: 1st Conference of Intellectuals from Africa and the Diaspora; 2005: Year of Brazil in France.

country's foreign relations under the leadership of Lula da Silva, there was a decrease in the radicalism of the anti-imperialist discursive aspects and contestants of the US hegemony very observed in his political trajectory, to the extent that in place of these fundamentals, the government The Brazilian sought consolidation as an agent through a rhetoric based on universal principles in evidence on the international agenda, such as human rights, environmental preservation, indigenous emancipation, equity and justice in international law and self-determination of peoples, for example. In this sense, within the scope of the United Nations, Brazil played a central role in the process of approval by the General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in 2007, and has led within the organization the fight against actions and inactions which restrict the right of self-determination of peoples. Still at the United Nations, there was recently an attempt to play a leading role in achieving the Millennium Development Goals, in particular the eradication of hunger, which led the country to leave the United Nations Hunger Map in 2014. In this way, processes such as these, often symbolic rather than concrete, mark the style with which the Federative Republic of Brazil has used to overcome its military and economic limitations and guide an assertive insertion in the international scenario.

The previous pages are brief markers of what the Brazilian State has built as a framework of cultural diplomacy, in the midst of a history that reveals the effects of the political power of different nations through the appropriation of cultural assets, in a symbolic demonstration of dominance and power. In the case of Brazil, what can be observed is an environment conducive to widespread plundering and looting, insofar as the chaos produced by an action that affects the entire social structure through the theft or theft of an artifact, which has a with collective memory, it is still not proportional to the number of claims for resumption made by the Brazilian State. Therefore, it is also worth mentioning that the right of peoples to restitution and reparation for the damage caused must necessarily be an international instrument of cultural diplomacy in Brazil, advocating for the human right to guarantee memory, which is promoted by the United Nations, in order to that the States parties fight against impunity, which allows the restitution of goods to natural and legal persons, but also the right to know the truth.

In this way, it is claimed that Brazil's international cooperation is one of the most visible forms of application of what we refer to as the construction of a cultural diplomacy adjusted to the defense of cultural heritage through the defense of more significant efforts in relation to repatriation and return of cultural goods. The discussion around the possibility or not of the existence of a cordial power that is committed to the most refined practice of patrimonial safeguard, presupposes a brief debate around the very notion of power, borrowing one of the classic authors of realism, Hans Morgenthau, which departed from the idea of power applied to the individual, held that one man's strength over the minds and actions of other men, in order to inquire about what we mean when we attribute aspirations and actions to a nation (Morgenthau 2003, p. 200). This identifies the difficulty of attributing certain yearnings to all citizens of a nation, while the author recognizes modern nationalism as one of the sources for building power and suggests geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, degree of military preparedness, population, national character,

national morale—degree of determination with which a nation supports its government's foreign policies in war or peace, the quality of diplomacy and the quality of government as the constitutive elements of national power.

Morgenthau had in mind the United States of the second post-war period and the construction of American power. The complexity and sophistication of Morgenthau's reasoning is greater than his critics make out. The quality of diplomacy, although of an unstable nature, was placed as the most important among all the factors that enter into the formation of the power of a nation, taking the presence of the other factors as a prerequisite:

The quality of a nation's diplomacy combines these different factors into an integrated whole, entrusts them with direction and weight, and awakens dormant potentialities by giving them the breath of real power. (...) It is (...) the art of bringing together the different elements of national power, in order to make them produce the greatest possible effect on those points in the international situation which most directly concern national interests. (Morgenthau 2003, p. 273)

In the case of contemporary Brazil, Itamaraty never tires of extolling its persuasion skills, but how can an emerging power that maintains our rates of illiteracy, poverty, violence and exclusion be cordial? Brazil has not yet reached the status of power, but it is possible to say that it is in the process of building power. In this journey, the preservation of the accumulated historical of its foreign policy, duly adapted to the international situation of the beginning of the twenty-first century, the concerns around human development, in its broad sense, the defense of democratic principles, both externally and internally, the diversification of the country's international ties, the construction of soft power resources through cultural heritage, and, within it, the improvement of cooperation and cordiality. The cordiality debated as a multifaceted phenomenon, however, should be form and not essence, while it requires greater consistency in other power resources.

8.6 Preliminary Conclusions

It was found, based on the bibliography raised, that the current panorama of international relations, marked by a fierce competition between countries for markets and investments, while in many times the use of physical and coercive force is curtailed by the international institutional arrangement, which may bring more reprimands than rewards. In this way, more and more creative measures are required from States in the pursuit of their foreign policy objectives, and Brazil is prominently included in this list. For this reason, an attempt was made to expose the opinions of authors who believe that the cultural aspect of diplomacy can be one of these measures, with the notion of cultural diplomacy presented by Zétola (2021) being key, insofar as the deliberate use of cultural diffusion, if characterizes it as a way to facilitate the other priorities of a nation's foreign policy. Therefore, this concept is opposed to that of International Cultural Relations, which would be a cultural contact between peoples as an end in itself, because while international cultural relations can be undertaken

by any agent of civil society, cultural diplomacy necessarily needs to pass through by State planning, as this is the actor who still holds the responsibility for formulating foreign policy guidelines. We tried to expose some classic cases of the use of cultural diffusion as a deliberate instrument of foreign policy, analyzing the case of the Brazilian cordial man. The analysis of contemporary Brazilian cultural diffusion was then carried out, mainly during the first two governments of Lula da Silva (2003–2011) as President of the Republic, in order to verify if the strategies adopted in the cultural diffusion of the country were aligned with our other international interests—that is, if we had in Brazil the existence of a cultural diplomacy.

When analyzing how the process of disseminating Brazil's culture and image abroad takes place at the same time, it was seen that, within the structural organization of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this task is the responsibility of the cultural department, which operates through six divisions. The Division for the Promotion of the Portuguese Language Abroad (DPLP) has the function of disseminating the Portuguese language spoken in Brazil, acting through the so-called Brazilian Network for Teaching Abroad (RBEx), formed by the Brazilian Cultural Centers (CCBs), by the cultural institutes and by readers. The CCBs form a group of 21 centers spread across three continents (America, Europe and Africa) and are considered, by the MRE itself, the main tool for Brazilian cultural diffusion. Despite the limited budget for this work, the DPLP seeks to achieve its goals by choosing to focus on priority areas for Brazil's foreign policy: such as Latin America, Africa and underdeveloped countries, it is worth mentioning that this was one of the guidelines of the Lula governments, while pointing to the overlap between the actions of the DPLP and the most imposing tools of the Brazilian international agenda.

Furthermore, some inconsistencies are perceived between the practical actions of our foreign cultural policy and the official government discourse. While, through its reports and its official website, the Itamaraty, on numerous occasions states that South America, Latin America, Africa and, finally, the other underdeveloped nations are the priority areas of our policy of cultural diffusion, this is only partially true. In fact, the CCBs and cultural institutes are primarily located in these areas, however, with regard to the more general dissemination of artists, music, cinema and others, it can be noted that there is a prioritization by those art consumer markets, especially the European and American. This is evidenced by the experiences of both the *Novas Vozes do Brasil* Program and bilateral cooperation, which until now has only been dealt with mainly with European countries. However, even if they deviate from the Itamaraty's official discourse, the actions that privilege more traditional markets are still within the logic of cultural diplomacy, as there is an interest in taking advantage of Brazil's cultural identification—widely discussed in this work—with these countries, above all, to seek gains in areas of investment, technical and academic cooperation, which Brazil would still have to grow by relating more firmly with these developed nations.

Finally, it is worth leaving here a hook for perhaps a future sequel to this study and other researchers who wish to embark on the subject. The historical and contemporary strategies of cultural diffusion in Brazil were analyzed within the logic of cultural diplomacy and it was verified that perhaps the main restriction to an improvement

of this aspect of our foreign policy is the restricted budget. No attempt was made, however, to investigate the causes of the lack of prestige enjoyed by the cultural factor within the Brazilian diplomatic corps. The very lack of academic studies referring to cultural diplomacy already demonstrates that the lack of interest in the area is not exclusive to Itamaraty, but already comes from the academy of international relations itself. Contrary to the above, efforts such as the Cultural Heritage Laboratory of the Federal University of Juiz de Fora ensure that research aimed at unveiling Brazilian cultural diplomacy and its relationship with national culture and the nation's cultural heritage are significant and guarantee a progressive perspective. Alongside this, one can point out the very difficulty of choosing which cultural traits to spread and where, a problem that intensifies in a diverse culture like the Brazilian one, it is worth emphasizing that its cultural traits are beyond the complexes of Zé Carioca, revelries filled with sex, hot bodies and prostitution, as well as extravagant women. Furthermore, however, they are too complex to be analyzed here and require an expansion of this study to be investigated. What is expected, after all, is that the present work encourages new research in the area and expands what has been debated.

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Chapter 9

Brazil's Active and Haughty Policy Toward the African Continent: Between Diplomacy, Soft Power, and Heritage (2002–2008)



Leonardo Rauthier Brandi

Abstract This text aims to deepen the deliberation on the concept of soft power and its relation to Brazil's cultural, ideological, and political characteristics with the African continent, based on the policies adopted by President Lula's government from 2002 to 2008. From the perspective of heritage and soft power, it is possible to illustrate the multidimensionality of the ties established by Brazilian foreign policy, which beyond technical positions that involve economic issues, diplomacy with Africa affects the entire perception that Brazilians may have about themselves, as for example, the lost pardon of President Lula on the island of Gorée, Senegal in 2005 that was highlighted by the famous diplomat Celso Amorim in his book *Brief Diplomatic Narratives* (Amorim C (2013) *Breves Narrativas Diplomáticas*. Benvirá, São Paulo). This concept, coined by the political scientist Joseph Nye in the 1990s, seeks to understand the changes from coercive policies he called hard power, military operations and economic actions, to a less tangible international policy, which highlights the cultural dispute that involves the distinct forms of resistance, identity affirmations and the struggle for rights, thinking the material and immaterial heritage of the great international powers. We will seek to meet the new demands that emanate from society before history, in order to understand the cultural and social agents silenced and marginalized by hegemonic discourses that make the countries of the African continent and Brazil think about their heritage and cultural policies from the perspective of the concept that we will focus on in this book, the soft power. In order to understand the relationship of soft power with heritage, avoiding shallow analyses of these concepts, we will think about the use of cultural heritage, in its physical and symbolic, material and immaterial dimensions present in some points that we will have as object. Based on a wide reading of the literature that involves the concept of soft power and heritage, we will analyze some events, such as the relationship between the Funk carioca known as Batalha do Passinho, which occurs in Brazil, in the state of Rio de Janeiro, and the typical Angolan dance, known as Kuduro. On this

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first topic, we will highlight how in Brazil this battle was considered cultural patrimony of Rio de Janeiro, seeking to decriminalize images associated with the favela and its unfoldings, and why in Angola, the dispute to recognize Kuduro as cultural patrimony has not yet occurred, even though it has reached several Portuguese-speaking countries. The second event that we will focus on will be the stop made by the until then head of Brazilian diplomacy, Celso Amorim in Acra, capital of Ghana, that there was a community of descendents of former Brazilian slaves there, with the curious name of Tabon. The Tabons are governed by a king, whom President Lula met during his visit to Ghana in 2005, and from this relationship, there was a sensible attempt at cultural cooperation, with the creation of the Casa Brasil. This house was built to meet some activities that could make the cultural and health exchange with the fight against AIDS, and, finally ended up serving as an office to the “king of taboos”. The third moment of analysis will be the contribution of Paulo Freire, a great Brazilian educator, in the process of fighting illiteracy in Guinea-Bissau with his national literacy campaign and adult education and its developments after Lula’s visit in 2005.

Keywords Africa · Ghana · Angola · Guiné Bissau · Soft power

The objective of this chapter is to focus on the questions and not only on the answers, and with this, we will think about Brazil’s actions regarding its process of cultural, ideological and political exchange with the African continent. It will be from the policies adopted by the government of President Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva from 2002 to 2008 that we will look at patrimonial analysis together with the concept of soft power to illustrate the multidimensionality of the ties established by Brazilian foreign policy, which, beyond economic issues, glimpsed diplomacy with the African continent as an important vector of political action. A significant example of this new perception was President Lula’s 2005 pardon request on the island of Gorée, in Senegal, which was highlighted by the Brazilian Chancellor, Celso Amorim, in his book *Breves Narrativas Diplomáticas* (2013), as one of the most polished examples of Brazilian soft power.

When thinking about Joseph Nye’s concept, coined in the 1990s, we seek to understand the changes from coercive policies he calls hard power, military operations and economic sanctions to a less tangible policy of National States in the Present Time. The cultural dispute that is intrinsically impregnated with resistance, identity affirmations and struggles for rights, places us before the material and immaterial heritage of the great international powers as a great challenge of interpretation. We will understand the new claims that emanate from different societies before history, in order to understand the cultural and social agents silenced and marginalized by the hegemonic Eurocentric discourse, which makes countries from the African and South American continents coadjutant in the promotion of their heritage and cultural policies. To this terrain, we give the name of soft power.

A new category of documentary sources for historiographical research was born from the Internet, as digital sources. For Present Time researchers, it is fundamental to recognize that after its consolidation and popularization, we have an unlimited collection of new sources; this gigantic range in the twenty-first century has become increasingly present in historical research as primary sources.¹

In addressing Febvre's idea that historical knowledge should be broadened from a documentary perspective, producing research from a variety of sources, we understand that:

History is made with written documents, no doubt. When these exist. But it can be done, and must be done, without written documents, when they do not exist. With everything that the historian's skill allows him to use to make his honey, in the absence of the usual flowers. Therefore, with words. Signs. Landscapes and tiles. With the shapes of the field and the weeds. With the eclipses of the moon and the hitching of shooting horses. With the examinations of Stones made by geologists and the analyses of metals made by chemists. In a word, with everything that, belonging to man, depends on man, serves man, expresses man, demonstrates man's presence, activity, tastes and ways of being. A whole part, and without doubt the most exciting part of our work as historians, will consist of a constant effort to make silent things speak, to make them say what they themselves do not say about men, about the societies that produced them, and to finally constitute among them that vast network of solidarity and mutual aid that makes up for the absence of the written document?

(FEBVRE apud LE GOFF, 1992, p. 540)

With these words, we can justify the digital sources as tools for the historian's craft, as the several resistances to the incorporation of new documental categories. For the History of Present Time, the adaptation to new techniques and information technologies proves to be essential, and therefore, we cannot neglect these sources; since this research, a good part of its development was in a pandemic period and the digital world became fertile ground for the elaboration of this dissertation. Not to look at the Internet as a primary source is not to understand how attitudes, ways of thinking and values that are consolidated from the high capillarity and popularization of the World Wide Web.

The heritage theme has appeared in greater proportion since the 1990s and the early twenty-first century, especially in the cosmos of International Relations, with a focus on the UN and UNESCO. Therefore, cultural products and world heritage preservation policies have become one of the fundamental pillars that support the concept of soft power and its influence on multilateral dynamics, operationalized by international documents that have become famous, such as the Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972), the Cabo Frio Charter (1989), the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001), the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003) and the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005).

¹ What we know as the Internet is a worldwide computer network that connects millions of computers together. This equipment was initially desktop computers, UNIX-based workstations and servers that store and transmit information with websites and e-mail messages. With each passing year, more devices are connecting to networks, such as PDAs (Personal digital assistants, or palmtops), televisions, notebooks, cell phones, and automobiles. So the term "computer network" seems to be outdated in its application to the Internet.

To understand the relationship between these two concepts, we will think that cultural products only become soft power through their influence on international relations. It is important to see in a broad way that culture is an element that is in constant dispute within international relations. For Gueraldi (2010, p. 10), it is the political factors that will give the tone of promotion and insertion of Brazil in the international arena, which brings to this work, the importance of thinking about the recognition that cultural issues reach, from the mid-1980s, initiatives that expand the scope of diplomatic spheres, in an attempt to countries to become allies. The case of Brazil before the African continent, during the first decade of the twenty-first century is paradigmatic.

Cultural heritage becomes fundamental to the understanding of Brazil's relationship with these countries because the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 recognizes and consolidates the idea that "goods of a tangible and intangible nature, taken individually or together, bear reference to the identity, action, and memory of the different groups that make up Brazilian society" (Article 216, caput of the Federal Constitution of 1988). The role of cultural heritage that we will highlight in the future will be fundamental to think about the relationship of the countries involved in this research and the role of heritage that permeates international relations. In this sense, the figure of Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva and his diplomatic actions serve as a motto to understand how the Brazilian soft power action was consolidated in the relationship between the South American and African continents.

We will observe that the use of an active and proud policy, a term used by Celso Amorim in the Brazilian diplomatic campaign, to build international relations that would not only bring benefits to Brazil, but also to the countries involved, will become the greatest differential of Brazilian foreign policy during Lula's first mandates. A fair, honest and affirmative diplomatic policy will permeate the Brazilian context. Let us then, delve deeper into the idea of how the Atlantic relations between South America and Africa are built.

When we think about the set of concepts that arise from the manifestations of cultural heritage, of groups or societies that feel they belong to a certain collectivity, we understand that memory is always very dynamic and present, transmitting and preserving the experience of social traditions. It is on this ground that the consolidation of soft power takes place, which is perceived through the hands of the family and the school. There are conceptions of the world that are constituted from films introduced by parents, and with this, certain narratives such as the "American way of life" are reaffirmed in the family nucleus and in school spaces, often reproducing discourses that devalue or devalue local knowledge and heritage, compared to those of hegemonic countries.

In Brazil, Law 10.639, of 2003 (a true institutional counterpart to the slave past), which made the teaching of African and Afro-Brazilian history and culture compulsory in schools as a whole, has become a manifest example of soft power as a tool for historical reparation. Even though resistance to this law is found all over the country, the teaching of this theme still requires a lot of political will, specific initiatives, awareness campaigns, and activities that defend Afro-Brazilian culture. The teaching of History in Brazil is at the center of this challenge, mainly due to the

hegemony of the European bias that permeates all Brazilian social relations, from the most subtle, such as movies considered to be classics on TV, or music, to the very image of Brazil. It is much easier for us to conform to the American way of life than to clearly identify Brazil's roots and its connection to its indigenous and African origins.

Motivated by this perception, we will present the process of exchange between Brazil and Angola from the intersection of musicality and dance. We will identify the reasons why the recognition of Funk and Passinho (two very controversial popular artistic expressions in Brazil, largely due to the prejudiced view of the white Brazilian middle class) as a cultural heritage of Rio de Janeiro. In an analogous way, we will also analyze how Kuduro, an Angolan musical/scenic style, obtained international capillarity and ended up influencing the Passinho disputes in Brazil, despite not having much sympathy or cultural recognition in its country of origin.

If we think about the weight of carnival and its influence on Brazilian culture—including, at the moment I am finalizing the details of this work, I am experiencing the Brazilian carnival—the dispute of narratives generated from the obligation of Law 10.639 found fertile ground to germinate in the carnival space. The carnival space is constantly disputed by the front commission that carries the responsibility of the claims of a country that is not in the official portraits, raising to a public debate about the Brazilian heroes already established in historiography. In this showcase, blacks and natives played a fundamental role in the construction of the Brazilian identity, different from what the history present in textbooks presents.

To understand this connection, it is important to recognize that Brazil is the blackest country on the planet, outside the African continent, with the black population representing more than 50% of the total country. This data alone should be enough to stop the so-called institutionalized structural racism that exists here. Therefore, this law is a powerful educational practice to promote ways to overcome racism, this blood-stained chain that interlinks the transatlantic relationship.

9.1 Education as a Tool to Strengthen Soft Power

Brazil's relationship with African countries and former Portuguese colonies from the 1970s on, when these young nations gained independence, was characterized by few diplomatic cooperation initiatives. During the Geisel government (1974–1977), the relative distance from the continent began to decrease, and it was after the government of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva that relations were consolidated. With this, negotiations are initiated to enable the transfer of technology and knowledge from Brazil to countries that are former colonies of Portugal, thus making it possible to reduce their poverty. Former colonies such as Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Angola, and São Tomé and Príncipe became the focus of Brazilian diplomatic actions. From this group, we highlight Guinea-Bissau, Ghana and Angola.

Education is an unquestionable priority. It will be Paulo Freire's transforming experience in Africa that will help us understand the confluence between the educational process and the material and cultural production system proposed on the continent. Freire's role in African countries, starting with the denunciation of the oppressive reality, the criticism of dispossession, the colonialist farce that tried to mask that dehumanizing reality, and the announcement of a new society, constituted a dynamo of struggle. Therefore, the intention of constituting an educational project that united reflection, practice, and theory in Guinea-Bissau helped the country to free itself from old oppressive practices (Pereira and Vittoria 2012). The illiteracy rate in that country was 90% and its educational process had to be distinct from the Eurocentric molds, because only then, a political consciousness would be born. Before, everything that belonged to the colonized had to be reduced to the metropolitan or ruling class taste.

That is why Brazil assumes a fundamental role in the country's development process, by understanding that popular culture is intertwined with rural and urban workers, integrating them from the dialog of the educational process with the productive process. In the Lula government, it was understood that if carried out doses of generosity and coherence, the Brazilian soft power will be recognized and enhanced in its diplomatic relations (Ballerine 2017).

If the concept of soft power is the ability to influence others to do what you want through attraction rather than threat or coercion, Brazil understood that its diplomatic relations with this island off the African coast would enhance its image as an active and proud country on the international scene. With the mass adherence of young people to the Centro Cultural Brasil Guinea-Bissau, one of the fruits of this cooperation was the expansion of several areas of knowledge. Therefore, it is fundamental to understand that Brazil exports to Guinea-Bissau not only material influence, but also cultural influence, as it transfers technology and the way to produce these cultural manifestations in a reciprocal manner, which helps to configure the "proud" relationship referred to by Celso Amorim.

Since the beginning of the independent country, there have been moves to develop policies to improve the education system in the country, that is, to give a new teaching perspective to what was being built. It was with the help of Paulo Freire's adult literacy method that schools were spread throughout Bissau's neighborhoods, as well as within the armed forces (Semedo 2005). The Cultural Center Brazil Guinea-Bissau (CCBGB) is inserted in this work because it is an environment for dissemination, promotion, and consolidation of Brazilian culture in Guinean soil.

This center provides Portuguese language teaching, including Brazilian literature. This is fundamental for Brazil. The professor and secretary of the center, Gibril Balde, highlights that this space is fundamental in the process of assimilation of the Brazilian culture in Guinea-Bissau. This cooperation has been very good and has produced positive effects, as Brazil contributes in a modest and praiseworthy way to the training and formation of citizens, in several areas, such as: The Scholarship Agreement; the Student Agreement Program—Post Graduation, among others. This is an example of the relationship between Brazil and Guinea-Bissau, in which a bilateral policy of

technology transfer is consolidated, a field in which the Brazilian cultural heritage is absorbed by all those who pass through the CCBGB. Therefore, Brazilian soft power is enhanced through policies such as this.

9.2 Brazil and Ghana, the Taboos as a Key to Understanding the Construction of Memory Spaces

The African diaspora to Brazil was perverse since the colonial period. In order to work on the sugar cane plantations and in sugar production, this contingent of enslaved people were moved to the interior of the Brazilian territory. This diaspora within the diaspora made it, so that in the nineteenth century, groups of African descendants deported for reasons of political involvement, or of their own volition, freedmen and prisoners, returned to Africa. With this, they reaffirmed the will and desire to revisit the original culture and some of their ancestors AMOS. It will be in this context that some communities that declare themselves as “Tabons” and “Agudás” will be constituted.

The return was not easy as some think, there were several obstacles that caused upheavals, such as the fear of being enslaved again and the strangeness of those who returned with the others. It was the introduction of Portuguese culture by those who returned to their native land, taking with them knowledge and customs assimilated from their former evildoers in Brazil. Those who returned to Africa landed in Benin, where today constitutes Benin, Nigeria, Togo, and Ghana. This deportation process escalated after the Malês Revolt in Bahia in 1835 and others who managed to return on their own. One of the facts that had the greatest impact on this process were the laws #9 of May 13, 1935, and #14 of June 2, 1835. These laws were established in Brazil to hinder the permanence of Africans in the country and the regulation of deportation (Santos 2020).

The Revolta Dos Malês of 1835 is considered the largest revolt of slaves in Brazil, of Muslim origin and many others of African matrix religions. With the law that regulated the deportation process, and the implementation of the Brazilians on the coasts of West Africa in Freetown, Monrovia, Accra and Lagos, it will be from these Brazilians of Muslim origin, that Nii Ankrah of Otublohum, near Accra, will receive these former slaves, called the Tabons or “brasieiros”.

The Tabons are held responsible for the introduction of Islam in Ankra, by the belief that they took a copy in the Holy Quran with them in the process of slavery in Brazil and preserved to return with it when they were freed. However, the impacts after the introduction of Islam in Accra by the Tabons were overtaken by other groups during the course of the 1870s and early twentieth century (Samwini 2006).

Kwane Essien's study describes how this ethnic group managed to articulate themselves culturally, politically, socially, and economically to be accepted in the local society, exposing how they managed to escape slavery in Brazil, only to become

victims of colonial exploitation decades later. A brief genealogy of the Taboos, divided into three stages, which correspond to the historical context of Ghana: the first from 1820 to 1900, in the period considered pre-colonial; the second, from 1911 to 1957 corresponding to the colonial period and from 1957 to the present day the post-colonial period.

Despite being considered foreigners in their native land, they continued to celebrate their celebrations that had habits here in Brazil and, therefore, the historical process that permeates the return from Brazil to their native land will undergo several transformations in the historical memory, remembering, forgetting, representing, and negotiating their ties in different periods and circumstances.

9.3 The Heritage Relationship Between Kuduro and Passinho

The relationship between Funk and Kuduro (Ku in Angolan Portuguese is compared to the word “bunda” in Brazil) goes beyond musicality, and here, we will highlight how these styles became objects of study. A scholar of this Angolan musical style, recognizes the importance and power of songs when living in a situation of oppression, speaking of the empowerment of oppressed individuals who have been forced to resist against a system that oppresses them (Wilper 2011). The Disputa de Passinho is no different, mixing diverse musical styles, and it creates a sense of collectivity and mainly of social empowerment in the face of a state that oppresses them as it occurs in the communities of Rio de Janeiro. The contempt on the part of some social groups in both countries is the portrait of their dissatisfaction against a popular rhythm that, starting in Brazil and Angola, has spread worldwide.

When we make the relationship between these two artistic practices, even if it can be considered a phenomenon, there is an integration between music, dance, expression, new narratives, social criticism, identity, etc., which demonstrate the capacity for transformation and the plurality of the cultural essence (Muzombo 2020).

The conception of heritage often leads us to believe in the physical aspects of culture, a portrait of Eurocentrism in heritage understanding. However, intangible heritage may seem new to many, but the truth is that life in society is full of products and practices that reverberate this heritage. The social tensions that reflect the marginal culture, social practices of subaltern groups, one can see the tensions with the dominant or hegemonic culture. What we can highlight is that the representation of the real Angola and Brazil are the customs that represent the daily life of a society. It is very clear to see in the reaction of the dominant elites to what comes from the suburban/peripheral regions to recognize these cultural expressions. If we reaffirm that Funk and Kuduro is the expression of delinquents or marginals, it only reaffirms that in fact the elites are bothered by the existence of these representations of daily life that are different from those who live outside of this reality.

The cultural and intangible heritage has been the subject of debate for some years, the same way as in Brazil. After the Angolan independence, in 1975, 30 classified monuments were inherited, thus being born the legislation that defines the selection, identification and classification processes of the cultural heritages, it was the Presidential Decree 80/76, of September 3. The National Institute of Cultural Heritage (INPC) was created, with the purpose of preserving the heritage at a national level, with technical and legal legislation to safeguard and control it. UNESCO organized in Mexico City in 1982, the World Conference on Cultural Policies (MUNDIACULT), considering culture as a set of spiritual and material, intellectual and affective traits that characterize a society or social group. With this, the manifestations of the arts, of literature, the different ways of existing, the fundamental rights to exist in a dignified way, the traditions, and the feeling of belonging, will be traits that constitute the collective memory.

Cultural manifestations belong to the people, which include dances, songs, food, tales, myths, legends, and the way of making handicrafts, and with this, the understanding that each people has a set of knowledge and intangible cultural manifestations that need to be safeguarded (Muzombo 2020). The comparative analysis between Kuduro and Disputa de Passinho is that both styles have a significant strength, and therefore, even if both represent everyday life separated by the Atlantic Ocean, they have similarities. With intangible, but notorious capillarity, by seeing its proliferation in the streets, squares, in cabs, bars, TC, radio, and Internet Kuduro is widely disseminated on Angolan TV, with channels entirely dedicated to it (Zap channel 100, BE Kuduro), which present the theme 24 h a day, and channel 2 of the Angolan Public Television, presented by the mentors of Kuduro, Sebem, then by the duo Os Namayri (President Gasolina and Prince Ouro Negro). The relationship between Brazil and Angola regarding the two musical genres are similar in several aspects, such as rejection due to the fact that they come from suburban neighborhoods and are mostly made by people with low levels of education.

Funk carioca and Kuduro stand out when comparing some elements such as sound, plasticity, and social elements. The sociability spaces in festive environments, where music and dance are the link that expresses the common taste, where the distinction is given by the linguistic accent and the expression of sentimental references to the countries of origin. The Passinho disputes began in the Funk dances of the Marvelous City and received the title of Intangible Cultural Heritage of the people of Rio de Janeiro.

The Passinho, which is a mixture of various styles such as break, capoeira, frevo, and even classical ballet was the subject of Bill 390/2017, by MDB council woman Verônica Costa. The law was approved on June 20, 2018, with the pretext that this dance goes beyond dance per se, and yes, for the ability to unite communities in the city of Rio de Janeiro, which until then did not communicate, due to the non-solution of violence by the city's public security. Through dance, the tension between different favelas is eased, since those involved in Disputes de Passinho are able to overcome the borders that separate the territories controlled by drug trafficking, which make these regions rivals and make any relations between these regions impossible. Just like Kuduro and the disputation of Passinho, they will give the tone of artistic expressions

that manage to reduce social tensions and constitute spaces of memory, building and reaffirming the existence of subjects silenced by the system that does not see them. The Batalha do Passinho has been held since 2013, shaking the city of Rio de Janeiro with a prize of up to R\$10,000.

9.4 Conclusion

The concept of soft power of Joseph Nye corroborates the Cultural Heritage in the ability to influence other countries, so Brazil has adopted policies that knew how to take advantage of its image with various countries, especially those who were objects of study of this chapter. It is essential to highlight that in the years of Lula's government, Brazilian foreign policy identified the need to define the African continent as a priority, and therefore, we highlight here the relationship of Brazil in the aspects of Cultural Heritage, with Guinea-Bissau, Ghana and Angola.

From bilateral relations with these countries, Brazilian diplomatic capacity has proven to be active and effective, just as in the process of technology transfer to a country that already had Brazilian literature as its identity, using the literary works of Machado de Assis in the adult literacy process in Guinea-Bissau. In Ghana, the constitution of an ethnology demonstrates the peculiarity and richness of the relationship between these two countries, from the consolidation of the Taboos and the relationship between memory and history. In the country of Kuduru, it became clear that Brazil has much more in common with the people of the original continent of humanity than the official Brazilian history wants to make clear. Secondly, what we can notice in Brazilian foreign policy are the efforts during the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in an objective way to consolidate a South-South cooperative foreign policy, with priority to South America and Africa.

It was in Brazil's experience with the African continent that its capacity to expand its presence in the world became clear. One of the basic principles of soft power is to have its political practices recognized by other countries, and from this point on, to be able to influence other peoples, with the image, it has consolidated in international relations.

Within the time frame of this work, President Lula has visited more countries on the African continent in Brazil's history, more than all presidents in the country's history put together. There were more than 27 countries visited in the continent in 2003 alone, and for Celso Amorim "Africa has ceased to be a continent of problems to become more and more a continent of opportunities. Together with the idea of opportunity, the idea that Cultural Heritage is a potent opportunity to expand diplomatic relations is reaffirmed, and with it, to obtain greater opportunities to participate in the UN decision-making processes. The greater the number of partners, the greater the opportunities.

The Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), a financially significant institution in the Brazilian economic landscape, has announced the approval of a substantial credit line totalling USD 1.4 billion. The primary objective of these credit lines is to cater to approximately 200 Brazilian companies established in Angola, thereby strengthening the commercial and economic ties between the two countries. Cultural Heritage constitutes one of the most important vectors. Converted into a tool of soft power, it can and must increasingly sophisticate the relations between Brazil and the rest of the planet, because it must translate universal values that are compact with the international community (Christofoletti 2017, p. 15). So when we think about the ability to positively influence different countries, we must always remember that, whether in education (Tabons in Ghana) or the performing arts (Kuduro and Funk), they translate the best of human relationships.

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Chapter 10

Cultural Heritage as a Potential Soft Power Instrument



Lara Elissa Andrade Cardoso 

Abstract The content aligns with allusions to cultural heritage present in 2023 master's thesis “As tonalidades do soft power brasileiro: entre a visibilidade e a atuação” (Cardoso, 2023) (The shades of Brazilian soft power: between visibility and acting), whose purpose is to present, from the perspective of cultural heritage, “soft power” from reports of four representative newspapers of national electronic media, Folha de S. Paulo, O Globo, O Estado de S. Paulo and Jornal do Brasil, between 1997 and 2018. In their wide plurality, the nuances of soft power were mapped as a persuasion tool and strategical instrument of Brazilian foreign policy, given the unprecedented character on heritage in the country. Based on this, the article is a result of intersection of History and International Relations fields and flows in the sense of describing how the theme is inserted in current geopolitical scenario; the different conceptions of power, in which cultural heritage as soft power is one of such variation; the vulnerability of cultural goods and conduct of protection, preservation and safeguard measures; the inestimable value and significance of collective identity of several social groups; cultural heritage and its position as a primary source of soft power for whole humanity, as well as for strength, geopolitical strategies and prominence in the international system of states. That said, the present work intends to offer a theoretical-methodological study of soft power in order to provide a bond between theory and practice to demonstrate a brief explanation on how works the soft power application in Brazilian foreign policy.

Keywords Soft power · History · Cultural heritage · International Relations · Press

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10.1 Cultural Heritage in Current Geopolitics

The work in hands is part of the first chapter of the master's thesis entitled "As tonalidades do soft power brasileiro: entre a visibilidade e a atuação" (The shades of Brazilian soft power: between visibility and acting, 2023) presented in the post-graduate program in History at Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora (UFJF), whose narrative stands out by contextualizing cultural heritage in the current interstate system; the plural character of "power" in the face of its varied notions of meaning; the relevance of cultural heritage as an instrument of soft power and, still from this perspective, the potential that heritage itself and other elements carry for strength, power and national strategies.

Soft power instruments mark the image of their respective countries and contribute to enrichment in financial, international, tourist and social terms. The African art case that is present in European museums is worthy of being highlighted: valuable, rare and priceless, it has attracted attention of historians, anthropologists, museologists, artists, admirers and businessmen for decades. Nowadays, Africans struggle to recover artifacts that rightfully belong to them. Other nations and social groups also unite to claim before world organizations from the advance, but still embryonic, dialog about international policies and the return of their cultural goods, opening doors to the themes repatriation, devolution, safeguard, restitution, nationalism, symbolism, memory and tradition.

The technological instruments of communication and transport evolution, as well as current war conflicts, contribute, in a way, to the expansion of interest in these cultural goods, as well as the ease for the occurrence of smuggling and deterioration, reflecting on the vulnerability of spaces for protection of "collective memories".¹ In this sense, we are experiencing a moment of crisis in the context of cultural heritage, which is verified through crimes perpetrated by radicalized groups of the Islamic State, such as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Taliban or Al-Qaeda. Since 2014, the group has been destroying artifacts, statues and monuments in front of television cameras because they have found that they are out of line with the extremist view of Islam. In addition to radicalism itself, we can verify the deterioration of heritage in a bigger sense, given the lack of sensitivity of some political actors with regard to the safeguarding and repatriation of their cultural properties and, especially, the process of illegal commercialization of cultural heritage, which has been configured as the third largest illicit practice in the world, whose profitability has generated financial transactions of around six billion dollars annually according to data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Christofoletti 2017, p. 117).

Specialized agents in protection and security of cultural goods differ according to each country since the states have liberty of decide to adhere to the treaties. In this sense, countries choose which cultural goods they intend to allocate under

¹ The category "collective memory" was developed by the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945) in "A memória coletiva" (1990, p. 81/82) and implies that memory of experiences must be considered in a group perspective, leading to into account the social contexts in which they operate.

international guardianship and protection, so that countries have autonomy to define their own means of protecting heritage. International action regarding the safeguard is insufficient and one of the failures refers to the lack of adherence by member states, insofar as first world countries have their own exclusive measures. In highlight, the following three international treaties: the Hague Convention of 1954, the UNESCO Convention of 1970 and the UNIDROIT Convention of 1995, while each of them was willing to intervene seeking measures that correspond to the context of the time in which that emerged, such as post-colonialism, in reference to times of war and times of peace.

In allusion to Brazil, it should be noted that there is an institute in charge of ensuring these measures for historical, artistic and landscape heritage, which is named Instituto do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional (IPHAN). Linked to Ministry of Tourism, IPHAN is responsible for protecting and promoting national cultural goods, insofar as it guarantees their longevity and usufruct for present peoples and generations to come. The list of registration requests includes not only “physical” heritage, but also buildings, fountains and representative urban complexes; after all, the registration dossier includes intangible heritage² and is divided into books that include the following four categories: knowledge; celebrations; forms of expression and places. Throughout history and until today, certain social groups are more privileged and better regarded both by society in general and by the state itself. As Karine Lima da Costa (2018) argues, it is clear that “the issues involving the ownership of cultural heritage, although commonly proclaimed as belonging to all individuals, are delimited by very specific spheres and contexts” (Costa 2018, p. 116, own translation).

In this way, a series of expressions, traditions, manifestations, experiences and memories enter the regrettable statistics of silencing and the consequent cultural erasure, which led to the absence of historical records documenting the memories of indigenous peoples, quilombos, tenements and working class. It is worth mentioning that the entire cultural plurality fulfills its role of prominence and contributes to the vast wealth and diversification that constitutes the country. In view of what has been highlighted, the problem involving repatriation and restitution issues appears to be in certain niches justified by spheres of power and domain, in that game of who commands and who obeys. The very appeal of intellectuals engaged in the preservationist agenda, international bodies and even the population itself, operates as an incentive to ensure that there is greater reach and, in effect, everyone stays abreast of the spheres in dispute with regard to the theme and, consequently, stimulates the encouragement in recognizing the real debate dimension, in order to reinforce the role of foreign policy in clarify the attractive magnitude and potential that they carry about caring for their heritage. It is inferred, therefore, that the Brazilian cultural heritage, as a basic element in terms of soft power, is at risk. The next topic addresses a more

² Although we do not agree with the material and immaterial distinction of heritage since they coexist, the immaterial category achieved notoriety from the Federal Constitution of 1988, in its articles 215 and 216 and includes practices, ways of doing, domains of social life, knowledge, celebrations and festivities, performing, plastic, recreational or musical arts, as well as places where cultural practices are manifested.

accurate and pragmatic analysis of the variations attributed to the concept of power in International Relations field.

10.2 Power and Hegemony in International Relations

In reference to soft power concept and considering that the object of study consists of one of the variations of “power”, for a denser study and more accurate understanding, it is worth exploring the senses of “power” in the history of International Relations and its implications, considering immediately that its meaning is not static, since it varies according to the course of time and, especially, the context. That said, it is noteworthy that in terms of nations, different countries could play their role of hegemony through the historical panorama of the moment.

That said, the initial premise related territorial space, natural resources and demographic volume as synonymous of power. Then, each nation had its territorial limit, and the biggest concern was with the neighboring countries, which had the nearest threat. At first, power was attributed to the nation with larger territorial dimensions and allied to the military force; this was the idea of hegemony, in which countries struggled incessantly by territorial expansion. Through this scenario, the notion of power migrates and, above all, coexisting with the capitalist notion while, in this sphere, it is the economic force that dictates the level of power. So, as presented, as per the course of time, the semantics of power has changed and, consequently, states have seen the need to adapt to different realities, especially with regard to engagement, agreement and re-establishment through others. For Ignácio Ramonet (2003), the old sources of power no longer have effectiveness, in opposition, they classify themselves as costly disadvantages in the post-industrial era, whose prosperity is revealed in intellectual capacity, promoting knowledge, research, creativity and ability innovation while, on the other hand, the production of raw materials has lost strength in this regard. To illustrate his argument and recognizing the United States as an exception in this case, Ramonet quoted a group of countries that have richness in natural resources and significant demographic volume while being disadvantaged amid the power distribution scheme. They are Brazil, Russia, India, China, Mexico, Nigeria and Indonesia. China, however, has been presenting itself more and more as a soft power potency, which would be wrong to say that it is at disadvantage in the face of power distribution. According to Paulo Menechelli (2022), a specialist in Chinese cultural diplomacy, China has a preponderant role in the cultural level in International Relations, while classified as, among other spheres, one of the main actors in the global audio-visual market, since the movie industry is an expressive soft power instrument in the country.

Like other spheres of power, the soft power dimension presents itself as a witness to fundamental changes of power nowadays. Then the world scenario is constantly changing, and so is the soft power. It is not static, on the contrary, it changes according to the context. In reference to the height of the great empires, Matthew Fraser discussed an appropriate fragment about the search for power:

No empire—Greek, Roman, French, Ottoman, British—has been indifferent to the effects of its soft power resources. In our present information age, however, a wide range of countries as well as other actors in international relations have dramatically increased their quest for soft power on a hitherto unprecedented scale (Fraser, M. apud, Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 11).

Thus, it is evident that, despite being recognized as the central figure of the soft power concept, it would be inappropriate to say that it was Joseph Nye who invented him. He leveraged his dissemination, since the “essence” of soft power has always existed, even at the time of the great empires, continues to coexist with other factors and adapting in the face of different scenarios, so that the notion of power and adaptation to what was viable in each context was already usual. That said, Ballerini (2017) considers it essential to emphasize that the concept of soft power was not originated from scratch, and in view of this discussion, what must be evident is that, in each circumstance, different devices and strategies of what is now called soft power were used. Nowadays, in the so-called information age, some scholars seem to align with Fraser (2020) and Gueraldi (2006), and through the phenomenon of globalization, the resources are different, the demands are different, and technology is more advanced. Gueraldi (2006), in his master’s thesis, argues that information control is characterized as a strong ally of a hegemonic nation. In reference to the advance, Nye pointed out that due to developments, information flow and globalization, new actors are associated with the international system today: “States, non-state actors, great powers, normal powers, rogue states, terrorists, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs) [...]” (Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 7).

In addition, the emphasis of power has shifted strongly from military might to technological development and, in light of this, it is up to the foreign policy of each country to update itself to what is on the agenda in the world today and align itself with current demands so that, according to Nye (2004), ignoring values such as democracy and individual freedoms may compromise their efficiency and, consequently, lead to isolationism. In line with Gueraldi, the definition of exercising soft power feasibility “[...] encompasses more tangible concepts, depending on financial resources, deadlines, potential availability of information and the state of theorization about it” (Gueraldi, 2006, p. 8, own translation). And, as a rule, the first world countries are responsible for dictating the rules of the international system, considering that these governments seek to understand and study international structures, their functioning and their triggers. However, it is worth emphasizing a particular weighting in the case of China since not being a champion in terms of democracy is not an impediment for the country to be a potency of soft power, as it has been presenting itself contemporaneously.

Most American universities have a specific department for studies on Latin America and other cultures, such as Chinese, French and/or Arabic. European countries also tend to invest in study departments about other nations, while, on the other hand, Latin American universities lack those research places on their neighboring countries, consequently being, according to the ex-former secretary general of foreign affairs, ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (2002), subjects and at the mercy of evaluations and studies from countries that make up the hegemonic center, which dictate rules, directions and traditions before others. The fact that Brazil does not

have a study department targeting Argentina is configured as a strategic error that, according to Guimarães, demonstrates the peripheral countries and their foreign policies vulnerability.

Still on the unstable nature of power, Joseph Nye Jr. argued that resources change according to the changing context, that is, they varied in the past and will continue to do so in the future. In reference to North American soft power, e.g., it could be usual to imagine that the historical trends of the Cold War episode are not identified as reliable guides for predicting the ebb and flow of American soft power in combating terrorism forces. Therefore, based on Congressional Smart Power of 2007 repercussions, chaired by Richard Armitage and Nye himself, his position stands out: "We concluded that America's image and influence had declined in recent years and that the United States had to move from exporting fear to inspiring optimism and hope" (Nye apud Ohnesorge, p. 5). That is, according to Nye (2004), soft power is characterized as one of the most relevant powers of influence in American culture, which even gives legitimacy to a series of actions in United States foreign policy, so that the fact that soft power played a relevant role in foreign policy there for many years, makes this perception of power decline in America particularly significant and worrying. That said, it is worth mentioning Nye was reworking the concept idea based on critics for defending the pure application of soft power. So, his currently more focused notion of so-called smart power, whose definition would not be limited to a mere variation of soft power, however a combining strategy of soft and hard power whose application would take place in different scenarios and varied contexts. In this sense, smart power does not define a political act as mild or crude, as it adapts to different purposes and can mutate depending on the situation. By way of illustration, the power and military capacity of a nation should not be regularly categorized as instruments of hard power, since their use may be intended to attract another state based on cooperation, strategy or exchange of knowledge.

To summarize the definition of power discussion, for Robert Dahl (2001), "the concept of power involves the ability to get another person to do something that, otherwise, would not be done" (Dahl apud Guerardi 2006, p. 31, own translation). In the version of the renowned French political scientist Raymond Aron, referenced by Vítor Ramon Fernandes (2015), a distinction prevails between power, which is sometimes offensive, and sometimes defensive:

Offensive power is the ability of a political unit to impose its will on others and its ability to not let the will of others be imposed on it. [...]. [And the defensive power] consists of a state safeguarding its autonomy, maintaining its own way of life, [and] not accepting that its internal laws or external actions are subordinated to the wishes of other countries (Aron apud Fernandes 2015, p. 32, own translation).

In Aron's conception, the nation based solely on the so-called defensive power is vulnerable to the risk of assuming an isolationist posture, which for the theorist is not always recommended, as occurred in the face of General Charles de Gaulle aggressive posture whose intention was the rise of France to the level of first world country. From a denser analysis, it is relevant emphasize that in International Relations field, a traditional theoretical clash between realism and liberalism predominates, which

will be better developed later on. According to Edward Carr, theorist defender of classical realism, power would be distributed in at least these following categories: military, economic and power over opinion. The latter seems to present aspects of soft power and its meaning refers to the strategic domain of persuasion. In view of this and what has already been presented, among different categorizations and meanings attributed to power, Hendrik W. Ohnesorge, in the second chapter of his work entitled “Soft Power: The Forces of Attraction in International Relations”, pointed out his objective of expanding the discussion about power, claiming to be the result of an inconclusive research given its high complexity of mechanisms and processes. To illustrate it in a playful way, he also highlighted a speech by Paul Pierson, which is presented as follows: “Power is like an iceberg; at any moment in time most of it lies below the waterline” (Pierson apud Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 24).

With regard to soft power and its implications, Ronaldo Guimarães Gueraldi (2006) characterized soft power as follows: “it is the ability to influence others to do what you want by attraction instead of coercion. Coercive power would be military ostentation and economic sanctions, classified by Nye as brute power [or hard power], while cultural, ideological and political identity would compose ‘soft power’” (Gueraldi, 2006, p. 65, own translation). In illustrative terms, it turns out, then, soft power, especially in its cultural sphere, operates with seductive notions of persuasion and convincing, promoting attractive results such as human rights, democracy and individual opportunities. Therefore, it is immediately worth emphasizing that soft power would be far from carrying a pejorative, manipulative or Machiavellian sense, as occurs in the human nature conception by realist authors. There are forms of power that we would say are more visible, such as economic and military might, and others that are invisible, which have the role of persuading, attracting, and influencing the opinion of other people to act as you want. That said, apparently, this less explicit power—soft power—is generally not aligned with the thoughts of realist authors in International Relations (IR), which defined public opinion for its manipulative nature of political power. In this sense, the nature of soft power is prominently similar to Lynne Weil’s (2001) public opinion interpretation being able to shape the international political agenda.

As noted, the powers arising from the war industry and imposition build a hegemonic tendency, insofar as they provoke interstate competition through the struggle for their own interests. Still on hegemony, skeptics, Thayer and Layne argue that “in international politics, benevolent hegemonies are like unicorns” (Layne and Thayer, 2007, p. 68), referring to the imaginary figures of unicorns that are mostly present in the youth sphere. In order to establish a correlation between state security and power, this defensive commitment with the aim of taking advantage at any cost prevails in International Relations issues, more precisely, in the realistic tendency whose premises go hand in hand with hard power.

After demonstrating the approximations and comparisons between hard power and realism and soft power and liberalism, although equally supported by other authors in IR, they are presented as unfeasible for Joseph Nye Jr:

There is no contradiction between realism and soft power. Soft power is not a form of idealism or liberalism. It is simply a form of power—one way of getting desired outcomes. In the same vein, Nye argued that even though some observers try to distinguish between hard and soft power as belonging to the realist and liberal camp in IR theory, respectively, the shoe does not fit (Nye apud Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 60).

Therefore, in Nye's conception, soft power and hard power should not be designated or even compared as possible theories in International Relations, since they are characterized, in fact, as variations of types of power. It is important to emphasize that the meaning of power goes far beyond the dichotomy between hard and soft power and, in recent times, the power discussion has been gaining more and more prominence, especially after the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001.

As maintained by Ohnesorge (2020), there are no final answers for the study of power. Thus, far from provide "final answers", at all times new reformulations, ideas and concepts appear whose objectives aim to cover the content in question. That said, it is worth to present further a series of statements by authors who proposed to innovate and discuss the subject; Niall Ferguson is one of them. Engaging in his studies, he verified, from the turn of the century, the presence of a paradox allied to the globalization phenomenon: "[the] paradox of globalization is that as the world becomes more integrated, so power becomes more diffuse" (Ferguson apud Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 6). Considering this, according to Joseph Nye, five specific trends contribute to this so-called global diffusion of power, they are: "economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology and changing political issues" (Nye apud Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 6).

Thus, however, the information that is important to retain is about the changed scenario, in which international politics is being implemented today. In the globalization age, there is clear evidence that nations, economically, are more interdependent than ever, as the recent financial and global crises have so dramatically demonstrated. In the midst of an increasing dispersion of power among a growing flow of actors, there is a shift in the relevance of different varieties of power. And, in consequence of these developments, globalization and new actors associated with the international system today, Ohnesorge (2020) pointed out that the sources of power are, in general, moving away from the emphasis on military force and conquest that marked previous eras, as previously addressed. Nowadays, in the assessment of international power, factors such as technology, education and economic growth are becoming more and more important, while, on the other hand, geography, population and raw materials are marking less prominence.

In sequence with the analysis of changes in the power notions at a global level, it is worth bringing this speech date from 1992, by Benjamin R. Barber, in which he opposes culture and tools, evidencing the increase in preference for artifices that involve culture in its most varied spheres in opposition to the military might:

[C]ulture has become more potent than armaments. What is the power of the Pentagon compared with Disneyland? Can the Sixth Fleet keep up with CNN? McDonald's in Moscow and Coke in China will do more to create a global culture than military colonization ever could. It is less the goods than the brand names that do the work, for they convey lifestyle

images that alter perception and challenge behavior. They make up the seductive software of McWorld's common (at times much too common) soul (Barber apud Ohnesorge 2020, p. 9).

It is worth pointing out, however, that the increase in power prestige and acceptance in one of its varieties does not necessarily result in a decrease in other types of power. So, the growing relevance of soft power in international politics and the fact that it is the most significant variety of power currently, does not imply a decrease in relevance or annulment of hard power or yet another sphere of power. In reference to Simon Anholt, Ohnesorge highlighted:

Hard power, that is, military might and economic prowess, of course, remains vitally important in international affairs. Countless empirical events in the recent past all around the world, from Crimea to Syria to North Korea, underline this point. At the same time, power—across all its varieties—is no zero-sum game and the increasing importance of one variety does not necessarily result in the decrease of others in all instances (Ohnesorge 2020, p. 10).

Given this, once again it is noted that power is always dependent on the context. In the recent decades, the context of international relations has changed considerably, resulting in soft power as expressive as ever. Interconnecting the main sense that shapes this power to reach hearts and minds, Nye highlighted: “Winning hearts and minds has always been important, but it is even more so in a global information age” (Nye apud Ohnesorge 2020, p. 10). In view of this perception, the increased relevance and demand for soft power was not only identified in foreign policy, but also in academia, while “soft power and its associated concepts have resonated both with those who make American foreign policy policies and those who write about it” (Christopher Layne apud Ohnesorge 2020, p. 10). Despite this, at a national level, the theme is still moving at a slow pace, which motivates the search for titles and references from other languages.

Gathering some criteria, Guimarães (2002) sought to demonstrate the strategy that led the “hegemonic centers” to leadership, given that the prominence of the United States, e.g., is the result of planning that involves the following factors and the preservation of: (A) technological; (B) economical; (C) political; (D) military and (E) ideological powers. With regard to North American hegemony, Guimarães pointed out that it would be a mistake to relate the current international position/insertion of the United States as an effect of the so-called Manifest Destiny.³ The insertion is, actually, a concretization process of the planning involving the main factors highlighted above.

“More than ever, success depends on the ability to attract, build and mobilize networks of actors to work collaboratively. Those countries with the ability to do so will be the ones driving change and shaping global events in the future” (Portland 2021). Available on the Internet, the Soft Power 30 page is the result of the work of a company called Portland that operates in strategic communication consultancy in

³ “Manifest Destiny” is the name of a document that was presented by the United States as an attempt to justify, as if it were a divine choice, its prominence on the international level, being privileged for being surrounded by two oceans (Atlantic and Pacific), as well as having two neighbours considered weak militarily (Mexico and Canada) (Pecequillo 2003).

agreement with companies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), government and foundations in order to shape their stories and establish an accessible communication bridge for the general public. On the website, Portland brings together a ranking of the thirty nation-states with the greatest evidence of soft power use, based on surveys and their respective score analysis based on specific criteria. With the last update in 2019, The Soft Power 30 has an interactive tool that allows you to use informative texts about the countries included in this accounting, as well as their highs and lows. A significant fact worth mentioning is the fact that Brazil is the only country in South America to make up this ranking, largely due to the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Rio Olympics. The possibility of filtering the analysis by category or also by year, from 2015 to 2019 and currently in 26th position with 51.34 points, the spheres of analysis of the countries cover the points: digital; enterprise; education; culture; engagement; government and polling, being, in the Brazil case, the highest score assigned to the enterprise, 30, and the lowest, to the cultural sphere, 16. In the text that presents the overview, Portland wrote a point of highlighting about the past government of president Jair Bolsonaro and its character of dividing opinions even among the international community; the Brazilian particularity of reinventing itself and being among the champions in the soft power category in Latin America, guided especially by our traditional and biggest cultural event called carnival, from the visibility of national football as well as the prominence of monuments such as Christ the Redeemer.⁴

Still about carnival, it is worth opening a parenthesis to analyze it in its tangible and intangible character. To a lesser extent than Hollywood, carnival fits in as a Brazilian soft power as it plays an internal and external attraction role. Furthermore, in terms of tangibility, the promotion of tourism is reinforced, while the intangible issues include recognition of the people joy and the biggest cultural festival in Brazil—and the world! The event, according to Ballerini, has “[...] volume, industrial discipline and media coverage capable of selling the country to nations very different from ours” (Ballerini 2017, p. 92, own translation). It is interesting to note that the performances that parade along the avenue carry messages with great potential to reach, in order to impact the world with themes ranging from environmental preservation, political criticism or technological evolution. In this sense, considering the broad reach of the concept, there are chances of using this potential to also benefit the country in economics and politics terms, as well as other soft power variations such as sport, diplomacy, cooking, dance and tourism. In light of this, the next topic will discuss about, the relevance and role of cultural heritage as well as their approaches linked to soft power.

⁴ Regarding the last update of the data being four years ago, we tried to contact Portland team via email, however we did not receive any answer until now. In the message, I requested updates and tried to reinforce that pandemic context would bring significant changes to the topics investigated, guided by the notion that the countries ranking would present considerable changes amidst public health, economic crises and political scandals.

10.3 Cultural Heritage as Soft Power

The cultural heritage existence is essential and intrinsically tied to human existence since, from assumptions raised by History and Anthropology, culture is characterized as an inseparable aspect of life. Long before, there are the conceptions of goods, culture and property, and even before heritage notion, these elements were already present in the lives of human subjects and groups in communities, resources that would be described nowadays, as cultural goods/cultural property. To clarify the content, it is noteworthy that the sense of cultural goods is not static, it has been changing over the years, whereas the definition imposed by the 1970 UNESCO convention, in Article 1, is even broader than the 1954 Hague Convention, two of the main international treaties that go back to the theme:

For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘cultural property’ means property which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science and which belongs to the following categories: (a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and objects of palaeontological interest; (b) Property relating to history, including the history of science and technology and military and social history, to the life of national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artist and to events of national importance; (c) Products of archaeological excavations (including regular and clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries; (d) Elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites which have been dismembered; (e) Antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins and engraved seals; (f) Objects of ethnological interest; (g) Property of artistic interest, such as: (i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on any support and in any material (excluding industrial designs and manufactured articles decorated by hand); (ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any material; (iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs; (iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any material; (h) Rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and publications of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.) singly or in collections; (i) Postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections; (j) Archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic archives; (k) Articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old musical instruments (UN, United Nations 1970).

Through advance and strengthening of international organizations, as well as the interstate relations densification, efforts to protect cultural heritage have achieved an important role in cultural diplomacy and international scope, as well as the presence in the debates related to the culture and roads of soft power, especially in which concerns the vision and engagement of a nation against other countries. In this sense, it should be noted that interstate relations have gone from the mere role of good neighborhood policy to directly affect decision-making, alliances and exchanges between states-nations, which reaffirms in the formation of bilateral and multilateral treaties.⁵

The undergraduate course in International Relations in Brazil is not particularly interested in the approach aimed at museums, landscapes and cultural spaces, which,

⁵ Bilateral treaties correspond to official international agreements usually of economic or political nature involving the exchange between two countries, while multilateral treaties refer to agreements between two or more countries. They gather to form alliances and align guidelines in various fields such as trade in goods and services, environmental, cultural issues, health-related issues, etc.

on the other hand, is merely concerned with “economy, military affairs, crimes, health, environment, terrorism and so against” (Christofoletti 2017, p. 18, own translation), as Christina Luke and Morag Kersel emphasized. Although cultural heritage does not yet mark prominence in the sphere that intersects History and International Relations areas, this connection has been increasingly assertive and necessary. The internationalist universe, for a long time, has been inclined to the themes that concern the economy, military affairs, health issues, terrorism, war and violence in more general terms. To the extent that power notion in IR has been acquiring new configurations, especially from the turn of the twentieth century to the twenty-first century, issues related to culture, science and education assumed new denotation to ideals of progress and development of a nation:

At the end of the 20th century, classic themes from the predominance of the realistic theory—such as discussions about polarity of the international system, power balance, security, among others—gave way to new theoretical strains, which multiplied their intellectual productions on the so-called new topics of International Relations (Vigevani, 1994, p. 45 apud Christofoletti 2017, p. 14, own translation).

Thereby, the mechanisms and instruments destined to safeguard heritage were restructured, especially from the second half of the twentieth century onwards, under the support of various nations, taking into account that such a trend of development of the protection of cultural heritage operates both at the global level as regional and national, as verifiable from publications in Latin American press vehicles such as *Estado de Minas*, *Clarín* and *El Universal* (Cardoso and Agostinho 2021). Despite cultural heritage debate is unprecedented, in the recent decades, the means questions aligned to its protection have intensified both at the international and at the domestic level, being explored in several areas while, on the other hand, International Relations still lacks in-depth information related to the subject, that is, it is far from granting openness to the subject. In certain academic areas of International Relations, the manifestation of dialogs that encompass policies for the preservation and safeguarding of cultural goods, the so-called heritage diplomacy, as well as the management of maintenance processes and use of them as instruments of soft power lacks depth, resulting, consequently, in the disproportionate effect of the attention devoted to studies related to hard power to the detriment of sources that derive from soft power. Thus, studies aim to bring the approaches multifaceted while focused on the cultural scope in the substantial task of providing for the narrowing of borders between IR and cultural goods. That said, it is worth emphasizing the fact that not all cultural elements become soft power, that is, they are characterized as instruments of soft power, since everything is dependent on the context. According to Galdioli, for the process of transformation of the cultural product—popular or sophisticated—into power of attraction (soft power) to take place, it is necessary to translate universal values, in the sense of being widely shared by the international community (Galdioli apud Christofoletti 2017, p. 15).

Over the last decades, approximations between preservation policies and the field of International Relations have been subdivided into concerns that go beyond the mere conservation of material heritage and have moved on to approaches of more

extensive themes such as the debate about the illicit trafficking of cultural goods and the developments involving the repatriation process; the incidents of destruction of works of art and monuments promoted by radicalized ethnic and religious groups; the expansion of studies that address the issue of the immateriality of heritage; the participation of other actors in the heritage management process; the dissemination of research referring to UNESCO member states and the strategies used for selection, reception, adherence and safeguarding of policies directed to heritage and museums, as well as related research considered “foreign”, resulting from the effects of immigration or even studies on cultural goods from different societies. All this thematic plurality opens frontiers for the dialog between cultural heritage and International Relations, with extension to correlated areas, even stimulating the implementation of a study group in which I am a member called “Patrimônio e Relações Internacionais—CNPq” (Heritage and International Relations). The group is registered with the CNPq (National Council for Scientific and Technological Development) and is linked to the postgraduate program in History at Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora (UFJF). Coordinated by Professor Dr. Rodrigo Christofolletti, it brings together academics especially from History, IR and Social Sciences areas, while it focuses on contributing to the advancement of this research agenda and exchange between researchers at national and international level. Starting in mid-September 2018 and active until the present moment, the meetings were held fortnightly at the UFJF Cultural Heritage Laboratory (LAPA). The discussions raised through the meetings dimension a debate of timeless richness while starting from the critical reading of materials suggested according to the studies schedule prepared by the coordinator, in order to bring pertinent statements to the work presentations of the members, to list a wide scope of possibilities that instigates researchers in their different repertoires and learning trajectories such as undergraduate, master’s and doctoral students. By way of illustration, the discussions already carried out were based on authorial productions of names accustomed to the areas, as well as Rodrigo Christofolletti, Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Caio Martins Bugiato, Bernardo Futuro Rodrigues Hazan and Hendrik W. Ohnesorge, in order to diversify the scope and also the interdisciplinary character of the study. Currently, the proposals go along to filling the gaps that are present in the characterization of soft power, especially based on contents brilliantly raised by Dr. Ohnesorge. Besides, “Bens Culturais e Relações Internacionais: O Patrimônio como Espelho do Soft Power”, organized by Dr. Christofolletti, occupies the responsibility of the pioneering role, encompassing a multitude of approaches, concerns and innovative characteristics within the scope of Brazilian literature, since it presents several authors and its various conceptions. A similarity between this work and that one by Hendrik W. Ohnesorge, “Soft Power: The Forces of Attraction in International Relations” (2020), is based on bringing visions that are not limited or ended, as they go beyond the horizon, as in the metaphor of mirrors in which the IR field is highlighted traversing the path of cultural heritage as soft power in recent times (Christofolletti 2017, p. 15). Then, later on, there are reasonable arguments listed about the safeguarding of cultural heritage and its relevance to the strength, power and geopolitical strategies of a nation under the prism of soft power.

10.4 The Potential Embedded in Soft Power Elements

To discuss the theme, it is worth highlighting Olender's text "O afetivo efetivo. Sobre afetos, movimentos sociais e preservação do patrimônio" (2017). The author introduces the debate based on a need and an appeal, which consists in reinforce the affective value linked to the construction of a collective identity: "This text is based on a need and an astonishment. Need to specify, and to emphasize, the effective importance of affective value in identifying what must be preserved and even in the way of doing it" (Olender 2017, p. 321, own translation). It is evident that cultural heritage is a broad category, material and/or immaterial, it marks the history of generations and encompasses art, monuments, know-how (cooking recipes, handicrafts, etc.), historic buildings, ruins, mountains, artifacts of indigenous peoples, music, churches, traditions, festivities, among others (Bischoff 2004).

That said, the process of listing a heritage often occurs from the social mobilization of the community that strives to have preserved its place of memories, and occurs through a political bias, when the element fulfills historical, cultural and scientific relevance, as well as when it is characterized as an instrument for the cultural maintenance of a people allied to identity formation, while consolidating cultural wealth for peoples and all humanity. Otherwise, silencing or even erasing the marks of existence of these communities would also be erasing part of the trajectory of these people who grew up and lived there. According to "Instituto do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional" (IPHAN), listing is the most common means of legal protection in Brazil and seeks to protect: "[...] goods of historical, cultural, architectural, environmental value and also of emotional value for the population, preventing them from being destroyed or mischaracterized" (IPHAN). In this way, distorting or disregarding the movement to protect a nation's cultural goods is not consistent with a great and effective political strategy for innovation, development, individual freedom, cooperation, progress, human rights, and identity construction, as it is notable in first world countries who seek to align themselves with these principles and values.

These debates are necessary to reinforce the indispensability of bringing the theme to the forefront of the political agenda, as well as to highlight the urgency of enhancing international cooperation and the recognition of cultural heritage as a key to "collective memory", since it is configured as an efficient tool for protecting and safeguarding the cultural goods of a nation. Regarding the previously mentioned concept of "collective memory", the author Maurice Halbwachs (1990) is pointed out as a reference, to the extent that the theme refers to the set of memories related to the social contexts in which they operate. For Halbwachs, memories do not exist in isolation or individually, as they are part of the social environment. So, although people have unique perceptions in the face of an occasion they experienced together, on a group outing, for example, the memory with a significant content always comes from the perception of the whole and therefore, collective, in consideration of living in society, with interference from the social environment.

About carnival, it is worth to analyze its connection with the Brazilian cultural heritage, since its immense affective value for the population, the attraction of

national and international tourists, its visibility and also its significant economic movement. Furthermore, it is an event marked by traditionalism and Brazilians are aware of how valuable it is. *Frevo*, *Maracatu Nação*, *Maracatu de Baque Solto*, *Matrizes do Samba* and *Samba de Roda do Recôncavo Baiano* are carnival rhythms that are arranged in the IPHAN record books. In view of their potential, state actors have, “at hand”, an extraordinary opportunity to invest in festivities with an international dimension and strategically use soft power, in order to receive significant financial, historical and cultural results. The positivity and demonstration of the cheerful, cordial and fun people, as well as the plurality of colors, brightness, costumes, rhythms and dances also contribute to the strengthening of bonds with other states, in order to put into effect opportune bilateral treaties. It is responsibility of state agents to take care of the country’s cultural identity; of the preservation of expression forms as well as ways of creating and living that are characteristic of the Brazilian people. As decision-making occurs from the alignment to international legislative measures or in the formulation of its own, in addition, the mobilization of the various social groups that make up the nation plays a relevant role by being aware of and fighting for what is rightfully part of their histories since, as evidenced by Pierre Nora (1993), “memory places”⁶ are created because there are no longer any “means of memory”⁷.

An attempt was made to cover, in these topics, under a more cautious view, the broad cultural sphere as a soft power instrument, going through the management of culture by national policy and the political actors in charge of this function. In addition, openness is granted to the plurality of meanings, notions, and adaptations of the meanings of power in geopolitics in the midst of different historical circumstances on the subject, tracing a relationship with the object of study. In the subtitle “Cultural heritage as soft power”, space was opened to discuss the relevance of a nation cultural goods, how they act as soft power and the measures for preservation, protection and safeguarding. The research group “Patrimônio e Relações Internacionais—CNPq” (Heritage and International Relations) and theorists who stand out as references in the subject stood out in this topic. To finish the article, “The potential embedded in soft power elements” aims to list arguments about safeguarding cultural heritage and its relevance to strength, power and geopolitical strategies of a nation under the prism of soft power.

The content ends with a deepening of the theme in sense to pluralize and illustrate it in different positions in order to clarify its nuances, meanings and attributions, highlighting the relevance of the study and its collaboration for the scientific community, in the intersection of History, International Relations and the correlate ones. In addition, cultural heritage theme plays a leading role in this research as it aligns with

⁶ Briefly, the expression “place of memory” was coined by the French historian Pierre Nora to refer to historical repair of physical places where social memory is anchored. They are functional, symbolic and representative places of desire to produce memory, where collective memory is expressed and revealed.

⁷ Means of memory are understood to be any signs of culture and tradition of a community passed down from generation to generation so that they are strong, timeless and, above all, present.

soft power, evidencing the concern with its shallow preponderance in the internationalist area and the theoretical immersion in IR begins with the various notions of power described in chronological order covering different contextual developments up to the present information age. In sum, power connects with the perception of cultural historical heritage as a collective identity of various social groups, with the potential to fulfill the role of a soft power instrument for all humanity, if applied with discernment.

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Part II

Soft Power Spaces

Chapter 11

Universalism and Diversity: The 50th Anniversary of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention



Leonardo Barci Castriota

Abstract If, since the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some authors, such as John Ruskin and Alois Riegl, had already noted that the idea of cultural heritage transcended national boundaries, it was only after 1945 that the trend toward internationalization gained strength in this field, with the emergence of a series of organizations that have contributed to the establishment and diffusion of standards and policies common to the various countries. In fact, if in the eighteenth and especially nineteenth centuries, nation-states began to engage in the protection of their national heritages, it will be from the second half of the twentieth century onwards that a new chapter in the internationalization of heritage opens up, with global efforts in this direction, even if they still rely heavily on national efforts. This perspective led to the creation of a new bureaucratic stratum connected to heritage preservation at the international level, the development of a series of procedures and standards to be followed worldwide, as well as the listing of a series of monuments and sites, which are now considered to be of worldwide significance. Together, institutions such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Council of Museums (ICOM), and the International Council of Monuments and Sites have played a central role in the internationalization of cultural heritage by establishing global doctrines, methodologies, and standards for professional practice. This effect is propitiated by a series of actions, ranging from the elaboration of doctrinal documents, which serve as true codes of conduct, to the imposition of common methodologies for conservation, through training programs and international seminars, as well as the availability of consultancies and funding mechanisms. As a result, today we have, for the first time in human history, the existence of a world heritage system, with the institutionalization of a uniform standard to deal with pre-existences, which, sometimes, with its insistence on universal values and international standards, conflicts with local and particular visions. From this perspective, this paper proposes to investigate the use of the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention, the most important international treaty in the field of cultural heritage, which created a globally shared dynamic for identifying and monitoring cultural properties.

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Starting from contemporary criticisms on the Authorized Heritage Discourse (AHD) of this Convention, which would draw part of its authority exactly from the idea of its universal applicability, this paper will examine the conflict between universalism and diversity, showing the positive displacements that this conflict brings to the very concept of world heritage and the consequences of this displacement.

Keywords UNESCO · World Heritage Convention · Icom · Icomos

Françoise Choay, in her now classic book *L'allégorie du patrimoine*, spoke of a “heritage inflation”, pointing out a triple expansion, typological, chronological, and geographical, of cultural heritage. Regarding this latter, she observed that the notion of historical monument and the conservation practices linked to it had spread outside Europe, “where they were born, and which had long remained their exclusive territory.” (Choay 1999, p. 11). This expansion had been slow but inexorable: the 1870s had seen the entry of the historic monument in Japan, in the framework of the Meiji opening; in the United States, which had been the first to protect its natural heritage, the protection of the built heritage had also come under consideration, even if still linked to great national personalities; and even China, “to whom these values had remained foreign”, had begun to explore the vein of its historic monuments since the 1970s. The best proof of this she saw in the attendance at international conferences for the conservation of historic monuments: while only European countries had attended the Athens conference in 1931, three non-European countries (Tunisia, Mexico, and Peru) had already participated in the 1964 Venice conference; while by the end of the 1990s, “eighty countries from five continents had signed the World Heritage Convention”.¹

If the adhesion to the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, which turns 50 years old in 2022, reflects the important role that cultural heritage plays in our days, and if through it an entire world system of heritage management and monitoring was created for the first time, the formulations and uses of the Convention are not free of controversies and criticisms. In this text, I will address a central issue: the apparent contradiction between the ideal of universalism, which underlies that document, and the more recent acceptance of diversity as a basis for cultural policies. To do so, I will situate the Convention in a movement of globalization in the field of heritage, then discuss the criticism of the universalizing ideas that underlie its formulations, to finally present a possible solution to this apparent contradiction between universalism and diversity.

¹ By 2022 one hundred and eighty-seven countries were party to the Convention (<https://www.noaa.gov/gc-international-section/heritage-world-heritage-convention#>).

11.1 The World Heritage Convention and the Globalization of Heritage

If, since the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some authors, such as John Ruskin and Alois Riegl, had already noted that the idea of cultural heritage transcended national boundaries (Choay 1999), it was only after 1945 that the trend toward internationalization gained strength in this field, with the emergence of a series of organizations that have contributed to the establishment and diffusion of standards and policies common to the various countries. In fact, if in the eighteenth and especially nineteenth centuries, nation-states began to engage in the protection of their national heritages, it will be from the second half of the twentieth century onwards that a new chapter in the internationalization of heritage opens up.

This movement was strengthened at the end of World War II, when, from the meetings held at Bretton Woods (USA), mechanisms were forged to facilitate recovery and development in the post-war world and to prevent global conflict, including the creation of the United Nations (UN) and its subsidiary bodies, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. These various international organizations have played a central role in the processes of globalization and heritage has also participated in this movement. As we shall see, in the field of cultural heritage, this perspective led to the creation of a new bureaucratic stratum at the international level, the development of a series of procedures and standards to be followed worldwide, as well as the listing of a series of monuments and sites, which are now considered to be of worldwide significance.

In November 1946, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) appeared in this context, a specialized agency based in Paris, whose operation is divided into three sectors already mentioned in its name. UNESCO pursues its objectives through five major programs: education, natural sciences, social/human sciences, culture, and communication/information, developing projects that address issues such as literacy, teacher training, promotion of independent media and press freedom, regional and cultural history, promotion of cultural diversity, translations of world literature and human rights, among others. In recent years, UNESCO has also contributed to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals defined in the 2030 Agenda, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2015.

UNESCO's Culture Sector deals with cultural heritage, both tangible (sites, museums, libraries, and archives) and intangible (language, oral history, music, dance, intellectual property). Since the beginning of its activities, this organization has been involved in major projects in our field, such as the Nubia Campaign, launched in 1960, which aimed to relocate the Great Temple of Abu Simbel, threatened by the construction of the Aswan Dam on the Nile River. It is interesting to relate the Eito-Sudan Safeguarding Campaign to the origins of UNESCO, but it is important to draw attention to its political context, the eminently political origin of this cooperation. It was not a "benevolent" operation: despite massive donations, mainly from the United States, France, Italy, and Germany, the international expeditions

demanded that half of the archeological finds be taken to museums in their countries, leading to the transfer of entire temples to New York, Leiden, Madrid, Turin, and Berlin.² Other outstanding campaigns were those of monuments all over the world: in Moenjodaro (Pakistan), Fez (Morocco), Kathmandu (Nepal), Borobudur (Indonesia), and the Acropolis of Athens (Greece), among others. Here we can also mention UNESCO's intervention in the successive floods in Venice, especially that of November 1966.³ According to Leo Schmidt, these interventions, which relied on help from several parts of the globe, showed that safeguarding these endangered heritages was not only a concern of the affected countries, but showed that they should be perceived as the heritage of all humanity (Schmidt 2008, p. 79).

UNESCO's work in the field of heritage led to the adoption, in 1972, of the *Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage*, also known as the *Paris Recommendation*, an important normative framework for the protection of heritage worldwide, linking in a single document the concepts of nature conservation and preservation of cultural property, recognizing the way in which human beings interact with nature, and the need to preserve the balance between the two. In addition, the Convention defines the types of natural or cultural sites that, because of their exceptional interest, may be inscribed on the World Heritage List, for which they must demonstrate their integrity and authenticity, in addition to meeting the criteria established by the Organization. By signing the Convention, each country undertakes not only to conserve the World Heritage sites located on its territory, but also to protect its national heritage.⁴ In 1992, to ensure the implementation of the Convention and to coordinate all matters related to World Heritage within its framework, UNESCO created the World Heritage Centre.

Among the advisory bodies, advising the World Heritage Committee is International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), which evaluates and advises on nominations for inscription on the World Heritage List and monitors the state of conservation of these properties. ICOMOS is an international non-governmental organization that brings together professionals dedicated, as its name suggests, to the conservation of historic monuments and sites around the world. Created in 1965, the mission of ICOMOS is to promote the conservation, protection, use and enhancement of monuments, urban centers, and sites. In addition, it is actively involved in the development of theory, methodology, and scientific techniques for the conservation

² "A series of complex political relationships that had developed out of colonial histories of Egypt and its neighbors drove the patronage of member states and the subsequent cave-up of salvaged archaeological remains. The campaign was an important nation-building exercise, in which the power and influence of various member states was expressed in the level of support offered and, by extension, the number of Egyptian antiquities that flowed back 'home' to act as material witness to their influence on the world stage." (Harrison 2013, p. 59).

³ More about UNESCO's field interventions, see Donnachie I. "World Heritage". In: Harrison 2010, pp. 117–118.

⁴ Under the Convention, which entered into force in 1975, participating countries nominate sites to be included on the World Heritage List and the List of World Heritage in Danger ("Danger List"). Currently, the World Heritage List is composed of 936 natural and cultural sites in 153 countries, and the Danger List includes 35 sites from 28 countries (<https://www.noaa.gov/gc-international-section/heritage-world-heritage-convention#>).

of architectural and archeological heritage, while carrying out actions to raise awareness and defend heritage. Its work is based on several doctrinal documents elaborated over the years, especially on the principles enshrined in the “International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites”, known as the Venice Charter, product of the II International Congress of Architects and Technicians of Historic Monuments, in 1964. In most Latin American countries, ICOMOS National Committees were formed in the 1970s: for example, the Argentine Committee was founded in 1973, and the Brazilian Committee in 1978, existing today in almost all the countries of the region.

Together, institutions such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Council of Museums (ICOM), and the International Council of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) have played a central role in the internationalization of cultural heritage by establishing global doctrines, methodologies, and standards for professional practice.⁵ This effect is propitiated by a series of actions, ranging from the elaboration of doctrinal documents, which serve as true codes of conduct, to the imposition of common methodologies for conservation, through training programs and international seminars, as well as the availability of consultancies and funding mechanisms. As a result, today we have, for the first time in human history, the existence of a world heritage system, with the institutionalization of a uniform standard to deal with pre-existences, which, sometimes, with its insistence on universal values and international standards, conflicts with local and particular visions.

11.2 Universalism and Diversity: The Malaise of Conservation

In March 2001, during a trip to Istanbul, María Pilar García Cuetos, Art History professor at the University of Oviedo, Spain, lived a very peculiar experience that profoundly transformed her way of thinking about heritage. The circumstances of that trip were, in themselves, already special: she was visiting that ancient city—in other times called Constantinople and Byzantium—while convalescing in body and spirit, like many romantic travelers before her. The previous years had been difficult for her in several senses: after leaving the government of the Izquierda Unida in the city of Langreo, Spain, very disillusioned with the possibilities of promoting real change, and soon after becoming a full professor, María Pilar had been struck by a serious illness, which had meant long treatment and difficult reconstructive operations (García Cuetos 2009b). Perhaps a new availability, which convalescence usually brings, was responsible for the feeling of extreme perplexity she feels when she personally encounters the ancient Ottoman vernacular architecture in wood, an encounter that, in a way, makes her question certainties that she had accumulated over the years.

⁵ More on this, see: Castriota 2020.

Guiding a group of 35 Asturians to learn about the work of the Renaissance architect Mimar Sinán Ağá, the historian, on her way to little Saint Sophia, suddenly finds herself walking down a dirt road, in the lower part of the old Ottoman neighborhood of Sultanahmet, among ruined houses. Faced with those buildings, the skeptical looks of the locals, and the children, “with their little-worn curiosity”, she then realized, in a revealing instant, that all the theoretical armor she had been carefully forming throughout her professional life was of little use and was proving to be, there, “so impractical”, so out of place, that, in an important turn, she decided to relativize it and “make some much needed reforms” (García Cuetos 2009a, p. 18). The fact is that for more than fifteen years, as she tells us, she “had read, reflected, and subscribed to the whole theory of the Charters of Restoration, had fought with conviction to save this constructed memory, which seems to matter to us only to a few and which turns out to be so dangerous for speculators”. At that moment, however, while searching for a singular building, María Pilar finds the wooden architecture of a polychromatic Istanbul, “grayish and battered, without the bright colors, without the bitter red, but standing, intact”.

In that moment of sudden revelation, the long-accumulated theory appears totally out of place in front of that scenario, in front of that important heritage—but not fitting in the traditional molds—that resisted both the 1999 earthquake and the countless historical setbacks of that millenary city, “as complex as it is beautiful”. As perplexity often leads to reflection, María Cuetos begins to question the very foundations of the knowledge she has acquired over the years, and especially the principle of authenticity, one of the pillars of Western conservation theory. From that turning point, from which derives the book *Humilde condición: El patrimonio cultural y la conservación de su autenticidad* (*Humble condition: cultural heritage and the conservation of its authenticity*), the researcher starts to pursue a different reading of what would be to safeguard “the authentic of our cultural heritage”, producing a deep and instigating reflection about the meaning of devoting so much effort to preserve heritage, considering with special attention cultural diversity and the “cause-effect relationship between heritage conservation and economic and social development” (García Cuetos 2009a, p. 18).

In addressing such a complex issue as authenticity, the author begins by presenting us with a theoretical review of this concept in the field of cultural heritage, showing that it is born inextricably linked not only to the theory, but also to the praxis of monumental restoration and, therefore, dealing already from the beginning with the challenge—or the paradox—of trying to preserve intact assets that “are the materialization of memory and as such can be transformed and changed”. For European theory, as García Cuetos (2009a) notes, the architectural matter inherited from the past is always the “receptacle”⁶ of a series of values, bringing the restorative process—while preserving the cultural asset—always a real risk: “it is capable of transforming

⁶ In an important article on values and heritage classifications, Gustavo Araoz refers to these “receptacles” as “vessels” “that are the containers of the site’s significance”. (Araoz G. “Heritage classifications and the need to adjust them to emerging paradigms: the United States experience”. In: Tomaszewski 2008, p. 170).

this matter and changing these values”. From this apparent paradox, the author feels the need to recover the theoretical reflection on the concept of authenticity, showing that it appears precisely when the theories accepted by UNESCO and widely disseminated in international documents and recommendations are questioned, “which state that every object will be authentic, since its creation and with all its history, and that preserving authenticity means safeguarding the matter and the effects of historical time materialized in it” (García Cuetos 2009a, p. 19).

However, at the end of the twentieth century, this theoretical elaboration is faced with an inescapable reality: the distinct vision of the experts of the Latin American, African, and Asian cultural sphere, which start from a very different reality to the European one, since a good part of their architectural assets, “made with wood, adobe or tiles, e.g., and subjected to continuous repairs and replacements, made it very difficult to identify the authenticity and the preservation of the matter.” From this “rich and intense” debate, new documents are born, which, like the Nara Document, show that the value of authenticity is plural, and cannot be applied or understood in the same way in different cultural spheres or in different types of heritage.⁷ We could also mention here the Burra Charter, a document prepared by ICOMOS AUSTRALIA, the first version of which dates from 1999, with which it began to be realized that the traditional doctrines of heritage were particularly focused on Western conceptions. At the same time, The Burra Charter began to recognize and incorporate into heritage conservation non-Western values, with the introduction, e.g., of the concept of “cultural significance”: instead of seeking a univocal truth, as previous doctrines had done, the Burra Charter was open to a plurality of values, including the values of non-dominant groups.⁸

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, emerges then, as Rodney Harrison states, a “broadening agenda” of cultural heritage, “within the context of a multicultural and postcolonial critique”, in which “new ‘representative’ models of heritage came to replace older notions of a single definitive ‘canon’ of heritage” (Harrison 2013, p. 115). Here, we face an apparent paradox: if heritage and the value of authenticity are plural, diverse, and can only be understood in the realm of each culture, how can we still adhere to the idea of universality conveyed by the UNESCO World Heritage Convention?

⁷ More on the issue of authenticity, see the interesting contribution by Françoise Choay, in her paper presented at the 1994 Nara conference, entitled “*Le concept d’authenticité en question*” (Choay 2006, pp. 255–285).

⁸ More on the evolution of the international heritage charters, check out Wells (2007), and Castriota (2022), pp. 18–26.

11.3 Universalism and Diversity: The “Creative Spaces of Friction”

As we’ve seen, the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention, the most important international treaty in the field of cultural heritage, created a heritage global system, a globally shared dynamic for identifying and monitoring cultural properties. According to Rodney Harrison, this document articulates the third phase of the heritage trajectory, that he names “late-modern”, which saw the emergence of “world” heritage organizations and the idea of “universal” heritage values: “Models of heritage that had been developed in a Euro-American milieu began to be applied in very different cultural contexts, and this led to conflict over the definition and ownership of heritage” (Harrison 2013, p. 114), he writes, in the same line as Françoise Choay (1999), acknowledging the geographical broadening of the heritage realm.

This system, however, is not exempt from various critiques, the central one being that regarding the already mentioned conflict between universalism and diversity. To tackle this question, let us begin by citing the preamble of the World Heritage Convention that states the *universality* of value of certain cultural assets, which will implicate in a kind of moral necessity of their conservation.

Considering that certain properties forming part of the cultural and natural heritage are of outstanding interest and require conservation as part of the world heritage of humanity as a whole... (Preamble of the *World Heritage Convention*, 1972).

This claim to the universalism of value is strongly criticized by contemporary heritage studies, especially in relation to three main areas: the Convention’s definition of heritage; the practices it suggests should be followed in managing such heritage appropriately; and the idea of the universal value itself (Harrison 2013, p. 110). To exemplify the most common criticism on the Authorized Heritage Discourse (AHD)⁹ of the World Heritage, I will recur to Laurajane Smith, who, in her seminal book *Heritage Uses*, states that the World Heritage draw part of its authority exactly from the idea of its universal applicability.

Part of the authority of the European Authoritative Heritage Discourse (European AHD) ... lies in its self-legitimizing claim that it is universally applicable and that there are, or should be, universal cultural values and expressions. This whole discourse of universality is itself a strategy of legitimizing the values and nature of the heritage that underlies the authorized heritage discourse. The discourse of universality makes a moral appeal to the sense of the “brotherhood” of humanity ... this kind of appeal contributes to its persuasive power. (Smith 2006, p. 99)

We can notice how she makes clear the intrinsic link between universalism and the power structures created/recreated by UNESCO: on her view, this sort of appeal is one of the less obvious strategies of legitimization, but very persuasive:

⁹ As Coopers explains, the Authorized Heritage Discourse (AHD) “is implicated in an active process of both creating and legitimizing the significance of specific entities – and by implication negating the creation and legitimization of others. Under such a perspective, the AHD is created and used by public policymakers to ‘govern or regulate the expression of social or cultural identity’ (Cooper MA. “Heritage Discourse”. In: Samuels, Rico (eds.), 2015, p. 164).

Although the claim to universality within the text of the World Heritage Convention and associated guidelines, practices and debates appear to offer a straightforward description of a value that *is*, it is nevertheless an explicit argument about the legitimacy of European cultural narratives and values. It also becomes only natural and legitimate that both this convention and other international heritage documents ‘demonstrate the importance, for all the peoples of the world’ (preamble) of these cultural narratives and values. (Smith 2006, p. 99)

On the other hand, I would like to bring to our consideration to a very precise response to this criticism that is formulated acutely by Rodney Harrison that, reversely, states that it will be this *very claim to universality* that opens up “the possibility of a non-Western, indigenous, minority and postcolonial critique that is ultimately going to be responsible for the transformations in heritage practice that took place in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries”.

By expressing itself as a universal convention that relates to world heritage, the World Heritage Convention is explicitly forced to confront the issue of representation, whenever claims are made contrary to its definition of heritage. (...) Had the Convention not expressed itself as a set of universal values, there would have been no need for those working with the Convention to consider all counterclaims or requests for representation. (Harrison 2013)

According to his view, that I endorse, it will be *the universalism itself that will provoke the need to always redefine heritage* that we can see at work in the implementation of the Convention since 1972. The diversity of views, brought by other cultures especially those non-European, produces then a kind of productive divergence that makes the world heritage field expand, which Harrison names “creative spaces of friction”. As Ian Donnachie notes, due to this creative friction, on the ground there has been “increasing diversification” in listing,

with more groupings of sites, some in quite interesting ways, like serial (or groups of similar) sites, route ways, industrial heritage, designations of heritage cities and cultural landscapes, the emergence of new heritages (such as intangible heritage), and of large-scale restoration and safeguarding campaigns. (Donnachie I. “World Heritage”. In Harrison 2010, p. 121)

To exemplify these shifts—theoretical and empirical—brought to the “World Heritage”, Harrison brings to the fore the contribution of the vision of the native peoples of Australia and New Zealand that, calling into question the strict division between nature and culture, impacted on the category of cultural landscape, which was finally accepted in the Convention Guidelines in 1992. The acceptance of the Tongariro and Uluru-Kata Tjuta as “associative cultural landscapes” was not only a recognition of a different relationship between cultural and natural values, and of “an overarching philosophy in the appropriate management of the landscape”, but it also signified the re-conceptualization of the category itself.

The debates surrounding the listing of Uluru-Kata Tjuta National Park as a “natural” heritage site drew attention to broader issues relating to differences between UNESCO World Heritage Convention’s model of the separation and dualistic opposition of cultural and natural heritage, and alternative model of heritage in which natural landscapes might be conceptualized as ‘cultural’ ones. The Convention’s self-definition as a universal convention representing all human heritage meant these alternative models had to be taken seriously and given equal consideration with existing ways of conceptualizing heritage. The outcome of this process

was a clear shift in the definitions employed in relation to World Heritage in the years that followed. (Harrison 2013, p. 126)¹⁰

According to this perspective, universalism would then be an engine that would make the Convention open to diversity, continuously incorporating new perspectives, in a process of expansion and rearrangement. Thus, contributions from all regions of the world would bring new visions to the stage and shift the Convention's articulating concepts. In this perspective, in which the "creative friction" is seen as a positive divergence, it is worth asking, as we did in the 2nd edition of the ICOMOS/LAC Scientific Symposium held in Brazil and Peru in December 2022, what would be the contribution that Latin America and the Caribbean could bring to this re-updating of the Convention on its 50th anniversary. Even though, the conclusions of this event are still being elaborated and should result in a publication-synthesis of our cultural region, we can already see that, according to most of the participants, the most significant contribution of Latin America would be in applications articulated around the idea of "cultural landscape", in its different dimensions.

In this respect, in the expansion and reformulation of the idea of cultural landscape, we should highlight that, in Latin America, we should necessarily depart from the point of view of our native peoples, who, like the Australian aboriginals, deny the strong division between nature and culture, which has marked Western thought at least since modernity, considering it instead from a perspective where all beings are included in a maternal whole, that is represented, for instance, by the idea of "Pachamama". In this direction, Rodney Harrison refers to Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, a Brazilian anthropologist, who develops an "Amerindian ontological perspectivism", that would take this process of relativization of the divide between nature and culture to its logical conclusion, inaugurating a "dialogical" model of heritage (Harrison 2013, pp. 204–226).¹¹

Intimately linked to this idea, but keeping important specificities, the idea of cultural routes—could—and already is in some way receiving contributions from the Americas, where we find very long paths that constituted important civilizational exchanges. Here, we could cite the multinational inscription of the Qhapag Ñan, an extensive Inca communication, trade, and defense network of roads and associated structures in the Andes, and the Camino Real de Terra Adentro, which includes five sites already inscribed on the World Heritage List and 55 other sites located along 1400 of the 2600 km of this long route that starts in northern Mexico and reaches Texas and New Mexico, in the United States.

Finally, it also seems to me that we have important contributions to the theme of the relationship between heritage and sustainable development, with the idea, for

¹⁰ Another important contribution to the expansion of the World Heritage idea came from Asian and African with the establishment of the Intangible Heritage List and the Intangible Heritage Convention in 2003.

¹¹ Another important derivation of the idea of landscape would be, from my point of view, in the re-reading that we could make of the category of urban landscape. Our cities are different—where the historic centers are heterogeneous and not homogeneous, as in Europe, which leads UNESCO, which is still very Eurocentric, not to understand the heritage character of our urban centers.

example, of GOOD LIVING (BUEN VIVIR), an epistemological–ethical–political consideration that comes from the Andes, and that today informs not only the so-called Andean neo-constitutionalism, but also the heritage policies themselves in some countries of the region, with the radical recognition of the existence of diverse nations and the so-called right of nature.¹²

In this vein, we view the future of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention for the next 50 years with optimism: by incorporating divergent and non-hegemonic perspectives, the Convention paves the way for greater representation of all cultural regions of the planet, in which Latin America will no longer be so underrepresented.¹³

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¹² “There is no single definition of Buen Vivir. Collective well-being comes close. It is germinating through a range of perspectives and social actors across South America. Buen Vivir is still a concept and a lived practice under construction. To give a clue to what it is not, it's the opposite of the Fairfax-Lateral Economics Wellbeing Index, which puts a dollar figure on national wellbeing using a range of indicators. Unlike any index based on logarithmic economic indicators, in Buen Vivir the subject of wellbeing is not the individual, but the individual within a community in relation to a specific cultural-natural environment. Buen Vivir is foremost a decolonial stance. According to leading proponent Eduardo Gudynas, executive secretary of the Latin American Centre for Social Ecology, it calls for a new ethics that balances quality of life, democratization of the state and concern with biocentric ideals.” (<https://theconversation.com/buen-vivir-south-americas-rethinking-of-the-future-we-want-44507#>).

¹³ In 1994, the World Heritage Committee launched the Global Strategy for a Representative, Balanced and Credible World Heritage List. Its aim is to ensure that the List reflects the world's cultural and natural diversity of outstanding universal value. More on this, especially on the Action Plan for World Heritage in Latin America and the Caribbean 2014–2024, see: <https://whc.unesco.org/en/lac/>.

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Chapter 12

Discussions on the Fragility of African Soft Power: An Analysis of Democratic Republic of Congo



Wazime Mfumukala Guy Baudouin

Abstract In order to clarify the issues in the debate on soft Power, we shall review the genealogy of this concept by introducing Nye's initial theory and considering its subsequent evolution and spread around the world. From an American-centered perspective to the analysis of the rise of emerging powers, and from a state-centered theory to the emphasis on the role of non-state actors, the various uses of the notion of soft Power have demonstrated its malleability. Furthermore, in addition to its function as an analytical device, the concept is often coined as a rhetorical argument in support of foreign policy consultancy. The regional integration is a collaborative process and cooperation by which several neighboring countries constituting a geographic region decide to integrate and intensify their exchanges: economic, cultural, environmental, etc. even if from the point of political point of view, integration is hampered by several their obstacles, including the refusal often opposed to the supranational political management of space integrated. It is given precisely in this context that we will talk and discussed in our analysis about the luck of soft Power in Africa and how that impact on the underdevelopment of the continent and in particular on the empowering of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The interest of our research is three fold. First, it is about adapting and putting into practice one of them are—If not the only—method of evaluating soft Power strategies proposed to date. Secondly, it is a question of making a contribution to the global field of knowledge in international relations by improving the understanding of the concept of soft Power, a new form of Power and a new mode of competition between the great powers. Thirdly, if some others countries and continent having made soft Power an official principle of its foreign policy, it seems essential to analyze in more depth one of the main foreign policy strategies of a now essential player.

Keywords RDC · UICN · Red list · African soft power

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A human being is a being of free light
 Who becomes embers when He falls
 And Who becomes a fire “when He gets up.
 (Nelson Mandela: South Africa’s first Black president)

The regional integration is a collaborative process and cooperation by which several neighboring countries constituting a geographic region decide to integrate and intensify their exchanges: economic, cultural, environmental, etc. even if from the point of political point of view, integration is hampered by several their obstacles, including the refusal often opposed to the supranational political management of space integrated. It is given precisely in this context that we will talk and discussed in our analysis about the luck of Soft Power in Africa and how that impact on the underdevelopment of the continent and in particular on the empowering of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The interest of our research is three fold. First, it is about adapting and putting into practice one of them are—If not the only—method of evaluating soft Power strategies proposed to date. Secondly, it is a question of making a contribution to the global field of knowledge in international relations by improving the understanding of the concept of soft Power, a new form of Power and a new mode of competition between the great powers. Thirdly, if some others countries and continent having made soft Power an official principle of its foreign policy, it seems essential to analyze in more depth one of the main foreign policy strategies of a now essential player.

12.1 Some of the Soft Power Objectives

Soft Power makes it possible to achieve a double objective: it makes it possible to orient the preferences of other actors indirectly while creating an “environment favorable to the acceptance of certain political decisions” (Fan 2008: 153; Nye 2004: 99). In the current international context characterized by hyper-communication and a large proportion of democratic states, modifying its external environment involves not only convincing foreign leaders of the merits of its policies, but above all their populations. According to Nye, we note here the link with the theories of hegemony developed by Gramsci then Cox: “[...] a world leadership which claims to represent the universal interest and which extends to the interstate system. The priority given to the ideological and cultural bases explains the how of the consent of the participation of the subordinate groups” (Nye 2011, p. 89).

The structures of hegemony, because they legitimize policies and national orders, create universal norms and put in place mechanisms and institutions that serve to establish rules of law and behavior for states and transnational actors, and facilitate the entrenchment of the social and material bases necessary for! “Exercise of Power by the hegemon.” And improving one’s international image is one of the preferred means of achieving this end: in fact, presenting “an improving image of one’s country to the public opinion of other countries” is essential since the population can now

exert a certain influence on the decision-making bodies: parliament, elections, etc. (Nye 2004, p. 105).

12.2 Sources of Soft Power

All the sources of soft Power fall into three categories: culture, internal political values, and foreign policy, to which it is possible to add certain aspects of economic and military power. To be considered as real sources of soft Power, these elements must be considered legitimate, credible, and attractive by other political actors thus leading to a desire for imitation. We can also define the culture as “the set of values and practices that create meaning in a society” (Nye 2004: p. 11). It should be noted that there are several types of culture, each of which must be publicized according to its particularities: scholarly culture, classical music, literature, art, academic exchanges, history and popular culture cinema, popular music, series and TV shows.

However, having cultural resources is not enough: it is also necessary to have them means to convert these cultural resources into results (effective soft Power), that is to say, to disseminate them and make them attractive to foreign populations (trade, organization of cultural events, academic exchanges, etc.) Domestic political values: in this category, Nye (2004) groups together all the political measures taken by a government, the values it favors in its domestic policy, its political ideals (e.g., the importance given to human rights, the type of political model, and the nature of the regime (democracy, authoritarian state, etc.). As with cultural resources, these resources must be converted into results by using means to make them attractive to the target populations. Nye believes that certain elements stemming from foreign policy constitute sources of soft Power.

At the level of the substance (content) of foreign policy, it identifies the behavior of a state in international institutions and the values it conveys in its foreign policy decisions, the way of managing its relations with other states (development aid, participation in peacekeeping operations, etc.), how to define their national interest and the means put in place to achieve it. Stylistically, these elements relate to the actor's attitude: “Does the state consult its peers, is it in favor of multilateralism or unilateralism, is it arrogant or humble, does it support so-called universal values,” etc. (Nye 2004: 65–66). In some cases, the economy can be a source of soft Power, depending on how the government uses it: if it seeks to “consolidate its Power with the help of its economic capacities,” it is hard Power. If other states are “attracted to its growth and economic Power and seek to emulate it or develop partnerships with it because of the prospects its growth offers,” then this is soft Power (Courmont 2009: 178). Military Power can also become a source of soft Power, particularly in the case where military Power participates in creating a myth of state invincibility, leads other states to admire this model and to want to imitate it (Nye 2004: 25). The soft Power can also derive from military Power when a state practices military cooperation, for example by setting up “exchanges, joint exercises, assistance programs or even military training” (Nye 2008: 106). The exercise and dissemination of soft Power.

Although soft Power has become an essential concept in international relations, several of its characteristics make it difficult to implement. First, soft Power cannot be the monopoly of state actors, unlike hard Power.

The soft Power can be produced and disseminated both by governments and by non-state actors: NGOs, private firms, civil society, etc. This multiplicity of producers of soft Power makes it difficult for the state sectoral to control the production and circulation of information. "Is this one broad or narrow, focused on the short or medium term?" (Nye 2004: 60). 12 example, a large part of the American film industry is controlled by the private sector and conveys messages that sometimes conflict with the values advocated by the government (Nye 2004). Nye notes a paradoxical effect of this multiplicity producers: the cultural elements produced by society and the values they convey, even if they are in contradiction with the government's objectives, make it possible to reinforce its credibility in the sense that the latter leaves room for freedom of expression (Nye 2004: 17).

Freedom of expression being a value perceived positively by the majority of populations. Second, the importance of receiving soft Power strategies makes it difficult to exercise, and its impacts difficult to assess. Indeed, it is not the actor at the origin of the measures put in place but the way in which they are received that defines these measures as coming under soft Power, even more than other form soft Power, depends on the context: the messages sent are "received and interpreted differently and with different consequences" according to the countries and the target populations (Nye 2004: 111). Thus, the soft Power of a state varies according to time and the populations targeted, but also within the same country, according to the different social groups. A good knowledge of the reception process is therefore as important as knowing how to put in place a soft Power strategy in order to be able to adjust your message. According to Nye (2004), the strategies put in place by a country are usually perceived positively by countries or social groups that have a culture and values similar to the using country. Finally, to conclude this overview of the concept as envisaged by Nye, we are going to present below a list of the factors which decrease or increase the soft Power of a state. For him, the credibility of a state on the international scene, the dynamism of its civil society as well as its capacity for self-criticism are factors that promote soft Power. On the contrary, an arrogant or selfish foreign policy undermines the seductive potential of a state. Similarly, policies that seem hypocritical (e.g., discrepancy between internal and external discourse, and between actions and discourse or advocated values), or even manipulative are diminishing the soft Power of the state concerned. Finally, when a state promotes values that contradict those of the country or the target group, its soft Power is diminished.

12.3 Other Soft Power Issues

As mentioned in the first section of our article, it appears that the whole of the African population gathers around the consensus of the good positive economic and cultural representation of the West. It also appears that this positive representation and interest in Western language and culture has not been generated by the work of promoting the African continent and countries, but only favored by them. This finding of the existence of such a consensus during our observations, interviews, raises other questions: If there is a consensus on a positive representation of the West, as well as a strong demand for learning from the preexisting colonial cultural standard. Why do Western governments employ so much energy and financial means to set up vectors for the diffusion of soft Power in a continent that is already almost down over to its cause? It is useful to recall here that Africa as well as a component of the countries, shelter more executive strained in the West and having adopted more Western culture than African if there was a world competition.

It seems that the issues of cultural soft Power in Africa are considered more broadly than initially estimated at the beginning of the colonization process. The issues of cultural soft Power in certain African countries are not traditional issues: it is not only a question of promoting African culture and standard European languages since the continent and the countries only have to improve the image of the West. It would rather make Africa an example of good cooperation for the rest of the world. This stake would thus explain the importance and the prestigious character of being trained by the West. In addition, it should be noted that, in the past, sometimes the West has already used certain African countries and the special relationship as an example of good cooperation.

Some objectives assigned to soft Power cannot be an objective in itself, it is an instrument serving one or more objectives identified by occidental countries. With a subtlety of intelligence, inter-human relationships should evolve very smoothly, following this path of inter-relationship, life becomes very easy and simple too. Seeking the opposite of everything that already exist and contribute to the consolidation of harmony in relations and cooperation between peoples and sovereigns states became one strong force that joins delicacy, if you need this unity to be something very powerful, it Will be much better to bring the concept of safety or soft Power to our socio-political lives and make the concept the basis of our relationships! And receive attention and care, Yes we all want that yes. We all often harden ourselves throughout life, because we are vulnerable, so the need to retrace a path back and be soft as we all need softness. We want to develop soft Power it is because we all have goals in mind to convince others about this power. Faced with different challenges, we notice that the hard Power is very inefficient, even with some results they are not durable, but ephemeral and short-lived. It is truth at the use of soft Power always satisfies both parties and that even If that force is soft, it is good because it does not intend to influence something for bad.

The two main principles of soft Power are as follows: to argue in the end to convince but is very important to start the soft Power process in any situation.

Mastering soft Power or getting involved in this concept, you would not have to enter into a direct confrontation because the best strategy is to develop a scenario in which each one convinces himself and creates his own arguments reacting in a positive way to reach the desired objective from confrontation and security without confrontation or pressure. If you want to have something depending on someone else, you would have to establish a positive relationship with that person with whom you want to have something. Its suppose to create a kind of partnership where each of you would have and would win. We want in our lives to be overly protected; take care of everything that could threaten us, or challenging us and turns our life into being suspicious, ensuring our survival in any way and using all kinds of efforts for our survival and sovereignty. We are oblige to know that the soft Power must not been used only to whom you would have interest but to everybody, course of it will be very easy according to the system in which all, we are always interdependent. Every time we have good relationships with everyone in this world, is a sure way to find resonance at the moment you need in your life and your journey. For this reason, we propose to take a turn at the moment that we hope only the good lives for those who are around us.

Now speaking about interstates relations, we know that it is not so easy but in each of the interstate relations, the geopolitical tradition distinguishes two types of relations between nations. The former are based on traditional power, that is, on a symmetrical relationship of rivalry and negotiation its mean “hard Power.” Therefore, in the traditional geopolitical economy, war measures forces, while diplomacy seeks compromises and agreements. Finally, the economy and trade between nations, in turn, presuppose exchanges. Those kinds of interstates relationships are based on influence “soft Power.” They are, therefore, part of an asymmetrical relationship between an influenced and an influential, who, due to their prestige, the ties they created outside their borders like leaders and foreign populations by the attraction of its cultural or political model, by the favorable prejudices it enjoys, it has the ability to influence other nations, to obtain, by co-option, strategic results in its favor, to define the agenda of international politics. In the field of international relations, it is not negligible to obtain, at a first level, the neutrality of governments initially favorable to their cause.

12.4 About African Soft Power: In Focus the Democratic Republic of Congo

Disarming the hostility of others, of other nations, that the basic or the important strategy. At a higher stage, the influence strategy is triggered to gain control over areas and networks to elicit favorable behaviors. At this level, trade becomes possible, as well as obtaining political support in international organizations. This type of privileged relationship makes it possible to create allies and the multilateral support in the causes defended by the influential nation. In the last stage, when the methods

of persuasion and seduction aim to produce total mimicry, absolute adhesion, the values of the influential nation and its world view are shared by the other, who starts to behave according to his model.

12.5 African's United

Talking about Africans' Nations, if they are united, they are or they became a very intrinsic force and greater than the negative influences that separate them. Many of the world's countries are very rich through internal cultural soft Powers; in terms of finance, economy, social, and tourism in a global or universal sense, the governments of these countries wisely use this Power of theirs as a business card. Where the example of the discovery of scripture in Egypt from the rosette stone, this stone represents a object of great financial value every time when its being visited by tourists from all over the world; another example, the sold for well over US\$12 million, a rare artistical work by the Ivorian artist was to Rolland claim its soft Power to the Ivory Coast (Sotheby's New York).

Giving the third example of the Democratic Republic of Congo, there are in the Louvre Museum where you can find sculptures of the Luba people, a tribe and ethnicity of the Democratic Republic of Congo, these sculptures have perfect geometry, well made and that represents the existential connection between life and the death; however this sculpture brings a lot of money in the tourist area in Belgium and in Paris where the Louvre Museum is located, the sculpture is the most visited to know. These examples of relics are evidence of the traditional African histories of their Empires, the whole situation demonstrates that Africans and their continent is always exploited and that the countries' owners do not enjoy their soft Power, representing through the culture telling by the relics who speak or tell the ancient stories of Africans, their social habits, their beliefs, and their other perceptions of life, a big damage for these people and the continent. When the international system of colonization start, unfortunately the soft Power of the African continent and its people was totally plundered by the invading colonizer. Today, in this century of the growth of consciousness, the much-talked question of the restitution of African works of art to their country of origin appears, a more complicated and complex situation, so we must first of all seek to know what it means or what the concept called transnational African art means. It is one of the term used for art from Africa and today can be used at the same time for arts produced in the African Diaspora of America and Europe. The word is very imprecise and also generic, without a current synonym when excluding the artifacts of African cultures from the Islamic countries and those countries which are near the Mediterra. Since the twenty-first century, there has been a group of researchers of the movement that seeks to include the works made and produced on the African continent within the scope of art called African art, this to help to assert and present to the world the great cultural diversity in this continent so despised. And almost oppressed. We know that the most popular or famous artifacts are ceramics and masks of well-stylized or stylish human figures,

and they are so important and valuable that they are produced as models of mass culture and product, or “airport-culture.” In the twelfth century, the use of bronze by the kingdom of Benin has generated a beautiful artistic production and these works were mostly made or manufactured to be used in religious ceremonies nature. Therefore, in Central Africa, the wooden figure is used with a heart-shaped face, curved in wards, using circles and dots to the full extent. In architecture and sculpture was the domino of the Kingdom of Zimbabwe as its national symbol like the bird of Zimbabwe carved in stone. The most valuable artifacts were those that European settlers identified as closes to their art, such as Nigerian objects with commemorative heads of kings, statuettes made of bronze and copper. The human figure was always well prioritized and sculpted, referring to tribal chiefs, dancers, hunters; also the anthropomorphic figures of African gods.

The qualities of these works became important for all humanity that influenced the art of several other countries in the world, for example Portugal, the largest European colonizing country. The soft African Power of the art is greatest in these sculptures, in the three-dimensional figures so influential, until even the two-dimensional paintings used other objects and clothes fabrics in their composition. To communicate with Africans ancestors, they were using mask and by the entrances until they approaching their ancestors. The African continent collects several artistic artifacts dating back since the 5 or 6 thousand years, but recent discoveries demonstrate the time greater than 6 thousand years; another important fact is that the African continent will always and will be the source of humanity and the human race for sure. The present-day Sudan is located in the kingdom of Kush, where a variety of monumental sculptures of different styles and varieties were produced. The inspiration of the artistic culture of the African people was first about all nature and the forest where the productions took place, for this reason we cannot said that African art is not a confined art in urban museums which greatly facilitated the losses of artifacts being used natural and organic materials.

According to Renata Araujo, a researcher at the Afro-Brazil Museum, she defines that African art was organized according to the interests that Europeans had in this art. Various gifts made for the Pope and different European aristocrats were taken from Africa by the Portuguese in the fifteenth century was like a bush, a salvage place in which any one can do what he wanted to do, and the some Portuguese was being considered African art like exotic objects and not an Art. From the nineteenth century onwards, the concept changed due to the fact that African colonization was late with multiple difficulties of penetration into the continent, in the territories great difficulties for diseases linked to the continent, all this was discovered when and from the moments that the European ethnographers and botanists begin to collect artifacts from the African continent and classify thus by etymology and ethnography too, but these collected objects were not called art even though they were transferred by the etymological sector of museum especially in Europe. In that moment, Pablo Picasso was the only new genius painting through his work in the twentieth century changed the course and understanding of this situation. He is considered the genius of the twentieth century and one of the greatest masters of painting. From 1907 to

1914, the objects deconstructed by the Spanish painter destroy all realism to create new figures.

Without a doubt, African art was always considered primitive by those who colonized the continent, because they associated the social condition of the African people with technical skill, one of the big and great intentional mistakes, almost as a proposal making by the colonizer. Visual artists such as Pablo Picasso, Vincent van Gogh, Modigliani and others, wanting to be inspired by sophisticated forms and productions in order to have a new time of European art, managed to break the board of this negative colonialist consideration. They discovered and realized the sophistication of African art that in a special way expressing in a very formal and powerful way the culture of this continent, of course, they changed the way of expressing themselves to be based on these African artifacts to use the works as a medium for philosophical discourse and intellectual.

We also discovered the appearance of movements like: Futurism and Expressionism, who began to explore new geometric shapes or geometric proportions that even took place in architecture until they influenced several architects of great reputation, namely Paul Rudolph, Oscar Niemeyer, Le Corbusier, and others that we do not have to mention all of them "The African art doesn't have format canons like European art, we can say till now." Modernists will delight in this world of new possibilities. It will not be possible to claim that without African art, modern art could not exist, not because the illustrious plastic artists precursors of European art could already discover this already. But the most precious thing is that from this consideration, African art had an impact and gained the status of art, and the miracles of conservation to house them in museums and galleries had taken place.

After having recognized art status, thousands of these sculptures and other works from the African continent were subject to looting by colonists since 1870, with influence on European artists. For example, Cézanne and Gauguin, all worthy Impressionists, were inspired by the colors and shapes of African sculptures, which later reached positively the inspiration of Matisse and Pablo Picasso to realize Cubism. Without knowledge and specific social functions of these sculptures, they recognize the spiritual aspect; even beyond the naturalism that was real in European art. The African esthetics in its distorted forms and figures were used to speak of anxiety to modern life according to Ernst L. Kirchner and Paul Klee, and went to the symbolic transcendence, over time the wilderness primitivism appeared, a much more complicated and less accepted concept to denote interest in African artifacts of the time for Europeans African sculpture through its sophisticated approach to the abstraction of the human figure attracted modern European artists. Some of the relict faces of African sculptures and their lack of African esthetic-type expression of affection were often evoked in modern painting and modernists sculpture. Max Weber was influenced by Europeans when they painted masks in abstract style.

Alain Locke in turn said that "African-American artists should look to African art for inspiration. Several other artists also say that African art inspired a mention of spirituality. In the 1950's at the Classicism's time, even Universities began trying to understand the shapes, colors and texture of African art, a difficult job because African people have ethnic diversities...". The Africans independences also had

a negative impact on the African area because of the territorial divisions between peoples of the same ethnicity, these divisions affected many the artistic quality and expressions of the peoples. Regarding airport-art, the commercialization of artistic objects and foreigners began without any quality criteria in view of the appearance of counter fact objects.

The copies market of the African mask culture from the post-colonial time had an influence of the deep African tradition and globalizing the art world including the participation of Africans artists for example: Seydou Keita one of the photographer, Maliano and El Anatsui a sculptor From Ghana, leading to increasingly debate on divisions between Western art and non-western African Art relegating the past to the view of Primitivism of African Art according to Denise Murrel. With the agenda on time until now, there turn of African's art founding in America and Europe has not yet been carried out.

12.6 The Presence of African's Art Outside

The Museum of Neues in Berlin (Germany), being informed by Egypt about the return of the bust of Queen Nefertiti that has been kept since 1913, the response from the Museum of Germany was always: "better to leave "these patrimony in museums in countries where there are no wars"; because such works are patrimony of humanity" The works were purchased on the African market and therefore belong to the buyers' but we know that everything was not acquired lawfully; unfortunately, there is no way to distinguish buying from the theft and looting that were often done by Western colonist sine the last century. And how many African countries are at war to carry out their turns of African goods and heritage taken from Africa! Everybody need and want to speak this.

It all happens because there is a complete lack of soft Power that harms the continent. According to the Art Council England, it is estimated that every Pound paid by the art and culture industry generated 2.01 Pounds to the economy by attracting visitors, stimulate talent, revitalize businesses, and places, without estimates for Africa, but every Pound is more important for the continent than for England, but the economic gain from the return of African's works art would be very significant for Africa. With all precision, we can say that it was around 1450 when Portuguese colonizer were enchanted by the beauty of African artifacts found on the continent, but it has been centuries since African artistic works were looted.

But in Sierra Leone, Benin and the Kingdom of Congo at the end of the nineteenth century, things were became more hurried because the British interested in the trade did not have the possibility to enter the African kingdom to start the trade, since that and also the African ceremonies did not authorize the entry of foreigners so after insisting than the British were attacked by troops of the kingdom because the Europeans did not obey or did not respect African culture in the ceremonies. After the victory of the African troops, the British returned to attack and spread the kingdom of Benin, looting almost 2000 objects of arts from Benin, taking everything in the

British Museum until today. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the illegal business and the looting of the African's art became one kind of billionaires business, with the help of the Africans curators.

The Africans people were taking the opportunity to exchange the original objects for copies and selling everything on the illegal market. When you go to visit the National Museum in Bangui in the Central African Republic, for example, you will notice only two masks left in all entire collection, because all masks have been looted. Without pictures or the possibility of having the identification number of the stolen object, it is difficult to recognize that, today in the Quai Branly Museum in Paris, there are three no masks from the Republic of Nigeria we can found, purchased for a value of 20 million Francs from a Belgian dealer. ...but where did this dealer buy the masks it is the very difficult and strong question to answer... the Europeans say that they will buy all the artifacts of wild civilization to store an mass in their museums and according to them to save these artifacts from destruction, that according to the anthropologist: Adolf Bastian in the nineteenth century. Nothing has changed in this practice of looting, theft, and illegal trade.

The absence of soft Power on the African continent has a large and long-term impact although art and instrument of education and serves to help define the identity and personality of Nations. The absence of soft Power makes a huge historical avoid affecting creativity, motivation as well as artistic innovation. To facilitate things, for example, the current holders of African arts objects bring or can open a branch in the country of origin and from there, taking the art, the economic gain with the visits will be maintained and thus transferring the soft Power to the country of origin. The Louvre Museum have already made this approach in its Abu Dhabi branch. For "Marta Salum, being in London today, it becomes an unavoidable symbol of colonization." We know that the British Museum in London does not open or leave back the head of life, a highly valuable thirteenth century artifact from the region of present-day Nigeria. The European and American museums have a heap of works that today are the physical record of a collection of colonial product and the result of colonial exploitation. Several imminent personalities already campaign for the process of returning art objects to their countries of origin, for example the campaign made by Lawyer Amaal Clooney, who made this campaign to return the Parthenon marbles to Greece, from the fifth century A.C. Cultural colonialism is well condemned in Acropolis Museum; unfortunately exist without true solution. The excuse to keep stolen and looted works in imperial capitals and colonies grows weaker and weaker; they argue that their museums take better care of art objects than museums from their countries of origin, always the same excuse and meaning less justification.

At a conference in Cairo, Egypt, 16 countries and others signed a declaration demanding the return of stone art rosette and the bust of Nefertiti items most coveted by the country of origin, the British Museum was pressed, but claimed and appealed to an international convention of 1954 that prohibits the looting, theft, and resale of works of artistic and historical value during wartime, knowing that this agreement did notify according to the date of looting of these artifacts, we saw that it is one kind of bad strategy. Today exist an other fact called Auction, the example is from

Sotheby's who in 2017 dedicated an auction only to modern African works. Today you can think and even say that only countries whom had financial strength can win the fight for the return of works of art; we see the best example of the return of 32 gold ornament sold for more than 3 mil years, looted in Gansu and sold to a French collector in the late twentieth century, then returned to China in 2015.

Poor countries have more difficult to win this war let see this example of a big African country: There are currently 1154 World Heritage Sites, five in the Democratic Republic of Congo. And from this small set, four of them are on an alternative list the so-called Red List, or list of Heritage Sites considered in danger by UNESCO, which currently comprises 54 sites. The objective of this project is to investigate the reasons that led four of the five Congolese World Heritage Sites to be inscribed on the so-called alert list of Heritage Sites considered in danger of disappearing, in order to understand how the country has been consolidating itself as one of the least active in terms of African countries with regard to the effective protection of their world heritage. In addition to the legal concern arising from this matter, the chosen theme is the result of a personal matter, in view of my Congolese nationality. It seeks, primarily, to present the factors that triggered the entry of this set of Congolese heritages on the UNESCO alert list, and which structures the Congolese state has used to reverse the contemporary situation of gradual loss of its world heritage.

Through the detailed analysis of the documentation produced by UNESCO and the IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature) of Congo; other international agencies involved in the preservation of the Congolese heritage previously selected and cataloged; as well as interviews with UNESCO representatives in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the objective is to understand how four of the five natural parks designated as Congolese World Heritage Sites reached this situation of abandonment and almost irreversibility, in relation to their safeguarding and what are the possibilities of reversal from this deteriorating picture or image. The proposal is to understand to what extent the actions to protect endangered world heritage in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have favored or hindered the preservation of this set of World Heritage Sites and how this special protection by the legal system in force in the country has faced the neglect of a nation immersed in civil war for decades. Africa is a continent experiencing, throughout its process of emancipation and consolidation, a series of degradations and violations, seen by international bodies as the keynote of its political regimes.

They still suffer from consolidation and lack of progress, in areas such as the Environment, Ecology, and even the conservation or protection of parts of its heritage, as a rule, linked to biodiversity. The natural wealth of the African continent is as abundant as its territorial extension. A quarter of all gorillas on the planet live in Virunga National Park, a park in the Democratic Republic of Congo in Africa; unfortunately, it is one of the endangered World Heritage Sites. Many kind of mineral used by industries around the world come from the African continent, deposits of the tropical jungles. Africa is also rich in diamonds, gold, oil, wood, and uranium. All this abundance, however, does not reach the population: this wealth is restricted to half a dozen businessmen associated with the militias. Some companies use militias and mercenaries because they know the jungle and know how to protect mines.

The African community and the continent are experiencing daily, on the part of their authorities, a lack of interest in conservation issues, as well as a marked deterioration of their world heritage, a degradation that is consolidating and expanding drastically, year after year. In the last two decades, this situation has become unsustainable and the reflection of this situation was the decree by UNESCO, of the interdiction of 90% of African World Heritage Sites, in a clear situation of danger. Every time the protective shield of its patrimony is removed from a society, the value of its dignity is involuntarily removed. For this reason, no society can subsist without the ties of its ancestry.

According to data provided by UNESCO. The African continent is the home to the largest number of World Heritage Sites considered to be in danger. The continent is one of the most complete examples of this alarming situation, included this unflattering list, also known as an IUCN Red List of threatened species comprising the IUCN—International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, was created in 1964 and constitutes one of the most detailed inventories in the world on the world conservation status of several species of plants, animals, and protists. This complex set of natural patrimonies has known different processes of creation, consolidation, and distinction, which has made it have, at the same time, its own specificities and common problems, which makes it even more difficult and potentiates the need to understand its position in the pyramid of Red Lists. In other words, it becomes complex to understand how the continent allowed its world heritage and cultural arts to deteriorate in an almost definitive way.

Here we have a list of threatened species in each country (totals by taxonomic group)* reptiles, fish, mollusks, other invertebrates, plants, fungi, and protists: note that for these groups there are still many species that have not yet been evaluated for the IUCN Red List and therefore their status is not known or these groups have not yet been fully evaluated.

Therefore, the numbers presented below for these groups should be interpreted as the number of species known to be threatened within the species that have been assessed to date, rather than the overall total number of threatened species. The problem consists of the following question: What are the immediate causes of the destruction of African world heritage and cultural art, to the point of being included in the so-called list of Heritage in Danger (Red Lists)? Although we intend to denounce and present some help approximately on the destruction of these world heritages found in Africa, we will focus this analysis of events that culminated in the devaluation and near destruction of parks and natural sites designated World Heritage Sites, seeking to understand how African ecosystems and biodiversity still survive, even though they are threatened with losing the integrality of policies for the preservation of their heritage. Armed conflicts and political instability threatening biomes and collective property; civil wars, corruption, low tourist appeal, and poverty. These elements make up the equation that made it possible for Africa to neglect its world natural heritage and the incapacity to evolve the natural or cultural soft Power in this continent and in some of African's countries. On the other hand, the question is: What strategies can be used to guarantee the safeguarding and requalification of these assets, along with the instruments for the protection and enhancement of the

historical heritage that already exist? Answering this question will help you understand other questions: What are the reasons for the intense threat of these natural parks and what are the impacts of the deterioration of these world heritage sites on African territory? What is the relationship established between the failures of the preservationist policy in the past and in the present? What is the future perspective for these assets? What are the factors and agents involved in the devaluation of these assets? These questions underlie the certainty that one of the biggest problems faced by those who fight for the preservation of heritage is the lack of an understanding of how collective interests must overcome individual and government interests in order to call for the socio-growth of the country.

Africans and the continent in general. We want to understand this investigation process how to effectively carry out and implement the protection of the so-called endangered heritage, constituting the "urgency lists, or Red Lists." It is intended to analyze the relationship between the events and the agents involved and highlight the developments that contributed to the list of endangered patrimonies covering its World Heritage approved by UNESCO. It is an analysis of the relevant aspects to the theme in order to identify the frequency, periods, and reasons why such patrimonies have been framed in this controversial legal figure that is the "permanence on the danger list." This attempt aims to understand the events that still promote the degradation of African environmental heritage and that increasingly potentiate the continent to turn its back on its natural heritage, formed by its natural history, its forest massif made up of different species of exceptional biodiversity and its high level of endemism, which generates great esthetic, economic, and tourist value.

The time frame that will guide this approach covers the second half of the twentieth century and the first decades of the 2000s, a period of consolidation and multiplication of Red Lists in the world, as a result of greater attention by international protection bodies. But what exactly are these Red Lists, or endangered heritage lists? The reasons that justify the inscription of cultural heritage assets on the list of Heritage in Danger may correspond to issues caused by natural disasters, such as climate change; armed conflicts; military occupation; development pressures or aggressive new construction; as well as lack of maintenance or abandonment as it had already been defined as approved and safeguarded by international preservation agencies (ICOMOS Heritage@Risk program (H@R), 1999).

We consider two factors as premises: (a) the absence of an effective commitment to the collective security system by the authorities and the nations that own the Red List World Heritage Sites (those in danger), and (b) the existence of a set of procedures how difficult is the articulation of a coercive structure capable of guaranteeing the principles stated in the UNESCO Convention of 1976: on the "safeguard" 'of historical/natural ensembles and their role in contemporary life. Taking into account, in particular, the extensive damage caused by colonization, civil war, the looting of African arts, the deforesting of landscapes and territories, the trafficking of goods and animals, and other situations linked to the process of political dismantling of this continent, it is understood that comparative analysis that is concerned with understanding why the world's culture and heritage, in whatever form, is in danger of

disappearing, in a much broader universe when thinking about the African continent, constitutes a significant flag of preservation at an international level.

The relevance and urgency of the work is given to the extent that UNESCO decides on the future of the artistic culture of the whole of Africa. These cultural and heritage resources are now facing major challenges linked to human development needs. In fact, little assistance was provided in the fight against poverty which remains a major concern of African countries in particular. In this sense, the theme of soft Power is justified not only because it highlights the difficulties of this continent, but also makes it possible for Europeans, Asians, and Americans to know in a broader way the problems that make African artistic cultures something so complex and of difficult solution. For these reasons, deepening the studies on the possibility of losing the seal of cultural assets, we understand here in particular the arts, will help to think, at a planetary level, about something that is not exclusive to the African continent, but which is evident in this part of the world, given its weaknesses and precariousness. In this sense, this modest article provides us with examples of identification, protection, and appreciation of cultural and heritage resources that may help to understand this alarming situation. For this reason, acting with the need for topophilia, which is a characteristic feeling common to native citizens, this article becomes relevant as it proposes to highlight situations that act as a spotlight against the negligence and lack of care for African art and culture, enhancing the understanding of Africa's heritage.

Our analysis and investigation will be able to contribute to the deepening of the understanding about the prosthetic measures, the means of usufruct and the administration of the arts of the continent, firstly by the State of Origin and then by the African continent but will also allow that such an unknown history, as it can be the subject of an approach with such diverse characteristics. Our Goals: It seeks to understand the planning of the protection of these cultural heritages with emphasis on their identifications. For this purpose, a tool will be used essentially based on the analysis of the existing information in the documentary funds already selected for this article and in the same sense, it aims to discuss the extent to which returns processes through soft Power and diplomacy can become effective in conserving and recovering artifacts: To present how the movement of degradation and primitivization of African art took place and how this process has generated a constant deterioration of the cultural environment in direct proportion to the progression of poverty and the difficulties arising from a world with increasingly scarce resources; To demonstrate that current development patterns will not be able to last much longer and that it is first necessary to achieve a balance between human activities and the natural environment; To highlight the importance of preserving African art and culture for all humanity, recognizing, for imperative scientific and economic reasons, the contribution of protected natural areas to the promotion of culture and the well-being of humanity; To highlight the problems that Africans had to face and the policies that they tried to initiate in recent years to consolidate their achievements (restructuring of protected areas, new concept of development, etc.). This knowledge will provide us with a solid basis for proposing innovative strategies to compensate or alleviate the symptoms of cultural destruction and loss, taking, for example, the fact that UNESCO has been reinforcing its protective action within African countries. In this sense, it is

essential to bring this view more careful with cultural heritage, especially its artistic artifacts, not only to give visibility to its management (or mismanagement), but above all, to highlight the reflection that the transformation can only occur if visions of art preservation and development learn from coexistence. To compose the analysis of this qualitative research, we will adopt as an epistemological basis the descriptive dialectical method, corresponding to our objective, since we do not intend to point out a specific solution, but to study its variables, as well as analyze the historical and fundamental right arguments, links and interests cooperation of the actors that appeared in the international scene during the period of analysis. Based on a literature review, we will map the main issues on the agenda of the 1976 conference, in addition to analyzing the relations of assistance and protection between the main national states.

Initially, we will make a brief analysis of the relations between African nations in the context of the conservation and protection of art, culture, World Heritage Sites, considering the relative position of African countries members of UNESCO. What is the purpose of soft Power? In geopolitical and diplomatic debates outside the United States, the term “soft Power” is often used synonymously with state-initiated political influence: economic, cultural, and ideological and refers to multiple forms of public communication. “Described in 1990 by Joseph Nye in his book *Bound to Lead*,” the concept of soft Power, that is, the ability of a nation to seduce and persuade other international actors thanks to the attraction of its values, ideas, and culture, has been known for a long time 25 years. The concept has or has had an undeniable success in terms of intellectual marketing, like Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” or Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations.” The most worrying is, in fact, the question of its social cohesion. In 2012, Joseph Stiglitz, won Nobel Prize in Economics, explained this eloquently in *The Price of Inequality*: “America’s global power is its soft Power, the power of its ideas, an education system that educates leaders around the world, the model that offers to others. The United States has long and decades exerted its influence through the strength of its economy and the appeal of its democracy.”

But the American model is losing some of its luster. Not Just Because American Capitalism Didn’t Bring Sustained Growth. It is just that others are beginning to understand that the vast majority of citizens have not benefited from this growth: such a model is not very attractive politically. And they also feel the American-style corruption of the American political system, which is penetrated from all sides by the influence of private interests. For us Africans, following the Nigeria example, we have to conquer the world through our soft Power which is our music, literature, fashion, arts; then we will talk about the soft cultural power. I will talk about Nigerians, for example, who have known this for some time: their sounds, images, and styles have infiltrated global culture. This cultural wave from Nigeria today affects all areas, it is relayed by the community based in London or the United States. New talents are constantly emerging in the arts, fashion, music, and literature, and they take their inspiration from Nigeria during the African “Music Victories.” So there is literature, music, but also cinema, or rather Hollywood. And who says cinema says stars, the African continent is full of these stars. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) listed on Tuesday 14 December 2021, the

Congolese Rumba as Intangible Heritage of Humanity, a legal entity that protects threatened cultural heritage.

The intangible cultural heritage, or “living heritage,” is defined by UNESCO in its digital portal as “a heritage of our ancestors that we pass on to our descendants.” The Rumba is danced and singing in Lingala, the national language of both countries, which has been the main vehicle for its dissemination since 1940. The decision in favor of this danced musical genre stuck between two people was taken during the sixteenth session of the Intergovernmental Committee of UNESCO, inaugurated in Liverpool, Great Britain. The Rumba’s candidacy has been taken since 2020 by UNESCO to the two countries on the banks of the Congo River that bear his name: the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its neighbor, Congo-Brazzaville, who consider this musical genre as a heritage. In both Congos, Rumba is a cultural identity, a cultural and musical genre that produced great figures of African music, such as Franco Luambo Makadi, Papa Wemba, Koffi Olomidé, Werrason or even Fally Ipupa and Ferre Gola. The Rumba is the third Central African Cultural Heritage listed as Intangible Heritage of Humanity after the polyphonic songs of the Aka Pygmies of the Central African Republic in 2008, then the Tambour of Burundi in 2014. It includes, in particular, “oral traditions, performing arts, social practices, rituals and festive events,” underlines the Organization. To be defined as intangible cultural heritage, a cultural practice “must be dynamic,” underlines the same institution. It must also “have meaning in people’s lives” when the Congolese authorities plan celebrations with concerts and other productions in the capital Kinshasa, the exposure of this dance throughout the world must also be promoted and above all invite other parents, a kind of gentle power for the guests to discover the real meaning of this dance that is an identity of Congolese and African peoples.

Africa holds the largest number of stories yet to discover and we are determined to tell the world, in our own way and with our voice. Suffice it to say that far from the difficulties—albeit real—of poverty, terrorism or corruption, Africa is today in the process of bursting into the stage world culture. This soft Power is not just about the United Kingdom or the United States: China is also under the spell of African’s countries like: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria. “Adichie, a Nigerian writer, has become a literary icon in China. It editor in Shanghai knows very well why: to addressing current issues such as gender inequalities, the issue of migrants or racism. Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie helps readers reflect on key existential questions. However, If China has not ceased in recent years to strengthen its “cultural diplomacy” by funding Mandarin classes across Africa, it must also be recognized that most Chinese readers have no idea what Africa or literature is African. An omission that we Africans must strive to fill, spending ourselves also to make our art and music known throughout the world, a “soft Power” policy.

12.7 The American and Chinese Soft Power

In practice, only the United States seems to have hard Power and “complete” soft or soft Power with almost 45% of the world military budget, leading economic power, technological gap, presence in strategic positions in IOs. Faced with this, the new emerging states, which have not always developed all their hard Power, as illustrated by the economic fragility of the BRICS, they are deepening their soft Power through their activism within the IOs, the action of emerging countries within the WTO; demands for the reform of the Security Council or its cultural diplomacy. But can we say that they are outdated concepts? Recently, it seems that we are witnessing the overcoming of the dichotomy between these two notions, as illustrated by the concept of “smart power,” designating their combination in favor of “elegance.” It was especially advocated by former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton to define the new goals of American foreign policy, moving away from messianic speeches and systematic coercion, but maintaining its diplomatic and military power on the same situation or status. In this way, new forms of power seem to be developing, such as “net power,” combining aspects of hard Power and soft Power in the context of the development of new information technologies. If the notions of hard and soft Power remain structuring, these keys to understand power relations deserve to be revisited. In summary, China is building and using digital soft Power that utilizes many digital channels. This digital soft Power ranges from the export of its method of governance to possibilities of anticipation on the positions of other state actors. Taking advantage of its lead in the Field, and remunerating non-Chinese companies in the sector which it cannot yet do without, China is also drinking digital data that allows it to refine the efficiency and predictions of its algorithms and invests massively directly or indirectly in its specialized companies. In doing so, it manages to file patents and export its own technological standards, which gives it an enviable place for the futures years, and gives him powerful tools to shape a world according to his desires, all in a soft and gradual way.

The literature interprets the soft Power as a rebalancing of the hard Power, it is hard side military and economic being considered too developed. Some leaders believe that a set of “enabling environments” is necessary for the emergence of their country: a stable and peaceful international environment, a regional environment with the above characteristics, a cooperative environment based on the equality and mutual benefits, an “objective and friendly” media environment. The objective of the leaders seems to have evolved thereafter. Soft Power is no longer seen as an instrument for achieving great power status, but a means of gaining recognition of its status as a great power. From this perspective, soft Power becomes a foreign policy strategy aimed at defusing fears related to any big countries like China, USA, or others accession to great power status. Although it is no longer possible to speak today of a Chinese or American threat, as at the end of the 1990s, it should be noted that certain concerns persist. As we understand it, the “China threat thesis” is defined as a set of negative perceptions about China’s rise to great power status. Anchored in the realistic vision of the emergence of powers which posits that there can be no peaceful

rise, several countries view China's rise to Power with concern. They fear that China is seeking to impose itself as a global hegemon, and that this attempt will destabilize the international system for a long time. Their concern is fueled by another element of the realist approach, namely the impossibility of knowing the exact intentions of the rival actor, particularly in terms of satisfaction with the international order. About the China situation, the realist theory posits that it is impossible to know with certainty whether it is a revisionist power or in favor of the status quo. The "Chinese threat thesis" therefore reflects a dual concern of the international community: The actors in the international system fear that the rise of China will exacerbate the rivalry with the current superpower, the United States.

These actors are concerned about a possible evolution of China as a revisionist power. For some authors, the Chinese threat is also reflected at the economic level. Thus, the developed countries believe that Chinese economic growth has negative consequences on their economies, citing in support relocations, certain unfair economic practices like espionage, dumping etc. While developing countries, such as "China's Southeast Asian neighbors find themselves in direct competition with it because their economies have similar structures: they are not complementary but competitive" (Kurlantzick 2007: 85) In recent years, the perception of the rise of China has evolved: we have moved from a perception of China as a threat to a more nuanced vision. China is now seen as a key player in the international system: a key player in economic recovery, it has also become a responsible player in world affairs. Although a growing number of countries and regions view China's rise more positively, many concerns persist. Interpretation of authors of foreign literature try to offers a different interpretation of the objectives that Chinese leaders assign to their soft Power. After the analysis, it is possible to say that the China's difficulties in developing its soft Power can be explained by the defensive and ad hoc nature of the measures put in place: this reflects a "lack of confidence," and "an absence of grand Chinese strategy in relation to the use of his own soft Power."

In other way, we cannot believe that soft Power is also used to achieve the following internal objectives: to preserve social stability and the cohesion of the population according to the slogan of harmonious society, to create favorable internal conditions for the ascent of big hard country to great power status, and using soft Power to "explore alternative routes to sustainable growth" selfness. Ultimately, soft Power becomes, at the internal level, the foundation of a catch-all ideology perceived as the solution to many internal problems.

Reassure his neighbors, and then? Which is necessary to taken a series of measures intended to defuse the concerns of the international community. These measures consist of denials not very effective if not followed by concrete actions, promotion of the doctrine of peaceful development. Measures to promote the empowering of the culture both internally and externally. The Methods of production and distribution of soft Power: Like Nye (2004), more leaders differentiate high culture and popular culture and implement different strategies according to the target audience. High culture strategies may seek to promote academic and scientific exchanges, while popular culture strategies seek to reach the greatest number of people through mass cultural products: films, popular singers, television programs, music, etc.

Analysts have observed that commercialization and the establishment of international marketing strategies are means widely used by Western countries to spread their culture, especially at the level of popular cultural products. Inspired by Western techniques, similar initiatives have been undertaken to make certain cultural products more accessible. These initiatives are mainly the responsibility of the government, but are sometimes the work of private actors to delegate it. An important example of soft Power in the world is Italy as it has long held a greater cultural power, due to its legacy of the Roman renaissance, since the sixteenth century, when visiting Florence, you will find dozens of Italian cultural centers and poles, the whole world has a great respect for Italy from its cultural legacy.

The country is full of the soft Power spread through its museums, churches, parks, but Italian art promotes itself through the country's charisma. So a way to visualize the value and importance of soft Power for any country, Italy should be a model or an example to be seen in this sense, Italy on its own is a museum open to everyone, also an artistic heritage of the humanity despite the negative side of its politics and its hard Power for decades that country is the most visited country in the world, this is the strength of its soft Power; here it was or is a matter of an immense soft Power that wants to or not wanting feeds other important useful cultural elements such as its gastronomy, its cinema, its works with an expression of divine perfection. Another universal example of overcoming the soft Power known naturally is "Water": Water never fights or fights with stones or mountains, but with all smoothness, water manages to pass through the stones, penetrate the mountains, and follow its path without any obstacle. Unfortunately at this very present moment, we live in the reappearance of hard Power to have what we want, we want to talk about the Russian war against Ukraine since February 24, 2022. More needs to be done in peace operations to adequately address the drivers and root causes of conflict—in particular, building a basic foundation for a sustainable system of governance and security based on the principles of the rule of law.

Providing a bridge between post-conflict stabilization and long-term development can help sustain peace, but the challenge of meeting the humanitarian needs of people affected by conflict in areas controlled by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) is growing in complexity. Russia has never invested in the preservation or dissemination of its cinematographic cultural legacy, for example, of course it makes impossible the soft Power to mitigate the bad decisions made by the Russian authorities. China on its own, owning a millenary culture, strong cinematographic, musical and electronic source; however, it does not allow that soft Power to thrive with freedom, because China is not democratic.

The existence of the soft cultural power joins the institutions, artists, and producers who carry the symbolic power, all this benefit will serve to shape the image of the world, structuring the image of the country and the reality. Soft Power is able to bring strong political, good tourist, social system, diplomatic benefits as the country has a strong cultural heritage with international legitimacy; here the soft Power makes other countries admire the country's ideas, they want to be with the country's Initiative and they will even want to consume what that country consumes, leading to the growth of its economy easily. This kind of countries whom using this quality

of soft Power trying to forget their army past time or ideology. Why is soft Power important in today's geopolitics? At this level, trade becomes possible, as well as obtaining political support in international organizations. This kind of privileged relationship makes it possible to create allies and therefore multilateral support for the causes defended by the influential nation. The soft Power in the twenty-first century: According to Joseph Nye, the contemporary Power landscape is characterized first by the decline of secular "super" hegemonies (as was the case for the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century and then the United States in the twentieth century).

12.8 The Future Soft Power

Future world power is more a matter of power shared by a few great powers rather than a rent enjoyed by a single country. The trend is toward international cooperation rather than a solo journey. Yet we need to know that the fact that a great power must be able to manage and use wisely the resources at its disposal. It is not only a question of benefiting from a quantity of resources, but of being able to convert them into vectors of influence. It is therefore important to define and follow a power strategy. The arrival of the Internet and new technologies does not cause fundamental change, but only a new means: soft Power is used and shaped in a different way. Social networks accelerate the flow of information and can involve any citizen in soft Power. From now on, the soft Power of a country also depends on its ability to produce and share information. It is certainly perfect, that I am a free African with a very Western training and education, an African trained in the West, having worked there in various countries and giving to the West the love that I have for her and that west has me delivered. Finally as an African, as I say it, I am waiting for the autonomous cultural expansionism of Africa without the West, without the Russians and the Chinese, which are only privating us. I have done legal training in law studies, diplomatic training and historical training, Entrepreneurship with a will to share our Western skills. Without fear neither of colonization nor of the current war, I am convinced that this new war will ruin Western people if it does not put a tragic end of life. This is so, for sure that, the black man was at the origin of humanity, maybe he will be the last. Now with our training in the profile of the African and Congolese cultural soft Power, we will look to work at the emergence of a new Africa. The Africa with its soft Power should be desolved and we should not take too much part in the war of influence, our camp must be belong to our continent and our countries. Let us be pro Africa and pro our countries and pro our cultures. The new Africa should be on the side of everyone who will be our partner, one who comes to us is because he/she finds an interest. Not to be like a freed slave who does not know where to go without dependence on his master. Looking for the emergence of our soft Power for our developments, supposed to be our new topic.

12.9 Final Considerations

By presenting an original theoretical framework, inspired by the symbolic perspective, we offer an explanation that is both more complete and more nuanced than those offered by the two classic perspectives in international relations, namely the idea of hard Power, conventional power dear to realists, and the theories of soft Power developed by Joseph Nye. It explains the growing paradoxical fascination exerted by Asian power not only on developing and formerly communist countries, but also on a growing number of democratic and industrialized countries in the West. In the analysis, perspectives based on hard Power (the power of coercion) and soft Power (the power of influence) are generally at the expense of another, more subtle form of power. This power is, so to speak, of a symbolic nature. To acquire this symbolic power, an actor must cultivate interactions such that others perceive him as a legitimate actor, "The power of influence as falling under "soft and cultural" power, but also as the power of "influence and conviction," "cultural and ideological attraction as well as international norms and institutions": the difference with the concept of symbolic power sometimes seems tenuous."

The rise of African continent and The Democratic Republic of Congo especially can come by the conjunction of three factors, namely a favorable context, a solid symbolic capital, and a strong rhetoric or the capacity to produce seductive speeches. This conjunction can explain if possible the future growing paradoxical fascination exerted by the power of this country the Democratic Republic of Congo and also the African continent, not only on the countries of the developing or formerly communist world, but also on a growing number of democratic and industrialized countries in the West. But also symbolic successes of this country the Democratic Republic of Congo, through its brilliant economic successes, its apparently successful management of the political and economic crisis, and a discourse emphasizing the harmony of relations, the equality of States and mutual respect, in which the economic and political dogmas dear to Westerners would give way to mutually beneficial relations.

At this time of the socio-economical-political crisis, the Rdcongo supposed to be exercising his soft Power. The Congo/Kinshasa, presents itself as a superpower that is both generous and concerned with the search for harmonious relations within and outside its borders. He can also show his policy of non-alignment. Today, it increasingly relies on Bantu or African nationalism and worries about the economic and political ambitions of its neighbor. If the country try to conclude some economic agreement with others for example, one kind of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership this largest free trade agreement in the world, with its members representing global big percentage. For some central African's countries, this agreement is all a blessing since it will allow them to offset the devastating effects of the economic crisis that is gradually setting in due to the region of great lakes. Thanks to this agreement, Rdcongo's overseas investments will be facilitated, and the economic dependence of several neighbors members on this country will be further accentuated.

If it was possible that the African continent and the Democratic Republic of Congo building and using economics resources and cultural soft Power where foreigners

need, this cultural and economical soft Power ranges from exporting its method of governance to possibilities of anticipating the positions of other state actors. Taking advantage of its lead in the field, and remunerating non-Congolese's companies in the sector which it cannot yet do without, Congo also invests massively directly or indirectly in its specialized companies. In doing so, it manages to register patents and export its own technological standards, which assures it an enviable place for the years to come, and gives it powerful tools to shape a world according to its desires, all in a soft and gradual way. And then we can think that the Democratic Republic of Congo and the African continent can empowered by themselves.

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Chapter 13

Cultural Experiences of Brazil in Africa: The Management of Intangible Cultural Heritage in the Context of Soft Power



Thamyres Alves Rodrigues

Abstract In a global scenario in which cultural experiences are increasingly shared—not just from a north-south movement, driven by traditional western powers in towards other emerging countries in the world, but also by a south-south influx (McCLORY in *The new persuaders*. Institute for Government, London, 2010; Lane in *French scientific and cultural diplomacy*. Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 2013), provided by the economic and cooperative advance between the two shores of the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean—to scrutinize the ways in which these sharing happens becomes relevant, especially when one intends to understand the cultural bias as a soft power variable. Given this scenario, we propose a study of the state of the art of policies aimed at the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity implemented in Brazil and Africa, their points of contact, and their preservation actors in the face of international relations and their main holders. In order to do so, we start from a notion of global history, whose transnational analogies, or solidarities (to paraphrase SLATE, NICO; 2012, 2012), are encouraged as a way to demand the nation, and not abandon national affiliation. Finally, in addition to this survey, which aims to identify the way in which elements of immaterial culture are managed and disseminated, we also seek to highlight the discrete struggle of isolated actors (infrapolitics according to James C. Scott) that works “as the cement of the most elaborated” (Scott in *Domination and the arts of resistance: hidden transcripts*. Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn, 1990) through which they are putting to the test the limits of cultural hegemony, increasing, together with the responsible state bodies, the reserves of soft power, and its consequent instrumentalization.

Keyword Intangible heritage · Soft power · Africa · Brazil

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13.1 Introduction

In a global scenario where cultural experiences are increasingly shared—not only from a north–south movement, driven by traditional Western powers toward other emerging countries of the world, but also from a south–south influx (McCLORY 2010; Lane 2013), provided by the economic and cooperative progress between the two shores of the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean—it becomes relevant to scrutinize the ways in which these sharings happen, especially when one intends to understand cultural bias as a soft power variable. Given this scenario, we propose a study of the state of the art of policies aimed at the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity implemented in Brazil and Africa, their points of contact and their preservation actors in relation to international relations and their main holders. To do so, we start from a notion of global history, whose transnational analogies, or solidarities (paraphrasing SLATE, NICO 2012, 2012), are fostered as a way of claiming the nation, and not abandoning national affiliation. Finally, in addition to this survey, which aims to identify how the elements of immaterial culture are managed and disseminated, we also seek to highlight the discreet struggle of isolated actors (infrapolitics according to James C. Scott) that works “like the cement of the most elaborate” (Scott 1990) through which they put the limits of cultural hegemony to the test, increasing, together with the responsible state bodies, the reserves of soft power and its consequent instrumentalization.

In recent decades, we have been experiencing an intensification of the globalization process, causing profound changes in all spheres of society, stimulated by technological advances, boosting interaction and the exchange of knowledge between individuals around the world, generating profound variations in the understanding of time and space. With this technological advance, there is also a sharing of cultural experiences not only from a north–south movement driven by the traditional western powers toward other emerging countries of the world, but also from a south–south influx (McClory 2010; Lane 2013), provided by the economic and cooperative progress between the two shores of the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean—it becomes relevant to break down the ways in which these sharings happen, especially when one intends to understand the cultural bias as a variable of soft power.

We cannot be naive in believing that south–south connections dominate soft power. We know that Eurocentrism and North American ideas are still in the spotlight, mainly due to their historical connections linked to wars and imperialism. Christofoletti highlights McClory’s assertion that “as the old guard collectively enter a period of sustained austerity, soft power assets will be among the most tempting budget lines to cut—as evidenced by the recent UK spending review” (McClory 2010, p. 43 apud Christofoletti 2017, p. 19). The author asks: “how much longer will the soft power hegemony of the traditional western powers last? The emergence of other emerging countries in the world is taking measures to increase their soft power reserves and build the capacity to take advantage of them” (McClory 2010, p. 45 apud Christofoletti 2017, p. 19).

Soft power arises in opposition to the so-called hard power, in a post-Cold War period, in a century marked by the First and Second World War, as well as Nazi-fascism, society no longer tolerated so much destruction in the name of conquests and national interests, the basis of military and consequently economic domination. The theory that formed at the turn of the twentieth century to the twenty-first states that “soft power is the ability to influence others to do what you want by attraction rather than coercion. Coercive power would be military ostentation and economic sanctions, classified as brute power, while cultural, ideological and political identity would compose soft power” (Nye 2004, p. 19 apud Christofoletti 2017, p. 19).

Within this sharing of cultural experiences lived in the contemporary world, the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity is observed as a door that is open to new opportunities. The choice of analysis of policies aimed at the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity implemented in Brazil and in Africa, their points of contact and their preservation actors in relation to international relations and their main holders, is due to the intention of demonstrating the existing connections in the South–south beyond the diaspora, since Brazil is an Africanized country as a result of slavery in the modern era, cultural exchanges taking place between these two territories According to Paul Gilroy (2002), the ties established with the diaspora favor the formation of a communication network that goes beyond the ethnic borders of the nation-state, enabling geographically distant populations to interact and carry out cultural exchanges. These cultural exchanges take shape, being passed on to several generations, forming part of the memory of the population present on both continents, being present on the list of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, such as Samba de Roda from the Recôncavo of Bahia and its connection with Angola.

The expansion of Brazil’s international relations in the cultural area had a great growth in the early 2000s, during the government of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, however most of the actions were of short duration. This south–South cooperation can be a great ally in Brazil’s projection abroad, with eyes drawn to the country through cultural attraction and not coercion. However, the existence of long-term actions is necessary, allowing the Brazilian territory to use its rich Intangible Cultural Heritage and its connections with other regions, such as the various countries of the African Continent, as a way to gain benefits abroad, in addition to increase its relations in the area of cultural diplomacy.

With cultural experiences being shared not only by the great world powers and consequently by the cultural industry,¹ Brazil has been expanding its external projection in a south–south cooperation. This cooperation takes place through the sharing of knowledge, experiences and resources among developing countries. Before delving into the cultural experiences of Brazil in Africa from the perspective of intangible assets, we must pay attention to the trajectory of Intangible Cultural Heritage, the Safeguarding Convention held by UNESCO.

¹ Cultural Industry is a concept coined by Adorno and Horkheimer, where art is seen as a commodity of capitalism, with the intention of being consumed by the large population masses, legitimizing the interests of the dominant classes. Check: Adorno and Horkheimer (1985).

13.2 The Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity

“Intangible cultural heritage” means the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge and techniques—together with the instruments, objects, artifacts and places associated with them—that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as an integral part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, which is transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups based on their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, generating a sense of identity and continuity, thus contributing to promoting the respect for cultural diversity and human creativity.²

The safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage was an action that guarantees the preservation of cultures that run the risk of being absorbed by the cultural industry strongly marked by capitalist dynamics. It is also observed that a large portion of the intangible assets recognized by UNESCO are divided between Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, thus occurring what we call heritage democracy, considering that about half of the Material Cultural Heritage of Humanity it is found in Europe (Pelegrini and Funari 2008, pp. 55–57).

According to Simone Scifoni, the patrimonialization of material goods recognized by UNESCO is linked to a Eurocentric vision:

Monumentality and exceptionality thus define the matrix of values necessary for international recognition, imprinting a Westernized and Eurocentric vision of heritage on this experience. For Canclini (2012), the heritage of humanity serves to establish a world hierarchy, which not only classifies, but also organizes differences, based on criteria that are external to the realities of peripheral societies. This produces a World Heritage List concentrated in European countries, little representative of the world’s cultural diversity.³

Still according to Pelegrini and Funari, if we observe the lists of Material Heritage of Humanity, around 50% of material goods are present in the European continent, and approximately 10% are in North America, thus occurring a great concentration in the regions economically developed. In addition, the notion of civility and culture that govern heritage sites in Central and South America and on the Asian and African continents also show clear traces of the “cultural values introduced by Europeans in these regions.”⁴ Values that were imposed on societies in Latin America, Asia and Africa, during the long periods of colonization and imperialism. Since the officialization of intangible assets by UNESCO, we have observed in the map of intangible assets a strong concentration of these cultural traditions in the Asia, Africa and America region, thus occurring an appreciation of the cultures of the peoples of these respective territories.

To paraphrase Maria Cecília Londres Fonseca, the expansion of what can be considered cultural heritage is one of the many effects of the globalization of society,

² UNESCO. Recommendation for the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage. UNESCO. Convenção para a salvaguarda do patrimônio cultural imaterial. Tradução do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Brasília (2003)

³ Scifoni (2017).

⁴ Pelegrini and Funari (2008).

insofar as having aspects of its culture that until then were considered exotic, recognized as world heritage, adds positively to international relations with political benefits and economic (Fonseca 2003, pp. 72–73). This expansion of cultural heritage means that eyes are not focused only on economically developed countries, which make up a large portion of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, turning attention to developing countries with the so-called Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanities.

As it is a relatively new subject for all public sectors, whether at the state, national or international level, in addition to being a theme that has begun to gain strength in the academic area in recent decades, according to several researchers in the area, such as Sandra Pelegrini and Pedro Funari, The UNESCO convention did not make the recognition criteria clear, however, it indicated the ways to better identify them, describing which areas intangible heritage operates in society, as noted below:

- A) Oral traditions and expressions, including language as a vehicle of intangible cultural heritage;
- B) Artistic expressions;
- C) Social practices, rituals and festive acts;
- D) Knowledge and practices related to nature and the universe;
- E) Traditional craft techniques. (Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Heritage 2003, p. 1)

The Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity took place in 2003, however UNESCO had already established the Proclamation of Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity (cultural manifestations of exceptional importance). This proclamation took place in 2001, with the ideal of selecting cultural manifestations worthy of international recognition. The Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity was made official in 2006, representing a major advance in the area of policies for the protection of intangible heritage at the national and international level.

At the international level, the debates around the Intangible Cultural Heritage is premature, however, we observe a growth in the discussion around the theme, mainly in developing countries that see the possibility as a way to expand international relations, with what we call by soft power, attracting international attention, thus bringing about economic and political development.

13.3 Soft Power and Globalization

In an increasingly globalized world, historians from different areas have turned their attention to areas of knowledge that are recognized as global and comparative, demonstrating the relationships between different states, through the economic, cultural and even what is up to diplomacy, going beyond the delimitation borders of each nation (Conrad 2016). Within the historiographic field, according to Sebastian

Conrad, global history has been gaining space since the end of World War II, however, it manages to consecrate space in the late twentieth century, during the attempt to find explanations for the present through globalization. Within the perspective of global history that seeks to detach itself from a Eurocentric view, analyzing historical processes by inserting them into a global scenario, demonstrating the connections and similarities between distant territories, highlighting in the present work the south–south⁵ connections.

Based on the idea that soft power seeks a space in society through attraction and not coercion, which can bring positive contributions to developing countries, considering that for a long period of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the great economic powers occupied this space through hard power, with a large military force, causing repression in other countries, we observe a weakening of what we call cultural hegemony that for many years was marked by hard power and in recent years has been directly influenced by the cultural industry. According to the thinking of James C Scott, we observe that in the long term, the resistance in small proportions of the cultures of the developing regions has positive results, without having to use economic or military force, thus attracting the attention of world agencies linked to heritage for example, with the simple idea of endurance and persistence in everyday life.

This cultural resistance in the midst of so much information in a globalized society and strongly influenced by the cultural industry has brought positive points to the area of international relations in a scenario of south–south cooperation, bringing into play cultural aspects that existed in isolation from recognition of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.

The Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity brings into play social actors that for a long time were silenced by a society strongly influenced by a Eurocentric vision and economic power.

The predominance of peripheral continents in the fight for the valorization of intangible heritage can probably be understood as revealing a disjunction, as we saw before, between high and low culture. The predominant architectural and artistic culture in material cultural heritage it associates with the elites: “civilization” is over-represented in UNESCO listings. As a counterpoint, the peripheral, popular and simple character, so to speak, of immaterial culture favors the predominance of the peripheral world.⁶

From a popular perspective, developing countries use the ideal of soft power to gain space on the international stage. This space on the international stage for developing countries is mainly due to cultural attraction, being one of the main sources of soft power, as George Niaradi and Marina Bueno Feitosa point out:

⁵ The countries of the global South encompass all nations in economic development, encompassing Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and Oceania. They may have a large or small economy. Countries that are part of the global south, despite having a high GDP, are still classified as the south because the rates of social inequality, illiteracy, infant mortality, among others, are quite high. Check: <https://wp.ufpel.edu.br/pelotasmun/2020/09/13/o-que-e-cooperacao-sul-sul-e-por-que-ela-e-importante/>

⁶ Pelegrini and Funari (2008).

Professor Nye (2009 apud Steingart and Schmitz 2009) points out three main sources of soft power: a) the culture of a country; b) political values, which can be very attractive to other countries, such as democracy, freedom of expression and opportunity; and c) the legitimacy of a country's foreign policy—this means that if the foreign policy is considered legitimate by other countries, you become more persuasive.⁷ (Niaradi and Feitosa 2017, 80)

Within the perspective of the three main sources of soft power, whether through culture or politics, especially when it comes to the idea of freedom and democracy in a society strongly marked by the great wars that profoundly influenced the twentieth century (as previously described), government representatives increasingly use soft power. Currently, the great world powers use their economic powers to attract the attention of other countries, as an example, we can mention Hollywood productions to attract attention to the United States, leading a lifestyle that seeks to arouse everyone's interest. Hollywood productions are present in cinemas on all continents, as well as on streaming platforms, influencing the whole world. However, we must emphasize that this is due to the great power present in the cultural industry in the United States, which does not occur in the countries of the South, which are still in development.

In the last two decades, the intensification of globalization and the information revolution have markedly occurred, two factors of extreme importance in the execution of power in a soft way. This so-called third industrial revolution concerns the development of new technologies and the expansion of the number of internet users, which means that with each passing day, information circulates around the world more quickly, reaching a much larger number of people. (Nye 2002).⁸

The development of new technologies is a great ally of soft power, but we must not forget that with this technological advance, the economically developed countries take the lead again, repeating the entire historical cycle that has been occurring since the period of colonization and imperialism. So that developing countries also have access to soft power, there are international relations between nations, such as the various areas of diplomacy.

Diplomacy is an extremely important tool in the soft power of all countries, especially in developing countries, such as Brazil and African countries. Cultural diplomacy is allied with Intangible Cultural Heritage. UNESCO projected these countries to the world, with the recognition and Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, since it put on the scene identities and traditions than cultures that have been silenced by mainstream media and the cultural industry. With attention turned to developing countries, there is greater credibility of nations:

The more capacity for the dissemination of soft power it has, the more credit it will have before the international system, "the country that manages to legitimize its power in the eyes of the others finds less resistance to obtain what it wants. If he has an attractive culture and ideology, others are more willing to go along with him." (Nye 2002, p. 39)⁹

With an ideology of attraction, countries do not focus on culture thinking only about local society, as the intention is to make culture circulate beyond borders,

⁷ Niaradi and Feitosa (2017).

⁸ Ouriveis (2013).

⁹ Ibidem, p. 174.

and with this cultural circulation, thus occurring what Nestor Canclini calls cultural hybridity (Canclini 1997). This cultural dissemination occurs on a large scale due to communication and transportation technologies.¹⁰

It is possible to say that, nowadays, culture is increasingly leaving its space in low politics to be part of the collection of high politics, alongside and composing vital themes for relations between States, such as foreign policy, trade, development and security (Oliveira 2014). The cultural element for acting in the international arena received greater attention from analysts and theorists of International Relations during the second half of the 20th century. Between the mid-1970s and early 1980s, theorist Marcel Merle (1981) was one of the first authors to emphasize the importance of the cultural dimension for understanding International Relations.¹¹

As culture received more attention in the scenario of international relations, cooperation between countries can be considered as a fundamental tool for cultural diplomacy, especially in south–south cooperation relations, as a way to achieve mutual recognition. This south–south cooperation relationship can be observed in Brazil's cooperation with African countries that have Portuguese as their official language.

13.4 Brazil's South–South Cooperation with Africa

With cultural experiences being shared not only by the great world powers and consequently by the cultural industry, Brazil has been expanding its external projection in south–south cooperation. Brazil is listed by Nye (2011) as one of the regions with potential for the development of soft power in this period of globalization that the world has been going through in recent years. For this, one of the main tools is the cooperation that occurs through the sharing of knowledge, experiences and resources between developing countries. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), was created to mediate the Foreign Affairs that were linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was created in 1987 to mediate at the national level cooperation programs and projects from the country to the outside, as well as from abroad to the Brazil under bilateral, trilateral or multilateral formats.¹²

Regarding the more specific priorities and efforts of Brazilian foreign policy in the field of preservation of cultural assets and heritage, it is essential to highlight not only the actions of the MRE and the MinC, but also those developed by the Instituto do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional (IPHAN), a federal agency linked to the MinC responsible for the promotion and preservation of Brazilian cultural heritage, in addition to representing the country in International Relations in this area. Responding to the demand for international partnerships in the area of recognition and safeguarding of cultural assets, the institute has diversified and expanded the establishment of International Technical Cooperation projects.

¹⁰ Rodrigues and Maciel (2017).

¹¹ Ibidem.

¹² Check: <http://www.abc.gov.br/sobreabc/introducao>. Accessed on: November 20, 2022. BRASIL. Agência Brasileira de Cooperação. Histórico da cooperação técnica brasileira. Disponível em <http://www.abc.gov.br/SobreABC/Historico>.

“The international cooperation embodied by IPHAN encompasses heritage protection initiatives defined by it as instruments to promote national development and also to strengthen diplomatic relations.¹³

Paraphrasing Gilberto Rodrigues and Tadeu Maciel, Brazil has been increasing its know-how in the area of preservation and heritage laws, sharing the knowledge that the agencies linked to heritage currently have with other countries.¹⁴ In addition to having a considerable number of intangible heritage assets in common with international partners (samba de roda, capoeira, among others) mainly with African countries that have Portuguese as their official language.

Advances in safeguarding and registering intangible heritage in Brazil have served as an example for other countries in south–south cooperation, through courses, projects and actions developed mainly by IPHAN. Cooperation between countries has been an important factor for international relations,¹⁵ and consequently soft power. Such cooperation can be seen with African countries, as noted below.

Due to the large territorial extension and the large number of countries that the African Continent has, we chose to analyze the cooperation between Portuguese-speaking countries, due to the cultural approach, in addition to the greater number of projects and actions developed in these countries. Diplomatic relations between Brazil and African countries are part of the cultural approach that these regions have due to the African diaspora.

South–south cooperation takes place mainly in countries that have Portuguese as their official language. On the African continent, we observe this statement with the largest number of projects and actions being developed in Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea. However, it should be noted that in the area of cultural heritage, these international relations are minimal.

In Angola, we have the Technical Cooperation Project Strengthening the Management of Cultural Heritage in Angola created in 2008, lasting one year. The project had the following objectives:

Training of Angolan professionals in methodologies for identifying and documenting cultural heritage; protection and conservation of material goods; identification, registration and safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage; promotion of cultural goods; and museum management. Afterwards, Iphan carried out eight missions to the National Institute of Cultural Heritage of Angola and sent 22 technicians and directors to that country, where training workshops were promoted in the field of cultural heritage which, in total, benefited 84 Angolan technicians. (IPHAN)¹⁶


Within the scenario of Intangible Heritage, the project aimed to promote the training of Angolan professionals, with emphasis on practices of records and safeguards. São Tomé Príncipe, is a country that despite its cultural diversity, does not have any cultural asset on the list of World Heritage Sites. However, we

¹³ Ibidem, p. 48.

¹⁴ Rodrigues and Maciel (2017).

¹⁵ Hill (2003).

¹⁶ Check: <http://portal.iphan.gov.br/pagina/detalhes/599/> Accessed on: November 16, 2022.



Graph 13.1 Classification of south–south cooperation by segment (2000–2014). *Source* ABC

countries with common problems, taking as an approach the ideas of the UNESCO conventions.

We observed that south–south cooperation relations grew during the first term of President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, with the union of countries being mobilized, in addition to the participation in decision-making forums of international¹⁹ politics. Currently, Brazil already has 37 embassies on the African continent, however the number of actions in the area of intangible cultural heritage is still minimal in relation to other projects in south–south cooperation relations.

With the Graph 13.1, we observe the great cooperation between Brazil and the countries of the South, however we observe a low number of actions in the cultural area, and consequently in the Intangible Cultural Heritage.

13.5 Final Considerations

This text sought to highlight the process of recognition of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, highlighting the importance that this Safeguard process, carried out by UNESCO, had for the democratization of cultural heritage, with a large number of intangible assets being recognized in developing countries, distancing

¹⁹ Silva (2017).

itself a little from the high amount of material goods of humanity that are recognized by UNESCO in European and North American soil.

This democratization of intangible heritage was a great ally for the soft power of developing countries, attracting the attention of other nations through their cultural traditions. Within the concept of soft power, where the attraction and attention of other nations is sought, we highlight the south–south cooperation relationship, which is an important tool in a globalized society.

Within these south–south cooperation relationships, we seek to list the performance and cooperation of Brazil and the African countries that have Portuguese as their official language in the scenario of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity. Despite the large number of embassies that Brazil currently has on the African continent, and the various projects and actions in international relations, we observe that actions in the area of intangible heritage are still timid in view of the potential that Brazil has.

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Chapter 14

The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: An Important Soft Power Strategy



Fernando Fernandes da Silva

Abstract The proposal of this article is to provide a brief overview on the protection of the underwater cultural heritage in according to the rules of the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001). The main purpose of this convention is to protect “all traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or archaeological character” which have been under water for over 100 years (art. 1°). Furthermore, the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001) stems from articles 149 and 303 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which obliges States to protect the historical and archaeological objects for the benefit of mankind. Therefore, the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001) is adopted by the international Community, on behalf of mankind, to prevent acts of piracy and looting. There are many examples of outstanding underwater cultural properties that deserve protection because of its historical, artistic and archaeological values, such as Alexandria Lighthouse (Egypt), RMS Titanic (United Kingdom) and several sunken Spanish galleons. Therefore, the cooperation between States and International Organizations for the promotion of cultural exchange of underwater cultural properties, through exhibitions or to compose the museums collections, e.g. is an important soft power strategy. On the other hand, several States claim sovereign rights over some underwater cultural properties that cause legal disputes, that can be resolved by the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001).

Keywords Underwater cultural heritage · International cultural cooperation · Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (UNESCO 2001) · *Soft power* · Underwater cultural property

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14.1 Introduction

The proposal of this article is to provide a brief overview on the protection of the underwater cultural heritage in accordance with the rules of the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (UNESCO 2001) and its application to the development of *soft power* promotion strategies. The main purpose of this convention is to protect “all traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or archaeological character” which have been under water for over 100 years (art. 1°).

Furthermore, the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (UNESCO 2001) stems from articles 149 and 303 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which obliges States to protect the historical and archaeological objects for the benefit of mankind.

Therefore, the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (UNESCO 2001) is adopted by the international community, on behalf of mankind, to avoid threats against to underwater cultural heritage.

There are many examples of outstanding underwater cultural properties that deserve protection because of its artistic, historical and archaeological values, such as *Lighthouse of Alexandria* (Egypt) and several sunken Spanish galleons.

Therefore, the cooperation between States and International Organizations for the promotion of cultural exchange of underwater cultural properties, through exhibitions or to compose the museums collections, e.g. is an important *soft power* strategy.

14.2 International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia (1960–1980)

One of the most important works of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is to organize international campaigns of solidarity to enhance the protection of cultural heritage in the world, particularly cultural properties situated in areas affected by natural disasters or armed conflict. This kind of traditional UNESCO work dating from in mid-fifties, moment it started the International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia (Egypt and Sudan).

In the mid-fifties, the Government of Egypt decided to raise the Aswan dam that would flood most of Nubia's territory, with destruction of many temples, historical monuments, several archaeological sites and many cultural properties that illustrate all stages of history, including Ancient Egypt: steles, inscriptions, drawings, rock paintings, statues and other archaeological documents.¹

The new Aswan dam would form a new artificial lake with one hundred and thirty billion cubic metres, with three thousand square kilometres, stretching over five

¹ UNESCO (1)).

hundred kilometres through the Nile River Valley that would submerge the territory of Nubia, located between Egypt and Sudan.²

For this reason, the General Director of UNESCO of that time, Mr. Vittorino Veronese, officially launched the International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia (1960) and did an follow statement:

These richness don't belong to only their countries that nowadays are trustee. The entire world has the right to their perenniality... (...) The men must unite to forbid that Nile, accumulated source of fecundity and energy, become liquid tomb from the part of beauties that the men of present-day received from the men of yore.³

From then on, many countries led by UNESCO were mobilized to remove thousands of cultural properties before the flooding of the region by the waters of Aswan dam. Some countries took responsibility of protection of one temple or another: for instance, the Federal Republic of Germany promoted the removal and rebuilding works of the *Kalabcha* Temple; and Netherlands and Belgium cooperated to remove and rebuild the *Kuma* and *Semna* Nubian temples.

Between the years 1964 and 1968, the high point of the campaign was the removal of *Abu Simbel* Temples, the most important architectural work of Pharaoh Ramses II (thirteenth century B.C.), from its original site to another site, located sixty four metres above the level of that site.⁴ It is important to mention that four temples were donated by the Egyptian Government as sign of gratitude: *Debod* was donated to Spain, *Dendour* to United States, *Ellesya* to Italy and *Taffh* to the Netherlands.

The International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia ends in 1980, with extremely positive results, because more than twenty monuments were rescued, including the *Abu Simbel* Temples, hundreds of archaeological sites were excavated and recorded, thousands of artefacts were recovered and several temples were saved with the removal works.

14.3 The Main Threats to the Underwater Cultural Heritage

Nowadays, according to UNESCO, there are many threats to the underwater cultural heritage, such as climate change, commercial and tourist exploitation, trawling and fishing, economic activities, industrial work, developing seabed and pillages.⁵

² *Ibid.*, p. 41.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁴ Abu Simbel is a large architectural complex, with two temples: the first one measures 33 m high, 38 m wide and 63 m deep, with four colossal statues that represent the traits of Pharaoh Ramses II and measure each one twenty metres high; the second one is dedicated to his wife, Nefertari, adorned with six statues that measure ten metres high. Beyond the colossal structure of the complex, the same complex housed many archaeological artifacts that were transported to the new site or donated to museums.

⁵ UNESCO. Threats to the Underwater Cultural Heritage. Available in: <https://www.unesco.org/en/node/79953>. Date: March 9, 2023.

Thus, climate change provokes the destruction of the many historic and archaeological sites, due to a change of standards of conservation, changing sea currents or temperature increase; commercial and tourist exploitation with the purpose of recovery porcelain dishes, vases, jewellery, among other valuables to put them up for sale, without considering scientific standards, can destroy archaeological sites; historic and archaeological fishing sites, very important to understand the way of life of ancestral communities, can be destroyed by trawling and fishing or similar activities; the various maritime economic activities today, specifically major infrastructure projects, for example ports, can provoke erosion and pollution that destroy historic and archaeological sites; industrial works, such as bridge or gas pipeline constructions, directly affect submerged sites, that are close to the coast; and, some activities of developing the seabed, e.g. mineral extraction, impact submerged sites, especially by the extraction of sand and gravel.

Today, it deserves attention to address the phenomenon of pillage of underwater cultural heritage. UNESCO defined as “‘pillaging’ or ‘looting’ refers to the theft of historical artefacts from a heritage site in violation of the law”, specifically in ancient shipwrecks.⁶

Due to new technological inventions, many treasure hunters, with modern and effective equipment, appeared in recent years exploiting shipwrecks and take profit with collecting artefacts and coins, violating scientific and legal rules. However, such activities cause natural and cultural damages, with destruction of marine life environments and historic and archaeological sites. It's important to mention UNESCO report related to the following event:

Treasure-hunting companies often prioritize the quick removal of sediment to unveil sellable artefacts. A mission by the UNESCO Scientific and Technical Advisory Body (STAB) of the 2001 Convention to the San José site in Panama found that the treasure hunters employed powerful water jets using propeller deflectors to remove sediment, causing considerable damage to both the heritage value of the site and its natural environment.⁷

14.4 Examples of Some Relevant Cases

Today, it is important to mention the positive experience of *Vasa Museum* (Sweden), located on the Djurgården island, in central Stockholm, that it displays intact seveneenth century *Vasa* warship, sank on her first voyage in 1628, because it was harassed by a strong gust of wind that leaned left it and caused a flood.

During the fifties, *Vasa* warship was found, near the Stockholm port, taken by the silt and well preserved. In 1961, the shipwreck was recovered in accordance with relevant to scientific and technical measures and since then work has begun on cleaning and restoring the shipwreck. The *Vasa* shipwreck was restored and as result

⁶ UNESCO. The Impact of Treasure-Hunting on Submerged Archaeological Sites. Available in: https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/uch-brochure_looting_0.pdf. Date: March 9, 2023).

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

of that the *Vasa Museum* was opened in 1990, becoming the most visited museum in Sweden, with a total of 1.532.779 visitors in 2019.

According to UNESCO, since 1961, *Vasa* shipwreck “has been visited by over 30 million people” and because of that many tourists spend an average of EUR 200 per day in Stockholm, which adds the amount of EUR 200 million per year in the city.⁸ However, there are many negative experiences that involving exclusively commercial exploitation of shipwrecks and the occurrence of damages against the underwater cultural heritage. Some of those experiences is the discovery of *Belitung* shipwreck or *Tang* shipwreck, a kind of *dhow* which sank around 830 A.D. and discovered by fishermen, in the year 1998, in the Gelasa Strait (it is a strait that separates the Indonesian islands of Belitung and Bangka) in 17 m of water.

The new discovery made two contributions to History: the first, the *Belitung* shipwreck contained 60.000 ceramics, the majority of them are *Changsha* ceramics from China’s Hunan Province; the second, it is a typical Arabian *dhow*, almost intact, that gave new information about construction methods used for vessels.

On the other hand, that history of discovery is surrounded by controversies. According to UNESCO the *Belitung* shipwreck and its artefacts was sold by the Indonesian Government for 32 million USD to a private entity, and Indonesia “lost an extremely rare wreck that could have provided scientific information and fostered sustainable development”⁹ with the possibility of creating a specific museum to house that archaeological collection, along the same lines as the *Vasa Museum*.

14.5 Some Legal Aspects of Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001)

UNESCO was created in London Conference (1945) and belongs to the United Nations System. According to Treaty Constitution of UNESCO, one of its purposes is:

Maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge:

By assuring the conservation and protection of the world’s inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history and science, and recommending to the nations concerned the necessary international conventions (...).¹⁰

Thus, it is a function of the UNESCO to protect the cultural heritage of humanity, through the propositions of conventions and recommendations, and the promotion of an international campaigns to safeguard the various cultural properties of our planet. So, we can highlight some conventions and recommendations that contain that purpose, in times of peace and in times of armed conflict: the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹⁰ Article 1º, 2, “c”, of Treaty of London (1945).

the Execution of the Convention (1954); the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1999); the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970); the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001); Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003) and the Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Excavations (1956).

The Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001), among others objectives, regulates the article 149 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) which determines that “all objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the Area shall be preserved or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole (...)”, or in other words, the “Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind”,¹¹ including its cultural properties and; the article 303, that states that “states have the duty to protect objects of an archaeological and historical nature found at sea and shall cooperate” to protecting underwater cultural properties, especially against exploitation activities without scientific care, including the pillage and the looting.

Thus, the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001) filled an international convention gap, since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) doesn’t widely deal of the protection of underwater cultural properties.

The Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001) determines, between articles 5 and 12, various types of obligations for the signatures States, in accordance with the rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), within four maritime zones (territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and the area).

Therefore, we can conclude, two kind of obligations: the first, there are obligations for States that cultural properties are located in territories where they exercise their sovereign rights or jurisdiction, for instance cultural properties located in internal waters or territorial sea; the second, there are obligations for States that cultural properties are located in territories where they no shall “claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its resources”,¹² including underwater cultural heritage. Both types of obligations reveal the potential for development of *soft power*; phenomenon that will be analysed in topic 14.7.

14.6 The Brazilian Law and Underwater Cultural Heritage

Although the 1988 Federal Constitution ensures the protection of national cultural heritage (art. 216), there is no specific law or legal code in Brazil which regulates the protection of underwater cultural heritage.

¹¹ Article 136 of United Nations Convention of Law of the Sea (1982).

¹² Article 137, 1, of United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (1982).

Indeed, the Brazilian law 7.542/86, which regulates the search, exploration, removal and demolition of sunken properties, deals tangentially with that theme because, in case of private exploitation, the underwater cultural properties “of artistic or archaeological interest will remain in the domain” of the Brazilian State.¹³ Nevertheless, the same law admits that the private explorer may receive up to forty per cent of the assigned value for that cultural properties. In the other words, there are no rules about an authentic protection of underwater cultural properties, such as conservation of archaeological sites which must be kept in the original location, i.e. they cannot be removed in favour of scientific interest.

We can conclude that the Brazilian law unfortunately encourages treasure hunters, associated with the fact that Brazilian State has no ratified the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001). Such situations represent the absence of consistent policy of protection of national underwater cultural heritage in Brazil.

14.7 The *Soft Power* and Underwater Cultural Heritage

According to Professor Rodrigo Christofolletti, there are many disagreements about the concept of *soft power* among authors of international relations.¹⁴ However, we can identify some common aspects of that phenomenon: *soft power* is related with the power between States and others actors of international community in international relations. Thus, according to the studies of Professor Rodrigo Christofolletti, some of examples of contemporary *soft power* are the Russian ballet, the Indian film industries and the French fashion.¹⁵ In short words, they are cultural expressions that influence behaviours in all parts of the world, i.e. this influence is a kind of power.

In this regard, the underwater cultural collection can be used for mutual understanding between peoples, i.e. for the construction of international politics and diplomacy in search of peace, regardless of the legal regime of protection, cultural properties belonging to the nation’s underwater cultural heritage or cultural properties belonging to the humanity’s underwater cultural heritage, in accordance with the rules of the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001).

For example, nowadays, it is estimated that there are approximately three million shipwrecks dispersed in all parts of the world. They constitute an important cultural collection to foster peace. This cultural diversity is important to each people, communities and social groups, because they can learn with each other behaviour and relationship lifestyles, eating habits, types of clothing, behaviours of ancient civilizations, that still influence us today, through language or certain institutions, and many other cultural manifestations. All this to create an environment of understanding and tolerance to cooperate with peace. Hence, it is necessary to build strategies for the

¹³ Article 20 of law 7.542/86.

¹⁴ Christofolletti (2).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 264 (footnote “1”).

protection and dissemination of underwater cultural properties, e.g. to compose the museums, as manifestation of *soft power*.

14.8 Final Remarks

In the light of the above, we can see two types of *soft power* that are associated with the protection underwater cultural heritage.

The first modality, it is *soft power* type that comes from the cultural underwater heritage of the history of a nation or specific social group or community, such as archaeological site of the *port of Iguape*, in Brazil, which represents the contact human between indigenous communities, African slaves and European settlers, as well as an important period of the Brazilian economy, as rice export port during the nineteenth century. However, that site was silted up, progressively, by river and sea waters from the second half of the nineteenth century. Then, the *port of Iguape* was recovered a few years ago, with the creation of a historic site in the old harbour becoming a tourist attraction pole.

The other modality, it is *soft power* that comes from the underwater cultural heritage of the history of civilizations that influence us to this day, i.e. civilizations that contributed with our behaviours, such as *Lighthouse of Alexandria*, probably built around the years 290–270 B.C., located in *Alexandria* (Egypt), founded by Alexander, the Great (356–323 B.C.), one of the greatest characters of universal history, responsible for military campaigns that led to the conquest of Asia and North East Africa. In addition to its intrinsic historical and artistic importance, the *Lighthouse of Alexandria*, considered one of the seven wonders of the ancient world, represents the beginning of appreciation of hellenistic culture in Egypt and of Ptolemaic Egypt, that lasts around three centuries.

The *Lighthouse of Alexandria* was destroyed over the centuries, due to earthquakes and due to various human actions. Nowadays, its ruins are submerged on the Mediterranean coast. It is important to mention that the western world inherited from the culture hellenistic diverse cultural manifestations, including linguistic influences. Then, the marine archaeology activities and eventual reconstruction of that lighthouse must be sponsored by UNESCO, representing the human collectivity, with the purpose of creating a *soft power* typical of the humanity in order to promote tolerance and peace. However, despite the cultural manifestation being the cultural manifestations of a specific people or being cultural manifestations of humanity is important to highlight that there is no hierarchy between them.

In fact, it is a duty of States and the international community promote the protection and exchange of underwater cultural properties for all people to learn from each other, to create an environment of tolerance and peace. This is the only *soft power* we can legitimately exercise, as it is stated in the preamble to Treaty Constitution of UNESCO: “That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed (...)”.

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Chapter 15

Destruction of Antiquities, Museums and Archaeological Sites in Syria During the War: Methods of Protecting Them



Ahmad Serieh

Abstract Syria constitutes one of the most important regions of the Middle East. It occupies the greater part of the western flank of the Fertile Crescent and the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. The beginnings of settlement there go back to the first periods of human settlement in the pre-Pottery Stone Age, which evolved to occur later on what is known as the agricultural revolution. Syria, along with Mesopotamia and Egypt, constitutes one of the most important archaeological areas in which the oldest civilizations in the world are concentrated. Therefore, since the beginning of the twentieth century, archaeological excavations, researchers in history, archaeological excavations and archaeologists in various regions of Syria from the Mediterranean coast intensify. For almost 4 years and half Syria has been witnessing painful events that have negatively affected the details of the lives off all Syrians as well as all sectors including the archaeological sectors for example a lot of old Syrian cites have been subject to damage and destruction and many castles as well many archaeological buildings that are significant. Not only the history of Syria but also the history of mankind have been affected as well. In addition, many of the archaeological site have been subject to serious violation and fierce excavation some of wish where carried out in systematic fashion by armed Ganges of antiquities due to the absence of the concerned governmental institutions and the archaeological authorities in many part of Syria that contains an exceptional cultural heritage and relics of ancient world civilizations, which appear in cities The current state of the country's cultural heritage raises serious concerns: many among the historical and archaeological sites, among them are the World Heritage Sites and the Heritage Guidance List World class, it has been affected by violent clashes or occupation by armed groups, where it was reported. He reported numerous acts of looting of ancient sites and museums. In this chapter, we will present the latest events involving the destruction of heritage in Syria, based on the assumption that the world heritage is definitively lost with the end of heritage in Syria.

Keywords Syria · Gangs of antiquities · Looters · ISIS · Soft power

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This chapter investigates the transformation of the terminology of heritage—and the uses of heritage—in Syria before and during the ongoing conflict, and how the internationally renowned term ‘heritage’ emerged to promote the destruction of Syria’s cultural patrimony. This chapter explores the semantics and impacts of the continuous destruction and the ongoing reconstruction plans on the cultural heritage of Syria. To conclude, I argue that those destructive actions started a process of ‘heritagizing’ the present which will eventually become a part of the Syrian collective memory. Threats of destruction of Syria’s cultural heritage emerged at the beginning of the revolutionary movements, or the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ in the MENA region, which started in 2010 in Tunisia and Libya, and ended in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. The destruction of archaeological sites in Syria differs from one site to another, as does the level of damage. Syria has six cultural heritage sites on the UNESCO World Heritage List: the ancient city of Damascus, the ancient city of Bosra, Palmyra, the ancient city of Aleppo, Crac des Chevaliers and Qal’at Salah El-Din, and the ancient villages of northern Syria.⁵³ In 2013, the World Heritage Committee (WHC) decided to place Syria’s six World Heritage Sites on its danger list.

Syria contains an exceptional cultural heritage and relics of ancient civilizations of the world, which appear through cities historic sites, monuments and museums. The current state of the country’s cultural heritage raises serious concerns: many among the historical and archaeological sites, among them are World Heritage Sites and sites on the Heritage Guidance List World class, has been affected by violent clashes or occupation by armed groups, where it was reported numerous acts of looting of ancient sites and museums.

The value and importance of cultural heritage as a human Syria constitutes one of the most important regions of the Middle East. It occupies the greater part of the western flank of the Fertile Crescent and the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. The beginnings of settlement there go back to the first periods of human settlement in the pre-Pottery Stone Age. Which evolved to occur later on what is known as the agricultural revolution. Syria, along with Mesopotamia and Egypt, constitutes one of the most important archaeological areas in which the oldest civilizations in the world are concentrated. Therefore, since the beginning of the twentieth century, archaeological excavations, researchers in history, archaeological excavations and archaeologists in various regions of Syria from the Mediterranean coast intensify.

During the third and second millennium BC, many civilizations emerged in Syria: the Canaanites, the Amorites, the Phoenicians and the Arameans. The Canaanites ruled most of the Syrian regions, while the Phoenicians settled along the Third: Damage to archaeological sites in Syrian coast, establishing a maritime empire in the western region of Syria, and the Aramean kingdoms extended in most parts of the Syrian country.

In different periods of time, the Syrian land included the Sumerians, the Assyrians, the Babylonians, the Akkadians, the Greeks, and the Hittites. Thus, the Syrian cities under the rule of the Romans, which appeared in the era of the Romans rule over



Fig. 15.1 Map of destruction. 2010

Syria, became one of the most important cities of the Roman Empire and then the Byzantines (Fig. 15.1).

15.1 Reasons for Encroaching and Vandalizing Antiquities

The causes of encroachments on antiquities can be classified into five categories:

First: the financial motive that can be satisfied by selling antiquities, and that is in areas that are not under the control of the state. The areas rich in antiquities, which are many, have been extensively excavated in order to obtain archaeological finds that can be sold in the global market, which has become popular in recent years. This motive can be considered the most popular reason, given the encouragement of antiquities dealers in Syria, to excavate antiquities for small rewards, and then smuggle them out of the country to the international market, where they are sold for large sums. It is worth noting that this kind of encroachment is not of a large scale, rather it is done only with the aim of obtaining the finds, and the aim is not to add: it

includes destroying monuments or destroying structures. Thus, it can be considered less harmful than others, but it is the most popular.

Second: The religious motive behind what extremist religious organizations have pursued, such as: adding: the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra and others, which are forbidden according to their methodology and others, who forbid according to their mythological methodology the presence of ancient statues and monuments because, according to their claim, they are not Islam has a connection, and that is why it must be removed, destroyed, and this kind is the worst. However, it should not be considered that the goal of ISIS, for example, is to destroy antiquities only from a religious point of view, but also to secretly excavate for antiquities and then smuggle them out of the country and sell them on the global market at high prices, in order to finance its workers. his military actions; Note: The context when talking about ISIS requires mentioning, because what is meant is ISIS. (Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums—Syria: ‘The reality of the Syrian antiquities from the beginning of the crisis until January 21, 2013a’).

Third: Organized groups, funded by neighbouring countries, to carry out excavations in certain specific areas, in order to obtain predetermined results, or for reasons we still do not know, but they aim within their general framework to reveal certain information, and try to hide or reveal it. According to the required purposes of forgery and distortion, this represents the most dangerous motives, especially since it aims to formulate a history according to archaeological discoveries that we do not know how and where they were made. This actually happened at the site of Mari, as far as we know, when a group of about 200 people attended, surrounded the site, and then started searching and excavating for days, according to the information received from the local community sources there, which showed that these groups included foreigners and Turks who managed the operations very discreetly, and no one was able to know anything about them.

Fourth: Some archaeological sites were damaged in the areas of clashes, especially the eternal ‘mortals’ of them, as the armed groups resorted to using ancient archaeological buildings in addition: in cities, such as: Aleppo, Daraa, and Homs and castles, such as: Al-Husn, Aleppo and Salah Al-Din, as shelters for them, and when trying to evacuate these areas and re-control them by the army, they were exposed to some dangers, and the armed groups blew up and destroyed for mosque minarets or towers in castles.

Fifth: The locals in remote areas, from the centre, used the ancient stones of the ruins, in order to build new houses, and this led to the demolition of some parts in order to use them again, and they also built illegal and random housing in archaeological areas that the laws did not allow for construction in it, which caused the destruction of archaeological sites.

15.2 Damage to Archaeological Sites in Syria

Encroachments on some archaeological sites began with the beginning of the crisis in Syria in 2011, in areas where the central authority was absent. These encroachments increased steadily, for reasons mentioned, with the intensification of severity. The crisis, to the extent that great damage afflicted some buildings in the areas of clashes, especially in the city of Aleppo. It seems that the inventory of the areas of damage is not fixed, but it always needs to be updated in order to keep pace with what is happening on the ground, and perhaps what is happening.

What we are writing now, what this study documents will not be the last of the damages, but we hope that this research will constitute, therefore, in the horizon of this research, it is necessary to establish a stable and integrated work base that is valid for any subsequent work or other future data for almost 10 years and half Syria has been witnessing painful events that have negatively affected the details of the lives off all Syrians as well as all sectors including the archaeological sectors for example a lot of old Syrian cites have been subject to damage and destruction and many castles as well many archaeological buildings that are significant. Not only the history of Syria but also the history of mankind have been affected as well. In addition, many of the archaeological sites have been subject to serious violation and fierce excavation some of wish where carried out in systematic fashion by armed Ganges of antiquities due to the absence of the concerned governmental institutions and the archaeological authorities in many part of Syria.

Archaeological sites in Syria, especially at the sites of clashes and at sites out of control, have been subjected to varying damages, and we can talk about them extensively as follows.

1. Palmyra

After the calm and peace that the city of Palmyra lived in, which made it attract many people from the neighbouring governorates that did not live in a good security situation, an armed group of the terrorist organization ISIS entered the city and wreaked havoc on it, and the destruction affected most of the Palmyra archaeological heritage. Sources from the local community in Palmyra confirmed the news of ISIS destroying the statue of the Lion of Al-Lat located at the entrance to the museum within the garden, after it previously adorned the entrance to the temple, which is It is made of soft limestone and is seen from the front, resting on its two legs, with the mouth open. The statue was discovered in 1977 by the Polish mission, and it was restored and displayed in the museum. Its height is 3.5 m, and it is considered one of the achievements of the first century BC. It has no equal in the world.

ISIS also recently blew up the Baalshamin Temple, dedicated to the worship of the god of heaven, whose foundation dates back to the first century AD. And he also smashed three one of the most important tower tombs in the city, by blowing it up with explosive materials, and completely destroying it. It is worth mentioning that these tower tombs are unique in terms of perfection and precision of manufacture, and they were a major reference for the study of architecture and funerary arts in the classical

period in the ancient Arab East. And in the vicinity of the city of Palmyra, ISIS blew up two religious shrines in the city of Palmyra, as the news received from the people of Palmyra showed that the gunmen affiliated with the terrorist organization blew up the shrine of one of the 'lords' whose lineage goes back to Imam Ali bin Abi Talib, and his name is: Muhammad bin Ali. This shrine is located in a mountainous area, four kilometres north of Palmyra (Ammar 2005, 76).

The organization also blew up the shrine of 'Shakaf', known as: 'Nizar Abu Bahaa al-Din', and it dates back to about 500 years. This monument is located in an oasis in the city, 500 m from the Arc de Triomphe as for the execution of the former director of the Department of Antiquities of Palmyra, Khaled al-Asaad, and his crucifixion on a pillar in the city, under the pretext that he managed and preserved these antiquities, it remains the most painful event, as the killers emphasize the clarity of their message of killing and destruction. (Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums—Syria: 'Pictures: Report on the Overall Damage to the Dura-Europos Site. 2013d').

2. Maarat al-Numan

The Maarat Museum (Khan Murad Pasha) was severely damaged as a result of a strong explosion as a result of the clashes that have been taking place in the area for a while, as the pictures show severe damage to the hospice building and the mosque that mediates the courtyard of the Ottoman Khan, which dates back to the sixteenth century. It is worth mentioning that this khan includes a group of unique mosaic paintings in the world, and there is no accurate information about the paintings yet due to the fact that the museum was in the hands of armed groups.

3. Idlib

The situation in them being deleted now that most parts of Idlib are out of the control of the Syrian state?! The Department of Antiquities in Idlib tried to communicate with the local community there to spread awareness to mitigate potential damage to archaeological sites, and it succeeded to a large extent at the beginning of the crisis, but after the crisis took on real militarization dimensions, and the entry and entry of many armed strangers to the region, it did not return. These contacts with the local community have no effect, as limited excavations have been observed in the 'Kafr Aqab' site in Jabal Al-Wastani, and in Jabal Al-Ala in rural Idlib, where the 'Qalb Lozeh' church, registered on the UNESCO World Heritage List in 2011, is located in the file of archaeological villages in northern Syria. Syria, where damages were detected in the 'Qalb Lozeh' church, caused by secret excavations and damage to the stone facades as a result of the clashes.

4. Hama

Shaizar Castle is located 30 km northwest of the city of Hama. The castle was built on a rocky massif bordering the Orontes River from the west. The construction of the castle dates back to the Seleucid period at the end of the fourth century BC. It moved to the Romans, then the Byzantines, and the Arabs conquered it in the 17th year of the Hijra. This castle was severely damaged as a result of armed clashes, which led

to the loosening of the stones of the northern façade of the main gate tower in the ancient Shayzar Castle, as well as its defensive wall, in addition to smashing parts of the Arabic writings above the entrance, which date back to the Mamluk era.

15.3 Apamea

The ancient Syrian city, in the middle of the Al-Ghab Plain, 55 km northwest of the city of Hama. Next to it is an ancient fort that bears its name. Today, it is known as 'Al-Madiq Castle'. This city was founded by King Seleucus I Nicator. In the year 300 BC., the city has maintained its prosperity and military status throughout its long history, which extends for nine centuries, as it was the base of the Seleucid armies, and many incidents of the Roman civil wars took place there, and it played an important role in the Persian-Roman wars. This site, unique in its architecture and importance, during the classical era, was subjected to acts of vandalism and theft that affected the bulk of the ancient city, as thieves dug antiquities randomly throughout the city and at varying depths. The images and information provided confirm the accuracy and validity of the satellite images that were published on the website of the General Directorate of Antiquities. And museums, and in many international sites, so that the situation developed and aggravated later, and excavations became carried out using heavy machinery, as in the tombs outside the walls of the city walls, and inside the city, especially in the eastern section and the main street (Akkermans 2003, 89).

15.4 Krak Des Chevaliers Homs

During the crisis, this castle suffered damage to some of its parts, when armed groups tried to control it, to be a fortified refuge near the Lebanese border, but their attempt failed, and the Syrian army soon restored it.

5. Aleppo

The armed groups tried to control the famous Aleppo Citadel, and they pelted it with various shells that caused limited damage to the external body of the Citadel or some of the internal internal buildings, and when we did not succeed in controlling it, they tried to dig tunnels in order to detonate it, and this is what led to the collapse of part of the defensive wall In the northeastern part of the castle. The Citadel of Simeon, registered on the UNESCO World Heritage List, within the archaeological villages file in northern Syria, is one of the most important sites in the Aleppo countryside. In it, the gunmen built rooms inside the castle wall near and outside the cafeteria, and they also vandalized the old main entrance to the castle, known as the 'Arc de Triomphe', and dug holes in it, and some people broke large ancient stones and



Fig. 15.2 Byzantine cities in northwestern Syria, fourth century AD. Photo Yann Arthus Bertrand. Access free. 2010

turned them into building stones for shops, in addition to the presence of a severe vandalism that took place In this area, the ancient walls of the ancient buildings were bulldozed, in order to expand the area of shops and kiosks that appeared in the area. The Department of Antiquities also documented minor damage to the northern façade of the Baptist Church as a result of the clashes (Fig. 15.2, 15.3, 15.4 and 15.5).

15.5 Museums in the Light of the Crisis

Some museums in Syria were subjected to attacks and vandalism, which were the most dangerous of their kind, because museums are the main repository for all archaeological finds. The Raqqa Museum was the first of the museums to be attacked, and the General Directorate had evacuated most of the artefacts and deposited three boxes in the Real Estate Bank, which are what the militants got after they took control of Raqqa. The militants' control of Hercules also had a great impact, as most of Hercules' remains were smuggled in an organized manner to Turkey.

In Deir Attia, the museum was controlled for a short period, and the museum in "Deir Attia" was controlled for a short time. It was enough to steal many pieces of Heritage, as the museum is mainly of the type of heritage museums of popular traditions. Fortunately, the army was able to quickly restore the museum. The status




Fig. 15.3 Byzantine cities in northwestern Syria, fourth century AD. Photo Yann Arthus Bertrand. Access free. 2010

of the Idlib Museum remains the most mysterious, and the extent of the losses is not known. This museum included all the archives of the archaeological site of ‘Ebla’, including texts and clay figures that number several thousand thousands. According to the statements of the Directorate and the Idlib Antiquities Department, most of the archives have been transferred to a safe place, but since Idlib is still under the control of Jabhat al-Nusra, the exact size of the losses and missing persons cannot be known (Abou Assaf 2000, 67).

Here, it must be noted that armed organizations of all kinds, especially ISIS, seek to trade in antiquities and control museums, whose antiquities can be transported outside the country with the help of Turkey and Jordan, and then sold to be sold in the international market to invest money again. In financing armed terrorist operations inside Syria. Italy was the first European country to participate in this trade, and then Germany, as the city of Munich—according to what was reported by the German TV itself—is a central market in the trafficking of archaeological finds smuggled from Syria and Iraq. And you pay high sums of money to buy it.

Heritage embodies the genius of a people and constitutes a link of the cultural and civilizational development of the human being, and what confirms this importance is that the loss or loss of any impact constitutes a great loss that does not compensate



Fig. 15.4 Palmyra—Before and After. Photo Yann Arthus Bertrand. Access free 2010



Fig. 15.5 Palmyra—Before and After. Photo Yann Arthus Bertrand. Access free 2010

not only to the state that has the impact but to humanity as a whole, because the heritage of any country is a link in a continuous series of episodes of the human story since it appeared on the surface of the earth until now.

Today, Syria has become a victim of the plundering of its cultural heritage, which has increased in severity during the current crisis the country is going through, not only stolen from wonderful possessions that cannot be dispensed with, but it has also been stolen by memory that helps us to gain more self-knowledge and plays an important role in understanding others in a way that we better. The unlawful plunder and smuggling of its cultural property is a common practice that primarily affected our archaeological sites.

Since the beginning of the armed conflicts and public uprisings that accompanied and followed the 'Arab Spring' that started in 2010, cultural heritage sites have been hit hard, damaged and often destroyed by different perpetrators. The Syrian Civil War has resulted in unprecedented damage to cultural heritage sites, monuments, and facilities. This has provoked observers, politicians, and international and national non-government organizations to debate about the impacts of damaging Syria's 'irreplaceable' patrimony and how to safeguard its past from the ongoing destructive actions.

15.6 The Importance of Research

The locus importance of research has been home to some of the most ancient civilizations on earth, which have left us exceptional objects, important texts and buildings and the remains of villages and cities as a priceless archaeological heritages. Its land contain some of the richest, most diverse and most numerous archaeological sites in the middle east. This extraordinary richness is very sadly at stake today because of the war that has raged in the country from more than 8 years. Archaeological sites in Syria have been and are now suffering from serious damage and gross violations old Syrian cities castles and other buildings have been subjected to damage and destruction. These monuments are significant in the history of Syria but also in the history of the human civilization. I investigate the arguments and statements of scholars, institutes and nongovernmental bodies on the semantics and impacts of the continuous destruction of heritage on Syrian identity and collective memory (Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums—Syria: 'After the Entry of ISIS: Palmyra is in Danger', Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums—Syria 2013b).

All of these statements and international responses have triggered a significant debate: do not all cultural heritage sites and monuments, whether they be Greek, Roman, or Islamic, contribute to the construction of Syria's identity and memory? If so, why are we currently witnessing an increasing European interest in protecting and reconstructing what radical actors have already destroyed? In particular, this interest has tended to focus on Roman period remains in Syria, such as the replica project

of Palmyra's Arch of Triumph, which was conducted by the Oxford-based Institute for Digital Archaeology in collaboration with the Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums (DGAM) of Syria's government (Balty 1984, 34).

I take a different approach, arguing that heritage is in a constant process of transformation and change over time. When seen in this way, the destruction and loss of heritage sites is not endangering Syria's heritage—it may, in fact, be seen as creating the future heritage of post-war Syria. In my view, the recent intentionally destructive actions have started a process of 'heritagizing' the present, which will eventually itself become part of the Syrian collective memory. This process has the capacity to make a strong contribution to the rebuilding of national identity in the aftermath of the war it is perhaps useful to look at the destruction of heritage in recent years in order to understand Syria's contemporary history. The war has endangered not only the well-being of Syrians and their multi-ethno-religious identities, but it has also inscribed new episodes of terror and destruction in the collective memory of Syrian people.

Heritage is a powerful tool that can play a key role in the politics of the contemporary world, as it is connected to power, politics, identity, belonging, economy. In 2016, Daesh forces had reoccupied the World Heritage Site of Palmyra. The next day, Daesh issued a video and images showing their jihadists walking around and in front of the National Museum of Palmyra, showing signs on Palmyra's walls, written in Russian, Arabic, Persian and English. Two months later, Daesh levelled parts of the Tetracylon monument and damaged Palmyra's Roman theatre, there in the past few years. The Roman site of Palmyra had to pay the price of liberation and lost many monumental buildings that had enriched the diversity of Syria's cultural identity and collective memory. The liberation of Palmyra ushered in a new era of heritage destruction in human history, which uncovered and simultaneously questioned the objectivity of Western media reports. These focused on the destruction of the Roman heritage in Syria, particularly in Palmyra, until Daesh withdrew in March 2017. Pollock argues that the destruction of cultural heritage has become one of the main goals of wars rather than just a side effect of conflict. The ruination and devastation of material remnants, identities and memories are damaged or completely obliterated in these intense conditions.

Many heritage conventions and legislation state that endangered heritage sites should be preserved for the benefit of future generations. On the other hand, it argues that 'heritage at risk' is not, in fact, at risk at all. She adds that the value of risk is formative for heritage, and in the assessment of heritage value, risk value tends not to be addressed. This tendency has created a one-way understanding of 'heritage at risk', which is mainly aimed at preventing heritage from loss and decay and stopping the of the Tetracylon monument and damaged Palmyra's Roman theatre. Nature of our ecosystem Holtorf suggests that heritage at risk has the ability to evoke the future and, consequently, colonize it, which is based on the idea that the future is a form of unchanging present: what has been destroyed is to be rebuilt. Furthermore, the increasing concerns about the preservation of heritage at risk has served as a justification to expand the horizon of heritage expertise, in order to bring about new techniques, tools, and methods to rebuild what has been endangered or destroyed.

The destruction of monuments, including those considered to be material representations of a nation's identity, does not inevitably mean the end of the lifecycle of those monuments. Rebuilding cultural heritage in the aftermath of war should not be taken for granted, and the focus should first be on the semantics and motives of the destruction—that is, how and why these heritage sites and monuments were built and later damaged, and what reasons lay behind the targeting of historic cities by state or non-state actors. (Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums—Syria: 'In Pictures: ISIS Blows Up Religious Shrines in Palmyra', 2013c).

15.7 Measures Taken

Following this review of the present situation of the archaeological heritage of Syria which is subject to constant change, we would like to provide a brief summary concerning the measures that have been taken in order to reduce the risk and the damage as much as possible.

Local measures

1. The museums were emptied of their objects and all artefacts were stored in safe and secure places.
2. The DGAM has taken a series of steps to involve all Syrians in defending the archaeological and the architectural heritage that represents their shared history and common memory.
3. Launched a national campaign to raise people's awareness of the importance of this heritage and their role in protecting it irrespective of any political or intellectual differences that many divide them today.
4. The department of antiquities has launched its website both in Arabic as well in English using information and news concerning the damage inflicted on Syria's archaeology heritage during the crisis.

International measures

1. The department of antiquities is currently coordinating with Interpol and providing reports on what has been lost and what has been found in the neighbouring countries or even published such as photos believed to be of Syrian archaeological objects which thieves have obtained through illegal excavation at remote sites.
2. The department of antiquities is cooperating with international organizations in the exchange of ideas and information.
3. The department of antiquities has called upon UNESCO to address the damages affecting Syria's archaeological sites and to urge the neighbouring countries to prohibit illicit trafficking of archaeological heritage.

15.8 Requirements What Must be Done Urgently

1. support the efforts of the archaeological authorities towards issuing an international resolution by the unsecurity council that bans illicit trafficking of Syria cultural property.
2. put pressure on neighbouring countries to control their borders and close them against thieves and smugglers.
3. the guards of the archaeological sites must be paid of their service for the protect the archaeological sites.
4. provision of satellite images and data is necessary international organization and foreign missions can help the department of antiquates by activating exchange of information and providing the directorate through modern technology with satellite images and data and archaeological sites that have been damaged.
5. the department of antiquates upon UNESCO and the organization concerned with preserving world archaeological heritage to consider the safeguarding of Syria cultural heritage as top priority in the post crisis period and to resume the implementation of the resolutions of UNESCO workshop.
6. commitment to the establishment of a fund to save Syria sites and the monument that on the world heritage list in order to enable implementation of the tasks identified in the plan of the action over the short term.

15.9 Conclusion

The value and importance of cultural heritage as a human heritage personifies the genius of a people and constitutes a link in the cultural and civilizational development of the human being, and what confirms this importance is that the loss or loss of any impact constitutes a great loss that it doesn't just pay off the state that makes the impact, but humanity as a whole, because the heritage of any country is a link. In a continuous series of episodes in human history since it appeared on the earth's surface until now Syria contains an exceptional cultural heritage and relics of ancient civilizations in the world, which appear in cities.

Historic sites, monuments and museums. The current state of the country's cultural heritage raises serious concerns: many among the historical and archaeological sites, among them are the World Heritage Sites and the Heritage Guidance List.

The value and importance of cultural heritage as a human heritage personifies the genius of a people and constitutes a link in the cultural and civilizational development of the human being, and what confirms this importance is that the loss or loss of any impact constitutes a great loss that it does not just pay off the state that makes the impact, but humanity as a whole, because the heritage of any country is a link. In an ongoing series of episodes in human history from the time it appeared on the earth's surface until now. (UNESCO Conference from 3 to 4 May 2016, in Berlin for Emergency Safeguarding of Syria's Cultural Heritage).

The Syrian crisis has cast a shadow over many aspects of life, and cultural heritage was one of them. With the prolongation of the crisis, which is now in its sixth year, the Syrian heritage and antiquities have entered a real danger, the effects of which may not be avoided later. Although what was discussed and analysed in the previous pages is not a small one, but rather a great danger, if the dangers are not avoided, the results will be greater and deeper. There must be real international cohesion to prevent this blatant assault on the antiquities in Syria and to neutralize them from any form of conflict on the ground, because the responsibility of the Syrian heritage is a global issue par excellence and no one has the right to manipulate or neglect it.

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Chapter 16

Two Sides of the Same Coin: Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Goods and Repatriation Toward a New Relational Ethics



Rodrigo Christofolletti

Abstract Various official memorandums have signaled for at least three decades the concern of the general directorates of UNESCO with the volume that the traffic of cultural goods and works of art has been reaching around the world. This type of international trafficking has grown aggressively thanks to its high financial return and the lack of specific legislation in several countries, which facilitates its rooting process. Cultural heritage has been squandered by a multi-million dollar trafficking system, and documents from international organizations estimate that the trafficking of art and heritage is at the top of the list of the biggest traffics in the world, second only to the smuggling of drugs, tools and human beings (UNESCO in The fight against the illicit trafficking of cultural objects: the 1970 convention: past and future, UNESCO, Paris, 2011). Covering numerous activities, ranging from the export of cultural goods by their legitimate owners, without proper authorization, to the specialized trade of stolen objects, including the appropriation and sale of works of art unknown to the authorities, this modality has caused concern to the public. All states, both dispossessed and recipients, have suffered from the theft and illicit trafficking of cultural heritage. Although the trafficking of cultural goods has gained space in academic texts, alongside other types of trafficking, there is no exact legal definition of the acts that this term penalizes. The broad definition of trafficking can be considered as any movement, transport, import, export, maintenance or trade in cultural property carried out in violation of the rules governing the possession or movement of such property or its status. The systemic and very well-articulated gear that characterizes the scheme of trafficking in cultural goods ranges from the theft of museums, monuments, religious, archaeological/paleontological sites and other private and public

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preservation spaces; illicit excavations (including underwater); subtraction of artifacts and works of art during armed conflicts and military occupations; illicit export and import of artifacts; illegal transfer of ownership of various cultural assets; production, exchange and use of falsified documentation; even the trafficking of authentic or counterfeit cultural goods. This entire list of actions has been fought in recent decades, a factor that contributes to increasing the visibility of endangered cultural assets across the planet.

Keywords Illicit trafficking in cultural goods · Repatriation · Historical repair · Soft power · UNESCO

Former UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova and directors of safeguard agencies discussed ways to strengthen the fight against illicit trafficking in works of art and cultural goods. Convened a video conference at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris, with the Interpol Administration of Unidroit, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNO-DC) and the World Customs Organization (WCO) for effective implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, nos. 2199 and 2253/2015, relating to the fight against illicit trafficking in cultural goods. [...] All agencies must integrate a control panel against illicit trafficking in cultural goods in their respective states. [...] We insist that it is particularly important to verify the origin of cultural property that can be imported, exported or offered for sale, especially on the internet, as websites specialized in this sales practice have multiplied in recent years. It is critical that collectors and dealers collaborate in the effort to rescue the pieces, as well as customs agents, art dealers, collectors and local populations, to do everything possible to recover priceless pieces.¹

(Bokova 2016)

The official memorandum described as the epigraph signals the concern of the former UNESCO Director-General about the volume that the traffic of cultural goods and works of art reached around the world. Half a decade later, this type of international trafficking has grown aggressively thanks to its great financial return and the lack of specific legislation in several countries, which facilitates its rooting process. Cultural heritage has been squandered by a multimillion-dollar trafficking system, and documents from international organizations estimate that the trafficking of art and heritage is at the top of the list of the largest trafficking in the world, second only to the smuggling of drugs, tools, and human beings (UNESCO 2011). Encompassing numerous activities, ranging from the exportation of cultural goods by their legitimate owners, without the necessary authorization, to the specialized trade in stolen objects, including the appropriation and commercialization of works of art unknown to the authorities, this modality has caused concern to the public. States, both the dispossessed and the recipients, are directly affected by the theft and illicit trafficking of cultural heritage.

Although trafficking in cultural goods has gained space in academic texts, alongside other types of trafficking, there is no exact legal definition of the acts that this

¹ Taken from Losekann (2011), UNESCO will work with international partners to rescue stolen museum pieces in Egypt.

term penalizes. The broad definition of trafficking can be considered as any movement, transport, import, export, maintenance or trade in cultural goods carried out in violation of the rules governing the possession or movement of such goods or their status. The systemic and very well-articulated gear, which characterizes the scheme of trafficking in cultural goods, ranges from theft of museums, monuments, religious, archeological/paleontological sites and other private and public spaces of preservation; illicit excavations (including underwater); subtraction of artifacts and works of art during armed conflicts and military occupations; illicit export and import of artifacts; illegal transfer of ownership of diverse cultural goods; production, exchange and use of falsified documentation; and the trafficking of authentic or counterfeit cultural goods. This entire list of actions has been fought in recent decades, a factor that helps to increase the visibility of endangered cultural assets around the planet.

Combating attacks on archaeological, historical and artistic riches requires international cooperation, both in preventing infringements and in ensuring the restitution of stolen goods. This work aims to address this type of illicit trafficking, suggesting that the international route of trafficking in works of art has in our country one of the least studied points of capillarity. Understanding this missive helps to understand how the illicit trafficking of cultural goods and works of art is now the third most important in financial volume in the world, moving more than 6 billion dollars in the last decade, according to the FBI, Interpol and UNESCO. In this sense, the policy of repatriation of trafficked goods poses a challenge to contemporary States, a factor that makes the study of this theme relevant.²

UNESCO Deputy Director-General for Culture Ernesto Ottone R. says that while illicit trafficking must indeed be tackled at source, we must also act on demand. "Potential buyers need to be aware of the devastating effects of this traffic. They must be aware that buying a looted object means running the risk of participating directly or indirectly in money laundering and financing of criminal and terrorist organizations." (Ottone 2022) At a global level, efforts have been made to find common procedures to combat trafficking in works of art and cultural goods. UNESCO's Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, of 1970, already proposed the elaboration and application of policies and strategies for the preservation and enhancement of cultural heritage and combating illicit trafficking in cultural goods and services. Signed by more than 80 countries, the declaration has not been complied with by some of the countries considered to be target markets for illicitly trafficked works of art. Also, within the framework of the United Nations, the Convention of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (Unidroit, International Institute

² This text dialogues with journalistic reports compiled over the last decade on blogs, websites, major newspapers and what is most contemporary in the literature and historiography on the subject. Cf: Alford (1994), Askerud and Clement (1999), Felician (1997), Felch and Frammolino (2011), International Council of Museums (1996), Johnston (1993), La Follette (2013); Manacord and Chappell (2011), Merryman (2006), Miles (2008), Nicholas (1996), Watson and Todeschini (2007), Waxman (2011) and Mackenzie et al. (2020), as well as a list of reports, books, and sources mentioned at the end of the text.

for the Unification of Private Law) was signed in 1995, and deals with the recovery of stolen cultural works. In addition to Interpol and UNESCO, the World Customs Organization (WCO), the International Council of Museums (ICOM) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are responsible for combating trafficking.

In reality, it is difficult to specify the depth of the depredation of this type of trafficking. One of the reasons that make it difficult to quantify illegal activities is that the value of cultural goods is not the same in the country of origin and in the country of destination. On the other hand, part of the robberies is not reported, since the purchases were made without tax returns. It is also impossible to quantify the damage caused by objects taken from clandestine archaeological excavations. According to Interpol, the countries most affected by the thefts are Germany, France, Italy, England, and Russia. Interesting inversion, if we consider that it was these same nations that over the last three centuries became the main responsible for the misappropriation of cultural goods and works of art around the world. See your museums. It is estimated that private individuals are the target of the highest number of robberies, followed by museums, archaeological sites, and places of worship. Official sources claim that paintings, sculptures, statues, and religious objects are among the most trafficked artifacts.

16.1 Conventions and Mechanisms Created to Defend Heritage

With the end of the Second World War, after accounting for losses and damages that were often irreparable to the world's cultural heritage, the need to create means of protecting cultural heritage was identified. Thus, in 1954, 45 countries came together at the Hague Conference to create the first international normative instrument for the protection of heritage. The convention was divided into 40 articles, and seven chapters, which entered into force on August 7, 1956. Important articles throughout the convention's text allude to the development of trafficking in cultural property. Analyzing the Hague Convention, it is clear that this resolution has become a decisive instrument for the protection of heritage worldwide.

It is extremely important for the protection of heritage in times of war to understand that all parties that sponsor the safeguarding and respect for heritage—at least 45 countries—are pledging not to accept looting and stealing of heritage, as occurred on the Second World War. The text of the convention also values all the work created through the *Monuments Men*,³ since, from article 25, it describes that, in times of peace or war, contracting members are obliged to present studies on the preservation

³ *Monuments Men* was an American battle elite for a series of historians and masterpieces that had a cultural mission to save heritage and monuments that Axis troops were stealing and destroying. Such works were supposed to be part of a museum that would be created by Adolf Hitler, nicknamed: the greatest of all time. The *Monuments Men* rated and repatriated the thousands of works. For more information, see Edsel (2011).

of heritage to their army, which would greatly facilitate the work of soldiers, and could, in theory, speed up the process of obtaining and saving goods in danger (Edsel 2011, p. 98).

Among the signatories of the Hague Convention, who did *not* complete the accession, the following stand out: Denmark, Japan, England, and the United States, since, although protagonists of the Second World War, they started to follow their own guidelines regarding safeguard in periods of armed conflict. The Convention created a protocol dedicated to disciplining the illegal export of cultural goods, ratified by 82 countries. In Brazil, Decree No. 44851, which emphasizes the importance of Brazil's participation as a signatory to the Convention, was promulgated on November 11, 1958, by President Juscelino Kubitschek.

After the Hague Convention, there was a growing increase in preservationist practice and in international conventions and agreements aimed at protecting endangered heritage. Despite the agreements, there were several examples of looting, theft, and illicit trafficking of works of art around the world. This discrepancy encouraged UNESCO to recognize the importance of safeguard mechanisms, of which we highlight the Convention on Measures to be Adopted to Prohibit and Prevent the Illicit Import, Export, Transport and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property; the Unidroit Convention on Theft or Illegal Export of Cultural Property and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). These international manifestations of safeguarding would have, in Brazil, a slow and gradual resonance, so that the traffic in works of art and heritage constituted a major problem of foreign exchange evasion, the content of which was only made explicit recently, in the last two decades.

The international traffic of cultural goods and works of art moves approximately 6 billion dollars a year, according to official sources. All countries seek to improve their legislation to make this type of transnational crime more difficult.⁴ Currently, in this scenario, France has established itself as the country with the most progressive legislation on the subject. In addition, the repatriation process has been effectively developing all over the world, with the direct intervention of Interpol and its counterparts, whose websites provide public access to a database with several works that were stolen or found, but which have no owners, and also works that have been stolen and returned to their respective original owners. In this way, Interpol enables public knowledge of these works, which facilitates their recognition, as well as international competence in repressing trafficking.

Some countries have groups linked to the government to search for and promote works of art, such as Colombia, with the National Campaign Against Illicit Traffic, Argentina, which has a sector in its Department of Culture called *Trafico Illicito*, and one of the most structured, the Italian example, called *Comando Carabinieri*, a group that has as one of its functions the fight against trafficking in works of art.

⁴ To learn more, see: CECOJI-CNRS-UMR 6224. Study on preventing and fighting illicit trafficking in cultural goods in the European Union. Final Report, Oct. 2011. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/Report%20Trafficking%20in%20cultural%20goods%20EN.pdf. Accessed on: 1st March 2022.

In Africa, the looting of artistic and cultural goods forced the creation of Africom, an organization of museums from different countries, whose objective is explicitly protective. In this continent, works of art, archaeological pieces and artifacts are particularly threatened, forcing ICOM to constitute the *List Rouge Afrique* (African Red List—allusion to the list of lost or endangered goods on the continent). This list includes terracotta, bronzes, stone figurines and clay artifacts from Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Chad. According to recent information from the Angola Press agency (ANGOP), it has already been possible to recover important works and goods.

One of the main differences between the trafficking of works of art and the rest of the trafficking actions is the issue that, for this type of criminal action, a great historical and cultural knowledge is needed. The fact that the traffic in works of art/heritage deals with the essentially cultural issue promotes the entry of different associations fighting crime, as well as individuals, who create means of propagating information about trafficked works. But it is not just illicit trafficking that makes up the black market for cultural goods. The internet itself is configured today as an expanding space for this practice.

At the other end of the equation, there are several types of databases on cultural assets.⁵ While all are used as information channels for the prevention of trafficking in general, others are more specifically for combating trafficking in cultural goods. First, it must be stated that there is a wide range of databases, both public and private, that identify and list the cultural assets of a State, a community, a museum, and so on, as well as databases with stocks of products of a particular species. There are also some databases on “national treasures” or, more broadly, cultural properties, classified as “under protection”, being listed, for example, as part of a list of assets at risk. All these databases interest us, insofar as they can identify the good that has restrictions. They are, therefore, tools for the knowledge of goods.

We highlight the Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD), an institution created in 1916 by 12 American museum directors, with the aim of bringing information together and creating a type of judicial protection for its members. It currently comprises 242 members from the United States, Mexico and Canada and is growing year after year. Its ethics statute aims to provide its members with information about culture, exhibitions, innovations in the field of works of art and, above all, count on the support of its members in the fight against the illicit trafficking of works of art.

Another prestigious institution is the Anonymous Swiss Collector, which maintains a blog created by Donna Yates, an important specialist in the field, with the aim of bringing weekly news about the world’s cultural heritage to its followers, such as information about missing works, antiquities recovered or found, criminals wanted by Interpol, dissemination of black and red lists of similar institutions, etc. Similar to

⁵ The Italian database, named: “Leonardo”, contains information on more than 3.4 million items and more than 400 thousand images. It is the largest European database. The police have direct access, and art dealers and sales rooms have indirect one, upon request. The “Leonardo” database of the Italian art protection squad can be accessed at: http://tpcweb.carabinieri.it/tpc_sito_pub/simpecerca.jsp.

Anonymous, Trafficking Culture maintains a highly accessible and extremely important page for cultural goods, as it promotes research programs funded by European Research Councils, whose purpose is to present evidence of the contemporary global trade in looted cultural goods.

Over the years, various organizations have been created with the aim of bringing together advocates of works of art from around the world and ensuring their return and repatriation. Through the website, it is possible to know and follow the progress of the investigation of several looted cultural artifacts and also collaborate with a cultural encyclopedia of missing artifacts, an updated list of the processes of trafficking in cultural goods taking place in the world.

An equivalent organization in international relevance is Art Recovery International, which has services that provide its clients with legal advice on cases related to the disappearance and repatriation of works of art, so that the sale of illicit works, or works that are being sought, does not for theft. Over the last three decades, counterparts have multiplied, and each institution, in a localized or systemic way, provides assistance in the prevention, mapping, repatriation and insurance of trafficked works of art and heritage.⁶ Several other organizations seek to act effectively against the theft of works of art and heritage. It is believed that trafficking in cultural goods responds to three levels of satisfaction and official purposes: (a) the greed of collectors, who want to decorate their homes with stolen works and end up illicitly acquiring them on the black market, without an invoice; (b) the sale of these artifacts aiming at financial gain through the action of money laundering, and currently, (c) through “artnapping”, a modality of theft and resale to the insurers themselves, since the loss would be greater without the recovery of the work. This modality has revealed the existing trade between insurance companies and museums that accept negotiation with the traffickers themselves. Regardless of the purpose of the theft, trafficking in works of art and heritage becomes increasingly complex and developed.

Currently, new ways have been found to carry out the so-called money laundering, among which the traffic of works of art and cultural goods stands out, which has become an effective way of diverting money to other countries, as the pieces are not subjected to a lot of inspection. The fact that there are few experts specialized in works of art, several illegal transactions of works around the world and the application of light penalties (the penalties for drug trafficking are much harsher) potentiates the vertiginous growth of this type of trafficking.

⁶ In order not to address the extensive list of institutions, agencies, organizations, websites, and databases that around the world work directly with the dissemination and repression of trafficking in works of art and heritage, we list those that have collaborated the most (in the western world) for the recovery of a significant part of the smuggled estate. Chasing Aphrodite; Conflict Antiquities; Cultural Heritage Lawyer; London Arts Stolen Database, Looting Matters; Metropolitan Police—Art and Antiques Unit—UK; Museum Security Network; People not Stones; Plundered Art; Secret History of Art; The Art Loss Register; Tom Flynn’s—Art Knows; Trackart Art Risk Consultancy; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; and WATCH. In addition to the bodies and institutions that monitor and map trafficked goods, The Journal of Art Crime, published since 2009, operates on a non-profit basis. Edited by respected scholars in the field, like Noah Charney, Marc Balcells and Christos Tsirogiannis, the JAC contains a mix of scholarly articles and editorials with interviews from experienced professionals in the industry.

Several countries are aware of the traffic of works of art. Switzerland and the United States have already taken steps to ensure that auction houses report purchases over \$10,000 in cash, but a significant portion of countries still disbelieve that this type of trafficking has such great influence. Interpol revealed that the countries most affected today are Germany, France, Italy, and Russia. Brazil already appears in the list of countries on the rise, currently between the 8th and 10th position in the list of countries where the traffic of works of art most impacts the economy.

Interpol has created a catalog of more than 34,000 works that have been stolen across the planet. The transnational organizations that currently work in the fight against trafficking in works and goods (Interpol, UNESCO, FBI, ICOM and WCO, together with private institutions of international law) head a very long list of similar organizations. In this list, it gains relevance. The Association for Research into Crimes against Art (ARCA, Association for Research into Crimes against Art). Currently, the most prestigious organization in the field of mapping trafficking routes in the world, ARCA, a private organization operating in various parts of the world, is responsible for investigating crimes against art and cultural heritage. ARCA is a research and extension organization that works to promote the study and investigation of art crime and cultural heritage protection; aims to identify trends related to the study of art crime; and develops strategies to defend the responsible management of collective artistic and archaeological heritage. As an interdisciplinary group, it works with scholars and allied professionals in the fields of law, criminal justice, security, museology, art history, archeology, and cultural resource management internationally, promoting the exchange of knowledge and advancements in this specialized field. All these organizations help to map the routes and spaces of action of international gangs specialized in trafficking. As in European countries and the United States, they also operate in Brazil, and specific cases have drawn attention in the last decade. Perhaps the most paradigmatic of all is that of banker Edemar Cid Ferreira, former owner of Banco Santos (Torres 2015, p. 35).

The traffic in works of art and heritage has been growing dramatically in recent decades thanks to the huge financial return and the lax legislation present in most countries, as it is a subject quite restricted to initiates or specialists in the subject, which makes it difficult to police action, which still does not prove to be completely effective in the knowledge of the subject about works of art. Therefore, the direct results of this denunciation will be money laundering and the use of works and goods for personal use.

The discussion on the international repatriation legislation of 1954, proposed as the initial theme of this text, presented the need for cooperation agreements between countries to prevent the disappearance of cultural goods of universal value. The war situation was the stage for UNESCO's first normative action for the protection of cultural heritage. The universal value of protection has its origin in the 1954 Hague Convention. Despite the limitations and practical difficulties of its application, there is no doubt that its systematization had consequences not only in the specific field

of the Law of War, materialized in the 2nd Protocol of 1999 (corollary of 1954), but also in other instances of the protection of the patrimony.

As the diplomat João Batista Lanari Bo analyzes:

We know that the jurisdiction over trafficking has expanded its operations, especially in countries where the practice has intensified. But what about in Brazil, how does the country deal legally and politically with the illicit trafficking of works of art and cultural goods? Deepening the discussions suggests that Brazil is still far behind in terms of specific legislation, despite having one of the most progressive legislations on heritage in the world, as it does not have its own legislation on the theme “trafficking in works of art”, although it is a signatory of various conventions on the subject and practice international cooperation as advocated by the Hague Convention, achieving success in some rescue, repatriation and mapping operations (Bo 2003, p. 47).

It is important, from the Brazilian point of view, to maintain the balance of action in the international community in all aspects of the process aimed at protecting cultural property, participating in negotiating processes and implementing the obligations and duties of the conventions to which it is a signatory. A country traditionally engaged in articulations aimed at *détente* and disarmament, it is equally important to maintain a coherent multilateral action, participating in the processes and decisions related to the protection of cultural heritage in the event of armed conflict. Therefore, it is worth noting the process that made Brazil one of the most attentive signatories to the traffic of works and goods, as described below.

16.2 Brazil and the Route of Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Goods and Works of Art

In Brazil, specific legislation has not yet been created to deal with illegal trafficking in cultural goods and works of art, so the country still uses the basis of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. It is worth noting that the Brazilian Federal Police started in 2008 a program of specific training for police officers, with the aim of being able to identify works of art and cultural property in danger. The police’s lack of expertise in cases of trafficking in works of art and cultural goods makes the country an even easier gateway for these crimes. Trafficking in works of art and historical pieces, as well as sacred art, puts our country’s cultural heritage in constant danger. There are many pieces of Brazilian cultural heritage lost annually due to robbery, theft and illicit trafficking. For this reason, since 1997, together with the Federal Police, Interpol and the International Council of Museums, the Instituto do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional (IPHAN) has developed a campaign called “Fight Against Illicit Trafficking in Cultural Assets”, whose objective is to return stolen or illegally diverted works of art to their places of origin. Stimulated by the greed of recipients and the lack of security in the collections of some institutions and private collections, thieves who work in Brazil steal everything: statues, paintings, saints, books, documents,

coins, photographs, maps, archaeological pieces, fossils, and any other type of object considered valuable to collectors. The registry of IPHAN, legally responsible for the preservation of goods listed by the federal government, records more than a thousand stolen items throughout the country.

There is a scheme used by specialists in art theft: once the theft is made, the pieces are distributed to dishonest antique dealers who act as recipients. In the select commercial circle of these objects, “collectors” are notified as soon as new pieces hit the market. The next step is to sell them to private collections. From there, locating the work becomes practically impossible, as those who buy, in general, know that they are taking a stolen piece and do everything they can to hide the object. The stolen sacred pieces are mainly resold in the domestic market. Indigenous ceramics are highly sought after abroad. Even Amazonian archeological urns are on the International Council of Museums red list and are considered assets at risk of theft. Paintings by renowned Brazilian artists, such as Cândido Portinari and Di Cavalcanti, are particularly coveted and have been stolen in actions that the police know are commissioned.

Despite the efforts made by IPHAN’s Department of Museums and Cultural Centers to provide instruments to the various institutions involved in the recovery of stolen works of art, cultural goods, historical and sacred art objects, IPHAN’s extensive list proves that a significant portion of the Brazilian historical and cultural heritage is missing. It should also be added that, in recent years, the illicit trafficking of works of art and cultural goods has been more intense and, even when the stolen objects are recovered, investigations are ended with the arrest of the perpetrators of the thefts, without reaching the recipients, antique dealers, museums, collectors and galleries, the real responsible for the crimes. As of 2006, Brazil begins to occupy a prominent place in the list of the ten countries with the highest volume of theft of cultural works in the world after the action carried out in the states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Bahia, in the collections the Itamaraty Palace, the National Library and the *Chácara do Céu* Museum, in Rio de Janeiro. These crimes evidenced thefts of various objects and works of art, including paintings by Claude Monet, Pablo Picasso, Henri Matisse, and Salvador Dali. Since then, Brazil has suffered several lootings, such as those that took place at MASP and the Mário de Andrade Library, from which a painting by Cândido Portinari and Pablo Picasso, as well as a set of old maps and other valuable historic pieces were taken. All this without counting the baroque estate trafficked from the old Brazilian colonial churches, which since the beginning of the twentieth century has been systematically plundered from our territory and sold on the black market, which generates billions of dollars in illegal profits. The Database of Wanted Cultural Goods, created by IPHAN, listed approximately 1032 art objects stolen in Brazil in 1997 alone, without considering in this statistic the goods that were not inventoried and registered by the Government. Twenty-five years later, in 2022, the number reaches just over 59,000 missing objects.⁷

⁷ Available at: http://4ccr.pgr.mpf.br/atuacao/encontros-e-eventos/cursos/curso-patrimonio-cultural/bens_cultural_procurados.pdf. Accessed on: 23 May 2022.

As for the other countries, between 2000 and 2022, in Italy alone, 753,000 artworks were stolen, and in England cultural losses represent of approximately 600–750 million pounds losses a year. After Brazil entered this list of countries in evidence, and such thefts and looting were reported internationally, the trafficking of works of art and heritage gained evidence in the country. However, ten years after the theft of the *Chácara do Céu* Museum—the biggest theft of artworks in Brazilian history—the works have not been identified or found, and the country remains on FBI and Interpol's list as the country where the most important art thefts of the twenty-first century occurred (Askerud and Clément 1999 apud Costa and Rocha 2007, p. 264).

A curious and frightening fact is that, from 2015 to 2022, Brazil was only behind the United States, France and Iraq in the world ranking of theft of cultural goods. However, the partnership between IPHAN and the Federal Police/Interpol has lasted 15 years and is bearing fruit. In February 2016, for example, IPHAN helped to identify 40 books, some over 100 years old, and 49 engravings seized in Argentina, which were returned to the collection of the National Museum library.

The law that regulates IPHAN (Decree no 25, of November 30, 1937) establishes that the owner of a fallen piece who does not report theft, robbery, or loss to the institute, within five days, is subject to a fine of ten times the object value. The attacks against the listed properties are judged as crimes against the national patrimony. According to the Penal Code, anyone who destroys an artistic, historical, or archaeological asset is subject to a fine and can be imprisoned for a period of six months to three years. Since the 1980s, the institute has developed the National Inventory of Movable and Integrated Goods (INBMI) program, which has technically identified around 90,000 objects from the collections of listed monuments. Most of these goods are sacred art, and it is estimated that there are more than 400,000 pieces to be inventoried.

Portuguese journalist Carlos Reis, in a 2006 report, discussed the potential damage that looting and theft causes to the countries involved. In an article entitled: Art trafficking: robbers of world heritage, Reis states that the spoliation and illicit trafficking of works of art cause irreparable damage to the cultural heritage of countries. According to its notes, the European Union recognizes that “the illicit trafficking of cultural goods has reached such a dimension that the cultural heritage is a permanent target of significant and often irreparable damage, with the danger of the situation worsening given the insufficiency of resources [...] catalogs of cultural goods from public and private institutions” (Reis 2006). But which path should the jurisprudence on trafficking follow when the origin of the trafficked work is known or in the possession of museums that practically institutionalized its possession? What to do, in addition to identification, public reprimand and forwarding of works and goods intercepted and/or in possession? The answer is complex, but it necessarily involves a serious discussion about the return and/or repatriation of works and/or cultural assets. This topic is still quite controversial, but we will try to argue below why the devolution is shown as an acceptable form of reparation for the historical and cultural damages perpetrated in the last centuries to the countries that saw their material heritage ornament museums, galleries, and lecture halls of private collectors around the world.

16.3 Repatriation as Historic Reparation

It is essential that the traffic in cultural goods and works of art be addressed academically, as it is currently a gateway to several other very important themes for the safeguarding of cultural identity, since the “trafficking” element is consolidated as an active agent of the so-called soft power, vector of agreements and disagreements between countries. As a result, the importance of repatriation/devolution for safeguarding the history of various communities becomes the order of the day.

In the last decade, the publication of books, academic texts, government dossiers and newspaper articles on the subject has grown exponentially, especially English publications. From the immense collection produced in recent years, some critical texts such as those by Benhamou (2014), Brinkley (2013), Bokova (2016), Cosomano (2010), Costa and Rocha (2007), Cuno (2008, 2012), Edsel (2011, 2014), Gross (2010), Howe Jr (2014), La Follette (2013), Nassif (2015), O’Connor (2012), Seif (2015), Veiga (2014), Waxman (2008, 2011), Wiziack (2013), Yates (2015, 2016), and Oosterman and Yates (2022), the collective on which this research is based. The return of works of art to the countries where the pieces originate and the repatriation of diverse cultural goods is a frequent subject among museologists, cultural property managers, curators, international law jurists, enthusiasts of cultural decolonization from all over the world, especially among countries that have important works of their estate exhibited abroad. In Latin America, it is the case of Mexico, Peru, Guatemala, Andean and Central American countries, which have indigenous gold and silver pieces being returned to their museums. Originals by the United States and European countries. Examples are not limited to the American continent. Egypt, Syria, Iraq, among other nations, have been increasingly concerned with the question of the repatriation of their archaeological treasures, their works of art and cultural assets. A few years ago, several of these museums in the United States and Europe began returning objects to their countries of origin, each with a story of its own.

Although much attention is paid to the act of repatriation itself, the return of the works does not always cause commotion or retain greater significance in the countries and/or cultures that produced it; sometimes falling into the limbo of oblivion and even becoming inaccessible to the public. Most Western museums now recognize the strong ethical sense of returning objects, particularly in cases where these works have left their home countries under dubious circumstances.

For some, repatriation, particularly of Western antiquities, refers to the persistence of a given country in a globalized world. It’s a kind of “object stubbornness,” explains James B. Cuno, president and CEO of the J. Paul Getty Fund. In *Who Owns Antiquity?* Cuno questions whether certain museums have the infrastructure to safeguard returned treasures—or keep them accessible, even away from the movement of the main cities and capitals. Another significant example of the return of trafficked or purchased work (this time as a source of money laundering) is the repatriation of the works of former Brazilian banker Edemar Cid Ferreira, carried out by the US court and already mentioned in this text. On the website of the auction house Sotheby’s

there is no mention of the fact that the works belonged to the former banker and came from a judicial process, which in itself signals the little transparency of this type of trade carried out by auctioneers of international prestige.

Sharon Waxman, a reporter who worked for two of the most important American newspapers, the New York Times, and the Washington Post, wrote a book whose title explains parts of the nebulous equation of the traffic of works of art in the world. In *Loot: the battle over the stolen treasures of the ancient world* the author points out investigations carried out in Egypt, Turkey, Greece, and Italy, showing the routes and schemes of the trafficking in old works. Waxman states that, among other procedures, the French used dynamite to detach the zodiac from the Temple of Hathor, in Dendera,⁸ which currently rests prominently in the Louvre. On the other hand, the brutality with which the British seized part of the marbles that made up the Acropolis of Athens is another example of hot forged imperialism. Therefore, defenders of object returns support their premises on ethical precepts and argue that colonial thinking must be definitively overcome. The reporter says that several museums in Europe and the United States committed irregularities when incorporating new objects into their collections, especially when accepting donations. Significant examples are the prestigious Metropolitan Museum in New York and The J. Paul Getty Museum in Los Angeles. It is still paradigmatic that cases of misappropriation of cultural goods, works of art and historical pieces by museums have reached the police pages of newspapers and to sensationalist news several times over the last decade. In a first-of-its-kind action, Italy has promoted an international trial of the illicit trade in antiquities from museums in the United States, including the Metropolitan and the Getty. A striking example was that of one of the most important curators in the métier, the American Marion True, considered one of the most powerful, respected and sought-after art historians in the world, accused of belonging to a network that dealt in ancient art.

Investigators accused True of making purchases from unscrupulous dealers. And colleagues seemed pleased with her disappearance, as if one of the world's leading art historians deserved to be the only American curator to be brought to court. Marion True, curator of antiquities at the J. Paul Getty Museum, was formally accused by the Italian Supreme Court of belonging to a network that dealt in stolen art. The curator has become the epicenter of a story more common than you might think. The world of art trafficking was opened in an interview the curator gave to the Washington Post newspaper (Edgers 2015).

True admitted to recommending the Getty to buy works that she knew had been looted. But he admits it with a caveat: "If I knew where the work had been taken from, I would pressure to have it returned", he asserts. On the contrary, many of her colleagues did little, if anything, to research the origin of the works. And none of them were charged. The lawsuit against True was catalyzed by searches of dealers

⁸ Campaigns are currently underway for the return of important pieces of its cultural collection to Egypt, among which the famous Rosetta Stone, which is now in the British Museum, the bust of Nefertiti, now in the Egyptian Museum in Berlin, stands out, and Dendera's Zodiac, housed in the Louvre.

and a massive leak of internal Getty documents, obtained by two Los Angeles Times reporters, and offers a rare look at the all-too-close relationships between museums, dealers, and collectors.

The fact is that True, as a curator, should not have been held responsible for the museum acquisitions. These purchases were made by the managers and management of the Getty, and in this plot, which looks more like a Hollywood movie script, True insists that she did not conspire with an illegal trafficking network, as the Italian prosecutors allege, but says she acquired art for the Getty, who knew it had been robbed. Why wouldn't you? She's all over the place. "Art is in the market," she says, describing the Getty's acquisition policy. "We don't know where it comes from. And until we know where it comes from, it's better to be in a museum's collection. And when we know where it comes from, we will deliver it." She did not traffic stolen works. She "rescued" art, sending it to large museums. The discourse can and should be analyzed, and shows how complicated the world of acquisition, repatriation, and illegal trafficking of works of art and heritage is.

According to museologist Cícero Almeida, a civil servant at the Brazilian Institute of Museums (IBRAM), repatriation is an issue that has to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, but he admits being favorable. "It is necessary to take into account that colonized countries are already able to take care of their pieces, and repatriation generates the positive side of encouraging society to recognize their production", analyzes the specialist in an interview with Agência Brasil.⁹ This perception is shared by a significant part of Latin American art specialists.

The witty text by Donna Yates, a renowned expert in Latin American art trafficking cases, entitled: *Illicit cultural property from Latin America: looting, trafficking, and sale*, is a mandatory invitation to clarify the reality of the chain of trafficking in Latin American cultural goods. Yates' text provides a broad overview of the theft, smuggling and illegal sale of objects (pre-conquest artefacts and colonial artifacts), as well as the functioning of this illicit trade in Latin America.

For Yates (2016, p. 3):

The looting and trafficking of Latin American cultural goods cannot be viewed in isolation. It is just one component of some of the biggest problems facing the region. It is not a separate issue and should not be treated as such. The regional instability caused by drug and human trafficking, the failure of corrupt governments, globalization, and neoliberalism, have generated inequalities in development and deforestation of legal principles, which are, in fact, the greatest threat to Latin America's cultural assets. If the goal is to protect Latin America's cultural assets, we must make people less poor, make people less insecure, and make Latin American governments less corrupt and more capable. In other words, international measures that focus on the source end of the illicit antiquities market are susceptible to little effective action. The policy focus must be on the end of the trafficking chain, which is the market. Causing a drop in demand and supply for Latin American cultural goods will result in a reduction in theft of cultural goods. Our focus should be on discouraging criminality and

⁹ Interview by Cícero Almeida to reporter Isabela Vieira. Returning works of art to their countries of origin is the theme of an international meeting on the protection of museums. Agência Brasil, 11 July. 2012. Available at: <http://memory.ebc.com.br/agenciabrasil/noticia/2012-07-11/return-of-works-of-art-aos-paises-de-origem-e-tema-de-encontro-internacional-sobre-protecao-de-mu>. Accessed on: 13 Jan 2022.

punishing criminals, rather than spending effort at all costs on simple recovery of artifacts. In addition, we must invest more time in developing better control techniques to discourage the market beyond ineffective and obtuse codes of ethics.

The expert's words indicate that not only Latin American countries, but a large part of the world, need gigantic investments to face the lack of preparation of so many decades. What draws attention is the excuse given by most governments, hiding in periods of fragility in their countries. This means that the obvious fact that cultural heritage is more vulnerable to depredation during times of conflict and disturbance of public order does not seem to be enough for the public and private powers of the signatory countries of the safeguard conventions to be convinced of the pressing need to inject greater figures into the prevention and protection of heritage and works of art.

In periods and spaces of social upheaval, museums, archaeological sites, religious institutions, and the like are looted for their salable content—to feed the international demand for “cultural objects”. These are the so-called looting and robbery spikes, which we are used to reading about, and they are entirely predictable, despite the uncertainty of geopolitics. They must be treated as a global problem. Experts are unanimous: we need to stop buying and selling illicitly traded material. In other words, we need to reduce demand: not just on materials traded by extremist groups such as Daesh, but above all international collectors, museum curators and organizations around the world, all links in the buying and selling chain of illicitly traded works of art and heritage, on a map that stretches from Syria to Bhutan, from Paris to the USA.

We also need a proactive global solution. The best way to protect cultural heritage is to prevent people from buying and selling illicit material. And, in the worst case—that already happened—that the countries have the courage to face the democratic vocation, yielding to those who are entitled to the spoils taken in times of war or peace. Jean-Luc Martinez, former director of the Louvre Museum,¹⁰ suggests the creation of “Museums of Refuge”, which protect goods from countries at war at the request of a sovereign state, as the Spanish republican government did in the Civil War, when it asked for help from France; and “Museums of expropriated works”, while works of art cannot return to their countries, would act as a means of preserving this heritage, which is now almost lost. He also proposed stopping illegal excavations, training specialists from countries in conflict, multiplying exhibitions with stolen

¹⁰ As cliché as it may seem, the same director who suggested actions to combat trafficking was recently accused of participating in favoritism and corruption schemes in office. Martinez, who ran the Louvre from 2013 to 2021, has been accused of turning a blind eye to the pieces' false certificates of origin, a fraud that could implicate other art experts. Paradoxically, the Louvre Museum features sculptures illegally exported and seized by French customs, with the aim of alerting the public to issues of threatened heritage. UNESCO, which has long cooperated with the EU, welcomes this new strong commitment by France, which unites its European partners in the fight against illicit trafficking in cultural goods. Finally, it should be noted that UNESCO and the EU are jointly organizing concrete actions to strengthen material and human resources in the face of the scourge of trafficking. The EU-UNESCO project (2019–2022) aims to strengthen the fight against illicit trafficking in cultural goods. For more details see: <https://g1.globo.com/pop-arte/noticia/2022/05/26/jean-luc-martinez-ex-diretor-do-louvre-e-acusado-em-caso-de-traffic-de-art.ghtml>.

works to show them around the world, which would help make them “unsaleable”, and drawing up a “black list of ‘paradises of concealment’” of assets. All these actions would help to inhibit the smuggling of heritage, its illegal sale and misappropriation around the world.

For, more than military and strategic power, the ability of countries to influence will depend “on a kind of soft power that derives from the identification with good causes in the most varied areas of International Relations. This soft power will be all the more decisive the greater the coincidence with the ideals we profess and the internal reality of the country.” (Fonseca Jr and Belli 2001, p. 8) This excerpt, taken from the article *New challenges from the United Nations*, published in the magazine *Política Externa*, in August 2001, suggests that the protection of heritage within the scope of UNESCO and its counterparts in safeguarding heritage around the planet depends on plural efforts and transnational.

16.4 Final Considerations: Towards a New Relational Ethics

In the last decade, especially after the revenge sponsored by the Savoy/Sarr Report, and all the publicity given to the document and everything it proposes to accomplish, the discussion on repatriation has never been so alive. French President Emmanuel Macron spoke at the University of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso on November 28, 2017: “From today and for the next five years, I want to see the conditions created to allow the temporary or definitive restitution of African cultural heritage to Africa”. Within months, President Macron commissioned economist Felwine Sarr and art historian Benedicte Savoy to prepare a report on how this goal should be achieved. The report, entitled: *The Restitution of African Cultural Heritage. Towards a New Relational Ethics*, was delivered to President Macron a year after Ouagadougou’s speech, in late November 2018. The entire report is essential reading for museum administrators, anthropologists, collectors, and the art trade around the world. With 89 pages in its English version, plus an additional 163 pages in appendices, maps, charts, and lists of African heritage objects in French museums, this is a revolutionary document.

A corollary of the courage produced by documents such as this one is the expansion of the world view of the dispossessed peoples. Whether in the echo of the Greek clamors demanding the return of the Parthenon marbles; in the dissonant voices of African or Latin American countries, demanding the repatriation of parts of their material culture; or in front of the set of any colonial pieces about to be returned, in numbers never seen before, a paradigm shift is taking shape in the face of the already known denials of the return of the so-called universal museums. The return of parts of their acquired estate, often illicitly or with little transparency, seems to have triggered a countdown.

Although it was not the task of this text to cover the subject in all its breadth, it sought to situate the subject in a historical perspective, in order to illustrate the foundations of what is currently known about the illicit trafficking of cultural goods and works of art, as well as the increasingly reported returns or repatriations of works and goods carried out by the countries of guardianship to the countries of origin. We can say that Brazil has a dense tradition on the subject, accentuated in recent decades by the country's entry into the not-so-selected group of states that top the list of the most vulnerable to trafficking in cultural goods. More effective legislation and new inter-institutional mechanisms are possible paths for Brazil to be able to solve more quickly the chaos of illicit acts that multiply every year.

The repatriation/return of trafficked goods and works of art is more than historical reparation: it is a flag that can make colonizing countries serious examples of historical appreciation and a broad understanding of the concept of sovereignty of colonized peoples. However, as Ernest Hemingway would say: "from speech to action there is a fjord of insensitivities". It is precisely the crossing of fjords, chasms and borders that has been mobilizing UNESCO, through its former Director-General, Irina Bokova, to seek diplomatic solutions to strengthen the fight against the illicit trafficking of cultural goods and works of art. Memoranda such as those transcribed in the epigraph of this text show that only an international task force and the adhesion of a large number of interested parties will be able to stop the escalation, ever higher, of the arms of the trafficking in cultural goods. But let us not be naive: we must ask ourselves, on the one hand, who is interested in the dilapidation of our patrimonies and, on the other hand, what is the moral cost of weakening the gears of trafficking? Brazil is one of the actors invited to seek answers to these questions. Otherwise, it will condemn its future generations to finance other reparations.

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Chapter 17

Circulation of Sacred Art in the Internet Underworld



Denismara Eugênia de Oliveira Nascimento 

Abstract The illicit trafficking of cultural goods is a recurrent practice worldwide, for having a high commercial value. By entering the scope of robbery and theft, the artifacts are inserted into this illegal trade route and are sold in antique shops, auctions, fairs, or directly into the hands of collectors. In Brazil, sacred art is one of the most trafficked types of cultural goods. Religious works are mainly present in churches and chapels. Due to the high price of Brazilian art in the international market, the state of Minas Gerais in the last decade had a significant increase in thefts and robberies of sacred works. Due mainly to the high value attributed to these goods in the illicit market, this heritage became the target of highly specialized gangs. A significant part of this collection ends up in the hands of thieves, receivers, and antique dealers. The fetish for these works indicates a large number of people with interest in the pieces from the past, leading to an increasing impoverishment of the country's cultural legacy. Currently, it is noticeable that antiques dealers have been advertising their pieces on the Internet. This new space has allowed quick and direct access to users. In this sense, it is understood that this type of criminal action can occur in another layer of the Internet, in a more hidden base where these criminals operate. From this point of view, the central objective of this work is to analyze these crimes in the various networks that make up the internet: "surface web", "deep web", "darknet". In some of these networks, the user has access to functions in which they can share content with a high degree of anonymity and security, fostering illicit activities and restricting content that cannot be found in normal searches. Thus, we seek to try to identify the roadmap of these networks and understand how sacred art is shared in these little explored regions of the Internet.

Keywords International market · Sacred art · Cultural heritage · Trafficking · Internet

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17.1 Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Goods

The illicit trafficking of cultural goods is a recurring practice in the world, for having a high commercial value. When they are targeted for theft and robbery, the artifacts¹ fall into the illegal trafficking route of cultural goods and are sold in antique shops, auctions, fairs, or directly into the hands of collectors. In view of this concern, some international conventions were created in the twentieth century to try to safeguard the cultural assets of each country. In this sense, the “Convention on the measures to be adopted to prohibit and prevent the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of Cultural Goods” from the UNESCO General Conference applied in Paris on November 14th, 1970, aimed at proposals to protect the evasion of cultural goods.

There is a collaborative network of institutions, such as public institutions, civil society organizations, international organizations, and universities that have discussed this issue in order to build frameworks to limit this crime. The academic publications and studies on this theme have been growing in the last decade, incorporating different values, and can be used to analyze human experience, the heritage of peoples, and their past. According to Rodrigo Christofolletti, understanding the trafficking of cultural goods and works of art in an academic environment is fundamental, for:

currently be a gateway to several other very important issues for the safeguarding of cultural identity, because the “trafficking” element is consolidated as an active agent of the so-called *soft power*, vector of agreements and disagreements between countries. With this, the importance of repatriation/return to safeguard the history of various communities enters the agenda (Christofolletti 2017, p. 123).

Regarding the last decade in Brazil, as Raphael João Hallack Fabrino (2012) states, there has been a significant increase in crimes involving works of art in Brazil, “exposing the risk and fragility of a great diversity of collections” (Fabrino 2012, p. 15). In the country, this is one of the most common types of theft and, within this universe, Sacred Art: religious works that stay mainly in churches and chapels. Considering the lack of security and the vulnerability of the temples and museums of Minas Gerais, this heritage became the target of highly specialized gangs.

When discussing the existing relations between the disappearance of sacred works and the antiquities trade, we come across activities of an anonymous and global nature linked to illegal services on online platforms. In this perspective, with the dissemination of digital technology, today we have the Internet responsible for the globalization process. Through it, people can interact by exchanging information, entertainment, and conducting business transactions regardless of what country, state, or city you are in. However, it is also important to note that the globalization process arising from the internet also presents the diffusion of crimes in which it involves the “multinationality of subjects and goods, which is also a productive space for criminal organizations.” (Martins 2020, p. 12)

¹ These are ancient objects created by man, which have characteristics of the time and which were produced and come to represent the activities of human life.

In view of these concerns, we analyzed news and publications in printed and electronic newspapers about the disappearance of sacred works and their involvement in organized crime. In the reports of the newspaper *Estado de Minas*, for example, we identified the increase of attacks against heritage in recent years, addressing subjects involved, such as traders, specialized gangs, collectors and antique dealers who acquired these pieces illicitly. The repercussion of this crime in the press brings important contributions to the understanding of robberies and thefts (Fabrino 2012, p. 35).

17.2 In the Route of the Sacred Works

All this exposure can encourage the desire at any cost to own the sacred works, but on the other hand, it can also generate concern about their protection. This is because it is known that most of the pieces were produced in previous centuries, i.e., the desire of these people to own these works with the *status of* unique pieces is manifested with more intensity. Thus, our interest in researching the disappearances arose, due to the large number of stolen goods in the state.

According to the *Estado de Minas* newspaper of March 24, 2010, the State Prosecutor for the Defense of Cultural and Tourist Heritage registered about 689 pieces that were no longer in their place of origin. Therefore, the trafficking of cultural goods and works of art is at the top of the list of the largest traffickers in the world. This crime is still common nowadays and, for the most part, does not result in the recovery of the stolen collections, if we consider, especially, the alarming number of stolen goods in the cities of Minas Gerais.

Still alluding to the *Estado de Minas* newspaper, we have observed through a data survey between 1990 and 2008, that many of these works have been stolen by specialized gangs to be sold on the illicit market for incalculable values, with the elaboration of routes to loot pieces that have already been identified by the thieves. In view of this concern, we highlight here the sale of these works and the attachment of rare objects that give *status* to their possessors. These crimes are financed by the desire of collectors to decorate their homes with the works. Moreover, the illicit acquisition of these works (without an invoice, for example) is also often done through money laundering. The gangs specialized in this crime are not only active in Brazil, but also in countries in Europe and Latin America.

In light of the above, it is necessary to analyze the report in the *Estado de Minas* newspaper of August 20, 2003, which reveals, through the arrest of M.M.² the scheme of a specialized gang. In a statement to the Federal Police, M.M. clarifies: “The scheme of stealing sacred objects always started with orders from collectors”. The identified gang acted not only in Brazil, but also in countries in Europe and Latin America.

² Acronym of the first and last name of the head of the specialized gang.

Most of the sacred cultural heritage from Minas Gerais was destined for the state of São Paulo, followed by European countries such as Spain and Portugal (Jornal Estado De Minas 2003, p. 26). According to the investigations, the gang was well structured and was composed by: five people accused of the theft, the member who headed the group, four receivers, one of them a restorer, and three other people connected to antique dealers.

The stolen pieces are distributed to antique dealers, whose owners act as receivers. In the closed commercial circle of sacred objects, collectors are warned of the arrival of new pieces. 'Once taken to private collections, the location of the work becomes practically impossible' explains the delegate. The delegate says that some pieces arrive in Europe brought by foreign tourists, who are introduced to antique dealers by Brazilian collectors (Jornal Estado De Minas 2003, p. 26).

Feeling unjustly treated for being the only one in the organization to be arrested, M.M. informed the Federal Police of Minas Gerais, by means of a clue, who the other members of the group were. The clue was in the history textbook aimed at 6th grade students, which had on its cover a picture taken in the city of Ouro Preto-MG, in 1999, as we will see Fig. 17.1. The book was published by Editora Saraiva and had as its cover³ a photograph taken by the photographer Juca Martins, from the digital agency Olhar Imagem (Fig. 17.2). Below, we present an excerpt from this reportage:


He told Estado de Minas that the photo was taken around 3 pm, after he felt attracted by the good light, when he was passing by Nossa Senhora do Carmo Church. "I took advantage of that moment because my interest was to make images of Holy Week in Minas. I decided to include those people in the photo just to give a sense of proportion", he explains. The photographer also said that, at the time, he was working for the Pulsar agency, which included this photo in the company catalog. The agency's client list included Saraiva publishing house, which published a series of textbooks for 5th to 6th grade students. According to Saraiva's textbook editorial department, it was decided that it was necessary to have, on the covers of the books, photos of historical monuments with people, to link the past to the present. As the 6th grade book dealt with the mining period, explains the publisher, a picture of a baroque church was chosen, which portrays the period well. Therefore, the choice of Nossa Senhora do Carmo church, in Ouro Preto (Jornal Estado De Minas 2003).

The group caught by the photographer's lens shows us that one of the gang's strategies was to infiltrate, days before the crime, the daily life of the local community in search of information about the movement and security of the churches. Then, the group collects this data and draws up a possible security plan, without arousing the suspicions of the authorities. In this way, the "crooks" act at the right time and the crime is only discovered the next day.

Because some members of the group were free by *habeas corpus*, they did not interrupt their criminal activities, but started again in 2001. According to police chief Moura Gomes, "the group has been acting for at least ten years and, after the last arrest, it interrupted its criminal activities until 2001, when it restarted its activities" (Gomes 2003, p. 26). After this analysis, the Public Ministry, "with the help of other organs (Federal and Civil Police, IEPHA, IPHAN, etc) (...), managed to get all

³ Juca Martins' photograph was inserted on the cover of the book in question upon approval by the Ministry of Education.

Fig. 17.1 Thieves caught on textbook cover. Source: *Jornal Estado De Minas* (08/20/2003)



members of the gang prosecuted and convicted, and, in relation to two elements, the conviction has already become final and unappealable” (Miranda 2013, p. 08). In the year 2008, a worrying number of stolen objects is again reported: “about 69 objects in 10 reported cases”. Among them are not only images, but also antique pieces.⁴

⁴ Ibituruna on January 2, 2008, 13 pieces were stolen from the Mother Church of São Gonçalo do Amarante: two wooden resplendors, a silver turíbulo, three silver candlesticks, a golden chalice, a golden paten, three teakwoods, an image of São José and a gold-plated ostensorium; and pito from the Rosário Church: a gold-plated chalice, a silver lavabo, a silver vase and five candlesticks. Caeté on February 21, 2008, four crowns of Our Lady and a chalice were stolen from the Mother Church of Our Lady Mother of God, in the Roças Novas district, on the margins of the BR-381 highway. Pompeu on May 20, 2008, 28 bronze or copper pieces were stolen (recovered) from the local cemetery, which dates back to 1918: two statues of sheep, eight images of the Crucified Christ, 12 images of saints, four flame-shaped objects, and two square stands. Claudio on June 16, 2008, the patron image of Our Lady of the Rosary in the Rosário community was stolen. On August 3, 200, it was the turn of the image of São Sebastião, from the district of Monsenhor João Alexandre. On July 20, 2008, two pieces from the eighteenth century were stolen from a residence: the images of Nossa Senhora da Conceição and São José, both made of polychrome wood. The sacred objects were recovered. Matias Cardoso on September 4, three images were stolen from the main church of Nossa Senhora da Conceição: Sant’Ana Mestra, 64 cm high; São Miguel, 85.5 cm; and Nossa Senhora do Bonsucesso, 53 cm, all of Portuguese origin. Juiz de Fora on September 17, seven boiler



Fig. 17.2 Photograph by Juca Martins, incorporated into the History textbook (6th grade), in front of the Nossa Senhora do Carmo church in Ouro Preto. M. M., former leader of the gang, revealed to the federals that the people in front of the church of Our Lady of Carmel in Ouro Preto are members of his group. The photo is on the cover of a textbook. Newspaper Estado de Minas—Sunday, August 31, 2003. Source: Jornal Estado De Minas (2003). Photo by Juca Martins

This crime is associated with the gang mentioned above, because according to the prosecutor Marcos Paulo Miranda, there were still some members at large. By means of the following map (Fig. 17.3), it is possible to have a better view of the cities where the thefts took place, escaping from the surveillance of the Baroque axis—the most used route in the 90's—to open new routes. Besides churches and chapels, the criminals also entered old cemeteries.

valves, in bronze and copper, were stolen from two locomotives on display at the Railroad Museum/Fundação Cultural Alfredo Ferreira Laje (Funalfa). Pratápolis on October 8, 2008, the image of the patron saint of the Mother Church of the Divine Holy Spirit was stolen. The centennial piece, 1 m high and weighing 30 k, bears the sacred dove in silver and parts bathed in gold. Source: O Estado de Minas newspaper, October 20, 2008.




Fig. 17.3 Map emphasizing the municipalities where thefts occurred in the year 2008. Source: Jornal Estado De Minas (Graphic reproduced by Matheus Nascimento Rabelo)

17.3 Sacred Art in Comtemporaneity

The influence of colonial art has marked the history of Brazilian art, no longer being “something temporary and restricted to those spaces preserved in several Brazilian cities” (Coelho 2005, p. 115) and has become present in contemporary times, through the production and market of artistic works. To this day, the fascination for the Minas Gerais imagery is great. With their exceptional quality and with no serial manufacturing characteristics, the works come to have relevant aspects, as a common good, which belong to a certain place and community (Quincy 2016, p. 37), in addition to its relevance in the fine arts.

In recent years, we have observed a significant increase in the use of computer media in various areas of life, from education and work to social relations and entertainment. This trend is mainly due to the constant evolution of technology and its increasing accessibility. The use of computer media offers many advantages, such as easier access to information, greater efficiency and productivity at work, greater interactivity and communication, among others. For example, the use of digital platforms for remote work has been essential during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Merchants who use this framework make the Internet a sales channel for their products and services. These merchants can range from small local businesses that use an online store to expand their geographic reach, to large multinational companies that use the Internet as part of their sales strategy. Based on this, antique dealers have

embraced this tool and started displaying their pieces. The effective result can be noticed through the publications of some antique dealers in their social networks on Instagram.⁵ According to Paulo Faustino, digital marketing specialist “83% of users follow some business or brand on Instagram and 50% say they have already made some purchase through Instagram, either by clicking on an ad or sending a message (*direct*)” (Faustino, p. 05).

Instagram makes it possible to reach a larger and more diverse audience. Becoming a source of entertainment in the lives of thousands of people and especially Brazilians. When we mention Brazil, we note that 63% of users in the country “with access to Instagram, claim to check their Instagram several times a day, while 89% of users visit Instagram at least once a day” (Faustino, p. 05). In this way, the social network has become today the “darling” platform. With frequent access to it, Internet users have the possibility to create, share and enjoy visual content. Consequently, it has become the resource for connecting with the public, opening the range for companies to advertise their product. The use of this social network to market products has proven to be efficient for the commerce of sacred works. Taking into account these results, the auctions also seek this space for *online* dissemination of their collection. In it, antiquities dealers organize themselves to make available catalogs indicating the day, time, and a preview of the pieces to be auctioned. Usually the *link to the online* auction is in the bio of the *Instagram* profile.

It is curious to note that other social networks are also chosen to publicize this trade. We found on *Pinterest* some advertisements of sacred works for auctions. This social network appeared in 2010 and allows the user to discover, share and save images for **ideas**. There they can find inspiration and create folders (public or private) that gather several references on subjects of personal interest for each person. This tool has become a large catalog of references for people.

As for the production of sacred works in contemporary times, we have the story of the sculptor João Goulart Silva, better known as Jango, who started sculpting when he was still young. His work has Baroque references and is inspired by the churches in Tiradentes-MG, the city where he was born and where he spends his life. Although he is still known for his angels, Jango also creates saints, oratories in wood, soapstone, and moledo.⁶ According to him, if he had not been Catholic, he might not have started this work. For, it was from his visits during masses in the company of his mother that he began to carefully observe the internal decoration of the church.

The curiosity and attention of the boy Jango to every church visit later revealed his talent in carving and carving objects in wood. Observing other works can provide inspiration for creation. In this sense, we know that Aleijadinho had notion of the European styles in the period, “by handling theoretical treatises of architecture and ornamental engravings” (Oliveira et al. 2002, p. 14). This previous knowledge influenced his creations, which serve as inspiration for other artists, as Jango reports:

⁵ Created in 2010, Instagram is an *online* social network that enables the sharing of photos and videos among its users. One of the main social networks in the world.

⁶ Moledo is a rock in which it can take shape according to the artist who will carve it.

I have already been asked if I am inspired by Aleijadinho, then I am inspired by him, I love his pieces, but he has his trace and I have mine. Just like, for example, my son started sculpting, so he already has his trait. His angels are one way and mine are another, but he already has his own style. That's why it happened like this, to pass this art to others, so that it wouldn't end. My son liked it and is now working on it. Since he was a little boy he has stayed by my side watching.

In this genesis, some people with the fetish of owning this art, resort to antique dealers or stonemasons to produce pieces with these characteristics. The demand for these images in Jango's studio is mostly due to devotion, and among the best sellers are St. Francis, St. Michael, and Little Angels. This last one is the one that sells the most, because, according to the sculptor, they are the cheapest pieces. The prices of his works vary according to the client's request, but generally an image of 60–70 cm costs, on average, four thousand five hundred reais (Fig. 17.4).

Whether for religious worship or to decorate their homes, it is recurring matters such as *Grande Hall: Noble materials reign in the space that defines the reception of Casa Cor RS*, from Decor Magazine of July 07, 2017. In it, the architect and designer Henrique Steyer presents a project “created for the exclusive sponsor of the

Fig. 17.4 Sculpture of Saint Michael the Archangel made by Jango in his atelier in the city of Tiradentes—MG. Source: Author's personal file (2020)



Rio Grande do Sul edition, Qualitá Sul”.⁷ He presents a classic style with luxury elements, but what catches our attention is the use of a century-old sacred work for the ornamentation of the space.

The dramatic lighting highlights pieces such as the Louis Henrique armchair, signed by Henrique Steyer and launched in Milan at the 2016 design week. The piece of furniture is upholstered in antique French fabrics that the professional purchased from an antique dealer on his travels around the world. A 19th-century sacred art piece depicting an angel complements the sophisticated aesthetic⁸ (Revista Decor 2017).

It is common to find these references in private spaces, turning the work into something consumable. This need generates trends, which can be expressed in some fashion segments, as an example, the spring 2018 exhibition “*Heavenly bodies, fashion and the catholic imagination*”, which was on display at the *Metropolitan Museum* in New York. This exhibition presents fashion in clothing in which the devotional practices and traditions of Catholicism are reproduced. Sandra Penna, decorator, collector, and partner of the antique shop Sandra and Marcio in Belo Horizonte, analyzes the exhibition:

There everything stops being religion and becomes a symbolism in clothes with ornamental designs of crosses, as in Madonna’s dress, or in the oratory on Sarah Jessica Parker’s head, paraded on the red carpet of the opening gala. Golden, embroidered, elaborate in refinements and scrolls. It is fashion that is commanding the trend, which comes at the pace of decoration. Without a doubt, I predict that it will return to more refined pieces, of the Baroque that we in Brazil have in our DNA, our origin and culture. And we have denied this style! Everything goes, everything comes back, there is no such dogma. As an *early adopter*, I am watching and applauding.⁹ (O GLOBO 2018)

We notice new admirers among the young public, as explained by the newspaper *O Globo*, on August 02, 2018. In the article in question, Sérgio Zóbarán starts from the point of view of the *status*¹⁰ of sacred art, being “the items that are gaining space in homes of younger people,” whether they are incorporated as decorative items or for personal devotion. The executive director of IBB, José Carlos Marçal de Barros, who is also the director of the Museum of Sacred Art of São Paulo, states that “sacred art has always had its admirers. However, there are cycles. The collectors’ interest, without which many of the collections would have been lost, is permanent. But the new generations are showing more interest” (Fig. 17.5).

We can infer, therefore, that the market and the preservation of movable heritage go hand in hand, but with different destinations. This is because both the market and preservation are

⁷ It comes at: http://www.revistadecor.com.br/index.php?ppant=busca-listar&pp=galeria&cc=6920&filtro=ARTE+SACRA&filtro_ad=&de=&ate=.

⁸ See more at: http://www.revistadecor.com.br/index.php?ppant=busca-listar&pp=galeria&cc=6920&filtro=ARTE+SACRA&filtro_ad=&de=&ate=.

⁹ Report carried by the electronic newspaper *O Globo* on August 02, 2018.

¹⁰ “This is equally true for all those objects that are valued in a symbolic system that gives them uniqueness in relation to other objects—even if they are not immediately associated with the dynamics of valuation around aesthetics or the argument constructed by what is defined as art” (Lopes Da Silva 2020, p. 10).




Fig. 17.5 Brazilian colonial oratories are among the items that are gaining space in younger people's homes (Photo by Beto Riginik). Source: Jornal O GLOBO (08/02/2018)

interested in conservation—since the physical stability of the object benefits the continuity of memory and its role as a reference for identity, as well as contributing to its aesthetics and increasing its sale value. But when it comes specifically to the circulation of objects, the two fields are drastically different (Santos 2020, p. 40).

As the journalistic article points out, the desire to have works of art in a residence as adornment is something common, besides reflecting *status* to the possessor. In an environment of contemplation of colonial sacred works, the buyers of these pieces have their desire achieved through the antique dealers. However, it is important to remember that the acquisition and display of works of art require a certain level of knowledge and care. For, illegal trade may involve forgery, theft, or smuggling of pieces.

The illegal practice involving the commercialization of works of art uses the internet as a path that facilitates smuggling and allows the authorities to have difficulty in tracking them down. In this point of view, Camila Saldanha Martins (2020, p. 16) gives visibility to Brazil by pointing it out as being “in the main route of international cybercrime. Still, according to data from the Brazilian Federal Police from the year 2004, of every ten active hackers in the world, eight live in the country.”

In this context, the broad access to the internet has deep layers of content such as the *deep web* and the *dark web* which cannot be accessed by conventional search engines. Unlike the superficial internet, which “hosts web pages, e-mail services, databases, files, and many services used daily by people and companies,” (p. 16) also generating easy access to searches with the help of Google, Bing or Yahoo. The *deep web* is an area of the net that is not indexed by these search engines, making it invisible to most people. Often people use this *web* anonymously to access content that is not

available on the surface Internet. The *dark web* is the layer below the *deep web*, which may contain illegal content such as trafficking, child pornography and other criminal activities. In it “can therefore only be accessed through specific software for browsing in an encrypted and anonymous environment, with *TOR*, *Invisible Internet Project*, and *FreeNet*.” (p. 45)

Finally, there is the possibility that the illegal trade in artwork is happening in the darkest layers of the web, since these pieces circulate freely on various platforms on the surface internet. However, to analyze this hypothesis, it is necessary to access these networks with the help of a hacker and conduct further research. This approach can provide valuable information about the illegal activities of trading artworks on the internet, and result in a more detailed study in a future work. It is important to note that investigating these dark networks requires specific technical skills and must be conducted with caution and within legal boundaries. For this reason, it is pertinent to conduct an unfolding of this area in order to deepen the analysis and obtain more accurate and reliable results. Based on this information, it will be possible to prepare a consistent and relevant publication for future works. It is important to note that this step requires careful planning and execution in order to maximize the efficiency of the research and ensure the validity of the results obtained.

17.4 Concluding Remarks

“A conversión de la cultura en una industria que, aunque sea capaz de democratizar la cultura, acaba transformando los vestigios y monumentos en productos, dispuestos para ser consumidos por un turismo de masas que acaba muchas veces malinterpretando y destruyendo los monumentos” (Ocón 2020, p. 173).

We know that Cultural Goods traditionally have historical, artistic and cultural values. But the above mentioned epigraph makes us think that according to each context or situation in which they are found, their values are being re-signified. In function of the cultural industry, under the logic of capitalist production, these goods are transformed into art value, especially when they leave their place of origin and move to museums or to the hands of individuals, serving as adornment in their homes. Because of this value relationship, it turns to tourist exploitation, “musealizing” these objects.

According to Alois Riegel (1903), every ancient work of art has value, which can be classified as antique value, along with its non-modern aspect. In addition, the ancient work of art may carry its exclusivity, such as the “marks” of time, in addition to the condition of unique work, called novelty value. This value has original aspects, without any changes in the work. Thus, this value allows its possessor a title of social *status*, that is, the ability of individuals to own sacred works is linked to possession and knowledge.

In the placements pointed out here, the illicit trafficking of sacred works in the state of Minas Gerais must be considered a criminal act that hurts many of these values,

creating a rupture in the relationship between society and the works, in which ties of identity and memory linked to a discourse of tradition and faith were created. It is crucial to point out that the activities performed in the dark layers of the *web* are illegal. Considering the large number of access to this resource, Interpol (International Criminal Police Organization) currently, “has been training its officers to better understand how these systems work.” (p. 46) to help police forces combat this type of crime. Participating in such activities can have serious consequences, including fines, imprisonment, and damaged reputation. Instead, if a buyer is unable to purchase a work of art legally, it is important that they pursue other legal alternatives, such as contacting an artist or gallery for information on other available works, or participating in art auctions in which they present a bill of sale for their property.

In view of the above, we hope that through this brief reading about the narratives and processes related to sacred works, the reader can be led to new perspectives when thinking about cultural heritage. Thus, being directly linked to modern man, the illegal trade of cultural goods has been one of the concerns of the institutions involved in the preservation issue. Above all, by the search for its recovery and preservation, which must be understood in a way to contribute to the process of reconstruction of tradition and formulation of public policies in the field.

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Chapter 18

“We’re Back”: Background and Outcomes of Repatriation, Return and Restitution of Cultural Property



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Abstract News about repatriation, return or restitution of cultural property taken from their countries of origin in dubious circumstances is now increasingly common. Each situation has its own political context, but a common element is the use of circulation as a narrative component itself—a resource of soft power, to influence or establish the tone of political dialogue between states. The looting of objects symbolizes the dynamics of subjugation of one country over another; on the other hand, restitution, return or repatriation indicates, at least symbolically, a willingness to engage in a dialogue of historical reparation. But to what extent have the repatriation, restitution and return of cultural property sought to strengthen the proactive dialogue between the parties involved—understanding such proactivity as long-lasting cultural cooperation initiatives? In this article we propose an analysis of the political motivations, agents and outcomes of two case studies: the restitution of Goddess Annapurna’s idol to India; and the repatriation of Djidji Ayokwé, or “talking drum” to Côte d’Ivoire, both presented at 23rd meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation, within UNESCO system.

Keywords Repatriation · Restitution · Soft power

Although movable property is so-called because of its quality of being moved freely without damage to its materiality, when associated with a certain cultural context of preservation, such movement is more restricted, conditioned to what the heritage preservation discourse admits as possible circulation. As Gonçalves (2005) rightly points out, to keep up with the displacement of objects along the borders that delimit social and symbolic contexts is largely to understand the very dynamics of social and cultural life, as well as its effects on individual and collective subjectivity. The analysis of the diplomatic speeches given within the scope of the United Nations

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Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) regarding the issue of restitution, return and repatriation¹ of cultural property can be a starting point for understanding the dynamics and sociocultural effects of international circulation of cultural heritage. But before analyzing the impulses for the circulation of objects, it is necessary to review the construction of the legal, administrative and also political configuration of the international governance network dedicated to the maintenance of movable heritage in their places of origin.

18.1 From Circulation Control to Soft Power

It is estimated that the first regulations aimed at controlling the circulation of objects of cultural interest emerged under the intermediary of the Catholic Church in the fifteenth century, in the territory of the Papal States, in Italy (Silva 2020; Stubbs 2009; Szopa 2004).

At the turn of the eighteenth century, musealization served as a strategy for retaining cultural property within state limits. Already from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century, the plundering of cultural property during the Napoleonic wars and world conflicts increased the protection of the circulation of cultural heritage as a conduct to be agreed upon between sovereign States, pointing out diplomatic nuances of the circulation control measures. The creation of UNESCO, in 1945, and the adoption of the Hague Convention of 1954 by the Member States began to inaugurate the institutionalization of the theme at the international level. In 1970, circulation control started to have its own international policy with the publication of the Convention on Measures to be Adopted to Prohibit and Prevent the Import, Export and Transfer of Illicit Properties of Cultural Property by UNESCO (1970 Convention). This Convention brings illicit trafficking as a concern in times of peace, encouraging the mobilization of signatory countries that started to incorporate legislation dedicated to controlling the circulation of cultural heritage into their legal frameworks. The implementation of such measures began to mobilize other institutions, generating tasks of integrated and coordinated action between customs and police. Decades later, the sequence of formation of economic blocs at the beginning of the 1990s caused, among its secondary effects, the creation of cultural cooperation agreements, such as the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which establishes protective measures for the circulation of intellectual property and objects that have legal restrictions on their movement; and the Mercosur Cultural Integration Protocol—which included the idealization of the Mercosur Cultural Seal, to eventually promote free circulation of movable heritage along the territory of the signatory countries (Silva 2020).

¹ The term *repatriation* refers to the process of giving back items, human remains, or cultural objects at the request of a government, and occurs at state levels. *Return* refers to the return of a cultural object to the country that it was illegally exported from. *Restitution* refers to the loss following a theft or illegal dispossession of the original owner, state or individual; it sets up as a compensatory measure.

The implementation of measures to control circulation relies on the balance between a mature local legal and administrative structure and an international cooperation network that allows dialogue between these different state control cells over the movement of cultural heritage. In this sense, UNESCO, as well as the International Council of Museums (ICOM), play the role of mobilizing agents by promoting “authorized”² spaces for diplomatic dialogue around the specific themes of cultural heritage preservation. Instruments such as the UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the International Exchange of Cultural Property (1976), the Recommendation for the Protection of Movable Cultural Property (1978) and the Recommendation Concerning the Protection and Promotion of Museums and Collections, their Diversity and their Role in Society (2015) derive from such a dialogic space and establish a direction for what would be considered good agreed practices for the circulation of cultural property.

The brief recap of the establishment of measures to control the circulation of cultural heritage not only points to the growing demand for a multilevel and multi-specialized network for its operation, but also for the confirmation of a favorable political environment to *ensure* the circulation of property following lawful parameters, which, in other words, implies the exercise of ethics and deontology, and the maintenance of international peace and security.

Foradori et al. (2018) draw a parallel between the concept of securitization and multilateral initiatives of international cooperation based on discourses in the arena of heritage governance, highlighting the concept of securitization as a “discursive act”, and also as a “strategic practice”, which produces structural effects. Highlighting the context of resignification of practices to combat illicit trafficking in cultural property from the terrorist attacks of the Islamic State, the authors associate the speeches given by leaders of multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and UNESCO, and by diplomatic representatives of countries such as France, Italy and the UK, to the growing approximation between heritage protection and the development of security policies. Such approach also demonstrates the use of repatriation activities, restitution and return of cultural property as a subsidiary strategy to the international security agenda, highlighting the European attempts to renew trust relations with global south.

As pointed out at the beginning of this article, what we observe is the narrative power involving the very circulation of cultural property gaining space in political speeches delivered in a multilateral environment. The fight against terrorism, and the sociocultural process of decolonization, places the issue of the repatriation, restitution and return of cultural heritage as an effervescent element for the exercise of soft power: or the ability to attract without coercion. To achieve its effects, Joseph and Nye Jr. suggested three main sources for a country’s soft power: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home

² The ‘Authorized Heritage Discourse’ (AHD) is a concept that was introduced by Laurajane Smith in the book “Uses of Heritage” in 2006. According to Smith, the AHD is a hegemonic and professional discourse that “privileges expert values and knowledge about the past and its material manifestations, and dominates and regulates professional heritage practices” (Smith 2006, p. 4).

and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as *legitimate and having moral authority*)” (2008).

It is precisely the cultivation of political values and moral authority that seem to motivate recent initiatives by European colonizing countries in their diplomatic initiatives to strengthen measures to combat illicit trafficking, as well as the repatriation, return and restitution of cultural property, in a public demonstration exercise of what has been constituted as an ethical duty of reparation for the colonial past—without disregarding agendas aligned with the interest of maintaining economic and socio-cultural hegemonies already established by the historical dynamics of domination over developing countries.

18.2 Repatriation, Return and Restitution: Cases to Be Noticed

Through the analysis of the control of the international circulation of movable property, Silva (2020) points to the existence of an extensive network of multilevel and “multi-specialized” international governance, in which the United Nations System is a strategic actor. UNESCO, in turn, plays an important role in legitimizing positions, raising awareness and establishing legal commitments regarding the international control of the circulation. Regarding the issue of repatriation, return and restitution, the Intergovernmental Committee to Promote the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in case of Illicit Appropriation (ICPRCP) is the dedicated space for debate of the theme. The Intergovernmental Committee, created in 1978, brings together 22 Member States and is responsible for seeking ways and means of facilitating bilateral negotiations for the restitution or return of cultural property, as well as presenting proposals of mediation or conciliation to the Member States concerned.

It is possible that the most significant public debate in recent years regarding the issue took place in 2018, during the International Conference on the Circulation of Cultural Property and Shared Heritage, which brought the issue of circulation from political, academic and technical points of view. The event was attended by Director-General of UNESCO, Audrey Azoulay, as well as state representatives from Senegal, Germany, Jordan, France, Benin, Peru, Gabon and Lebanon. After the high-level ministerial panels, the conference brought roundtables addressing topics such as forms of cooperation, ethical debates and the new role of museums.

The ministerial panels reinforced the importance of the commitments of the countries of the global north with the restitution and return of cultural property to their countries of origin as an ethical duty of reparation for the colonial past, in order to rebuild trust with the global south. The views of museum professionals and academics added nuances of a procedural nature to the debates, bringing up issues related to the conservation of cultural property, property rights and the importance of dialogue with communities.

The difference between political and technical and academic discourses was evident at the conference. While the first contained motivations for using cultural heritage as soft power in order to build relationships of trust to reach other diplomatic interests, the other discourses demonstrated the possibilities of establishing cooperation agreements for the area of heritage, contemplating research partnerships, sharing expertise regarding curatorial management of colonial objects, financing conservation activities and restoration of cultural heritage after their repatriation to the countries of origin, among other possibilities. But the nuances of the eminently political processes of circulation are hardly perceived in the face of the wide media dissemination of repatriation actions. This is because,

Lobbyists, government officials, popular articles and student-led university newspapers speciously present repatriation as a one-size-fits-all process with the predetermined goal of liquidating problematic collections and decry museums’ pace in reaching absolution. Such oversimplification subverts not only the intent of relevant legislation and the delicate balance of legitimate interests it aims to achieve but also the varied wishes and priorities of source and descendant communities. [...] *We contend that, just as tired arguments against repatriation toolize racist tropes and colonial condescension, so do blanket calls for repatriation do disservice to it as a practice.* Museum professionals are well aware of the regular movement of collections around the planet—not only for repatriation but also for exhibition loans, research, or specialized analysis. Yet, of these circumstances, repatriation stands apart in its *susceptibility to politicization and sensationalism in media reports* written to castigate legacy institutions as bad actors (Jacobs and Porter 2021).

In the frenzy of repatriating cultural property to exercise soft power, opportunities to create long-term cultural cooperation channels may be in the background, or not even exist. The responsibility of the ICPRCP to pursue the appropriate means of facilitating bilateral negotiations for the repatriation of cultural property to the countries of origin occurs precisely in the sense of legitimizing cultural cooperation as the purpose of repatriations, and not only as its means. It is considering the relevance of bilateral agreements for the investigation of repatriation cases that the following two studies will be presented: the restitution of Goddess Annapurna’s idol to India; and the repatriation of Djidji Ayokwé, or “talking drum” to Côte d’Ivoire, presented at 23rd meeting of ICPRCP. The first case was chosen because it was introduced by Canada as a decentralized initiative, involving only technical bodies of the country; and the second case was selected because it involves France, a country recognized for its strong cultural diplomacy and its persistent use of soft power. Government official statements, and also newspaper and periodical articles were used as research sources precisely to find out how is the approach of the states involved, and the media content, to repatriation and restitution negotiations.

18.3 Canada and India: Restitution of Goddess Annapurna Idol

In the minute of the 23rd meeting of the Committee it is registered that Canada “has not concluded any formal bilateral agreements concerning the return or restitution of cultural property that do not fall within the scope of the 1970 Convention” (UNESCO, 2022). The country also indicated that it has over 2,600 museums, including federal museums, “all of which are independent of the Department of Canadian Heritage (Ministère du Patrimoine canadien) and are responsible for managing their own collections” and because of that “these *museums can independently conclude agreements with foreign States and museums for the return or restitution of cultural property*”. As an example, Canada pointed out the case of restitution of the idol of the Hindu goddess Annapurna, from the collection of the University of Regina (Université de Regina), to India. The Government of Canada’s stated that the role in this process is limited and is of a facilitative nature when requested, and indicated that “formal bilateral agreements are therefore not necessary in its country”.

Indo-Canadian diplomatic relations were established in 1947, the year of the Asian country’s independence. According to Mehta (2019) “Ottawa believed that enhanced ties with India would allow Canada to extend its reach to other Afro-Asian countries and pursue its foreign policy in relative autonomy” and that also “sought to position itself as a ‘bridge’ between the USA and India”.

As Indo-Canadian relations involve countries that are so culturally different from each other, although aligned with common interests, they are also marked by moments of intense distension. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the relationship between them suffered significant convulsions, such as the Insurgency in Punjab—an armed campaign by the Sikh militant Khalistan separatist movement. The aftermath of Punjab involved a diaspora of separatist Sikhs mainly to Canada—a dynamic that was encouraged by the liberal government policy of this country, which made up family reunification the basis for immigration, in order to import human capital.³ Tension came to a head when in 1985, following the massacres of Sikh people under Operation Blue Star conducted by the Indian government, Sikh extremists stationed in Canada, in retaliation, blew up Air India Flight 182 as it left Vancouver airport for India, killing all 329 passengers (including Canadians). After years of attempts at rapprochement, in 2002, following the Gujarat Riots, Canada officially suspended relations with the Indian state (Mehta, 2019).

In 2006, during the tenure of Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, relations were resumed, with the establishment of the Joint Study Group to probe the possibility of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). The two countries also initiated negotiations on a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPPA). By the end of Harper’s term, relations between the two countries had narrowed.

³ Canada is the seventh country with the largest population of the Indian diaspora, with around 1,800,000 inhabitants.

Under the administration of Prime Minister Trudeau, in the context of China’s economic growth and development of conception of the “Indo-Pacific” realm—confluence of specific strategies of countries with similar interests in the region—Canada saw closer cultural engagement with Asian countries, including India, as critical to the success of its economic development objectives. Soft power strategies included financial contribution to Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute, founded in 1968 to promote cultural relations and people-to-people ties. Also, the briefing on Indo-Canadian relations, released by the Ministry of External Affairs of India, brings as relevant events for the rapprochement between the two countries the celebration of 150th Birth Anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi, held from October 2018 to 2020, which included: the proclamation of October 2nd as Gandhi Day by the Mayor of Ottawa, and also a number of activities to mark the 550th Birth Anniversary of Guru Nanak Devji; and the proclamation of August 2020 as “Indian Independence Month”, by the Mayor of Halifax.

Meanwhile, in 2019, the artist Canadian Divya Mehra was invited to stage an exhibition at the MacKenzie Art Gallery in the Saskatchewan town of Regina. The gallery collection, under the care of the University of Regina, was built around a bequest from lawyer Norman MacKenzie in 1936. While visiting the collection, Mehra started a research about an Indian sculpture thought to represent Vishnu, one of the great trinity of Hindu gods. Upon gaining access to the vault in which the statue was stored, Mehra found that it was not a male figure (as Vishnu) but a female one. After this discovery, she contacted Dr. Siddhartha V. Shah, curator of South Asian Art at the Peabody Essex Museum, who revealed that the deity depicted was in fact Annapurna, also known as the Queen of the city of Varanasi—a district in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. Regarded as the spiritual capital of India, the city of Varanasi draws Hindu pilgrims who bathe in the Ganges River’s sacred waters and perform funeral rites.

Reading MacKenzie’s papers, Mehra found that MacKenzie had seen the statue at a riverbank shrine in Varanasi during a 1913 trip to India and expressed his desire to own it. When his guide refused to give him the figure, a stranger who overheard the conversation offered to steal it for him. MacKenzie took the statue, freshly pilfered from an active temple, home to Canada and misidentified it as a portrayal of Vishnu. Mehra brought her findings to MacKenzie’s Interim CEO John Hampton and encouraged him to repatriate the artifact to India (Packard, 2020).

Since the discovery of the idol in the MacKenzie collection Art Gallery—as well as the illegal conditions of its departure from India and permanence in Canada—the restitution took place voluntarily with the cooperation of the University of Regina. On November 19 of 2020, due to COVID-19 sanitary restrictions, a virtual repatriation ceremony was held, attended by Indian and Canadian officials to witness the handover of property. A brief description of some of the speeches given at the ceremony is relevant to the content presented so far.

At the ceremony,⁴ the Interim President and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Regina, Thomas Chase, stated that truth and reconciliation with Canada’s indigenous

⁴ Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q769-baqiaA>

people were very important to Canada as a nation, and the university was trying to help to overcome “the damaging legacy of colonialism” and to write “some of the historical wrongs that persist today”. He proceeds stating that the repatriation of artifacts was “another way to help to repair a damaging colonial legacy” for the university and for the country of Canada. He highlighted that the relationship with India was very important, based on mutual respect, and reinforced that the university had 1500 Indian students.

Accepting the return of this cultural icon, High Commissioner of India to Canada, Ajay Bisaria mentions that the Indian diaspora fully integrated into Canadian life added “dynamism and resilience to the Canadian fabric”, including Indians in leadership positions in politics, business, and also in the arts and education. Bisaria also stated that the year before 230,000 Indian students had chosen Canadian universities and colleges for higher education. He ended his speech by mentioning that Annapurna’s idol would remain not only as an artifact of Indian heritage, but also a symbol of the Indo-Canadian partnership.

Also noteworthy is the statement by David Hartman, Director-General of South Asia at the Global Affairs Canada, who represented the government, including customs and the department of cultural heritage. Hartman applauded the restitution initiative and mentioned that Canada recognizes that trafficking impoverishes the cultural heritage of a nation. In addition, he mentioned the return of the statue “Parrot Lady” by then Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 2015, as the first case of repatriation of a cultural property by Canada to India, and as a gesture of affirming “strong bilateral cultural ties”.

Finally, another speech relevant to the theme was delivered by Alex King, Curator/Preparator, of the University of Regina President’s Art Collection, who told the story of the creation of the Norman Mackenzie gallery. She confessed being ashamed of the circumstances in which the idol was collected in India and said she hoped its return to its place of origin would bring answers, and collective healing. King alludes to similar cases around the world and associates them to “cultural exploration” and also as motivators for reviewing institutional choices, stating that transparency was paramount, even if it brought pain.

After negotiations with the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), the nodal agency to perform the task of repatriation in that country, the idol of Annapurna returned to India in October 2021, arriving at Kashi Vishwanath Temple after a 4-day pilgrimage from New Delhi. Large crowds gathered at Varanasi for the final ceremony at the Temple, where the Prana Prathista (a ritual of consecration) was performed. The Ministry of Culture of India stated that the success of the restitution was due to the “continuous cultural relations with various countries of the world and the warm personal relations which the Prime Minister [Narendra Modi]” shared with other heads of the countries. Stated the repatriation as an active step to appreciate and acknowledge the historical past of India.

Narendra Modi has then being elected twice by Varanasi constituency to become the prime minister of India. It should be noted that Varanasi is part of Uttar Pradesh, a state with a population of 232 million people, and sends the largest number of members to the Indian parliament. The pilgrimage of the Annapurna idol and the

enshrinement ceremony took place in the presence of a large crowd, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic—with India being one of the countries most affected by the spread of the virus. Meanwhile, in honor of the repatriation, the MacKenzie exhibited Mehra’s sculpture “There is nothing you can possess which I cannot take away (Not Vishnu: New ways of Darsána)”, made to take the place of Annapurna idol at Mackenzie Art Gallery. The sculpture is a bag of sand that weighs exactly as much as the statue, purchased at a Hollywood prop store rich in Indiana Jones memorabilia.

Also, regarding this case, it is important to notice not only Canadian interests in the Indo-Pacific region, but also the interest of the University of Regina itself in nurturing relations with India as well. According to Global Affairs Canada, the Indo-Pacific region represents “significant opportunities for growing the economy”, as well as “opportunities for Canadian workers and businesses for decades to come” (Global Affairs Canada, online). As for University of Regina, the recruitment of international students brought an estimated revenue of more than 24 million dollars a year, according to Livia Castellanos, former Vice-President of international affairs at the university, in an interview for CBC News, in 2017.⁵ According to McCartney (2016), there has always been a link between Canadian foreign policy and International Education since the Canadian government has had an interest in it as a tool to cultivate its soft power, albeit its orientation has largely been in the context of a western hegemonic world operating with colonialist perspectives toward the global South.

18.4 Côte d’Ivoire and France: Repatriation of Djidji Ayokwé Drum

In the minute of the 23rd meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee, Côte d’Ivoire provided information on ongoing restitution requests with France, including the *Djidji Ayokwé drum*. The Quai Branly-Jacques Chirac Museum and the Museum of Civilizations of Côte d’Ivoire have jointly studied the provenance and history of the drum, and the case was considered the subject of bilateral cultural, museum, heritage and scientific cooperation, which is being followed by inter-ministerial decisions on the part of both stakeholders.

Côte d’Ivoire was a French colony between 1880 and 1960, when the country achieved its independence. Immediately after obtaining independence, Côte d’Ivoire came under the French sphere of influence known as “*Françafrique*”—a gray zone of diplomacy, involving a special network consisting of politicians, state officials, military officers, heads of oil and tools firms and members of the African elite, developing French policy-making. In this context, cooperation agreements were established on issues such as security, defense, diplomatic consultation and cultural, economic and

⁵ “India the new frontier for U of Regina student recruitment”, Nichole Huck for CBC News, September 14, 2017.

political matters (Schmidt 2013). Relations between both nations became closer and France became Côte d'Ivoire's largest trading partner.

Africa is of strategic importance to France. Due to colonial links, Africa is tied to France economically, politically and diplomatically. For decades the continent has been part of French prestige. Historical wars such as the Second World War considerably weakened France. As a result, close relations with its colonies seemed to offer one way of restoring its image as a great power (Raphala 2017).

The first president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, assumed the presidency of the country until 1993, when he died. Raphala (2017) points out that, economically, Houphouët-Boigny “transformed Côte d'Ivoire into an agricultural export power and the financial and services hub of West Africa through a close economic partnership with French interests”. In the security front, Côte d'Ivoire and France have always had military bonds, and that President Boigny was one of the closest allies of France. Also, their “military links resulted in the conclusion of a defense agreement between the two countries and in the establishment of a French permanent military base in Abidjan” (Raphala 2017; Piccolino 2011).

Internally, the country went through fragmentation that intensified with Boigny's death. Henri Konan Bédié succeeded the former president, while the economic situation continued to worsen. Bédié was accused of corruption and sociopolitical repression while dissatisfaction kept growing, leading to the coup d'état in December 1999, which installed the former army commander, Robert Guéi, as the country's president. The following year, after a troubled electoral process, Laurent Gbagbo was elected president of the country, until his capture and imprisonment years later during the Second Ivorian Civil War, due to 2010s elections that had placed his opponent (and current president of the country), Alassane Ouattara, in power.

According to Raphala (2017) during Gbagbo's term in office, there were a lot of misunderstandings and distrusts between him and Paris. He tried to loosen France's control over Côte d'Ivoire, and “reverse decades of French hegemony and economic strangulation”. While in power, Gbagbo decided to create a Central Bank that would allow the Côte d'Ivoire to have its own currency and free itself from the monetary dependence of other former French colonies in the region, whose currency remains under French control (Feierstein 2019), as long as other actions that went against French interests in the country.

As the cooperation agreements between France and its former colonies dictate, French companies have a first preference to buy raw materials from its former colonies. However, Gbagbo breached the pact when he awarded a contract to build a bridge in the capital (Abidjan) to China for a cheap price. Within this context, it can be asserted that Paris call for Gbagbo to relinquish power was bound up with France's commercial interests, especially considering the rising competition with China for influence in Africa (Raphala 2017).

In 2002, insurgents dissatisfied with Gbagbo's policy, driven by the desire for a re-run of the 2000 election and reform of exclusionary citizenship policies—which had the effect of excluding candidate Alassane Ouattara from the election—started the conflict known as the First Ivorian Civil War. During the conflict, France sent troops to the country to maintain peace and to negotiate a return to peace in the

nation. In November 2004, an armed conflict took place when Ivorian government jets attacked French peacekeepers killing nine people. As a result, French military forces subsequently clashed with Ivorian troops and government-loyal mobs. After a wave of anti-French protests—and French military reinforcement on Ivorian soil—in March 2007, a peace agreement was signed between the Ivorian government and the rebels.

In 2010, the country went through other elections, in a context of tensions and intense division between the north (supporters of the former Prime Minister Ouattara) and the south (whose majority supported Gbagbo), when Ouattara was declared the winner. Shortly after the Constitutional Council, which validates election results, declared Ouattara’s victory void, since a crucial part of his votes had not been counted within the legal deadline, which led to a new civil crisis of international proportions that would end up starting the Second Civil War. After months of unsuccessful negotiations, the crisis entered a critical stage as Ouattara’s forces seized control of most of the country with the help of the UN, while Gbagbo became entrenched in Abidjan. The UN and French forces took military action, with the stated objective to protect their forces and civilians. By the end of the conflict, France’s forces arrested Gbagbo at his residence in April 2011.

After officially taking office as President of Côte d’Ivoire, Ouattara made his visit to Paris as a head of state to personally thank Nicholas Sarkozy and his government for France’s intervention, a gesture that signaled the resumption of a relationship closer with France. However, there have been several high-level visits between leaders of both nations. In August 2017, President Ouattara traveled to Paris to meet with French President Emmanuel Macron, and in December 2019, President Macron paid a visit to Abidjan.

But France may have found Côte d’Ivoire embroiled in another political landscape of its foreign policy. Indeed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Integration and Diaspora, responsible for the implementation and the monitoring of the Government’s Policy on Côte d’Ivoire Foreign Policy, in collaboration with the various ministerial departments involved, has declared in its administrative statements that one of the most important actions to be conducted by that office is to forge renewed partnerships with new allies from Asian countries and Arabian Gulf.

Côte d’Ivoire has developed relations in recent years with China, India and the UK. China is behind a number of major infrastructure projects in the country, such as the modernization of the Port of Abidjan. In 2018, the countries signed five cooperation agreements during President Ouattara’s state visit to Beijing and a memorandum of understanding on participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

The unprecedented global expansion of Chinese media and communication networks over the past decade, specifically in Africa, raises important questions about the changing media landscape in what is emerging as one of the major media markets in the world. In 2012, CCTV News set up a media hub in Nairobi for its pan-African operations. However, China is not alone in this endeavor, driven by geo-political and economic considerations. Apart from USA, European, Japanese, Russian and Brazilian interests, India, the other Asian giant, is also deploying its hard and soft power in Africa (Thussu 2016).

Links with other countries, along with decolonial movement in the country, have changed the sociocultural landscape of Côte d'Ivoire and aroused feelings of aversion to links with France, which has led the European country to increasingly adopt cultural diplomacy, and the use of soft power as a means of smoothing out differences. In his speech at the University of Ouagadougou, Emmanuel Macron emphasized that he seeks equal partnerships, and not domination, on the continent. In the initiative to dialogue directly with the theme of decolonization, Macron pledged to return many of the African antiques controversially held by France. To that intent he tasked art historian Bénédicte Savoy and Senegalese writer Felwine Sarr with reviewing how African artifacts could be returned to their countries of origin. The report, titled "The Restitution of African Cultural Heritage: Toward a New Relational Ethics", was delivered one year after the Ouagadougou speech, in late November 2018.

The Sarr-Savoy report—intensely criticized for oversimplifying the issue of repatriation in its effects—states colonization as a "crime against humanity", and that every taking from Africa during the period of colonization is illegitimate. The report also acknowledges that the greater legacy of colonialism is economic inequality, political instability and humanitarian tragedies. At the end, it brings appendices, maps, charts and lists of objects of African heritage in French museums—among them, a list indicating 3951 Ivorian artifacts.

It is worth mentioning that Côte d'Ivoire had then mobilized to preserve its movable cultural heritage, after several looting acts occurred during the Second Ivorian Civil War. Such awareness led to the creation and mobilization of several entities with responsibility for protecting the country's cultural property, namely the Ivorian Office for Cultural Heritage, the Cultural Heritage Department, the Cultural Brigade, the National Central Office of INTERPOL, the National Police, Customs and public museums. The Law no. 87-806 dated July 28, 1987, on the preservation of cultural heritage, which hasn't been implemented, gained a new text in Law no. 2014-425 of July 14, 2014, that provided for coercive measures, with sentences and high fines designed to dissuade thieves and traffickers (Memel-Kassi 2020).

Immediately after publication of the Sarr-Savoy report, the government of Côte d'Ivoire published a list demonstrating interest in repatriation of 148 objects, and a formal request to French authorities has been issued through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the symbolic return of the Tchaman (or Ébrié) war drum Djidji Ayokwè, and the building of a museum of international standards by 2023 configured as part of this broad program of cooperation.

Confiscated in 1916 by French colonists, the Djidji Ayôkwé drum, or "talking drum", is carved in a single piece measuring 3.50 length. Considered as the true means of communication of the Ébrié people against French colonization, the drums served above all to sound the alarm about the arrival of French colonists. As it emitted various sounds, the drum served to transmit messages to the different villages of Abidjan and could be heard within a radius of up to 20 km. In an interview for Agence France Presse, in October 11, 2021, Aguego Mobio, leader of the Ébrié declared, after Macron's commitment to repatriate Djidji Ayokwè:

“We thank President Macron and expect a favorable follow-up to this announcement,” said Mobio. A large ceremony would soon be held to “inform the seven villages that make up the Ébrié people” in the Abidjan region, he added. “This talking drum will recall our history and raise the image of the Ébrié people, whose traces are disappearing with the uncontrolled urbanization of the Abidjan area, home to more than five million inhabitants” (Agence France Presse 2021).

What seems to be a dialogue in the political arena does not follow the scenario of the necessary procedures for carrying out the repatriation. Senator Catherine Morin-Desailly, who formed the Commission of Museums of France, meant to provide input on the reclassification of exhibited works—considered a necessary step in the restitution process—at the time of the announcement of the dismantling of the aforementioned commission, stated that:

“The purpose of this body was to establish sound reclassification criteria, but it was never given what it needed to carry out this work. Its members were not reimbursed for their travel expenses and the implementation orders took years to be released. The public authorities never provided what was necessary in order to compel museums to repatriate works when decisions along these lines were taken. Curators resisted our efforts, as did the Ministry of Culture.” (Marbot, 2020).

In the midst of an internal legal and administrative scenario dislocated with regard to the fulfillment of political promises of repatriation, France returned Omar Tall’s sword to Senegal in 2019, and 28 bronzes to Benin in November 2021. As for Djidji Ayôkwé, the repatriation remains highly anticipated⁶ by Côte d’Ivoire, but no further information was found about the construction of the international museum, foreseen as part of the agreement between the countries.

18.5 Considerations

Regarding UNESCO as the main catalyst of structural policies related to the circulation of cultural heritage, the brief analysis of the political speeches given in this legitimizing instance was considered the starting point of the research. The International Conference on the Circulation of Cultural Property and Shared Heritage, demonstrated the eagerness of countries to exercise soft power based on the repatriation of cultural assets, in contrast to technical and academic positions that offer alternatives, as well as complementary actions to contribute to long-term cooperation dialogues.

The minute of the 23rd session of the ICPRCP, in which member countries present their bilateral agreements, two cases were chosen for analysis of the extent to which cooperation had occurred, through official statements and media content of newspapers. In both cases, a proactive dialogue between the parties involved was not

⁶ The arrival of the Djidji Ayokwe at the Museum of Civilization in Abidjan can only be confirmed once the French Parliament votes on a law allowing its official return, similar to the restitution of historical pieces to Benin approved by the French parliament in December 2020.

discernible. The so-called bilateral agreements actually name reactive repatriation initiatives. The Annapurna idol was returned as a result of Divya Mehra's mobilization within MacKenzie Art Gallery and the University of Regina, ended with the return of the idol to India, accompanied by positive propaganda to the Indian Prime Minister, and the promotion of the University of Regina as a receiving institution for Indian students.

The Djidji Ayokwé drum is in the process of being repatriated as a result of France's systematic soft power policy led by current President Macron, which chooses to use the circulation of property back to their countries of origin as a pillar for relationships of trust with former colonies, in order to compete with outside influences in Africa, such as China. Furthermore, and most importantly, the absence of official information that mentions the Ébrié represents a significant gap in the repatriation process and raises questions about the representativeness of the communities of origin in other similar cases, soft power interests eclipse cultural cooperation purposes.

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Chapter 19

Colonial Marks in African Museums: Cases from Guinea-Bissau and Senegal



Thiago H. Mota

Abstract This chapter analyzes two African museums facing the debate on the decolonization of collections: the National Ethnographic Museum (MEN, from Museum Etnográfico Nacional), from Guinea-Bissau, and the Museum of Black Civilizations (MCN, from Musée des Civilisations Noires), from Senegal. The MNE was opened in 1988 but was ravaged by the 1998–1999 civil war, suffering irrecoverable losses. It reopened in 2001, lasting only until 2009. After another interstice, a multi-disciplinary and international team sought to recover the memories of the museum's founding and, in 2017, it was reopened to the public, until the new closure, during the COVID-19 pandemic. MCN is a thematic museum inaugurated in Dakar, Senegal, in December 2018. Projecting itself as a leader in the pan-African cultural scene, Senegal has invested in the production of a public memory that claims a character that is both modern and traditional, along with the lines of the Negritude Movement of the first half of the twentieth century. From these two institutions, representations of African religions will be discussed, a topic dear to the African diaspora around the world, based on the following question: how pieces with a religious profile, coming from different ethnic, national, or continental African communities, were recontextualized in museums? Their characterization as art or religion can be enlightening about the role that museums attribute to the cultures portrayed into them and to the people who produce and live that culture. After all, what is valued is the point of view of the makers of culture or is it the foreign views on them? This proposal stems from the debate around the decolonization of museums around the world that, in most cases, has been applied to Western museums, particularly European ones. Restitution policies for African countries are being proposed and new arrangements for African collections in the West are presented by curators who are concerned about the importance of rescuing the historicity of these museums and pieces that portray once-colonized societies, their cultures and forms of expression. Archaeologist and curator of the African collection at the Pitt Rivers Museum, Oxford, Dan Hicks argues that colonial museums became visible when they failed to justify and legitimize European colonization. They were initially created in Europe, in the second half of the nineteenth century, and can be understood as a material resource that acted

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as a mechanism that allowed the functioning of societies from the implantation of colonialism to the post-colonial regime, from a regime of coloniality. Their role was to produce and maintain a hierarchical image of human experiences, daily updating the European colonial conquest over other societies. Their collections resulted from intentional looting that were not collateral effects of the colonial conquest: rather, they were in its axis of legitimation, they were decidedly sought after and coveted as a form of subjugation of the conquered peoples. However, while everyone looks at Western museums, little is said about African institutions. What is the role of African museums in today's world? How do they participate in this debate? This is the theme of this chapter.

Keywords African museums · Senegal · Guinea-Bissau · Collections · Decolonization

The debate around the decolonization of museums around the world has mostly been applied to Western museums, particularly European ones. Restitution policies for African countries are being proposed and new arrangements for African collections in the West are presented by curators who are aware of the importance of rescuing the historicity of the museum and of pieces that portray societies that were once colonized, their cultures and forms of expression.¹ However, the *coloniality* of museums—or the persistent colonial condition that subordinates societies and cultures and crosses these institutions—is not the prerogative of European or Western museums. Throughout the African continent, institutions of social memory such as these can also have—and often have—colonial perspectives to address domestic cultures. Thus, this chapter seeks to discuss which history is taught in African museums.

Archaeologist and curator of the African collection at the Pitt Rivers Museum, Oxford, Dan Hicks argues that colonial museums became visible when they failed to justify and legitimize European colonization. Understanding the ethnographic museum as a material device created by and for a new Anglo-German imperialist ideology, at the end of the nineteenth century, Hicks argues that this institution must be analyzed from its materiality. Supported by studies of the anthropology of science and technology, the author argues: the objects with which we interact, which act on us, just as we act on them, become surprisingly visible when they stop working. When objects are no longer able to perform the function for which they were designed, we notice their presence, feel their absence, and experience discomfort. Ethnographic museums stopped working.²

These institutions were initially created in Europe, in the second half of the nineteenth century, and can be understood as material resources that operated in the functioning of the societies that generated them, from the implantation of colonialism

¹ Sarr and Bénédicte (2018) and Brulon (2020, pp. 1–30).

² Hicks (2020, pp. 09–11).

to the post-colonial period, based on a regime of coloniality. Its function was to produce and maintain a hierarchical image of human experiences, daily updating the European colonial conquest over other societies, such as African ones. As spaces for informal education, they reiterated the colonial condition attributed to non-European peoples within the scope of European imperialist expansion. Its collections, it must be remembered, resulted from intentional looting that was not a side effect of the colonial conquest. The search for collections for the newly created European ethnographic museums was one of the axes that structured the colonial conquests: foreign objects were decidedly sought and coveted as a way of subjugating the conquered peoples.

The conquest of Benin City, in present-day Nigeria, in 1897, was described by one of the curators of the British Museum and his assistant, in 1899, in the catalog of the exhibition *Antiquities from the City of Benin*, as retaliation for an attack suffered by the British in 1892. The military expedition sent in 1896, say the organizers of the collection catalog, “destroyed Benin City and made accessible to students of ethnography the interesting works of native art”, which formed the collection presented in this text.³ Also in 1897, the director of the Ethnological Museum in Berlin celebrated the fact that one of his students participated in another military expedition, declared as punitive, against the Ngolo, between the south of present-day Angola and the north of Namibia: “we can expect very bright things”—wrote the director of the museum, about a secret military expedition—after all, not so secret after all.⁴ The pieces that were sent to London and Berlin, in this context, were not random loot: they were decidedly coveted.

European colonial rule in Africa went into decline after 1945 and formally dissolved over the course of a few decades. But there, in the heart of empires, museums remained, maintaining the colonial conquest as timeless and endless: the exhibition of war booty has always carried within itself the meaning of military victory, conquest, and its permanent continuity. This narrative worked so well that it was not even noticed. However, the advance of the post-colonial debate, the mobility of people around the globe, the criticism of colonial permanence in the contemporary world were triggers that made the museum of yore stop working. So its presence became a visible nuisance. How to deal with this legacy, its collections, its history, and its very existence? A strong debate involving curators from European, American, and African museums, researchers from all corners and civil societies from several countries has been formed.⁵ However, while everyone looks to Western museums, little is said about African institutions. What is the role of African museums in today’s world? How do they participate in this debate?

Therefore, this chapter proposes to analyze two African museums in the face of the debate on the decolonization of collections. To do so, we will address religious representations within these museums. How are pieces with a religious profile, coming from diverse ethnic, national, or continental communities, recontextualized

³ Ibid., p. 05.

⁴ Sarr and Savoy, op. cit., pp. 24–25.

⁵ Beurden (2022).

in museums? Its characterization as art or religion can be elucidative about the role that the museum attributes to the portrayed cultures and, particularly, to the people who produce and live the culture. After all, what is valued is the point of view of the makers of culture or is it the foreign eyes on them? As a research agenda, I believe that the study of African museums in the context of the decolonization of museum collections should start from three pillars: the constitution of collections, the narrative regime of exhibitions, and communication with the target audience. In this chapter, I will focus on just one of these pillars: the narrative regime of exhibitions. So, I start with the following question: which Africa is narrated in African museums?

To forward the answer, I analyze part of the exhibitions of the *Museum of Black Civilizations*, based in Dakar, Senegal, and the *National Ethnographic Museum*, placed in Bissau, capital of Guinea-Bissau. My main argument is that the fact that these are African institutions, headquartered in African countries, with collections referring to national or continental cultures, is not capable, by itself, of characterizing such museums as freed from rhetoric, perspectives, and colonial arrangements. Rather, it is necessary to pay attention to the selective use they make of colonial narratives in search of the consolidation of post-colonial political ideologies, disputed interests in domestic societies, rearrangement of forces and influences on the international scene.

19.1 The Museums

The National Ethnographic Museum of Guinea-Bissau is one of the institutions that occupy us in this study. Opened in 1988, the museum was devastated by the 1998–1999 civil war, suffering irrecoverable losses. It reopened in 2001, but lasted only until 2009. After another interstice, a multidisciplinary and international team sought to recover the memories of the foundation of the museum and, in 2017, it was opened to the public again, with the exhibition “National Ethnographic Museum: 30 years of History”.⁶ This exhibition remained on display until 2020, when the museum was closed again by the new national government due to its proximity to the presidential office, and remains so. Despite the name, the focus of the exhibition—which is the object of this study—was on the formation of the museum, between 1986 and 1988, and not on the 30 years celebrated in 2018.

The National Ethnographic Museum was designed along the lines of those created in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. Its guidelines are the collection, study, preservation, and dissemination of the cultures present in the country. It is not a museum that considers the historicity of these cultures, which are presented as units in themselves, giving the visitor the impression that they are as they have always been. The exhibited pieces, when removed from their original contexts, underwent a new process of museological contextualization, with a marked concern to demonstrate

⁶ Mendes et al. (2018, pp. 26–30).
Ibid., p. 24.

the social use that was made of them, associating the museologized objects with photographs that portray their use in the communities from which they come. The exhibition descriptors bring both textual and photographic information. As Albano Mendes, museum curator, anthropologist Ramón Sarró and museologist Ana Temudo point out, the museum is “marked by a strong didactic character and connection to the community, [exhibiting] the photographic records in dialogue with the objects collected in the field, bringing the observer closer to the places and daily activities of the Guinean population”.⁷

The other West African institution that interests us is the Museum of Black Civilizations, a thematic museum inaugurated in Dakar, Senegal, in December 2018. Projecting itself as a leader in the pan-African cultural scene, Senegal has invested in the production of a memory public that claims a character that is both modern and traditional, along the lines of the Blackness Movement of the first half of the twentieth century.⁸ One example is the construction of the *Monument to the African Renaissance*, a sculpture made of copper and bronze, 52 m high, inaugurated in the country’s capital in 2010. Another is the Museum of Black Civilizations, whose presentation in the inaugural exhibition attributes deep roots in the past, teleologically:

The birth of the Museum of Black Civilizations (MCN) has its roots in the 1966 World Festival of Black Arts, itself preceded by several events. Let us cite the Congresses of black writers and artists held respectively in Paris in 1956 and Rome in 1959; the wave of African independence during the 1960s and later the liberation wars of the 1990s. Events that also echoed the Pan-African Conferences held in London in 1900, as well as the Paris Congresses in 1919, Dar es Salaam in 1974, Kampala in 1994 and Accra in 2014.⁹

Using retrospective reading, the museum projects itself as a tributary institution of pan-African ideals on a continental scale, particularly through the “African Civilizations” room. Here, an idea of Africa is projected into religions born within the continent, conceived as a central element of what is called “traditional life”. Added to this is the Pan-African inspired facilities, that were conceived after “the impluvium of the Casamance region in Senegal and Greater Zimbabwe”.¹⁰ The museum sets itself up as a landmark in the cultural landscape of Dakar, next to the Grand National Theater—although little known by the local population, including by taxi drivers who, supposedly, should be used to taking visitors to the place. It is a monument that feeds on a registered past to launch Senegal into the future, as a continental reference.

⁷ Ibid., p. 24.

⁸ Reis (2014).

⁹ MUSÉE des Civilizations Noires, exhibition.

¹⁰ MUSÉE des Civilizations Noires, exhibition.

19.2 Religion: From “Essence of Life” to Ethnographic Curiosity

In the constitution of the collections of both institutions, a central role is played by objects whose meaning oscillates between art and religion. As informed throughout the Guinean exhibition, “many of the objects collected by the Installing Commission and the places photographed on the ground (such as places of worship, or *balobas* in Kriol) are related to spiritual beliefs”.¹¹ Therefore, many of the pieces on display had a religious meaning in their original context of production and use. However, when they entered museums, they were recontextualized. In some cases, the past religious meaning is summoned from the new scene in which the play is shown, but the cultural and religious meaning is lost, eventually leaving its trace.

An example of this process is the preference for pieces of material and religious culture of the Nalu ethnic group, at the National Ethnographic Museum of Bissau. Among the religious expressions of different ethnic groups in the country, those coming from the Nalus are highlighted in the Museum’s permanent exhibition due less to their religious meaning than to the artistic value attributed by the agents of the commission in charge of installing the Museum. The pluriethnic civil society of Guinea-Bissau has no participation in this selection, it is not invited to participate, reduced to an object that is talked about. It is the artistic appeal attributed by those who conceived the museum that made the special nalus pieces, as one of the descriptive panels of the exhibition reads:

Several of the expeditions of the National Ethnographic Museum Installation Commission were destined for the south of the country, in the region of Tombali inhabited by the Nalus. This small ethnic group attracted attention for being authors of impressive little-known artistic works, among which the famous *nimba stands out*, an impressive female head and bust, which constitutes the largest piece made of a single piece of wood in the entire African continent, the gigantic *matimb* o drums (which reach 1m70cm in height), the figure with the head of a *matchol bird*, or the *koni* bird used as a symbol of the Museum.¹²

As Bruno Brulon argues, “in museums of the *first arts*, when *artification* is carried out as a process of desacralization of objects by the museum, these are alienated from their religious context, ceasing to have meaning for one society, to make sense in another”.¹³ In the case of the Ethnographic Museum of Bissau, it is a national Museum that portrays its domestic cultures with a foreign look. The Nalu community is not invited to participate in the construction process of its representation. Other ethnic groups, on the other hand, are underrepresented because they lack the artistic zeal attributed to the Nalu. The local religious sense gives way to the artistic sense produced outside the continent, more in dialogue with the field of African art history studies than with the history of local culture.

In addition, the exhibition does not dialogue with the Guinean population. Although Albano Mendes, Ramón Sarró, and Ana Temudo have argued that the

¹¹ National Ethnographic Museum of Guinea-Bissau, exhibition.

¹² National Ethnographic Museum of Guinea-Bissau, exhibition.

¹³ Brulon (2013).

museum has a strong didactic character and connection with the community, the exhibition seems to elect another audience: it is Nalu culture specialists (not its makers, but its scholars), who will have museum an “ethnographic document”, as evidenced by the excerpt below, taken from one of the descriptors of the exhibition:

Members of the Installing Commission were also able to photograph the work of making masks and the solemn dances of Nalus men and women. These images, which until then had not been captured by ethnographers, are today an ethnographic document of great value to specialists in the Nalu culture, much better known in the neighboring Republic of Guinea than in Guinea-Bissau, where the ethnic group is more numerous.¹⁴

The concern with the ethnographic value, in turn, led to a greater commitment by the museum’s installation commission to the process of incorporating the initial meanings of the pieces, recontextualized in the museological space. This procedure resulted in the presentation of objects, selected for their artistic appeal, accompanied by photographs that refer to the contexts in which the pieces were used. The images below show two of the pieces on display, the Goddess of Fertility, Nimba, and the Goddess of Fanado, Ninte Kamatchol, and the photographs that accompany the exhibition, on a side panel, with their respective descriptions (Figs. 19.1, 19.2, 19.3, 19.4, 19.5, 19.6, 19.7 and 19.8).

As can be seen, the construction of the exhibition at the National Ethnographic Museum of Bissau is aimed at an audience outside the portrayed communities and even the country. Although it is a post-colonial collection, since it was not produced within the scope of colonialism and its resources marked by violence, we have no information about the means of access to the pieces: whether donation, purchase from communities, expropriation or manufacture of objects similar to those used for expository purposes. Further research is needed to arrive at these answers. For now, what is evident is that the collection maintains a colonial narrative, conceiving cultures outside of time and producing restrictive knowledge, since it does not elect the local public as a partner in the dialogue.

The exhibition organizers argue that its “main goal was to sensitize Guinean publics to their material culture, as well as to help them reflect on the consequences of a war that caused not only many human losses, but also the dematerialization of their cultural heritage”.¹⁵ What we have, however, is the permanence of a look at national cultures conceived as alterities within their own country, communicated to outside observers. There is a museological perspective occupied in “collecting, studying, conserving and disseminating Guinean cultural and artistic heritage”¹⁶ that distinguishes those who think (“specialists of nalus cultures”, “Installing Commission”, “ethnographers”) from those who are thought (“men and nalus women”).

In this way, the museum reifies a condition of subalternity attributed to part of the national community. Although there is a genuine concern with the presentation of cultures, instead of focusing exclusively on the pieces, people are left aside: in the exhibition catalog, where the photographs that make up the collection are presented,

¹⁴ National Ethnographic Museum of Guinea-Bissau, exhibition.

¹⁵ Mendes et al. Al., op. cit., p. 30.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 53.

Fig. 19.1 Nimba: Nalú wood sculpture. Represented in the form of a woman, supported on four feet. Considered a goddess of fertility and also protector of Tabanca, or village, from endemic diseases against children. Photo by author



people are anonymous, they matter only as a group ethnic: it's the Mandinka elder, the woman swinging fishing... only the members of the installing commission are appointed, the only subjects in fact.

At the Museum of Black Civilizations, in Dakar, the disappearance of societies whose cultures are portrayed in the exhibition is flagrant. The focus is exclusively on the material condition of the pieces, as can be seen in one of the main rooms, on the first floor, entitled "African Civilizations". Here, the autochthonous religions of the continent are textually presented as great civilizational engines:

In the traditional African context, religion is an essential aspect of life. It pervades all its aspects and infuses meaning into the African social, economic and political dimension. But there are deeper channels through which traditional religion helps the community to realize its ideal of harmonious living. They include the transmission of certain important religious ideas and beliefs, initiation practices, ritual activities, forms of sacred symbols, and vital public institutions.¹⁷

However, the descriptive narrative is built through the constant use of the pair tradition *versus* modernity. It can be seen in the following excerpt: "Even in the modern State: traditional African religions, which were rightly qualified as matrices

¹⁷ MUSÉE des Civilizations Noires, exhibition.

Fig. 19.2 Preparation/
ornamentation of the nimbi



of popular culture, play an essential role in realizing this value that is so important among all traditional African groups”. African tradition, traditional religion, and popular culture are concepts that signify each other in the same discursive field, to which the modern State is opposed. Such an opposition, as will be seen, does not take place with regard to the representations that this museum brings of Islam, which would be a suitable religious expression in Senegalese modernity, which built it. Through this resource, the museum materializes the tension between “a modernity that is often an illusion of development and a tradition that sometimes reflects a weak image of a mythical past”.¹⁸

Despite the favorable speech and in praise of local religions subordinated to the concept of tradition, the exhibition of the pieces does not dialogue with this conception, which shows the neglect of the supposed tradition in favor of an idea of modernity. In February 2020, when this research was conducted, the museum presented a single general descriptor for the collection of objects, from different parts of the continent, exhibited under the label “African civilizations”. The descriptor reads:

¹⁸ Mudimbe (2013).

Fig. 19.3 Nimba mask



Fig. 19.4 Nimba drummers



Fig. 19.5 Women in the nimba dance



Fig. 19.6 Ninte Kamatchol: Nalú Sculpture. Considered the Goddess of Fanado (Circumcision). Also used to do Justice. Photo by author




Fig. 19.7 Matchol dance



Fig. 19.8 Matchol dance

In Africa, the mask and statuary are fundamentally of spiritual and metaphysical value; a sociocultural concept that helps African people create their sense of what constitutes order, law, authority, and the right way people should be governed.

The production of a uniform idea of “Africa”, as a continent composed of a single culture, is related to the pan-Africanist principle that governs the exhibition. With regard to the formation of cultures, religious objects, such as masks and wooden statues, are presented as central to the formation of African societies and cultures. The exhibition, however, completely loses sight of these attributions, stripping the pieces of the religious sense they had, by recontextualizing them in the Museum space. The following image provides a panoramic view of the exhibition, showing its organization along the lines of Western museums of African art, marked by ethnic classification (Fig. 19.9).

When walking among the pieces, the visitor does not find anything that suggests clues about the meanings that these objects had in the cultures in which they were created. We are only informed of the ethnic, geographic origin, and material composition of each object. Their journeys to the museum, their original meanings, the reasons for being there in that room... all of this escapes us. The exhibition is produced to generate pleasure in those who see it, emptying the pieces of any meaning that extrapolates the observer. It primarily caters to foreign visitors, especially those in




Fig. 19.9 When religion becomes art. Photo by author

the market niche known as “diaspora tourism”, made up of black African-American people in search of cultural consumption that supposedly connects them with their African roots, however superficial these “roots” might be.¹⁹

The images below, an *nkisi* bakongo and a Yoruba *Ibeji*, are examples of this process. They were completely emptied of their religious significance. There is a museological recontextualization unconcerned with their meaning, appreciated exclusively for their aesthetic qualities apprehended within the scope of what came to be labeled as “African art” in the West. This despite the fact that the museum presents itself as a promoter of spiritual values that it considers to be genuinely African. The *nkisi* bacongo, for example, is even presented through the classification as a “fetish”, coming from the Portuguese colonial nomenclature. The *Ibeji*, the orixá of the twins, has no explanation about its origin and spiritual meaning, past and present. We are only informed about the size of the piece, 35 cm, and its origin in the Yoruba culture of Nigeria. What “important religious ideas and beliefs, initiation practices, ritual activities, forms of sacred symbols and vital public institutions”, presented in the exhibition descriptor, are conveyed here? We do not know (Fig. 19.10).

The religious context of the piece, its social use, its meanings, and the appreciation of those who produced and used such an object or similar ones: all this is lost. The “spiritual and metaphysical value” and the conception of religion as “a primordial aspect of life” are replaced by the cold description of the materials used, the ethnic and geographical origin of the piece. How did they get to the museum? What were their routes? Who made them? When? What is the history of the pieces and the people they refer to? We know nothing.

¹⁹ Silverman (2015).



Fig. 19.10 Left: “Fetish with nails, DR Congo-Bakongo. Fabric, vegetable fiber ropes, yellow and white kaolin with nails and iron strips, glass and two ox horns. Height: 2.45 m”. Right: “Ibeji pair, girl and boy, Nigeria-Yoruba, wood, height: 35 cm.” Photo by author

19.3 Islam in a Senegalese Museum

Senegal is a country where around 96% of the population is Muslim and Islam is celebrated in private as well as public life. This explains the museum’s presentation of pieces linked to indigenous religions, exposed as a past obliterated by modernity, and those from the Islamic religion. If religions of African origin are emptied of their spiritual and, above all, political meaning, in this museological narrative elaborated in Senegal, what happens with Islam is the opposite. The descriptor of the room “African appropriations of Abrahamic religions” already shows, in the first paragraph, the path of interpretation of the exhibition. The spiritual and political meaning of Islam is interpreted from the perspective of colonial resistance:

Among the external influences that African societies had to suffer during their evolution and which profoundly marked their destiny, Islam is not the least in terms of ideology and institutions. Darussalam, the kingdom of peace, coincides geographically with the colonial empire. It is to this conjuncture that we owe the violent phase of Islamic expansion provoked less by fanaticism than by the need to maintain and sometimes revive theocratic states that disappeared or were threatened by the European presence.²⁰

²⁰ MUSÉE des Civilizations Noires, exhibition.

The nineteenth century in West Africa was a time of great political turbulence, caused less by European colonialism—which would only establish itself as a fundamental and unavoidable force at the end of that century—and much more by the Muslim revolutions.²¹ Between the end of the seventeenth century and the consolidation of the European presence, at the end of the nineteenth century, several Islamic theocratic states were formed in the region, resulting from an Islamic political culture that little by little was produced from Koranic education and the peaceful expansion of religion, who would come to confront the Atlantic trade in enslaved people and, later, become deeply involved in the mechanisms of slavery.²² In this museum, otherwise, such turmoil is seen as a result of the European presence. It is necessary to remember that the struggle of Muslim marabouts who sought to build states governed by the sharia regime in the region did not only take place against European colonizers. Before, alliances with Europeans or other local potentates were made and broken according to the best model of military strategies, whose *raison d'être* was the quest to conquer and maintain political power.²³

If the objects referring to autochthonous African religions occupy the function of artistic pieces in the Museum of Black Civilizations, totally devoid of their original meanings, the pieces coming from Islamic religious culture have another treatment, much closer to the sense of relic than of art. Islam has a privileged space, occupying one of the highest positions in the exhibition. This is the most textual section of the entire museum, very busy with the contextualization of the Islamic religion as a spiritual and political force, as a guide and resistance. The *aluah*, which is a wooden piece on which children learn to read and write through copies of the Koran, the holy book of Muslims, is resignified in this museum. The *aluá* continues to incorporate the initial meaning of learning, but it is decontextualized with regard to use and recontextualized within the scope of the exhibition as a support for textual narrative. The following image shows a view of the “Abrahamic Religions” room, whose predominance (80 to 90%) is of the Islamic religion (Fig. 19.11).

On the right, two sequences of *aluas* can be seen. In the first, the tablets are inscribed with an alleged interview conducted by a French colonial administrator with Ahmadu Bamba Mbacke, one of the most recognized Senegalese marabouts, and founder of the Mouridia confraternity.²⁴ The second, partially visible, brings excerpts from an alleged preaching attributed to Bamba. The *aluás*, therefore, are supports for another narrative about Islamic knowledge: not the expansion of religion through teaching, but the local production of knowledge and positions based on Islam. Through this resource, the museum claims for itself the status of heir to the pan-Islamic ideas, expressed on one of the hall walls. At this point in the exhibition, the text is punctually selected to endorse the perspective of black Muslims in the global context of the Islamic world. Ahmadou Bamba stands up against racial prejudices

²¹ Smith (1961) and Ware III (2014).

²² Mota (2020).

²³ Péliissier (1989) and Mendy (1994).

²⁴ Babou and Mbaké (2007).




Fig. 19.11 Excerpt from the exhibition dedicated to Islam, at the Museum of Black Civilizations, in Dakar (Senegal). Photo by author

within the Muslim community while highlighting that the fact that Africans received the Koranic revelation after the Arabs did not make them worse Muslims:

Everything in this book is authentic. So follow it with confidence. May my feeble fame in this generation not be able to make you refuse this pious work. Don't be fooled by my status as a black person to not take advantage of [what I say]. The man most esteemed by Allah is he who fears him most without discrimination of any kind. Skin color cannot be the cause of a man's stupidity or misunderstanding. O you who are intelligent, never give up my verses on the pretext that I do not apply them to myself. Nor make the advantages that Allah gives exclusive to the elders, for you will be stubborn and misguided. For it sometimes happens that a man of recent times knows secrets which an older man did not. "A light rain can precede a heavy one, but the advantage is the abundant one and not the weak one". You who despise my book, do not forget the text of the hadith which says: My community is like the rain, no one knows which part is the best; is it the first or the last?²⁵

In addition to the defense of black Muslims against racism in the Islamic world, an anticolonial narrative is expressed through texts and objects. Alongside Ahmadu Bamba, there are elements that claim active Islamic resistance against French colonialism, such as the display case that displays the saber of the marabout Tijane El Hadji Oumar Tall (1798–1864) and the copy of the Koran by Ahmadou Tall, his son (1836–1897). Both were involved in local conflicts and also with French forces. It should be noted that Oumar Tall's saber was on French loan in Senegal, when it was still owned by the French Army Museum. On October 6, 2021, however, the French National Assembly approved its definitive return to Senegal, later ratified by the French Senate (Fig. 19.12).

Photographs, cult objects, excerpts from the *Koran*, preaching by great Senegalese marabouts, personal objects—sandals, saber, *Koran*—of Muslim personalities... Here, Islamic material culture is recontextualized less as art or as an ethnic marker,

²⁵ MUSÉE des Civilizations Noires, exhibition.



Fig. 19.12 Saber by Oumar Tall: object, relic, art? Photo by author

like the pieces associated with indigenous religions. Its great significance is sometimes linked to the condition of a relic, sometimes to the religious and simultaneously political message that they seek to transmit.

In a country where 96% of the population is Muslim, as is the case of Senegal, a museum dedicated to Black Civilizations attributes to autochthonous African cultures a more folkloric sense than religious or even civilizational, contrary to what is indicated in the descriptor of the exhibition itself. On the other hand, unlike the section where the objects are displayed as art, the room dedicated to Islam suggests a deep engagement with the local population: here, Senegalese Muslims are definitely the target audience. It is they who are spoken to, they are the target of the entire arrangement presented in the room. Two ideas of Africa are opposed in this museum.

19.4 Final Remarks

Moving toward closure, I would like to return to the initial question of this chapter: which Africa is narrated in African museums and how can these institutions be analyzed within the scope of the decolonization of museums? What first becomes clear is that the idea of African homogeneity is impractical, whether in the characterization of “African museums” or in the definition of “African culture”. Here we have the example of two very different institutions, with different trajectories and different forms of organization and exhibition. At the National Ethnographic Museum of Bissau, interest in the cultures present in the country prevails, but exposed as otherness, in a kind of appreciation of diversity that gives up subjects in favor of their cultures embodied in collective subjects: without name, without history, without transformations. Despite this, the diversity of national cultures is valued, which is not the case in the Senegalese museum.

Although the Museum of Black Civilizations mobilizes a supposedly established rhetoric about the concept of tradition and appreciation of the continent’s autochthonous cultures, the museographic narrative produced completely empties

these cultures: without history, without subjects, without sense or meaning that goes beyond aesthetic appreciation. Although the objects on display were religious pieces, they are no longer and it is not expected that their past will be remembered. Like dead statues, they entered the necrophiliac domain of the *Craft*.²⁶ All contrary to the pieces that portray Islamic culture: the exhibition seeks to produce new contexts that value the Muslim religious and political experience, the objects are still alive, immortalized as relics that update the values of Islam in a fundamentally Muslim society. This is the part of the exhibition that dialogues with the local community, that speaks with it and for it. It is a perspective that deviates from Western expectations about Africa, which seeks to find in African museums a mystical, “traditional” continent full of roots for African-American cultures. On the contrary, what is available there is the local emphasis on Islamic culture, which embodies the part of the museum that most promotes engagement with the national public.

Therefore, I believe that thinking about the decolonization of African museums requires understanding them in their specific circumstances, within the scope of their national civil societies and the historical moment in which they were built. It also demands making them dialogue with the communities that surround them, transforming their collections into means for the production of knowledge, reflection, and identification.²⁷ Despite this, in the National Ethnographic Museum, in Bissau, and in the Black Civilizations Museum, in Dakar, although African, colonial marks are everywhere. Resulting from ideas, conceptions of the past, and projects for the future conceived in the post-colonial period, coloniality remains a challenge to be overcome so that the museum becomes, then, a place of production of knowledge for autonomy.

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²⁶ Marker et al. (1953).

²⁷ Soares (2019).

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Part III
Borders Soft Power

Chapter 20

Cultural Heritage and International Cooperation: Lusophone Diplomatic Strategies



Diogo Motta

Abstract We live in a world where time and space dynamics have been profoundly modified since the development of communication and transportation technologies. In this new space of more fluid borders and more instantaneous communication, aspects related to cultural diffusion and preservation come to occupy a place of increasing centrality in countries' foreign strategy. This text aims at analyzing how the creation of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) can be considered a Cultural Diplomacy strategy developed by the Portuguese-speaking countries that aim to consolidate and expand the gains from the exercise of soft power, seen as the ability to project power and influence others through co-option rather the use of coercion. This attraction arises as much from the culture and ideas as from the policies that are developed by states that, when perceived as legitimate by others, strengthen soft power. The central argument points out that the historical and cultural heritage shared by these States was the main driver of this process, as it has the capacity to stimulate cooperation, create an environment of solidarity and, thus, bring about gains in several areas. The production of an analysis focused on the cultural heritage of these countries, reinforces the importance of seeing the cultural diversity, so present in the community, as a foundation for integration and cooperation, and not as a source of threat.

Keywords Cultural heritage · Soft power · CPLP · Cultural diplomacy · International cooperation

20.1 Introduction

Thinking about the set of Portuguese-speaking countries necessarily means reflecting on heterogeneous states, which comprise a discontinuous geographic space and have asymmetric levels of development. In the same way, it means analyzing peoples who

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share a profound historical-cultural heritage, originating from the colonial period, and who have in the Portuguese language the greatest expression of this common heritage. The lusophone community is present in four continents—Africa, America, Asia and Europe—and comprises around 300 million people.¹

According to the Camões Institute,² Portuguese is spoken by 3.7% of the world's population, being the most spoken language in the southern hemisphere and the fourth most spoken first language in the world, behind only Mandarin, English and Spanish. It is also the official or working language in 32 international organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and UNESCO. Projections indicate that in 2050 the number of Portuguese speakers will increase to around 400 million people, and in 2100 to more than 500 million. In addition, it is estimated that the African continent will register the greatest increase, mainly driven by the strong population growth in Angola and Mozambique.

When dealing with the history of the language from a sociohistorical perspective, Carlos Alberto Faraco gave the term Lusophony a polysemic meaning. According to the author, the term—which has great acceptance in Portugal, almost none in Brazil, and is viewed with distrust in other Portuguese-speaking countries—is sometimes used descriptively to mention Portuguese speakers around the world; at other times, it assumes an evaluative character to portray a transnational community united by a feeling of brotherhood and the imagery of a common language; but that can also take on a political meaning by representing a project of collective management of the language, aiming at its promotion both within the bloc and globally (Faraco 2012).

Faced with this multiplicity of meanings, this chapter will address Lusophony from its political aspect: the creation of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP). The CPLP, thus, represents a process of political institutionalization of Lusophony, which brings together all countries—Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe, and East Timor—that speak Portuguese as an official language.

The community was created in 1996, as a multilateral space for international articulation between these countries, in a scenario of expansion of the activities of the International Governmental Organizations. The integration process was based on language sharing and was guided by a common cultural identity, based on solidarity and cooperation among its members. It is important to highlight, in order to understand the context that enabled the emergence of the community, that with the end of the Cold War and, consequently, of the bipolar order, multilateralism is increasingly seen as a factor that confers legitimacy to international decisions.

The Portuguese language served as the main driver for the creation of the CPLP; however, the community is not restricted to the promotion and dissemination of the

¹ According to the report “The state of the world’s population” by the United Nations Population Fund, UNFPA, the total number of people living in Portuguese-speaking countries totals 291.4 million people. Available at: <<https://news.un.org/pt/story/2019/04/1667931>>. Accessed 23 Jan 2023.

² Data available at: <https://www.instituto-camoes.pt/images/pdf_noticias/Dados_sobre_a_l%C3%ADngua_portuguesa_de_2022.pdf>. Accessed 09 Mar 2023.

language. From that initial point, an international organization with legal personality was formed, which operates both in internal processes of cooperation in all areas, and which seeks to strengthen the identity connections between its members, as well as in external procedures of diplomatic concertation, acting in broader international forums (Lafer 2013).

According to Lafer, what differentiates the CPLP from other international organizations is the combined action of multilateralism that acts, at the same time, in the community's internal plan and in the development and deepening of relations with countries and external organizations. The institution's role in East Timor's independence process is a good example of the combination of these two strategies, combining internal cooperation with external diplomatic concert. Thus, the CPLP has contributed to the deepening of the relationship between its members in a way that would not have happened without its creation (Lafer 2013).

In its Constitutive Declaration, the community (CPLP 1996) considers it imperative to consolidate "the national and plurinational cultural reality that gives Portuguese-speaking countries their own identity". The founding basis of the CPLP lies, in this sense, in a shared cultural heritage, in which the plurality of cultures, heritage and memories serves as a decisive vector of rapprochement between its members.

This text aims at analyzing how the creation of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) can be considered a Cultural Diplomacy strategy developed by the Portuguese-speaking countries that aim to consolidate and expand the gains originated by the exercise of soft power in the contemporary international system. The central argument points out that the historical and cultural heritage shared by these States was the main driver of this process, as it has the capacity to stimulate cooperation, create an environment of solidarity and, thus, bring about gains in several areas. This would be possible because culture occupies, today, a relevant place in international political strategies.

Thus, the objective is to understand how the integration process carried out by Portuguese-speaking countries is guided by rational strategies of Cultural Diplomacy that seek, through culture, to enhance their soft power and promote an environment of cooperation that creates synergies able to bring benefits in several sectors.

20.2 Culture as a Vector of Integration

Considering the specificities of the contemporary international system is fundamental to understanding the conditions that allowed the emergence of the CPLP, as well as its evolution, potentials and weaknesses. We are then faced with an increasingly interconnected world, where the speed of social interaction around the globe has increased significantly, largely due to the development of communication and transportation technologies. In this context, aspects related to cultural diffusion and preservation

come to occupy a place of increasing centrality in countries' foreign strategy, being that, with the greater circulation of people and information, the dichotomy between the global and the local is no longer well delimited.

This process of globalization was accentuated with the end of the bipolar order, which prevailed during the years of the Cold War, and brought culture to the center of contemporary affairs, that is, if during the twentieth-century issues related to identity and culture were agendas legitimately national, in the twenty-first century they become fundamental for the understanding of international political processes (Barão 2014). The CPLP emerges, faced with this situation, as an international organization that places the cultural factor at the center of integration and cooperation policies between the countries of the bloc.

According to Barão (2014), this new position that culture occupies in the international scenario can also be observed in the multilateral scope and comes mainly from the institutionalization efforts from UNESCO. She highlights the organization's concern with two poles of challenges that arise in contemporary society: the first stems from the need to preserve the world's cultural diversity and build relationships based on reciprocity and respect for differences; the second concerns the new condition of social and cultural exclusion caused by technological development and which creates enormous inequality between those who have access to these new opportunities, such as the expansion of relationships between peoples, and those who do not have even their most basic needs met (Barão 2014). Finally, the author points out that facing these issues depends on the behavior of each country and its foreign and domestic policies.

Faced with these concerns, the Community of Portuguese Language Countries highlights the growing importance of culture in relations of cooperation and exchange, as well as its centrality in contemporary debates on identity, social cohesion and respect for plurality. In addition, the CPLP recognizes that the cultural diversity of the member states of the community constitutes a wealth that must be shared both within and outside the community (CPLP 2017a). Therefore, by assuming itself as a pluricultural organization, the community opens the possibility of developing cultural policies that favor inclusion and contribute to the preservation of world cultural diversity. Examples can be seen in this regard, such as the creation of an internal commission focused on protecting the cultural heritage of its members.

Evidently this process of international cultural exchange is not a recent phenomenon; however, what differs it from previous times, according to Edgar Telles Ribeiro, is the great speed with which information circulates today, in addition to the political importance of this exchange of ideas. For him, as a result of these specificities, culture starts to play a significant role in international politics, where States seek, ultimately, to project their values. There is a perception that in a space where ideas circulate more quickly, culture can stimulate mechanisms of mutual understanding and reduction of mistrust by playing an important role in overcoming the barriers that separate people (Ribeiro 2011).

If, today, the speed in the flow of communications and the growing interdependence between countries define the character of international relations, the origin of the Portuguese-speaking common heritage occurred at a time when connections

around the globe were much longer and more difficult. Thus, to understand the cultural diplomacy strategies developed by Portuguese-speaking countries, we must consider the beginnings of this shared trajectory.

20.3 The Origins of a Common Heritage

The historical-cultural-linguistic heritage that gave rise to the Community of Portuguese Language Countries is directly connected to the colonization processes undertaken by the Portuguese empire between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries. These relations of domination were established both in the economic and political fields, as well as in the social and cultural spheres, and were marked by the exploitation of territories and natural resources, as well as by violence, which silenced cultural and identity erasure exercised against the original peoples.

Colonialism also developed through epistemological domination, in which the notion of European superiority was used as an instrument of domination aimed at subjugating the culture of colonized peoples, replacing them with the colonizer's ways of knowing. One of the main strategies of this immaterial control was the imposition of the official language and religion of the metropolis, beyond the elimination of local traditions and customs. As the adage quoted by the Malian traditionalist Amadou Hampaté Bâ in his text *The Living Tradition* (1981) says: "Neither in a planted field nor in a fallow does one sow".

In view of this, this work is based on the assumption, defended by Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Maria Paula Meneses (2009), that the end of political colonialism, with the independence of subjugated peoples, did not also represent the end of these unequal knowledge-power social relations established in colonization.

The dismantling of the cultural existence of colonized peoples occurred systematically, as Frantz Fanon pointed out: "Colonial domination, because it is total and tends to oversimplify, very soon manages to disrupt in spectacular fashion the cultural life of a conquered people. This cultural obliteration is made possible by the negation of national reality, by new legal relations introduced by the occupying power, by the banishment of the natives and their customs to outlying districts by colonial society, by expropriation and by the systematic enslaving of men and women" (Fanon 1963).

The colonial project represented a true epistemicide, where the pretext of the "colonizing mission" aimed to homogenize the world, destroying cultural differences and reducing world epistemological diversity (Santos and Meneses 2009). For Santos and Meneses, as an alternative to this dominant epistemology, it is necessary to recognize the epistemological diversity present in the world as a source of enrichment of human capacities, and not as something negative.

Thus, they defend the concept of epistemologies of the South, where the South is metaphorically conceived as a space of epistemic challenges that makes reference to the impacts of the colonial relationship: "Colonialism, in addition to all the dominations by which it is known, was also an epistemological domination, an extremely unequal knowledge-power relationship that led to the suppression of many forms of

knowledge typical of colonized peoples and/or nations. The epistemologies of the South are the set of epistemological interventions that denounce this suppression, value the knowledges that successfully resisted and investigate the conditions of a horizontal dialogue between knowledges. We call this dialogue between knowledges ecology of knowledges” (Santos and Meneses 2009).

The proposal for a horizontal dialogue between different cultures and knowledge seeks to put an end to this knowledge-power domination that lasts to this day. In this way, it dialogues directly with the aforementioned concern of UNESCO in preserving cultural diversity and establishing reciprocal relationships that respect differences.

In this sense, it becomes necessary to reflect on the role that the memory of non-hegemonic groups plays in the preservation and enhancement of the heritage of Portuguese-speaking countries. Understanding memory as a social construction means conceiving it, above all, as a disputed field of conflicts and political tensions. Colonial power acted to erase, silence and annihilate memories, identities and traditions, condemning these cultural forms to clandestinity. Thus, we must question whether heritage preservation and safeguard projects reflect this relationship of domination of colonial knowledge-power that lasts until today.

With this in mind, to think about heritage preservation also as a way of value, to disseminate and to preserve types of knowledge that, at times, have been subdued, is essential in a moment of contestation of the predominance of Eurocentric heritage approaches. The cultural cooperation carried out by the CPLP countries has this potential, because the plurality of the lusophone cultural heritage reinforces the importance of seeing the cultural diversity, so present in the community, as a foundation for integration and cooperation, and not as a source of threat.

The management and diffusion of cultural heritage occupies, today, an important role in the international policies of the States, functioning as a powerful instrument of Soft Power. Thus, it becomes essential to understand how this power can be used in the elaboration and implementation of cultural diplomacy policies within the lusophone community.

20.4 Soft Power and the Power of Language

The term soft power, popularized by the American political scientist Joseph Nye Jr in the late 1980s, is present in practically all analyses concerned with understanding the current dynamics of international politics. The study of power relations has always been at the center of the discipline of International Relations, where sovereign States seek to maximize their gains by controlling and influencing others in an anarchic international environment, that is, without the presence of a supranational entity that regulates relations between the states.

For Nye (2004), there are several ways to affect the behavior of others: you can coerce them with threats, induce them with payments, or attract and co-opt them to want what you want. Power, according to him, can be exercised from three sources: the use of military force and economic sanctions (coercion), the use of payments

(persuasion) and attraction. It is in this last scope that he defines his concept of soft power as the ability to project power and influence others by using co-option rather than the use of coercion (Nye 2004).

The ability to attract arises, then, both from culture and ideas and from policies that are developed by States that, when seen as legitimate by others, strengthen soft power and make the use of military or economic force become less necessary in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives (Gueraldi 2010). Soft power also seeks to exercise narrative control that aims to leverage a country's assets and thus shape the behavior of others through the diffusion of a certain worldview.

Power is not static, and changes in its configuration, given advances in communications, have brought soft power to the center of the debate. From the acceleration of globalization in the early 1990s, several other actors entered the international sphere, such as large companies, terrorist networks, international organizations or even individuals, which made the exercise of power more diffuse (Ohnesorge 2020). According to the author, globalization promoted greater integration and interdependence between countries and economies, drastically increasing the costs of using military force and economic sanctions (hard power). This is reflected in a change in the importance attributed to different types of power, with soft power assuming an increasingly relevant role in countries' strategies.

According to Ohnesorge, the growing importance of one of the varieties of power does not necessarily result in the diminution of the others; nonetheless, the exercise of power depends on the context, and the significant changes in the international situation that have taken place in recent decades have made soft power more important than ever (Ohnesorge 2020, p. 10).

For Nye, countries that have more communication channels that help them to guide issues in the external environment; who have a culture that is closer to prevailing global norms; and who have high credibility for their values and policies, both domestically and internationally, will obtain more gains in terms of soft power in the information age. Soft power is, therefore, a concept permeated by intangible elements, where attraction arises through culture, political values and foreign policy (seen as legitimate or illegitimate) (Nye 2004).

From these three primary sources of soft power proposed by Nye, we can identify how this variety of power is at the center of the integration process among Portuguese-speaking countries.

When dealing with the cultural aspect as a source of soft power, Nye (2004) considers that "culture is the set of values and practices that create meaning for a society". Language, therefore, can be seen as a fundamental cultural element, because it defines ways of being in the world, translates different worldviews, structures and organizes thought, expresses ideas and values and allows communication. The language reflects the people who use it and plays a decisive role in the constitution of identities.

In this way, the Portuguese language, seen as a common heritage among lusophone countries, is the foundation of a joint action between these countries and the main vector of the international projection of their cultural values. The creation of the International Institute of the Portuguese Language, linked to the CPLP, with the aim

of encouraging the promotion and propagation of the Portuguese language can be seen, therefore, as a strategy aimed at increasing the soft power resources of these countries. Thus, both the Portuguese language and the cultural heritage common to CPLP's countries can be seen as important elements of soft power.

The second potential sources of soft power, according to Nye, are political values (internal and external), where principles such as democracy and human rights, for example, are seen as more seductive. These values, which, when seen as legitimate, reinforce the soft power of States, are present among the guiding principles of the CPLP, such as the primacy of Peace, Democracy, the Rule of Law, Human Rights and Social Justice.

Finally, Nye presents the third source of soft power: foreign policy, which, when considered legitimate, brings about power gains to countries. In this case, the very existence of the CPLP, an international organization that strengthens multilateralism, can result in soft power gains to its Member States. In addition, the community has acted on guidelines that are extremely relevant in the contemporary international context, such as the protection of cultural heritage, which we observe with the creation of the CPLP's Cultural Heritage Commission.

Thus, to be successful in the contemporary international scenario, marked by the global information age, countries must strengthen and expand their soft power resources. With this, cultural diplomacy emerges as an important instrument of foreign policy strategies that aim to consolidate the gains and advantages arising from this soft power.

20.5 Cultural Diplomacy: An Action of Governments

Faced with this new situation, one of the practices most favored by the advancement of communication technologies was Public Diplomacy. Assuming that Traditional Diplomacy is strictly an activity elaborated by the State and that mediates the relations between two governments, Public Diplomacy is the communication of a government with the public abroad and includes efforts to inform, influence and engage this public in support of national foreign policy objectives (Snow 2009). Cultural Diplomacy is often perceived as a subset of Public Diplomacy. Thus, it becomes necessary, first and foremost, to undo the semantic confusion that often orbits around these terms.

Recognizing the difficulty in establishing a consensual definition of Cultural Diplomacy, in this work, with the objective of analyzing the CPLP' integration process, we will assume the concepts elaborated by Simon Mark in his text "A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy" (Mark 2009). This semantic confusion exists, therefore, due to the existence of related terms, which are used interchangeably with Cultural Diplomacy, such as the terms Public Diplomacy, international cultural relations and propaganda.

Subsequently, we will analyze, based on the constructed theoretical framework, the information gathered in the official documents that are part of the institutionalization process of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries. With this, we

intend to understand, through the narratives constructed in these documents, how they indicate the elaboration of a political project that has as one of its foundations the practices of Cultural Diplomacy.

According to Mark, although Cultural Diplomacy is a subset of Public Diplomacy, these terms are not synonymous, as there are instances of Public Diplomacy that do not use the State's culture. International cultural relations, on the other hand, differ from Cultural Diplomacy because some of these relations do not involve the government or contribute to foreign policy objectives—a prerequisite of Cultural Diplomacy. Finally, according to him, Cultural Diplomacy can, at first, be seen as a more benign form of governmental propaganda; however, the practice's commitment to engagement with its publics, as well as the honesty inherent in the culture, serves to distinguish it from propaganda (Mark 2009).

Based on this differentiation, Simon Mark defines Cultural Diplomacy as “the deployment of a state's culture in support of its foreign policy or diplomacy”, being, therefore, a diplomatic practice formulated by governments, or groups of governments. In this way, thinking about Cultural Diplomacy necessarily means dealing with the rational action of a government actor who seeks, through culture, to obtain gains in various sectors of international politics.

The Community of Portuguese Language Countries presents itself as a multilateral forum constituted by nine sovereign States, in which the cultural element—formed by sharing the language and a common historical heritage—served as the main catalyst of the integration process. CPLP's activities aim at articulating strategies that contribute to foreign policy and diplomacy objectives. This is evidenced in the community's statute (CPLP 2007) by stating “the political-diplomatic concertation between its members in matters of international relations, namely for the reinforcement of its presence in international forums” as the first of its general objectives. This corroborates Mark's argument, which points to the possibility of a government achieving its diplomatic objectives through an organization that has a certain degree of administrative independence.

According to the author, countries traditionally claim to use Cultural Diplomacy to achieve idealistic purposes, such as developing mutual understanding, combating ethnocentrism and stereotypes and preventing conflicts. The functional objectives include the advancement of commercial, political, diplomatic and economic interests, developing bilateral relations in all sectors (Mark 2009).

When analyzing the Constitutive Declaration of the CPLP, we noticed a strong presence of this idealist discourse. Thus, the community says it wants to contribute to strengthening human ties, solidarity and fraternity among Portuguese-speaking peoples. Furthermore, the document informs that cooperation and coordination actions will be promoted at the multilateral level to ensure respect for Human Rights in the respective countries and in the rest of the world; in addition to measures aimed at eradicating racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia.

Also according to the Constitutive Declaration, cooperation between its members can bring about social, economic, business, environmental and ecological gains. Therefore, we also identify the existence of the functional objectives that make up the definition of Cultural Diplomacy proposed by Mark. The CPLP highlights as its

second general objective “cooperation in all domains, including those of education, health, science and technology, defense, agriculture, public administration, communications, justice, public security, culture, sport and social communication” (CPLP 2007).

According to Mark, the activities carried out within the scope of Cultural Diplomacy encompass a huge diversity of participants such as artists and singers, but also the promotion of aspects of a country’s culture—such as the diffusion of the language—and the exchange of people. Furthermore, these activities are not limited to “high culture” and include the general population. Examples brought by the author range from the granting of scholarships, visits by academics, intellectuals and artists, to the presentation of cultural groups, exhibitions, seminars, conferences, and the establishment and maintenance of chairs in universities abroad.

This concept can be found in the third and last general objective of the CPLP, which aims at “the materialization of projects for the promotion and diffusion of the Portuguese language, namely through the International Institute of the Portuguese Language” (CPLP 2007); and in various purposes expressed in the Constitutive Declaration of the community, such as the increase of cultural exchange and the diffusion of intellectual and artistic creation in Portuguese-speaking spaces; the deepening of cooperation in the university field, in professional training and in the various sectors of scientific and technological research; as well as encouraging and promoting the exchange of young people, with the aim of training and exchanging experiences, particularly in the fields of education, culture and sport.

Faced with this, when analyzing the CPLP integration process in light of the concept of Cultural Diplomacy developed by Simon Mark, it is clear that the cultural element played a decisive role in strengthening relations between Portuguese-speaking States, in order to consolidate gains from soft power both in the multilateral relations established between the bloc’s countries and in those developed with other countries and organizations. In addition, all three general objectives present in the CPLP’s statute are related to the theoretical formulations proposed by the author.

20.6 Preservation of Cultural Heritage: Possible Paths

In this context, where culture plays an important role as a vector of integration, cultural heritage has gained greater visibility and relevance, being incorporated into new areas of international discourse. This radiography is pointed out by Rodrigo Christofoletti in his book “Bens Culturais e Relações Internacionais: o patrimônio como espelho do soft power” (Cultural Goods and International Relations: heritage as a mirror of soft power): “Recently, international organizations have begun to see heritage more broadly, taking them as part of the discourses and agendas that make up contemporary global governance. Whether relating it to the idea of sustainability, to the fight against extremism, or policies around access to citizenship and tradition,

cultural heritage now has much greater visibility and relevant participation, with an advance in the presence of organizations of preservation at the negotiation tables of international policies as never seen before” (Christofoletti 2017).

Thus, it is observed that the cultural heritage preservation is included in this new world agenda, as the memory, the values and the identity of a people constitute essential and strategic elements capable of stimulating human development, international projection of countries and dialogue between nations.

Still according to Christofoletti (2017), cultural heritage has been appropriated for commercial and political purposes within economies and, with that, it also starts to play an important role in the elaboration of Cultural Diplomacy strategies, ceasing to be a simple good neighbor diplomatic strategy to become a complex soft power tactic in various countries around the globe. In this way, according to the author, heritage has become a relevant topic in multilateral dialogues, increasing its influence on the global stage (Christofoletti 2017).

Given this situation, and recognizing that cultural heritage represents a strategic dimension for integration and sustainable development, in 2017, within the scope of the Strategic Plan for Multilateral Cultural Cooperation of the CPLP, the community’s Cultural Heritage Commission (CPC/CPLP) was created. In the final declaration of the X Meeting of Ministers of Culture, which created the commission, culture was highlighted as a founding and congregating element of the community and reiterated that “the Peoples represented in the CPLP share a historical, cultural and linguistic heritage that unites them, made of a common journey of several centuries that originated a tangible and intangible heritage that urgently needs to be preserved, valued and disseminated (CPLP 2017a)”.

Obviously, heritage should not be treated as something neutral. It reflects the dispute dynamics of the societies in which it is inserted and materializes different types of memories. Thinking of the heritage of lusophone countries as the legacy of a “common journey” means thinking about all the tensions, struggles and conflicts that are materialized there. From this conception, as a new global demand, there has been a pluralization in the narratives about heritage, which aims to contest the Eurocentric and homogenizing legacy of heritage preservation (Christofoletti 2020).

This legacy can be observed when we analyze the preservation policies at the international level, which gained strength from the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage of UNESCO, in 1972. The documents originated in the convention spread to the world, by means of criteria and values, ways of understanding and seeing heritage based on preservation experiences that favored a European vision (with regard to cultural heritage) and an American view (when dealing with natural heritage) (SCIFONI 2017).

Among the properties protected by UNESCO, it appears that most of them, about 47%, are located in Europe and North America, a number that increases to 52% if we focus on the list of properties inscribed as cultural heritage, as shown in Table 20.1. It is noteworthy the very low representation of African countries, which make up more than half of the lusophone community, representing only 6% of the cultural heritage recognized by the organization.

Table 20.1 Percentage of natural, cultural and mixed heritage recognized by UNESCO, by world region, in 2023

Regions	Natural, cultural and mixed heritage	Cultural heritage
Africa	8.47	6
Latin America and the Caribbean	12.62	11.11
Asia and the Pacific	23.94	21.66
Arab States	7.78	9.11
Europe and North America	47.19	52.11

Source Own elaboration, based on UNESCO data, available at: <https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/status/#d6>

It is observed that, among the nine members of the CPLP, four of them—Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe and East Timor—do not own any property declared as world heritage by UNESCO and three others—Angola, Cape Verde and Mozambique—have only one. Portugal and Brazil complete the list with 17 and 23, respectively. By way of comparison, Italy has 58 properties declared, and among the five countries that top the list, four are located in Europe.

Furthermore, when examining the heritage of these countries inscribed on the list, it is clear that most of them are directly related to the colonial past. This is the case of the only properties from Cape Verde and Mozambique on the list: Cidade Velha, the Historic Centre of Ribeira Grande and the Island of Mozambique—constructions that symbolize European maritime expansion and represent the Portuguese occupation in these regions. Many of the Brazilian cultural assets on the list are also in the same situation, such as the various architectural complexes in historic centers that portray Portuguese colonial architecture.

Thus, the continuity of the disarticulation of the cultural existence of peoples who were, historically, subjugated is verified. This process can be seen as the reconfiguration of what Frantz Fanon pointed out as the condemnation of the culture of the colonized to clandestinity, whose cultural obliteration is systematically undertaken (Fanon 1963).

The elaboration of a cultural cooperation project around the theme of heritage emerges as an important diplomatic strategy for CPLP's member countries, in the deepening of their relations as well as in the consolidation of the community in the international sphere. At the II meeting of the Cultural Heritage Commission, held in 2019, it was proposed “the inclusion of cultural heritage in the strategic agenda of the Community, considering its importance for the socioeconomic development of the member states” (CPLP 2019).

A positive experience that illustrates this strategy was the support for the candidacy of the historic center of Mbanza Congo in Angola. The former capital of the Kingdom of Congo was recognized as a World Heritage by UNESCO in 2017. The meeting of Ministers of Culture of the community, which announced support for the candidacy of the Angolan city, recalled “the importance of the Kingdom of Congo, whose

historical reach is of great magnitude in the Angolan national identity and in diaspora communities, as well as in the history shared between Angola, Brazil and Portugal” (CPLP 2017b).

Another point highlighted in the bloc’s cultural cooperation project is the development of training and education procedures in the patrimonial scope. The III Meeting of the CPLP’s Cultural Heritage Commission determined the elaboration of qualification actions for cultural managers, as well as the formatting of heritage educational initiatives, to be conducted by the Lúcio Costa Center/IPHAN (CPLP 2021).

If these initiatives are developed based on permanent dialogue between cultural and social agents, in addition to the effective participation of the communities that own and produce cultural references, assumptions institutionalized by IPHAN (Florêncio 2014), it is possible that the result will produce emancipatory patrimonialization processes, which overcome colonial knowledge-power. For this, education and training methods must take into account the various social segments and the knowledge of non-hegemonic groups.

CPLP, through its multiple cultures spread across the globe, symbolizes the value of diversity, which legitimizes its pluricultural character. In this way, the cultural heritage represents a very important aspect in the constitution of the community policies and in the very *raison d’être* of the bloc.

20.7 Final Considerations

The objective of this work was to analyze, from CPLP’s institutional documents, how the community is inserted in a political project perspective based on Cultural Diplomacy practices. It was observed, in official documents, the construction of a narrative that indicates that the cultural factor served as a bridge for the countries of the community to reach the objectives of their foreign policies, with a cooperation process that arises from the sharing of a common language, but that extends to other areas.

This was possible due to an international scenario in which culture ceased to be a subject exclusively restricted to the borders of the nation-state and started to occupy a prominent place in international politics. Moreover, it was possible to identify how the contextual character of power brought soft power to the center of political strategies at the international level in recent decades and directly influenced the construction of the lusophone community.

This chapter offers elements for a better understanding of Cultural Diplomacy as a practice capable of bringing gains in various sectors and, in the specific case of CPLP’s member states, creating synergies that influence international cooperation. Given this, cultural heritage has increasingly occupied a prominent place in global governance. This opens a field with the potential to further activate Cultural Diplomacy among CPLP’s countries, which can bring benefits both in terms of closer intra-community dialogue and in the community’s relationship with other organizations and countries, in addition to gains in terms of soft power.

The community has functioned as an organization in which its members start to act as a block on certain issues, in a decentralized political and decision-making process. A good example is the support for actions to promote and enhance the heritage of its members within the scope of UNESCO, such as the articulation and defense of nominations for tangible and intangible world heritage. If this type of action and discourse is systematized, as indicated in the 1st Meeting of the CPLP's Cultural Heritage Commission, the organization has the potential to contribute to modifying the already mentioned scenario of a certain Westernization of world heritage, promoting the heritage diversity so present among its members, and a greater heterogeneity among world heritage sites.

The historical and cultural heritage of CPLP's member countries is thus an important axis of approximation and cooperation between them, where common ties have the potential to reflect and affirm all the plurality present in the bloc, which reinforces the central argument brought forward in this text.

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Chapter 21

Between the Power of the Museum and the Power of the Community: Case Studies in Portugal and Brazil



Alice Semedo and Leilane Lima

'Is a box filled with works of art, then, a museum?
Is it a museum if it doesn't have walls? Can one make a museum
that is not?'

Elena Filipovic (2009) *A Museum That is Not*, e-flux journal.

Abstract This chapter seeks to explore the role of museums in society by employing the notion of *soft power* as the focus of discussion and using a critical/cultural approach to support the investigation of the relationships established between museums and community. The first part of the text focuses on a discussion of this concept, analysing its relationship with museums and its potential as a methodological approach. The second part presents two case studies: a project developed in 2015 by the Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga (MNAA), in Lisbon, Portugal, which had a great national impact, and another, developed since 2009 by the Arte Marginal collective, in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil. We propose a critical reflection on the different forms of power exercised by museums in the light of these two experiences, their motivations and possible impacts, namely through documentary analysis and interviews.

Keywords Museum · Soft power · Society · Communities · Power

This text is part of the chapter published in Portuguese authored by Alice Semedo *ComingOut—E se o Museu saísse à rua? A exposição-como-um-mundo dentro do mundo-como-uma-exposição*, published in 2017 in the book *Bens culturais e Relações Internacionais: o patrimônio como espelho do Soft Power*, organised by Rodrigo Christofolletti.

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21.1 Introduction

In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic caused a crisis in the international museum sector,¹ marked by a widespread climate of uncertainty about the future of museums and reflections about the challenges museums will continue to face in order to carry out their social, scientific, cultural and educational functions. Two years later, in 2022, while still trying to recover from the negative effects of the pandemic, we are witnessing the terrible consequences of the war triggered by the Russian Federation's military invasion of Ukraine,² for the countries involved and for the world.

As it is in the nature of crisis the instinct to respond and react,³ the International Council of Museums (ICOM) announced that the theme of the 2022 celebrations for International Museum Day, commemorated by the world museum community on 18 May, would be 'The Power of Museums',⁴ on the grounds that there are three ways in which museums can transform the world around them: the power to promote sustainability and climate justice; the power to innovate in digital transformation and accessibility; and the power of community building through education. This theme will also be the flagship of the annual conference to be held in Prague in August 2022.⁵

In view of such events and although uncertainties about the future remain, the theme of discussion and reflection proposed by ICOM for 2022 is very pertinent, since it is believed that museums, considered as vital cultural elements for their communities, can play a crucial role as agents of social change (see, for example, Casey 2001) and embody a considerable political and power element (Sylvester 2009, p. 3).

In order to participate in this potent debate on the power of museums, the authors resume some questions that were presented in the chapter authored by Alice Semedo *ComingOut—E se o Museu saísse à rua? A exposição-como-um-mundo dentro do mundo-como-uma-exposição* ('What if the Museum came out into the street? The exhibition-as-a-world within the world-as-exhibition'), published in 2017 in the book *Bens culturais e Relações Internacionais: o patrimônio como espelho do Soft Power*, also coordinated by Rodrigo Christofolletti.⁶ In that chapter, the discussion on the conceptualisation of the notion of *soft power* led to the description and interpretation

¹ See international documents in UNESCO (2020), p. 18, ICOM (2020), p. 2.

² In addition to the loss of many lives, on 13 April 2022, in an interview with AFP from Paris, Lazare Eloundou Assomo, director of the UNESCO World Heritage Centre, gave a warning about the loss of Ukrainian heritage sites: 'The symbolic mark of 100 damaged or totally destroyed heritage sites will be surpassed on Thursday or Friday. This morning we had 98 sites or monuments registered in eight regions of the country'. Accessed 15 April 2022: <https://www.uol.com.br/nossa/noticias/afp/2022/04/14/cem-patrimonios-ucranianos-foram-danificados-pela-guerra-alerta-unesco.htm>.

³ As recorded in other historical crises experienced by museums. On the subject, see Bolaños (2009–2010), p. 24–26, Bergeron (2009–2010), p. 61–65.

⁴ <https://icom.museum/en/news/international-museum-day-2022-the-power-of-museums/>.

⁵ <https://prague2022.icom.museum/>.

⁶ The text benefitted from the collaboration of Manuel Sarmiento Pizarro who, despite not having participated in the design, discussion and analysis or writing of the text, conducted the interview

of the behaviour of a Portuguese national museum in a rather specific situation: the holding, in 2015/2016, of the exhibition *ComingOut. E se o Museu saísse à rua?*—an initiative of the Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga that had a significant impact on the media and the museum community.

Thus, we propose for this chapter: to return to the conceptualisation of *soft power* and reflect on the purposes of a national museum—based primarily on the crucial aspects of this concept and on discussions about the *temple versus forum* binomial; to resume the presentation and analysis of the museological action carried out by the Portuguese national institution; to present another case study, where the power and authority of traditional museums were questioned by an art collective in Brazil that performs educational-cultural actions of museological nature in the streets of the peripheral neighbourhoods of Salvador, with the project *A rua é o museu do povo* ('The street is the people's museum'). Based on these two cases with very different outlines, this text presents a reflection on different forms of power exercised by museums.

21.2 Soft Power and the Possibility of Producing Uncertain Places

The term *soft power* was coined by Harvard professor Joseph Nye in critical response to historian Paul Kennedy's thesis of US power decline. This concept has been mostly used in the field of international affairs and describes the ability of a political player to influence, indirectly and without coercion, the behaviour of other players. In his words,

(...), and in 1989 decided to write *Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power* (Nye 1990) explaining why I disagreed with him. In writing the book, I first assessed American power resources in traditional economic and military terms, but felt that something was still missing. The US was also able to get the outcomes it wanted because of attraction rather than just threats of coercion or payment. I called this 'soft power' and tried to understand its origins and dimensions. I distinguished it from hard power behavior based on coercion or payment (Nye 2021, p. 4).

Since then, other works were published in which this author developed the notion of soft power that he had originally proposed in the book published in 1990.⁷ In the formulation and development of his idea about behaviours in foreign policy, Nye sought to present a broader concept of power in international affairs that

with the then Director of the Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga, Filipe Pimentel (2010-19), according to a pre-designed script, transcribing it carefully.

⁷ Among them: JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. *Soft power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, Public Affairs, 2004; JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. *Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization*, London, Routledge, 2004; JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. *O Paradoxo do Poder Americano: Por Que é Que a Única Superpotência Mundial Não Pode Actuar Isoladamente?* [transl. Tiago Araújo] Lisbon, Gradiva, 2005; JOSEPH S. NYE, *The future of power*. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.

was not restricted to situations/behaviours of control/dominance of one nation over another (coercing with threats; enticing with payments), but that also included other dynamics, combined elements and specific behaviours, more dependent on the minds and voluntary choices of the target audience in foreign countries (attracting and co-opting), as he himself stated, ‘(...) the use of force, payment, and some agenda-setting based on them I call hard power. Agenda-setting that is regarded as legitimate by the target, positive attraction, and persuasion are the parts of the spectrum of behaviours I include in soft power. Hard power is push; soft power is pull’ (Nye 2021, p. 6).

As opposed to the tangible resources of raw power—forces and finances—soft power has an intangible nature and depends on three main resources: ‘(...) its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)’ (Nye 2008, p. 97). The resources used by soft power define favourable ‘environments’ (Nye 2014, n/n) for the production of shared understandings, even developing other types of interactions. In this sense, soft power is the ability to create consensus around shared meanings.

In the field of international affairs, two possible effects of soft power can be the use of culture to maintain doors for political negotiations and the creation and development of an image that incorporates and promotes positive values that other communities relate to or respect in the international arena (Hoogwaerts 2012, p. 1).

Based on the author’s propositions over time, the most effective manifestations of soft power are not exclusively under government control, as they are also shared by civil society, in different contexts and situations. In the American case, the film industry, universities and foundations offer important strategies and resources for the exercise of this power. On the other hand, authoritarian countries would find it difficult to generate their own soft power because of their reluctance to release the vast talents of their civil societies (Nye 2021, p. 9).

As its nature is intangible, it is necessary that the players involved create physical environments, situations and opportunities for communication, exchanges and cultural sharing. In this case, three dimensions of public diplomacy are referred to by Nye—daily communication, strategic communication and development of lasting relationships (Nye 2004, p. 109)—and although they are all interconnected, it is of interest here to highlight, above all, strategic communication. This dimension is outlined by Nye as a set of themes constructed in a similar way to a (political) campaign involving the planning of ‘symbolic events and communications over the course of a year to brand the central themes, or to advance a particular government policy’ (Nye 2004, p. 108).

Despite its simplicity and immediacy, we understand that the presentation on some aspects of the concept of soft power is useful for thinking about the behaviour of people, institutions, companies, political parties, etc., in different contexts and in a variety of situations. The author of the concept himself, Joseph Nye, in his book *‘The Powers to Lead’* (Nye 2008) dealt with leadership outside the field of international affairs and the behaviour of governments. Here we are mainly interested in exploring fundamental principles of soft power that seem interesting and useful for thinking about museum contexts, such as: the use of attraction and co-optation as

fundamental strategies to create favourable environments; the development of images that incorporate and promote positive values with which the target audience chooses to relate; and the ability to create consensus around shared meanings.

* * *

Power is an essential element of human existence, and although it assumes a great diversity of forms and characteristics, its marks and manifestations are found in all dimensions of social life. In short, historically this phenomenon has been evaluated based on criteria such as the size of the population and territory, natural resources, economic strength, military power and social stability. The conceptualisation of power and the discussion of this concept have undeniably been marked by wide and deep divergences on how the term should be understood. The classical formulation of this concept comes from the work of Weber (1978) who conceptualises it as being 'the probability that one actor with in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance...' (p. 53).

Concerning museums, Foucault's conceptualisation of the relationship between power and knowledge, for example, has supported numerous research papers, enriching the debate (see, for example, Hooper-Greenhill (1992) and Bennett (1995)). Furthermore, power has been described as the ability 'to thwart another, an ability to engage in negative action' by authors such as Paynter and McGuire (1991, p. 6). This negativist conceptualisation is opposed to the positive interpretation by Giddens (1977) who considers it to be the ability to intervene in a transformative way. Other researchers point to a conceptualisation which relates this concept to forms of empowerment (see, for example, Miller 1992). Miller and Tilley (1984, p. 5) are two of the authors who aggregate these two poles, claiming that power can be both 'power-over' and 'power-to'.

We should also present here other problematisations of the concept of power related to Foucault, which have been so influential in the field of museum studies, and mention some of the criticisms enunciated by various authors to his conceptualisations. Although Michel Foucault also pointed to the capillary dispersion of power relations through networks that do not have a core, his conceptualisation of power in museums is often equated with notions of control and domination.

Witcomb (2003, p. 13–18), for example, argues that the Foucauldian approach is too monolithic to explore the complexity of museums and too static to allow for the possibility of change. Change which is constant in the museum scene for, as McClellan (2003, p. 1–29) so aptly describes, museums have been continually metamorphosing. Witcomb argues that the Foucauldian approach presents the museum as conspiratorial, consciously engaging in duplicity to maintain systems of power and thus portraying visitors as manipulated pawns without agency. Conjunctively, the museum is constructed by Foucault as an environment of state-controlled 'exclusion and confinement' without examining its relationship with popular culture, where, as Bennett (2004) has shown, the museum, the amusement park, and the international exhibition were all part of a wider 'exhibition complex'.

Since their inception, the generality of museums—with particular emphasis on national museums—have acted as powerful ‘treasure houses of material and spiritual wealth’ (Duncan and Wallach 1980, p. 448), carrying the weight of their institutional histories and the stories of their collections so close to raw power. Often, their primary function has been ideological, in the sense that they serve as emblematic embodiments of authority and status, and as means of recognising state power. Largely, more or less successfully, they fix, stabilise and guard both objects and the categories they embody, producing objects of knowledge that fit into cultural taxonomies.

Frequently, this work of sedimentation of categories of things naturalises social values and increases the representational force of these museums, their collections and exhibitions. So even if this force of representation is intangible, the consensual and value *framing* spaces on which the attraction is based maintain coercive characteristics. These consensual spaces are still rooted in raw power, and perhaps, in understandings closer to branding strategies than to the *new critical museology*—for example, a vision of visitors as targets and objects of intervention *versus* visitors as participants and subjects of action.

The function of transmitting messages of power through the selection and presentation of significant cultural objects of national identities and memories leads us to realise that museums have the power to incorporate a political element of great dimension, both national and international. The historical trajectory of these institutions—from private collections to public domain—reveals that museums constituted from the eighteenth century and multiplied in the nineteenth century were spaces of instruction and representation of the nation’s cultural and moral values. The power in exercise of these museums determined what these ‘memory institutions’, recognised as spaces of knowledge and enlightenment, chose what would be known (and also forgotten) (Chagas 2002, p. 40). The power attributed to national museums contributed to reinforce their socially and politically situated role. In the field of international relations, for example, such institutions began to play roles in cultural diplomacy, namely from cultural exchanges (see, for example, Hoogwaerts 2012; Cai 2013).

Despite the origin of museums being centred on objects and collections, over time, this centrality has shifted towards people. And, although this displacement—which is still occurring—is not a linear and unidirectional process, as it is witnessed in different museums around the world. In this sense, the current function of comfortable consensus spaces is not enough for museums. In a world of rapid change and transformation, it is important that museums are open to the new, to the unexpected, to new ways of working, new knowledge and new relationships with the public (Studart 2020). Likewise, it is important that they are aware of new priorities and partnerships and other museum models and practices, more autonomous, more open and more inclusive. It is necessary that museums continue responding creatively to reality (Cury 2003), that they put inventiveness and imagination into action, that they make new plans and devise new strategies to stay alive and resilient.

Duncan Cameron defends these forum-spaces as including polyphonic narratives that represent ‘the most radical innovations in art forms, the most controversial interpretations of history, of our own society, of the nature of man, or, for that matter,

of the nature of our world' (1971, p. 12), in clear counterpoint to the consensual inert spaces. The underlying issue is to transform the museum into a space that promotes diversity and inclusion, more democratic, more egalitarian, an institution capable of offering balance in opportunities, representations and accesses.

In a seminal essay regarding open-source software communities, Eric Raymond (2001) introduces the analogy of the 'cathedral' and the 'bazaar' coining the term 'open-source', abundantly employed by various disciplines to describe a new type of social organisation, that has become a true philosophical conception. In this paradigm, the 'cathedral' refers to traditional organisations that define the hierarchy of power and of authority in organisations (*top-down*), in much the same way as the 'temple' model described by Cameron for the museum. The 'bazaar' is, on the contrary, a decentralised open network built on the principles of social inclusion, free production, consumption and sharing, a conceptualisation that closely resembles the structure of the 'forum' museum (Grincheva 2013, p. 40–41).

The 'forum' museum model suggests an understanding of the role of museums that relates them to the creation of contact zones based on processes of exchange and distributed power that are not embedded in consensual and more conservative dynamics. Reflecting on contact zones, Clifford (1997, p. 212) encourages museums to become spaces that are 'a borderland between different worlds, histories and cosmologies' rather than authoritarian sites of universalised meanings.

The principle of co-optation associated with soft power, already stated here, may be understood as an indicator of the possible inclusion of collaborative strategies, which create critical dynamics to think these contact zones. Indeed, it could be said that soft power—despite the ambiguity of this concept—contains within itself the potential for transformation. If this is the case, and although Nye's (2004) definition is based on Weberian thought as 'power over', we believe that soft power can also be understood as transformative, due to the qualities already pointed out here. Transformative power is, in essence, empowerment. With Esche—who demands that art and its spaces be 'a permissive and imaginative space for expressing individual and collective desires that could not be accommodated... within current political discourses' (2004, s.p), and pointing, namely to the educational and discussion opportunities that the forum-museum provides, we add the possibility of another dimension of soft power in these spaces. This dimension is related to the creation of nonlinear and rhizomatic spaces and, therefore, disturbed, interrupted and in clear opposition to the striated spaces as defined by Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 33); quasi-spaces/ between-spaces; spaces of possibilities; spaces to imagine alternatives and spaces to imagine the future as we have already described in other works (cf. for example, Semedo 2014, 2015).

Furthermore, the attraction mechanism is for Nye more than persuasion through rational argumentation (Nye 2004, p. 6), suggesting that soft power goes further, relating to affect or feelings. Recent work on the role of reason and emotion in human cognition has pointed to the relevance of both logic and affect in how audiences engage with, for example, objects on display in museums (see, for example, Booth 2014) and the construction of places. Hardt (1999, p. 96) suggests that affective work produces, among other things, a sense of well-being, satisfaction, excitement, passion

and even a sense of connectedness or community. Although affect and emotion are sometimes used as synonyms, Hardt and Negri (2005, p. 108) warn that they should not be confused, arguing that, unlike emotions, which are mental phenomena, affects refer to the body and mind.

In any case, the affective work and experience seems to support the creation of these other alternative spaces implying the open dialogue between the visitor and the object as one of its fundamental characteristics; a characteristic that constitutes itself as a true productive force of knowledge. As research on heritage and museums has shown (see, for example, Munro 2014), visitors' responses to affective work are complex and the embodied experiences they bring to these spaces can have unexpected effects. The retreat from more didactic exhibition models in favour of others that embrace uncertainty and open spaces more typical of the forum-museum may also be associated with the influence of this research.

As we have already said, the discussion on the conceptualisation of soft power that we present here is perforce simple and does not take into account the broader academic debate on power and its meaning. It is a notion usually applied to the behaviour of nation states in the context of international relations. However, it seems to us that it can also be considered a useful means to describe and understand the behaviour of people, institutions, companies, political parties, etc., in different contexts and in a variety of situations, other than in the field of international relations.

Let us not forget, however, that this is a concept born in very specific contexts (USA, neo-liberalism)⁸ that do not always relate to our reality and that, in these terms, its application may be illusory. Hence we use it with some caution, questioning some of its principles and exploring other dimensions. These questionings then lead us to think about the way museums have developed in order to incorporate soft power in the roles they play. We are also interested in identifying characteristics of projects that can relate to a more dynamic approach to these processes and that produce contact zones based on processes of exchange, distributed power, empowerment and transformation.

21.3 From Authenticity to Places of Narrativised Experience

The Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga (MNAA) is a good example of the 'institutions of memory' (Holden et al. 2007, p. 16) referred to above, a feature that gives it special prominence in the national museological sphere. As an institution of memory, it is a physical manifestation of the nation's culture and heritage, providing spaces where 'work and pleasure can coexist (Holden et al. 2007, p. 53). Hence they are also places

⁸ On criticisms of the concept see Cai (2013), Nye (2021).

for the exercise of cultural diplomacy and soft power.⁹ Inspired by an English event from 2007, the MNAA promoted, between 29 September 2015 and January 2016, the exhibition *ComingOut. E se o Museu saísse à rua?* which had a great impact on the media and the museum world and was received with ‘warm welcomes’ not only by the buildings’ owners, but also by passers-by in general.

Conceived over several months, *ComingOut* consisted of the reproduction of 31 paintings from the collection ‘equipped with wooden frames and tables, just as they are exhibited in the rooms of any museum’, of ‘very high quality, in real scale’ and respecting ‘the characteristics and dimensions of the available walls’ (MNAA, Press Release¹⁰). Despite the museum-like approach, the exhibition sought a less firm ground that referred to ‘ambiguity’ and ‘confusion’. In an interview, António Filipe Pimentel, then director of the Museum, told us more about the potentialities already foreseen:

(...) in fact, the [Grand Tour] project is extraordinarily seductive; it is funny, it is humorous, it is puzzling and, regardless of that, it actually enters, it interpellates the inattentive attention of the public; and, above all, there was a side to the project that was very funny, is that the catalogue functioned, afterwards, as a report on the execution of the project, like an exhibition turned inside out; because the territory was the city, creating plasticity with that, because the city has its own plasticity and there was a plastic intervention that we didn’t know if was not going to lead to other plastic interventions; there was a dynamic of use that was very interesting to test (A. F. Pimentel, interview, 26 February 2016).

Today’s publicly funded museums are expected to play a relevant role in national or regional economies, whether as centerpieces in urban revitalisation, spaces for tourism and leisure or as spaces for citizenship (Witcomb 2003; Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 1998). The MNAA does not escape this ambition. To the press, the Museum declares that the objectives of the exhibition are related to its contribution ‘to the enhancement of the city as a cultural destination’ offering ‘a qualified experience’ for those who inhabit it or for those who demand it. They also invite visitors to visit the MNAA to ‘solidify their knowledge about Portugal and its history’ based on ‘a diversified journey through countless national treasures, which integrate our

⁹ It is worth mentioning the historical importance of Lisbon’s Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga, officially founded in 1884 to safeguard works of art mainly from the old convents and monasteries vacated by the law expelling religious orders from Portugal in 1834. From 1910, with the establishment of the Republic, it was joined by collections from the royal palaces and even more collections were created with the law on the separation of the State and the Church in 1911, which led to the nationalisation of property from the episcopal palaces and even from various churches in the country. Over the years, there were several patrons who donated works to the Museum, such as Calouste Gulbenkian. The MNAA’s collections reflect this reality, chronologically framed between the Middle Ages and the nineteenth century and with numerous works of religious art produced nationally and abroad, mostly painting, sculpture and goldsmithery. It also holds an important nucleus of collections of oriental art for export, and of African art, which document the era of the *Descobrimentos* and the Portuguese Empire, as witnesses to the relationships established on a global scale, from Brazil to Japan, passing through Africa, India and China.

¹⁰ Press Release available at: http://museudearteantiga.pt/content/files/comingout-pressrelease_baixa_resol.pdf?nonce=ef4d2bb08fdda2c1e02fafb1cbdc1621&nonce=c9fb55b2214329a419a550a19dc9e31b&nonce=c9fb55b2214329a419a550a19dc9e31b&nonce=c9fb55b2214329a419a550a19dc9e31b (Accessed 26 February 2016).

collective memory and tell nine centuries of our past' (MNAA, Press Release). The Museum is assumed as a brand that aims to incorporate this other brand: that of Lisbon bathed by the (*white*) light of the Atlantic that seductively extends to the Tagus. The Museum's brand will here become associated to the 'ballast of power' of the collections and to its aura. Contrary to the border liquidation of the announced exhibition and other strategic communication actions, the Museum is presented as based on solidification processes much closer to raw power, to ideas of *power-to* and hierarchy of civilisations, to the discipline of bodies and minds, than to the performative (post-museum) museum.

Unlike the English experience that inspired *Coming Out*, the option was not to exhibit the main works in the Museum's collection, but rather to highlight lesser-known but equally top-class works. The *Portrait of King Sebastião* painted in 1571 by Cristóvão de Moraes, *Salome holding the head of St. John the Baptist*, painted by Lucas Cranach, the Elder, in 1510–1515, *Senhora das Dores*, by Quentin Metsys, of 1511, and the *Madonna with child and saints* by Hans Holbein, the Elder, painted in 1519, were some of the reproductions that invaded the streets of downtown Lisbon (Chiado, Bairro Alto and Príncipe Real areas), 'a space of intense life, between commercial life, everyday shopping life, offices, work activities, nightlife, everything from bohemianism to concentration of tourists, etc.' (A. F. Pimentel, interview, 26 February 2016). In no way was it intended to:

(...) bring, randomly and without criteria, works from the museum to the street just for fun, because, as in all exhibitions, there are levels of fruition and approach, more or less demanding, more or less sophisticated, and we work to reach the general public, but also to respond to the most sophisticated demand. And, therefore, we thought that here the idea should be more focused on dissemination from within the museum, whose collections are very poorly known, but whose brand itself already has a great ballast of power (A. F. Pimentel, interview, 26 February, 2016).

The exhibition was set up in the quiet of night in a true *guerrilla* action (including promotional marketing) that took the walls of the centre of Lisbon by storm: 'The exhibition was set up at night in successive stages: first the *brigades* went to set the fixtures (and no one understood what that was for), so that afterwards, in the early morning of the inauguration, all that was done was to fix the replicas one by one, with the respective tables (...)' (A. F. Pimentel, interview, 26 February 2016). The intention was 'to surprise the public, the next morning, with an open-air exhibition in the centre of Lisbon'. The quality of the printing, the scale of the works, the frames and the tables would create 'the strong illusion that the MNAA had, in fact, gone out into the street' (MNAA, Press Release). The walls of the buildings start to function as Museum rooms that some identify as 'an urban art initiative organised by the MNAA' (Synek 2015, s/n). The buzz settles in:

'Is the painting going to stay here overnight?' The employees of the tapas restaurant *100 Montaditos*, in Pátio do Tijolo, seem worried about the huge painting that is being placed in the street. It's not an easy task, as there's a car almost glued to the wall, leaving only a few centimetres free for the manager of the company ExpoCena to nail it up with a drill. It all comes together and a cook even comes to the door to admire *Family group*, a large painting by Pieter de Grebber, dated 1630, a portrait of a large Dutch family, just in time with the queues to eat *montaditos* for one euro (Silva 2015, s/n).



Fig. 21.1 *ComingOut* 2015, Reproduction/Gustave Courbet, *Man of the Pipe*, Lisbon (Rua da Barroca) ©DGPC-ADF: José Paulo Ruas

The museum ‘turned inside out’ thus extends itself throughout the city and creates plastic interventions that integrate reproductions and spaces—connecting imagination and memory—as part of a process of creating narrative environments that integrate the daily lives of passers-by and enrich ‘the texture of the city with another sediment of fabric’ (A. F. Pimentel, interview, 26 February 2016) (Fig. 21.1).

These storytelling environments—based on recognisable/consensual markers and framings—and their scenic and museum effects appeal to the understanding of passers-by through observation and spatial, sensual, embodied experience, challenging ‘inattentive attention’ and inviting interaction and use of personal agency. Their meanings and associations inform perceptions of the world of bystanders, while their materiality lures passers-by in, offering a way to touch, to enter the museum, the art, the history, the city.

The introverted museum occupies the city and transforms it into exhibitors for a society that increasingly imagines itself through this spectacularisation of the museum-like. Colonisation by museum practices will also respond to the demand for authenticity fuelled by cultural amnesia, re-articulating consumer needs of today’s tourism and entertainment industry (Huyssen 1995). These environments of consensus created by the museum reveal places that are strangely familiar because certain aspects were already known and shared by many—the object, the museum, the place, the settings—and yet, at the same time, strange because in these environments they take on new forms. In other words, the plasticity of the objects and the places António Filipe Pimentel refers to (volumes, shapes, colours, light, materials, sound,

etc.) trigger physical memories and emotions that despite their familiarity, cause strangeness by arousing other possible dialogues and interactions. Here the corporeal will not be more fundamental than the intellectual, but it is deeply entangled in it.

The *ComingOut* exhibition was about building a seductive discourse that could be perceived as a guided tour based on the marks inscribed on the territory:

(...) the territory itself was defined with marks that, sometimes, had historical significance, others had a humorous significance, and, therefore, there was in fact a design of the exhibition that could be perceived as a guided tour and that was not random, being that it was constituted in this double aspect of adapting the works to the available spaces and simultaneously building with them this other discourse 'enriching' the texture of the city with another sediment of texture (A. F. Pimentel, interview, 26 February, 2016).

Every interpretative stance is discourse. Social meanings, forms of knowledge and experience, power relations and ideology are embodied and reproduced through language. The idea of discourse used here does not simply refer to the use of certain works and the organisation of the exhibition, but also refers to forms of social practice, their framings and, in this case, the museum effects that have been pointed out here. The way we frame certain concepts, themes or discussions, the way audiences are constructed, has effects insofar as they constitute, construct and regulate the understanding, fruition and discussion of these 'narrative environments'. Discourse not only organises the way they are understood, but also the way we act, the social and technical practices we reproduce, and in short, the way we build and reproduce knowledge.

The museum invites people to share the experience of their encounter with these objects on social networks (through, for example, the hashtag #ComingOutMNAA) and in the press, the works on display are addressed as 'you'. The city space is disturbed, misunderstandings are generated, the eyes of passers-by are interrupted and the body seems to have a life of its own: 'You pass the tram and you can almost reach out and touch it. Tourists point their cameras, those who are walking cross the street to get a better look. Is it really a work of art there, in the middle of the street?' (Caetano 2015, s/n). In a chronicle for the newspaper *Público*, Alexandra Prado Coelho (2015, s/n) describes these ambiguous spaces that lead her to ask a variety of questions:

There are paintings – with frames and everything – in the streets of Lisbon. They are reproductions of works from the Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga. And something happens to us when we come across them.

The first time I saw one I was taken by surprise. The effect was exactly the one I imagine is intended. I was walking along Rua do Loreto and saw the painting on the outside wall of a building. Now, when I think of that moment, I have the feeling that my brain took a fraction of a second to manage to transmit the correct information: there is a museum painting, framed and everything, hanging in the street.

I must have taken a step back and stopped to get a better view. I took a quick look around to see if there were other people watching or if I had been caught in some kind of joke. But no, the bustle remained normal. At ease, I took the time to observe the picture more closely. I read the legend beside it. I noticed the characters, the scene. I looked around again to confirm that I was behaving appropriately. Everything was calm.

(...) There are six characters, many details, of the place but also of the gestures, the glances. There is a lot to try to understand here: who are these people, why are they gathered in this room, what do they talk about, what is the expression of the man with his arm over his face and why does a girl look at him with an illuminated air, who is the man who enters and to whom only the dog seems to pay attention, which paintings are represented inside this painting? I end up on the Internet, of course, on the MNAA website, where I read that in this 'reference work from the Museum's collection of Dutch painting, and one of the most representative of this contemporary of Vermeer, the meaning of the composition goes beyond the mere representation of a gallant scene from daily life in Amsterdam in the mid-seventeenth century [and that] the various characters around the table may allude to the concept of the Five Senses.

Duncan (1995, p. 1–2) explains that, although visitors may not describe it as such, the museum acts as a stage that incites visitors to adopt performative behaviours of some kind. These rituals of visiting the museum depend, above all, on disciplinary discourses that frame visitors' behaviours. Despite the fact that these are reproductions and that street life imposes different rhythms on the *gaze*, the inculcated rituals of visiting museums remain enduring. One observes attentively, reads the legend, analyses perspective and composition and notices everything. But the ambiguity of these museum spaces is permanent and some cross the space, the hands touch, messages are left. *ComingOut* museum technologies reproduce 'the order of things', and despite the fissures that are opening up, it will be a *top-down* construction that emerges here that has little thought of how to integrate more active participation. It will be subversion and other guerrilla actions that will change the course of these spaces, proposing alternative forms of appropriation and highlighting their elastic qualities (Fig. 21.2).

The questions that arise are multiple: why are framed reproductions of the Museum, with explanatory tables, displayed in the streets of Lisbon? Could it be that, in this way, the Museum's collection becomes more accessible to audiences that are not regular museum visitors? Is the authentic object dispensable or is it still necessary for the production of meaningful experience? Can a museum without 'authentic' objects be considered a museum? What exactly is the effect that these reproductions have on people, and how does what is happening here differ from what happens in museums? How do these reproductions 'communicate'? Does the exhibition suggest that the reproduction is not a copy of the real, but becomes truth in its own right, what Baudrillard called hyper-reality? Or do these reproductions, on the contrary, have no importance whatsoever? And, in the manner of Benjamin, if we opt for these strategies can museums and art be of and for everyone? Do these objects have the power of agency? If so, does it include the power to redefine the world?

The nature and agency of the objects in the *ComingOut* exhibition opens up some of this dissonance. In museums 'authentic' objects are presented as 'evidence', authenticating the truth of history. This increasingly discussed feature of critical museology—object-based representation of the world—is key to distinguishing them from other forms of historical narrative or technology. We tend to see museum objects as unmediated anchors of the past, but 'authenticity' is an illusory construct. At what point is an object 'more authentic'? Authenticity supposedly evokes an aura, a

Fig. 21.2 *ComingOut* 2015,
Reproduction Table/
Unknown Portuguese
Master, *Inferno*, Lisbon
©Ramiro Gonçalves



transcendent experience. But objects have many lives (Appadurai 1986).¹¹ Moreover, our contexts shape our notions of what we think is authentic:

Some cultures admire the copy. In Chinese tradition, copying work by the masters is a sign of self-cultivation and of intellectual and moral strength. The cult of authenticity in western culture today is a protective gesture against the relativism of postmodernism and the commodification of culture. It reflects a desire to find our own authentic selves. It is also a distraction from and validation of the ‘othering’ in which museums engage. Claiming ‘authenticity’ is a way for museums to deny the imperialist and patriarchal structures that have informed their institutions (Marstine 2006, p. 3).

In Gell’s work (1998) one finds a more active model for thinking about objects and their biographies in which the object not only takes on different identities, but can also interact with those who look at it, use it, own it.¹² The objects’ power of

¹¹ The current discussion around the status of the object is informed by the extensive research coming to us from critical museology (see, for example, Pearce 1989) and material culture (see, for example, Tilley et al. 2006).

¹² As Hoskins (2006, p. 76) notes, this approach calls into question the boundaries between subjects and collective representations, underlining the importance of the phenomenological dimension of our interactions with the material world and the need to interrogate the objects that fascinate us as well as the reasons for that. As objectifications of cultural capital, art reproductions take on a special status because, as Fyfe (2004, p. 51) points out, at the moment of their consumption we often ask questions about what is presented to the eye (gaze); what is absent; and to what extent the intentions of the work and the author are fulfilled.

agency is found in this space of interaction as they produce certain effects: making us happy, leading us to ask questions, to reject what is proposed to us. In this sense, these objects and narrative environments have agency, producing effects, which will become very visible in the re-imagined museum geographies.

In fact, *ComingOut* is guided by a shift of emphasis that leads us from authenticity to experience.¹³ On the other hand, if it is true that reproduction is vulnerable to the accusation that a complete meaning is absent or that the original meaning is subverted, in a way, our thirst for authenticity is quenched and disbelief suspended by the veracity of the places, stages of these fictional performances. Objects are continually understood not as inherently meaningful, but as being able to represent something (ideas, values, places, communities) when placed in networks of interpretation.

We return to Alexandra Prado Coelho (2015) who tells us about her encounter with the exhibition, posing some of the questions that run through these spaces:

There was a museum painting in the street. And, in the midst of the strangeness of the situation, the biggest strangeness was still the frame. As if this were the element that made all the difference. Of course that there is street art and that we have original works in the streets and that we are used to that, but a frame is a much stranger element. It was the frame that told us 'I am not a poster, I am an actual painting and I decided to leave the museum, where you would never visit me, and come and show myself here in the street'. There is something touching in the sudden humility of the painting in front of me. As if it were it reaching out to us and saying that we are important after all (it belongs to everyone, that's the truth) and that there is no sense in there being any distance between us.

It is curious to understand how the simple displacement in space of a work of art – as the Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga does in this initiative, which it christened *ComingOut* and which brings 31 reproductions of works from its collection to the streets of Lisbon (Chiado, Bairro Alto, Príncipe Real) during three months – gives it other meanings and can change our relationship with it.

The museum, we all know, lends a solemnity to things. Even if many ways of desecrating it have already been invented, nothing changes the fact that we are within those walls for our own choice. And there is a different intimacy between us and a painting. We are often alone and with plenty of time to observe it. There is time and silence – precisely what does not exist on the street (2015, *s/n*).

The use of frames and tables is essential to the construction of the museal effect pointed out. By reproducing museum technologies that reinforce institutionalised conceptualisations, this 'museum sensitivity' tends to present these environments as neutral, uncontested spaces that remain linked to spaces/collections 'whose brand in itself already has a great ballast of power' (A. F. Pimentel, interview, 26 February 2016). Frames not only set boundaries, but provide ideological narrative contexts that imprint our understanding of what is possible to be included. But in fact, one of the effects that have the most impact happens when instead of isolating the reproductions from what is around them, the frame connects the two worlds: that of the museum and 'the outside world, the real world'; that of the 'real thing' and of the reproduction (Fig. 21.3).

¹³ The notion of experience alluded to here has been widely discussed as a means of accessing the 'real', the 'true', as opposed to the discourse of simulation and the 'absolute false', associated with Jean Baudrillard (1983) and Umberto Eco (1995).



Fig. 21.3 *ComingOut* 2015, Reproduction/Unknown Iberian Master, *Portrait of a lady*, Lisbon (rua do Alecrim) ©Paulo Duarte

One of the effects of the exhibition will be, precisely, its performativity in the sense that it deconstructs the museum effect as a technology, highlighting the museum as a means for cultural production and identifying the exhibition as a framing device:

Think of the museum, not as a place to which one brings technology, but as a technology in its own right - a set of skills, techniques, and methods. Think of the museum as a distinctive medium, not as an empty vessel for all kinds of *muséalia*. Consider it as a medium in its own right. A performing museology makes that medium transparent? A performing museology makes the museum perform itself by making the museum visible qua museum visible to the visitor (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2000, p. 11).

Thus—and expecting it in advance—the exhibition tests the ‘dynamics(s) of use’, opening itself to other ‘plastic interventions’ and narratives. The framings presented are challenged, interrogated, fragmentary and in the relocation of object-reproductions, the mechanisms of the museum become transparent as they declare that the museum is an active player in the construction of meanings. Places and spaces that are normally marginalised—or that lie ‘beyond-frames’, beyond museum settings—move into these spaces, disrupting them, striating the smooth spaces of consensual understandings and creating other spaces of possibilities for imagining the future. Spaces, as argued above, where soft power will best act. There will therefore be two important moments of displacement of these performative objects: from the museum-place to the imagined museum-city; from the imagined museum-city to places beyond the frame. A third moment, involving the production of other objects and spaces, would complete the cycle.

As in the English example, in Lisbon, in addition to the admiration and interest, replicas were vandalised and even removed. About a third of the reproductions were stolen and some were ‘relocated’. As the museum’s communications office told journalists the Museum considered that, ‘while these acts are still reprehensible, they seem to demonstrate an unrestrained “love of art” or, better, “love of reproduction”, on the part of some citizens¹⁴

Inferno, by an unknown Portuguese Master from the sixteenth century, which was on Rua da Rosa, in Bairro Alto, disappeared just 48 h after the inauguration.¹⁵ A few weeks later, other reproductions would disappear: *Ruins of Ancient Rome*, by Pannini and Delerive’s *The Flea Market at the Praça da Alegria*, which were located at the top of Rua das Taipas, near the São Pedro de Alcântara viewpoint. Also stolen were *Courtesan*, by Jacob Adriaenz Backer (Rua das Salgadeiras), *Obras de Misericórdia*, by Peter Brueghel, the Younger (Calçada da Glória), *São Damião*, by Bartolomé Bermejo (Travessa dos Teatros), *Madonna with child*, by Hans Memling, and *São Jerónimo*, by Albrecht Dürer (both on Rua Garrett), *Portrait of King Sebastião*, by Cristóvão de Moraes (Rua do Loreto), *Saint Augustine*, by Piero della Francesca (Calçada do Sacramento), *Man with a pipe* by Gustave Courbet (Rua da Barroca) and *Portrait of the Count of Farrobo*, by Domingos António de Sequeira (Largo do Picadeiro). These disappearances are being understood more in the light of notions of appropriation, being part of ‘the anthropological experience, the richer side of the project’ (A. F. Pimentel, interview, 26 February 2016), than vandalism.

A particular situation of the Portuguese experience related to theft was the transfer of four of the works, with their respective fixings and tables, to the south bank of the Tagus, more specifically to the outlying parishes of Laranjeiro (Almada) and Miratejo (Seixal), by a group whose spokesman calls himself ‘Robin of the Arts’ (Figs. 21.4 and 21.5).¹⁶ The MNAA knew how to take advantage of the occasion, and at each theft a table was placed in the previous location where the replica had been, with the inscription ‘Temporarily withdrawn for private exhibition’.¹⁷ Humour and irony were part of the MNAA’s communication strategy. Moreover, in December three new replicas were placed in the city, presented by the Museum as a Christmas gift and leading to a renewed interest in the initiative.¹⁸ It should be noted that none of the latter elements included in the street exhibition suffered any damage, theft or intervention, thus proving a possible effect of social awareness of the value of the exhibition.

¹⁴ Available at: <https://www.jn.pt/artes/furtado-um-terco-dos-quadros-expostos-nas-ruas-de-lisboa-4910739.html/> (Accessed 12 April 2016).

¹⁵ Available at: <http://observador.pt/2015/10/01/ja-foi-roubado-um-dos-quadros-expostos-na-rua/> (Accessed 10 March 2016).

¹⁶ Available at: <http://observador.pt/2015/12/06/robin-das-artes-tirou-quatro-quadros-do-chiado-e-deu-os-ao-miratejo/> (Accessed 10 March 2016).

¹⁷ Available at: <http://www.gazetadorossio.pt/mais-dois-quadros-roubados-a-exposicao-do-museu-nacional-de-arte-antiga.html> (Accessed 10 March 2016).

¹⁸ Available at: <http://observador.pt/2015/12/12/chiado-acordou-tres-obras-arte-nas-ruas/> (Accessed 26 February 2016).

Fig. 21.4 *ComingOut* 2015, Reproduction/Nicolas de Largillière *Portrait of Lord of Noirmont*, Lisbon (Capelo street) ©André Costa



Following a proposal by one of the main national auction houses, the Palácio do Correio Velho, the MNAA agreed to put the surviving replicas up for auction and, with this income to boost the acquiring of Domingos Sequeira's *Adoration of the Magi*, which had started in the meantime and which was intended to be a crowdfunding project.¹⁹ The auction is full of stories worth telling: 'some of the stolen replicas reappear, from Boucher's *Bathsheba Bath*, for example, which was brought here because someone tore it out, to the *Portrait of the Count of Farrobo*, which came from the left bank and the parish council returned it to the auction'. The event 'amazingly also reached a paroxysm of dispute (...) but it is still controversial if we understand that there things as dramatic as people disputing replicas for 3,000 euros who would doubtfully give 3,000 euros for a real work of art, but the fetishism

¹⁹ *Vamos pôr o Sequeira no lugar certo*, MNAA, Press Release. Available at: http://museudearteantiga.pt/content/files/modalidade_pagamento_sequeira.pdf?nonce=e9f7b7729e2ab65df072377a97c45b7c (Accessed 6 March 2016).



Fig. 21.5 *ComingOut* 2015, Reproduction/Nicolas de Largillière *Portrait of Senhor de Noirmont*, Almada (Laranjeiro) ©André Costa

worked’ (A. F. Pimentel, interview, 26 February 2016). A total of 27 reproductions were sold, resulting in a total of 33,290 €.²⁰

21.4 The Daring Cry from the Margins: ‘The Street is the people’s Museum’!

From the case study of the 31 reproductions of paintings from the MNAA’s collection, framed, captioned and allocated in strategically chosen territory in the centre of Lisbon, we move on to another example, now in the city of Salvador-Bahia, Brazil. In thinking about the geography of this important historical Brazilian city, we did not choose for our analysis the most expressive art museums—some run by private administration and others by public administration, such as: Museu Carlos Costa Pinto, Museu de Arte da Bahia, Museu de Arte Moderna and Palacete das Artes. Instead, we seek other spaces beyond the frames, broader, more ambiguous and irregular, the in-between places, forged by historical subjects living in marginal and border areas (Bhabha 1998, p. 27; Santiago 1978, p. 28).

²⁰ Available at: <https://www.pcv.pt/auction.php?n=1063&displaymode=resultssummary&ref=auctionspastinfo> (Accessed 26 February 2016).

In this search we found Fazenda Grande do Retiro, a neighbourhood located in the outskirts of the centre of Salvador, a place where people who make up the city's labour force live, characterised by unequal conditions of access to urban infrastructure and services. Its local residents are those who face the harsh daily reality of the Brazilian periphery living on the margins²¹ and marked, historically and socially, by the negligence and disregard of the State, by the inefficiency of public policies, by the poor and scarce working conditions (unemployment, underemployment, precarious work and informality).

This peripheral neighbourhood has been inhabited, sparsely, since the nineteenth century and more intensely from the mid-twentieth century. Currently, its population is 53,000 inhabitants and, according to the census conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) in 2010, Fazenda Grande do Retiro would be the fifth neighbourhood with the largest black population in Salvador, with 87% of people declared to be black.

As mentioned, the history of this neighbourhood's development was marked by the oblivion of the public authorities. Public policies are noted only for the existence of trash removal (which is still insufficient, as we will see below) and the presence of the military police. Even today, Fazenda Grande do Retiro does not have libraries, cultural centres, museums, theatres, that is, it is a neighbourhood totally devoid of cultural infrastructure.

In 2009, three young graffiti artists and poetry reciters living in this neighbourhood, much involved in the hip-hop culture,²² circulated around the central areas of Salvador to graffiti the 'best facades'. Circulating and demarcating the centre, leaving their visions and criticisms there, translated into images²³ through this language of territorial affirmation, the graffiti,²⁴ was a way of acting and manifesting the right to the city, it was also a way of disturbing, neutralising or even subordinating the message of others (Canclini 1997, p. 301).

At this time, transforming these 'best facades' with multicoloured paint was a dangerous intervention. One of these young people, Fabrício Brito, told us in an interview: 'Graffiti on the street was very risky a few years ago. We were considered criminals. The peripheral graffiti artist who dares to go downtown to leave his mark (...). We went to the city centre, it was a displacement to state that we existed' (F. Brito, interview, 27 April 2022).

Circulation through the 'outside world'—far removed from their daily realities experienced in the periphery—provided these young people with contact with public museums in Bahia, something not so common to residents of areas further away from

²¹ On the historical racial rift in Latin American countries see Quijano (2005).

²² On hip-hop culture see: <http://latinoamericana.wiki.br/verbetes/h/hip-hop-cultura>.

²³ At that time graffiti was considered a criminalised means of expression.

²⁴ Graffiti is an artistic language that reflects the reality of the streets and of the less favoured groups of society. This popular language is linked to other movements, such as hip-hop. It is territorial writing in the city, designed to assert territory. Its manual, spontaneous stroke structurally opposes *well painted* or printed political or advertising legends and challenges these institutionalised languages by altering and/or superimposing them (Canclini 1997).

the centre—in geographical, social, cultural and economic terms²⁵—according to the interviewee's words:

When I ask people in my neighbourhood, in my community, about museums, people have a narrow view of museums, a rigid view, not a good view either, you know? It's a vision of a space that is exclusionary, that does not want us inside. When I say *we*, I mean the peripheral community, the neighbourhoods far from the city centre. It's difficult to find a young person or even someone in their 40s or 50s from the community where I live, which is Fazenda Grande do Retiro, which is close to Liberdade, one of the blackest neighbourhoods in the world outside of the African continent. There it is difficult to ask someone about museums and for someone to say: I went to the museum, the museum is nice. So, this does not happen. The opposite happens – people say: I think there is such a thing over there, but I have never been there, (...) it seems very boring (F. Brito, interview, April 27, 2022).

In contact with the central museums of Salvador, these three young graffiti artists and poetry writers were disturbed by what they saw, '(...) when we arrived in these spaces, we saw that our representation was bad, racist and prejudiced. We were tired of seeing the history of black people as slaves' (F. Brito, interview, 27 April 2022). Such museums, according to him, did not offer a content that represented a large part of the population of Salvador, the communities in the peripheries:

(...) in many of these institutionalized museum spaces, for example, we even appear there, the peripheral subject is there, but as an object. I say this because I'm from Salvador, Bahia. And Salvador is a historic city with traditional museums (...), but even the so-called modern museums, when we go to access the interior of these cultural venues, we don't find such a dialogical narrative, a more open narrative, of our culture, of our aesthetics. Often we are represented in a pejorative way, in a prejudiced way, which does not correspond to what we are and how we feel. Some of the slave narratives from the nineteenth century are still preserved in these museums and these narratives do not contemplate our way of being (F. Brito, interview, 27 April 2022).

Another discomfort was caused by the experiences felt when experiencing performative behaviours in the visits to these museums. As mentioned before, these rituals are often characterised by the solemnity that these institutions lend to the experiences and by the constitution of an 'aura' attributed to the exhibited objects, which is enclosed in the museums' premises. As Fabrício tells us:

'There are many experiences, including those of students who, when invited to cultural mediation in (...) museums, are harassed by the security guards of these institutions or by cultural mediators who say all the time: 'silence', 'do not touch the works on display', 'do not go near it', as if it were something full of 'aura', sacralised (...). This often ends up distancing rather than bringing closer these public-school students who live in the periphery and who are more used to other kinds of art (...). What shocked us the most was to think that only in that space of organization and order there was culture. We thought that what we did was important, was cultural (F. Brito, interview, 27 April 2022).

The perception that the museum did not reveal the peripheral identities was fundamental for the three young people to react to those existing forms of representation

²⁵ Income, education, housing conditions, gender, cultural capital, generational situation, among others, represent important aspects for us to understand the different ways of using and appropriating cultural spaces and practices (Ibram 2012).

and to the idea that only in those institutionalised and solemn spaces was it possible to have access to culture. The reaction of the three youngsters came as contestation, in the form of graffiti: 'The street is the people's museum', since:

(...) saying that the street was the people's museum was very important at the time because that museum that existed there was not of the people, it was a museum of the aristocracy, it was a museum of the bourgeoisie, the people did not recognize themselves in that museum space. We as periphery did not recognise ourselves. It was a way of shouting, of breaking it (F. Brito, interview, 27 April 2022).

It was in the context of this cry of contestation against the authority of the city's museums (see Semedo 2019) that the Coletivo Arte Marginal Salvador emerged, which today has 12 people who carry out educational-cultural activities of museological nature, in the *quebradas* of the peripheral neighbourhoods of Salvador. Fabrício Brito is one of the idealisers of this collective. The artistic and cultural languages of strategic communication with local residents are multiple: graffiti, poetry, music, and more recently, performance. In the words of its creator:

Grffiti is something that is in the street, on the walls, that speaks a lot about us, the images there touch us, affect us in a way that raises our self-esteem, strengthens our identity. So, it was from this perspective that we ended up having the need to create the Coletivo Arte Marginal Salvador, that is: Arte Marginal Salvador, as a collective, emerges from the need to create spaces in which we can recognize ourselves as subjects that produce knowledge, that produce culture and that produce art (F. Brito, interview, April 27, 2022).

Since that moment in 2009 until today, the Coletivo Arte Marginal Salvador has been occupying the streets and squares of this peripheral area of Salvador, promoting graffiti festivals with poetry, music and street theatre and seeking to make art a tool for social transformation (Ribeiro 2019, p. 48). On these occasions, photographs and paintings are shown, clean canvases are exposed so that local residents can graffiti, poetry is recited, music is played and performances are held, as reported in the local press (Fig. 21.6)²⁶:

Conceived by the Arte Marginal Salvador collective, the project *A Rua é o Museu do Povo* will hold urban interventions and conversations in the format of lives (...), in the districts of Castelo Branco, Fazenda Grande do Retiro, Largo do Tanque and Liberdade, respectively. The interventions will take place in four squares located in peripheral neighbourhoods of Salvador and will include an exhibition of photographs by Hercules Bressy, paintings by Luís Santos, graffiti by Pedro Arcanjo, all members of the collective Arte Marginal Salvador. Actresses from the show *O Museu é a Rua*, from the popular art group A Pombagem, also integrate the program with performances to reaffirm the urban, marginalized street art (...).

By providing these meetings with people from the communities in the public squares of peripheral neighbourhoods, the collective wanted to constitute a museum to strengthen multiple peripheral identities. This museum would not have a traditional format (building, collection and public), but would be an open museum,²⁷ a process

²⁶ <https://www.salvadorbahia.com/eventos/projeto-A-rua-E-O-museu-do-povo/#:~:text=On%20day%2028%20of%20February,streets%20a%20performer%20Fabr%C3%ADcia%20Rios.>

²⁷ For other examples of street museums in Brazil, see the Museu Aberto de Arte Urbana in São Paulo website (<https://museuabertodearteurbana.wordpress.com/>) and the Museu de Arte de Rua website (<https://www.mar360.art.br/>).



Fig. 21.6 Actions promoted by the Coletivo Arte Marginal Salvador in the Fazenda Grande do Retiro neighbourhood, in February 2021. ©Tiago Caldas

museum, where local residents could recognise themselves as artists and makers of culture (Figs. 21.7 and 21.8):

(...) And this museum for us has always been the street. The street is a place of movements, of affections, of memories, of cultural manifestations. Much of what we did there was what we wanted to access. It was our mirror. The street is the place of unpredictability, it is chaotic, the street has a sound and cultural landscape, and we aggregate this with welcoming. The street is the bus passing by, the children playing in the square, the people walking, not the empty space. That's what makes it magical and extraordinary because anything can happen. We don't think that this affects us or puts our proposal at risk. When we do these actions, everybody wins, including the shopkeeper: the Bahian who sells *acarajé*, the street vendor... (F. Brito, interview, 27 April 2022).

The actions promoted by the Coletivo Arte Marginal transcended other peripheral neighbourhoods, and between 2014 and 2015, the collective incorporated new professionals to help operationalise and conceptually ground the educational-cultural actions, above all, in the theoretical and methodological bases of a *new theory of museums* (2006). In this context, the integration of Manuela Ribeiro, a museologist living in the periphery, was very important. With her participation, it was possible for the collective to 'put on paper' all its goals to compete for public funding. The result of this effort led, in 2016, to the approximation with the Directorate of Museums (DIMUS) of the State of Bahia and the integration of these actions in the programming of the National Museum Week, promoted annually by the Instituto Brasileiro de Museus (Ibram).



Fig. 21.7 Works produced by the Coletivo Arte Marginal Salvador in the Fazenda Grande do Retiro neighbourhood, in February 2021. ©Tiago Caldas



Fig. 21.8 Actions promoted by the Arte Marginal Salvador Collective in the Fazenda Grande do Retiro neighbourhood, in February 2021. ©Tiago Caldas

As an example of this approach, during the 16th National Museum Week in 2018, the project *Renascer das Artes: Musealizando* was developed, taking place in Pelourinho, in the Praça das Artes, Cultura e Memória and in the Casa do Teatro de Rua da Bahia, as disclosed on the website of the Fundação Cultural do Estado da Bahia:

With a Street Theater Round supported by the Fundação Cultural do Estado da Bahia (Funceb/SecultBa), the members of the Casa do Teatro de Rua, in Pelourinho, received in their headquarters a recital of poetry, live music and conversation round (...). The event *Renascer das Artes: Musealizando*, integrated the 16th National Museum Week – a project by IPAC/SecultBA – whose theme involved approaches to reduce the distance between the museum and society. The afternoon was immersed in live music by Edilson Bispo and included an open microphone at the Round Table ‘Museums, poetry and street theatre: possible dialogues’. The mediation was done by the artistic/general coordinator of Casa Teatro de Rua, Fabrício Brito.

In the street, no member is dissociated from the whole and everyone, without exception, can participate and collaborate. These moments of connection among people, in the public sphere (Arendt 2007, p. 62), stimulating them to interact, have the power to strengthen the street as a place of exchanges and of artistic-cultural production, proposing other and new ways of acting, thinking, feeling and living, and also helping in the re-signification of the understanding of the street and the museum as more open, horizontal, and inclusive spaces. Being the street the museum of the people, people can be what they are, in a spontaneous, non-ritualised and non-solemn way, without necessarily giving up technologies (object, exhibition, legends) and museum effects (contemplation, participation, fruition, creation, re-signification). In these situations, the authentic also takes a secondary role, and more than the object/creation itself, the value of the experiences lived and felt by people prevails.

These educational-cultural actions remove the protagonism of the museum-building and recognise other spaces and forms of museological action. Here, historical subjects do not move to demarcate territories, but create their own museums in their own marginal and border territories, as a response to the absence of representations in central regions, showing that it is not only the traditional museum that is an active player in the construction of meanings and re-significations. This reveals, on the part of the members of the collective, a museological perspective that constructs signs, which, without eliminating the main function of the street (circulation of people, traffic of vehicles), added a new function to it, seeking new meanings for objects and spaces (Chagas 1994, p. 52).

Reflecting on the collective’s 13 years of existence, Fabrício pointed out that some relationships have changed and that more dialogic actions can already be identified in traditional museums. However, ‘(...) we still think that this cry is important because there are still museums that have people who are not willing to engage in dialogue’. Moreover, the interviewee added that, today, the collective is going through a new moment, marked by the decision to constitute a community museum.²⁸ In his words:

²⁸ On community museums in Brazil see Santos (2017).

We were street, but now we are building a space. And in the construction of this space we will be able to put everything that we have built over the years because everything that was produced was taken to the homes of the members of the collective. So, we feel the need to have our own house, our collective's headquarters and the collective's headquarters will become a community museum. The collective settles down and will become a museum (F. Brito, interview, April 27, 2022).

The space that will be the Collective's headquarters and also the headquarters of the community museum was donated by Fabrício's father, in the Fazenda Grande do Retiro neighbourhood. His mother, Janete Brito, will be the manager of this future community museum and Manuela Ribeiro will be the museologist in charge. At this moment, the importance of the museum-building is resumed and, in planning its future activities, it is planned to hold a forum and cultural exchanges with downtown art museums.

We took the opportunity to ask the interviewee about what power this community museum will have to transform the reality of its surroundings. Fabrício answered with an example still very much alive in the memory of the residents. The Fazenda Grande do Retiro neighbourhood is historically known as the *Bairro do Lixo* ('Garbage District'). From 1975 to 1985, this carelessness with the waste collection generated a social movement, called *Festa do Lixo* ('Garbage Festival'), when the residents got together and collected the waste accumulated in precarious deposits and dumped it in front of the Imprensa Oficial da Bahia building. Even today, the rubbish produced is piled up everywhere, particularly in front of the local public schools. Faced with this serious environmental and social problem, the idea of setting up a community museum is to think about what to do to improve the quality of life in the neighbourhood. In Fabrício's words:

Talking to older residents of the neighborhood we found out that, during the military dictatorship, there were protests in favor of cleaning and a healthier environment. Older residents of the neighborhood held, between 1975 and 1985, the Festa do Lixo (Garbage Festival), in which the local residents would leave their houses, rubbish in hand and go singing and dancing to the building of the Empresa Gráfica da Bahia (Imprensa Oficial do Estado da Bahia), the only state institution that is located in a peripheral neighborhood in the city of Salvador. There, right in front of the building, the residents would drop off their rubbish. This was a way to protest against the state negligence regarding waste and also against the dictatorship. With access to documentary sources from this period, we thought of recovering this memory of struggle and incorporating it in our collection, in the community museum. Through education, through environmental education actions, we will build environmental awareness. This is a point that links us closely to this issue of social museum and community museum. The museum can be involved in this movement of struggle. Families, residents and young people will have access to this memory.

21.5 Conclusion

In this chapter we sought to explore the role of museums in society by making the notion of soft power the focus of discussion and using a critical/cultural approach to support the investigation of the relationships established between museums and

the community. For this purpose, we firstly centred on a discussion about this concept, analysing its connection with museums and its potential as a methodological approach. In a second moment, we presented two case studies: a project developed in 2015 by the Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga, in Lisbon, Portugal, and a project developed since 2014 by the Arte Marginal collective, in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil.

The first example revealed that the current theories and conceptualisations about the use of soft power by museums are perceptible and, in this case, one can see that the contrariness of the theft was cleverly used as a booster of its own effect. In the more elastic spaces produced by the MNAA exhibition, it is no longer a question of persuading, of intervening to influence behaviour, but rather of facilitating complex reflexivity and creative dispositions. The exhibition became a place where different points of view and conflicting options were posed, examined, reflected upon and discussed by different players. It was about operating within complex flows and demonstrating 'contextual intelligence' understood as 'the ability to understand an evolving environment and capitalise on trends, will become a crucial skill in enabling leaders to convert power resources into successful strategies' (Nye 2006, p. 13).

The MNAA was able to capitalise on the concrete reality of its experience in due time. If it is true that from the beginning the media and society in general were aware of what was happening in the city, the transfer of part of the exhibition to a peripheral area caught the eye and highlighted the Museum as the key player in this event. The community became interested in the reproductions; not only in their transfer and display in other places, but even in their ownership and, once again, the Museum was able to use this circumstance to raise funds for a different project.

The hierarchical vision of the organisation of things, of the positioning of subjects, prevailed in the example of the MNAA²⁹ but, nonetheless, other geographies and possibilities were proposed for this imaginary-city-museum. Geographies that are based on distributed power, in mobile and porous configurations. By mapping this notion of plural power in museums, the public is no longer an object of intervention but a subject of action. One thinks and acts beyond legitimacy goals. The concept of transvisuality may well evoke these changes that underline the importance of openness to the construction of a distributed (power) model of images and conceptualisations of the imagined city, of the imagined museum, changes brought about by 'intersecting ways of living' and 'trans-mediation'. Another idea to retain relates to that introverted Museum that occupies the city—from the inside out—but which little recognises passers-by as participants. The sites are, however, taken by storm. And instead of a city imagined by the museum, ample and irregular spaces emerge, other subjectivities and narratives are offered, perhaps nomadic in nature (Braidotti 2011); another look at the geography of the city that brings to the museums places beyond the framing. It adopts a non-totalising view of the city (of the Museum?) as an object that cannot be apprehended from a single standpoint (Soja 2000). By moving

²⁹ 'This will be replicable by whoever wants to (...); this is what is expected of the Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga: that it gives the standard that others, in their turn, replicate; that it be the Admiral Ship that, when it moves at sea, digs into the ocean to allow smaller boats to follow, and this is fundamental because smaller boats do not have the draught to withstand the size of the waves; we have to be the ones at the front to do that' (A.F. Pimentel, Interview on 26 February 2016).

in these ambiguous areas, instead of operating as raw power, disciplinary power, the museum reveals rhizomatic capacities (Deleuze and Guattari 1987), establishing connections, opening itself to the unexpected and to the transformation of spaces. The Museum body places itself on the border, on the margins, this immense place of possibilities for representation.

The second example revealed an example in which the fundamental principles of soft power are also present, since the collective's recognition of the museum as an institution that represents power did not relinquish it. On the contrary, its cry of contestation reproduced the social locus of the museum and elected the street as this place of empowerment and transformation of peripheral communities through art. Instead of a national museum stepping out to the streets to appeal to the public, to valorise Lisbon as a cultural destination and to promote a historically positive image of the city, the collective's rallying cry operated in the transformation of the street as a favourable environment to attract people, through the strengthening of feelings of pride and belonging, the creation of positive images of socially marginalised identities and the valorisation of the periphery's culture.³⁰ The power of persuasion, in this case, acted in the field of political militancy, in the form of identity empowerment, resilience and struggle.

Furthermore, the constitution of a headquarters for the collective's community museum includes cultural exchanges with central museums. These exchanges can be interpreted as significant political strategies, as 'acts of goodwill' to exercise cultural diplomacy between central and peripheral museums. The constitution of these relationships can be opportunities for funding, professional and personal learning and the projection of these museums, this also being an effective way to exercise soft power.

In the example of the Arte Marginal Salvador collective, the body of the museum is born already on the border and it is the places beyond frames and the public that become subjects of the action—while the museum remains the imagined object of intervention. As a result of educational-cultural actions promoted in the peripheries of Salvador, its strength lies in its capacity for identity empowerment, struggle and resilience. Museum effects are not abandoned, but it is the value of the experiences lived by the community that imposes itself and constructs the place of things in the world. The power of this community museum is based, above all, on the achievement of commitments related to: reducing injustices and social inequalities; fighting against prejudice; the improvement of the overall quality of life; the strengthening of dignity; the use of the power of memory, heritage and the museum in benefit of peripheral communities; the use of collective memory as a starting point for understanding and transforming reality and promoting sustainability and local development (Chagas and Gouveia 2014; Tolentino 2016).

Although situated in diverse social, historical and geographic contexts and at different moments, what unites these examples is the power of the museum and its actions. By placing the museum body in borderline places, in both cases discussions

³⁰ Examples in the *Guia de Museus e Memórias*, Rede de Favelas Sustentável (https://favelasustentavel.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/2020-11-Guia_Museus_Memorias_ESPELHADO.pdf).

and confrontations with plural visions produce other spaces of possibilities that lead to a rethinking of the community-city-museum relationship. Spaces of possibilities and reflections that concern everyone, since all museums are inherently social and part of a community. Spaces of possibilities that place the body of the museum on the boundary, on the margins, this immense place of possibilities for representation.

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Chapter 22

Documentation: A “Tool” of Soft Power in Museums



Alexandre Matos

Abstract Museums currently face an enormous set of challenges in responding to their mission and social role. Their role as mediators between material human evidence, manifestations of immaterial culture and the public is put to the test every day by the growing demand for credible information based on scientific facts and by the democratisation of access to information that technology, especially relevant to the Internet and social networks, continuously improves. The response given must be up to the new demands. However, how can the museum respond fully without knowing the collections it has in its custody? Heritage documentation is fundamental and can be the most potent tool to promote change, reflection and knowledge creation. This is true for times of peace but also for times of trouble, like the ones we lived with during the pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

Keywords Museum documentation · Standards · Soft power

22.1 Introduction

Once, during a conference about museum documentation, a colleague asked a pertinent question to all those present: “imagine that it would be possible to erase all our memories of a certain subject, say, e.g. a certain painter. If we had to choose between the works of this painter and the documentation on the works of this painter, which

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would be the most important to reconstitute the knowledge we now have about his production?" It is not a question with a straightforward answer. Can we reconstruct cultural memory only with works? If we don't have proper documentation about them, will we be able to recover their cultural relevance?

The question is pertinent, and for many of us, the obvious answer would be the recovery of the works, neglecting the documentation. However, would we be able to recover their equity value, in an extreme and exaggerated situation, such as the one described, without the related documentation? It may be easier if we think of another, more plausible context.

Imagine, e.g. that we remove a set of high-value objects from an archaeological context but completely neglect collecting and recording information related to the context. No records are made of the layer, zone, etc., the excavation of origin is not recorded, and no mention is made of the excavation methodology or any other field information that is obligatorily recorded in this type of case. The findings are incorporated into the collection of a museum that must study, preserve and disseminate, but no information is given to the museum about its collection and origin. What can the museum do? What can those objects tell us about the community and culture that produced and used them? What stories can they tell? What knowledge can be created? Little or none, in our perspective.

The documentation of cultural heritage in the custody of museums is as old as the very concept of a museum. It is not our intention in this article to go through the history of museological documentation and its changes over the last few centuries, which is very well treated by Marín Torres (2002) in her work *Historia de la documentación museológica: la gestión de la memoria artística* where we were able to go through the evolution of documentation in museums, from the eighteenth century, when the first modern museums were formed, until the end of the last century and the enormous revolution brought to this specific area of museology with the introduction of new technologies of information and communication. However, the persistence of this activity within museums since the founding of the modern museum is proof of its importance for the development of the museum and the role of intervention and promotion of change that these institutions play in today's society.

The museum documentation and information about the collections should be more valued. Knowing the relevance currently given to information designated by some authors as the fuel of the economy of the twenty-first century, we cannot help but be surprised when we are confronted with the existing statistical data (Stroker and Vogels 2012) regarding the information on European cultural heritage that is accessible on the Internet and that demonstrate the enormous work that museums, but also archives and libraries have ahead of them in this specific field.

On the other hand, the concept of *soft power*, as enunciated by Nye (1990) in the early 1990s, that is, the ability to exercise power through cooperation and seeking the same gains instead of exercising power through economic or military force has been transferred to the cultural sector. It has been used in this area as a fundamental element for the integrated development and integration of social changes that the cultural

sector can influence worldwide. However, to exercise this power of influence, the cultural sector must have knowledge and elements that allow a compelling attraction of those who have the power to change and influence change: people.

In this way, we will list, in the following lines, some questions that contribute to classifying information about collections and cultural heritage as throwing ammunition for creating and disseminating knowledge by museums and their audiences that enhance the integrated development of the world. The question will remain throughout this text: can documentation be a “tool” of *soft power* for museums?

22.2 Documentation in Museums or How to Build an Effective “Tool”

The development of museums in the second half of the twentieth century reflects, to a large extent, the development of society in the same period. Although it cannot be said that the museum only grew in the second half of that century, it is enough to point out the frank development of some countries in this area, as verified, e.g. in Portugal in the period after the implantation of the republic in 1910 (Silva 2000). We believe that there is a consensus that museums play a leading role in post-World War II society, as we can easily prove with the birth in Paris of the International Council of Museums (ICOM) in 1946 (ICOM 2016) and the consequent creation of several international committees dependent on this organisation who have developed a constant work in favour of culture and diversity to this day.

In the same period, we also witnessed the development of museology as a science whose object of study is the museum and the set of ramifications that interconnect it with different areas of knowledge (Aquilina 2011: 14–15), from chemistry to statistics, and embrace a set of “new” areas such as information science or other fields that have undergone significant changes in the same period, such as, e.g. communication.

In addition to the changes felt in the museum context, this period is synonymous with significant changes in all sectors. It is a time of economic growth and social development, unfortunately not in a global way, but with characteristics never experienced in terms of the culture of democratisation and the constant search for equity in Western society.

Society changes, and with it, museums and how they deal with the heritage they have in their custody also change. One of the main drivers of this change is the technological revolution introduced by information technology and computing, in which the role of the personal computer (PC) and the creation of the Internet was preponderant, allowing mass access to information on a global scale.

Castells (2012) describes that this revolution will be decisive in all sectors, from the economy to culture. However, it does not represent the end of all existing barriers. Due to its specificity, it creates or potentiates obstacles that must be overcome with new technical and political approaches. If the obstacle of distance is broken, the

language barrier becomes denser. If it allows more access and new distribution channels, it enhances the existence or even the increase of info exclusion. If in the economically more prosperous countries, it is a factor of social promotion, in the less favoured countries, it is or can be, an instrument of worsening the social gap between rich and poor.

In addition to these generic barriers, the obstacles that are being created by more specific issues of public policies, or rather their absence, for museums and cultural heritage and scientific and technical problems related to the treatment and access to information in these institutions and others of a similar nature, such as archives and libraries, are also relevant. The first is severe due to the absence of a concerted strategy that allows museums to adapt, in due time, to technological evolution; the second issues relate to the separation and development of the scientific areas of archives, libraries and museums concerning the inventory, cataloguing, documentation and retrieval of information on cultural heritage that Information Science and museology have dealt with in a different, and frequently, opposite way (Silva 2002).

The often-cited disinvestment in museums has also aggravated in recent years in countries like Portugal. Despite all museum's efforts during the pandemic years, it was clear the difficulties of many to cope with the demands of the imposed digital transition caused by the lockdowns. Although the existence of several obstacles, such as those mentioned above, in the transformations that society has undergone, mainly with the technological (r)evolution after the 70s, we can also find a set of bridges that contribute to the increase in the importance of museums and its collections in the social context in which we live.

Some of these bridges are better known because they have more media coverage and are related to the construction or renovation of museums and the physical access conditions to the collections and heritage they house. However, we find other bridges that have served the same purpose. Among them, we would like to highlight the creation of international scientific communities in the sector, the qualification of museum staff and the scientific and technical production that the previous ones jointly allow.

The creation of international communities (of a scientific and professional nature) is, concerning the documentation of museological collections filed, marked by the creation of the International Committee for Documentation (CIDOC) of the International Council of Museums (ICOM), in 1950 (CIDOC 2006), at the general conference of ICOM in London, to provide the museological community with the necessary support for the discussion and creation of good practices for documenting museum collections in a context in which museums were confronted with ethical problems, post-war conservation and safeguarding.

CIDOC has been a constant and productive forum, which has had a parallel in other institutions of international importance that we already talked about in 2012 (Matos 2012), in the construction of a set of practical and ethical instruments (the technical and scientific production mentioned above) that regulate methodologies and good practices. These instruments, in turn, help train new professionals and enable the development of new ideas and solutions based on technological innovations that arise almost daily.

The instruments mentioned above are known by the museological community as standards of an ethical nature, as is the case of the Declaration of Principles of Museological documentation, published by CIDOC at https://cidoc.mini.icom.museum/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2020/03/principles6_2.pdf (accessed on 06-03-2023), or technician, like the renowned CIDOC-Conceptual Reference Model that provides “definitions and a formal structure for describing the implicit and explicit concepts and relationships used in cultural heritage documentation” (as stated by the CIDOC-CRM SIG at www.cidoc-crm.org—accessed on 10-03-2023).

The museum information system is created upon those standards, and it sustains all the activities of this type of institution. Without standards and ethical support, having proper documentation about the collections would be impossible. Without information about those collections, we would not have a museum, mediation, communication, knowledge creation, etc. The museum would be diminished in its mission. How to build and strengthen these bridges is the next question.

22.3 Standards: The Ammunition of a Soft Power “Tool”

Documentation in museums is a task that requires a high sense of responsibility and dedication. It is a task in which museums dedicate a solid effort to research and record historical and collection management information to add context and meaning to the heritage they care for. To do so, museums currently have at their disposal, as we have seen, a set of technological and communication tools that require a holistic vision of this task in all matters of the museum.

Standardisation, initially introduced to answer the questions posed by technology, today becomes a much broader factor. It is the answer, or rather, the culmination of a building that lays its foundations on the mission of the museum and that begins to be built by understanding this institution and the professionals who compose it of how it can be fulfilled, which must be written and published in the collection policy (Matos 2013).

In turn, the collections policy, a fundamental document such as the mission of the museum, establishes the programmatic bases of the museum’s performance, responding to issues of development, conservation, documentation, and accessibility (Dawson and Hillhouse 2011) of the collection taking into account the two critical elements of the museum institution: collection (without any restrictions) and audiences. In this document, the museum defines its performance in the medium and long term, and it will be what everyone, without exception, must look into when deciding on the achievement of the mission that the institution proposes.

In the continuity of the construction of this structure, we will find, still according to what is defined in the Spectrum standard, the definition of the elements that allow the materialisation of the process of documentation and management of the collections. This definition should be presented as a strategy and management plan. A

fundamental working document, like the previous ones, clearly mentions objectives, priorities and criteria for managing the collection and the tools, resources (human and financial), deadlines and responsibilities that allow the implementation of the strategy and the accomplishment of the established planning.

This structure must be, whenever necessary, punctuated by moments of evaluation that allow correcting, improving, changing course, reorganising or even significantly altering the three documents mentioned above, taking into account the role of museums in the face of the social, economic and political context in which that these institutions are currently involved. That's how we reach the top of this building. We understand that standards and standardisation are the best "ammunition" for the soft power "tool" the collection's documentation could represent.

To standardise, in the context of museological documentation and nowadays, is to think of a structured and systematic set of tasks that aim to guarantee the quality of the information gathered about the collection and its management by the museum. We do not intend to address, more than we did before, the development of this knowledge in museums but rather to focus on the normative requirements placed today on museum professionals. The standardisation of documentation in the museological sector considers four distinct technical areas complemented by general standards, usually designated by: data structure standards; procedures or processes standards; terminology; and data and documentation exchange standards.

The first, relating to the data structure, concerns the information structure that allows the recording of information in a computerised system that guarantees the inclusion of all existing data on the different categories of information relating to cultural heritage. These standards were the first concern for the sector when digital information systems began to be used in museums. In addition to defining the data structure, made up of groups and units of information, that is, fields and tables in a database, this standards typology also describes the relationships between the different categories of data and the rules for their use, such as the ability to store about the same object, different authors or different classifications. In this type of standard, the mandatory existence and safeguard of historical information that makes it possible, e.g. to retrieve data on the location and conservation status of an object at any given moment is defined. Given the massive use of technology in every moment of our lives, this kind of standard is fundamental in the current context.

Although there are different standards of this typology and information systems that complement them by including the specific needs of certain museums, the most frequently cited is the one published by CIDOC in 1995 and called International Guidelines Object Information: The CIDOC Information Categories (CIDOC 1995).

The second one, procedure standards, describes how the museum should act to document and manage the information related to the collection it holds. They are composed of procedures that define a set of steps and rules to be followed to guarantee the quality of the data that make up the historical and management information in regular tasks such as loans, acquisitions, verification of the conservation status, movement (outbound and inbound), insurance management and collection storage management. They represent the steps that must be taken to ensure the proper administration of each of these moments and the quality of the information produced by

the museum (or other entities) during the process. These standards include detailed descriptions of steps, checklists, instructions, etc., defining the elements the museum must record and safeguard. Others even have, for the description of the procedures, a set of workflow diagrams that allow a more precise and more integrated reading of the process carried out in the day-to-day of each museum institution.

The reference standard discussed more carefully in the doctoral thesis that we defended in 2013 at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University of Porto (Matos 2012) is the one created in 1994 by a community of British professionals, then called *Museum Documentation Association* (MDA), and which is now managed by the *Collections Trust* (CT), an organisation dedicated to various museum collections subjects in the UK and Europe. This standard is commonly known as Spectrum–UK Collections Management Standard and has become, as a result of an openness policy implemented by the CT, the international reference standard about procedures for managing and documenting collections in museums. It has also been translated into many languages (like Portuguese, Spanish, French or Arabic, for instance), and it is available at <https://collectionstrust.org.uk/spectrum/> (accessed on 27-02-2023).

The third typology of standards is the one that requires the most resources and, at the same time, the one that represents added value for documentation work in museums: standards related to terminologies, or in other words, *thesauri*.

It is essential, first of all, to mention that we are not talking here about the ISO standard for building monolingual or multilingual *thesauri*, already published in 1985,¹ but rather the *thesauri* themselves, that is, the creation of hierarchically organised lists of terms, with the indication of the terms, their synonyms, related words and preferred terms that allow the indexing of information about collections and, above all, the retrieval of this information in an efficient way by museum professionals, but also and mainly by the museum public.

The construction of this type of tool has been an issue of complex resolution in the museological universe. It is known that museums build their collections based on the representation of material human culture, adding to this and, more recently, the area of intangible heritage. It is also known that cultural representations, material or immaterial, represent human beings’ individual and social complexity. Now, given this complexity, it isn’t easy to find the correct term to define globally, in the most diverse languages, what the name of an object is or, to present two examples, the technique used for its construction or the terms that allow classifying an activity within the context of intangible heritage.

This difficulty, reaffirmed by the absence, at least in Portuguese, of vast and structured *thesauri* that would facilitate the cataloguing and indexing of heritage in the custody of museums, is the one that presents the most obstacles in its creation. It

¹ ISO 5964:1985 *Documentation—Guidelines for the establishment and development of multilingual thesauri* (http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=12159) defines the guidelines for creating this type of *thesauri*. This standard was recently revised, in 2011, and gave rise to the ISO 25964-1:2011 *Information and documentation—Thesauri and interoperability with other vocabularies—Part 1: Thesauri for information retrieval* (http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_ics/catalogue_detail_ics.htm?csnumber=53657) which seeks to respond to the growing need for information retrieval through these complex indexing systems.

requires the participation of a range of knowledge (history, art, philosophy, linguistics, museology, information science, etc.) and entails establishing projects in the medium and long term so that the continuity and updating of these products are ensured. The high degree of scientific demand is also a factor that, in times of crisis we are going through, prevents the proliferation of projects of this nature (Jorge 2011), requiring certain peripheral countries to reflect on these issues that have led them to seek to incorporate in reference *thesauri* work teams, such as those developed by the *Getty Research Institute* (available at <http://www.getty.edu/research/tools/vocabularies/>—accessed on 04-03-2023), to participate in the translation and integration of their native language into a truly global tool.

This was the case, e.g. of Chile and its participation in the *Art and Architecture Thesaurus* (<http://www.getty.edu/research/tools/vocabularies/aat/index.html> accessed on 07-03-2023) with the translation of the terms into Spanish and the inclusion of new terms on pre-Columbian art as a contribution to enhancing a *thesaurus* that intends to be global (Vega 2008).

In the Portuguese case, that is, in Portuguese museums, this is an issue that represents several problems, explored by Jorge (2011) in her master's thesis, due to the almost non-existence of instruments of this nature that allow the indexing of the collections under their care. Like an oasis in the desert, we would like to mention as an example the cases of the *thesaurus* of scientific instruments created by several Portuguese and Brazilian science and technology museums (<http://thesaurusonline.museus.ul.pt> accessed on 07-03-2016) of the museums in the Autonomous Region of the Azores and the creation of a set of hierarchically organised lists of terms that resulted from the translation of *thesauri* existing in other countries and from the work experience of technicians from the Municipality of Cascais. Finally, the fourth typology of standards, resulting from the growing volume of information shared on the network based on the most varied information representation systems, originating in different countries and cultures and with varying levels of quantity and quality, is the data exchange standards.

The objective of this typology of standards is, above all, to allow interoperability between the different information data sets to ensure global accessibility to the information held in various repositories and, on the other hand, also to allow data to be linked between systems to obtain complete information on a particular subject.

The standards included in this type of category are decisive for the dissemination and communication of cultural heritage. They are the ones who have boosted the accessibility and use of collections globally on platforms such as *Europeana* (www.europeana.org consulted on 24-02-2023), for example. Those platforms are far from perfection, but they have enormous growth potential and allow, on a larger scale, in the European case, visibility for a work that is, in a common way, neglected by museums with the consequent problems raised.²

² We will talk more carefully about this topic later, but documentation work in museums, normally a technical task, visible only in internal management and in some specific moments of use of collections, such as exhibitions and catalogues, for example, is often neglected by the governing bodies due to the enormous effort it requires in terms of human and financial resources.

In this category of standards, we would like to highlight two specific examples: the CIDOC-Conceptual *Reference Model* (CIDOC-CRM) (<http://www.cidoc-crm.org> accessed on 07-03-2023) and the *Europeana Data Model* (EDM) (<http://pro.europeana.eu/page/edm-documentation> accessed on 07-03-2023). The first is the result of the international committee for documentation of ICOM work in developing specific standards in this sector. It was born from the merging of the research of two working groups of that committee (Matos 2007: 18) to create a reference standard that would allow, in the words of those responsible:

... promotes a shared understanding of cultural heritage information by providing a common and extensible semantic framework that any cultural heritage information can be mapped to. It is intended to be a common language for domain experts and implementers to formulate requirements for information systems and to serve as a guide for good practice of conceptual modeling. In this way, it can provide the “semantic glue” needed to mediate between different sources of cultural heritage information, such as that published by museums, libraries and archives. (CIDOC-CRM 2014)

This standard, already classified as an ISO standard in 2006 (ISO 21127: 2006) and updated based on version 5.0 of CIDOC to the ISO 21127: 2014 standard, is, therefore, a semantic structure that allows mapping with different cultural heritage information systems, including those existing in archives and libraries, and the mediation between the information living in these repositories with a view to its integrated use in different products such as heritage portals or systems for sharing information between researchers on a given topic on an international scale.

Not being a data structure standard, CIDOC-CRM may also be a determining element in the conceptual construction of cultural heritage information systems that aim for the integrative vision that today’s technologies allow. With the application of this standard, we take a significant step forward in the search for a truly global information management and retrieval system.

What was said in the previous example will also serve to describe, in a certain way, the objectives of the EDM. *Europeana* is a portal that brings together in a single online place a vast amount of information originating from information systems of museums, archives, libraries, radio and television stations and other institutions that manage cultural heritage. It is a project to which the European Union contributes with significant resources and seeks to be a virtual window on the European cultural heritage in the most diverse aspects. In addition to the leading portal, it contains a set of initiatives that add information related to a specific topic, such as fashion, World War and gastronomy for which they have the contribution of institutions that deal with these themes through the collections they keep and the research they produce, but in this case, interconnecting them with others, similar or not, that in the European context address the same specific theme.³

Europeana has been creating, throughout its existence, a set of technical instruments, among which we find the EDM, which enables the various content contributors to structure information following the rules of publication and data retrieval of the

³ Check the case of *Europeana Fashion* at <http://www.europeanafashion.eu/portal/home.html> (accessed on 25-02-2023).

project. This standard aims to allow an integrated information search in a single place, allowing a broader spectrum of accessibility to data on European cultural heritage.

These four “munitions” allow us to create the “tool” we seek. However, here we must safeguard that these “munitions” or these instruments cannot be “fired” separately. For their effect to be noted, museums must organise their information systems based on the assumptions presented in each of these standards, marrying them in a scheme in which all are interconnected and dependent.

From their common use, we manage to obtain information systems capable of responding to the needs of the different publics, internal and external, of museums and other memory institutions (safeguarding the different standards for the cases of archives and libraries). In addition, these standards are, or rather, must be interconnected with a set of other standards common to other sectors and research fields.

Nick Poole, the former CEO of *Collections Trust*, once said at this organisation’s annual conference: *The role of standards is not to standardise, but to enable!* We understand that this sentence, better than any elaborate explanation about the relevance of standards in different areas of our lives, summarises precisely what we seek to explain here. The use of standards is not the result of a specific technological imposition but an imperative of the paradigm shift that allows us today to obtain information about a particular collection, or even physical access it, based on a set of information that allows the consolidation and creation of knowledge. This is the only way, in our opinion, that we will be able to build a future in which information can be a fundamental right in modern democracies and not “the oil of the twenty-first century” controlled by some and accessible only to those who have the financial capacity to obtain it.

22.4 Documentation in Museums and Soft Power: A “Tool” Available to Museums

“Soft power” or, in Nye’s (2004) definition of the concept, the capacity of a political structure, such as a State, to indirectly influence the behaviour or interests of other political bodies through culture or ideology is a concept that seeks to confront the established in international relations in which influence between political bodies is exercised through recourse to economic and/or military power.

Being a theory that has been criticised by several authors, such as Niall Ferguson in his book *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire* (2012), which presents his view on the influence of the United States of America in the world through the exercise of *hard power*, is a fact that cannot be neglected by those who exercise power and must be seen, as Nye states, as a third way that allows the opening of channels of mediation different from the imposition that military and economic force represent.

However, the application of *soft power* is something that will have to be done, in the first place, in a local and regional context and in a territory that is conducive to this exercise: the cities. Not only because they increasingly comprise a more significant number of inhabitants (see data available from the World Bank—<http://data.worldbank.org>) but also because they are territories where, mainly in large capitals, various cultures and customs are present. The capacity for change in these territories will undoubtedly influence the recognition of this third way advocated by Nye.

It does not matter, in the context of the present article, to extensively use the arguments of both sides in this theoretical discussion because although the arguments about the inefficiency of soft power are perceived, the existence of this concept and its actual capacity in terms of effectiveness seems proven to us since the time of the Roman Empire and the processes of acculturation (in both senses) that Rome promoted between the capital and the provinces in a process that made the Empire longevity possible and that is perpetuated, until our days, in the issues of language and culture in general, as stated by Arnason and Raaflaub in the texts they publish in Chap. V of *The Roman Empire in Context: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (2010).

It is from the same assumption that Gail Lord and Ngaire Blankenberg depart in the book *Cities, Museums and Soft Power*, published in 2016 by the *American Alliance of Museums*, in which they invite a remarkable group of authors to address different manifestations of the use of *soft power* for the development of several cities and regions based on the use of museums as an instrument of this new means of influence.

One of the paradigmatic examples of culture’s ability to change and improve social conditions is soon addressed by publishers in the book in the introduction (Lord and Blankenberg 2016: 6–27), where several practical examples are presented, from Tate Modern, passing through by the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao or ending up in the Jewish Museum in Berlin, of museums that allowed or promoted a paradigm shift in the reality of the cities where they were inserted and, consequently, in the way in which these cities came to have a support instrument recognised worldwide to influence the society. These are examples of the ability to exercise *soft power* allowed by the third and most important, in our opinion, sources of this concept according to Nye⁴: Culture.

Indeed, the transformation wrought by culture in society cannot be demonstrated directly with the ease with which the exercise of power by brute or economic force is. We change someone more quickly through fear or hunger (or the threat of fear and hunger) than through diplomacy, core political values and culture. However, it is already possible to see practical examples of policies in which culture served as an instrument for *soft power*, as Joseph (2015) demonstrates in the chapter of Lord and Blankenberg’s work entitled *Museums in the Age of Brazilian Soft Power*.

In this text, Gegê Leme Joseph presents us with a reality of the country in the cultural commitment of the great Brazilian cities as a way of integrating the most

⁴ According to Jonathan McClory’s quote referred to by Gegê Leme Joseph in note 2 of her chapter in Lord and Blankenberg’s work (Joseph 2015, p. 82).

disadvantaged populations, giving them access to a set of information and issues that until recently were forbidden to them, or not transmitted, due to the well-known reality of the country in terms of social inequality. It is still a process under construction, which may be haunted by recent political events and the economic and pandemic crisis experienced worldwide. However, still, according to the author, the necessary connections between the centre and peripheries of society can find solutions to the vast problems that are still present, which could pass through more significant interaction, promoted by museum professionals, between the different institutions that oversee the capacity to implement the necessary policies.

At this point, the value of museum documentation can be demonstrated. Museums are institutions that are responsible for two crucial jobs. On the one hand, they guard, conserve, study and disseminate one of the most important treasures of humanity, that is, their collections and what they represent in terms of the cultural identity of the different territories where they are implemented. The collections, or the museum's collection, regardless of their typologies, are the core and central element that allows the museum to fulfil its primary mission. Be it an extraordinary example of medieval art, a scientific instrument or even the collections constituted in community museums, often immaterial, they define the museum. On the other hand, museums have the vital task of building with their public, without whom there would be no sense, a mediation relationship that enhances knowledge and reflection on themes opened by collection research and can enrich both parts of the equation: museum and public, in a relationship of mutual and open learning.

To overcome the barriers that often arise between the public and museums, museums must build, as we indicated above, an information system that allows them to create different channels of communication that belong to institutions that, as Lord and Blankenberg (2016: 11) rightly say, are "[...] *places where ideas are openly presented and contested—and have been for hundreds of years.*" and allows them to maintain a reputation, slight or non-disputed, of being credible sources of information and spaces for social dialogue capable of providing the cultural capital (Joseph 2015: 72) necessary for the concept defined by Nye.

However, the construction of an information system must observe, nowadays, a more comprehensive range of issues than the system itself or the technology that allows its use. It should focus on answering questions central to the museum's mission and the policies these institutions intend to implement.

In a global world, museum institutions need to review all their actions given the assumptions implicit in Nye's concept, and one of the ways in which documentation contributes to doing this is through revisiting collections assisted by members of different cultures, social classes, creeds, etc. A similar process to that defined in the programme of the Collections Trust and the UK Museums, Libraries and Archives Council entitled *Revisiting Collections* (Collections Trust 2009) which seeks to respond to a growing need for reflection on how we present our collections to visitors, tourists, members of other communities that do not have the same social, political, religious and cultural references.

Another way of listing the added value that the structured documentation of the collections makes possible is to promote, within the scope of the policies defined by the institution, the sharing of contents and information produced by the museum through open data repositories that can be used as a reference source or even as a data centre to be used by third parties to build new tools different from those created within the institution. Sharing open data is a time-consuming process that has encountered some obstacles. Still, it has been promoted by governments⁵ and has found a territory of discussion and sharp growth in culture and education.

In the area of culture, or rather, in museums, libraries and archives, there is even a set of initiatives such as the Linked Open Data in libraries, archives and museums (LODLAM) (<http://lodlam.net> accessed on 01/03/2023) or the OpenGLAM (<http://openglam.org> accessed on 01/03/2023), the latter funded by the European Union, which make available a set of resources on the network to help museums in complying with this new way of making data available, which has had a significant adherence and whose most notorious example publicly available was the open access of the result of the digitisation process carried out by the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam (Pekel 2014) with levels of quality rarely found until then.

On the other hand, this openness that museums have been looking for is also an enormous contribution to the interconnection between different repositories or sources of information available on the network that can be used to validate the knowledge that the museum produces.

An excellent example of this type of instrument is what was demonstrated in the case of the Cooper Hewitt-Smithsonian Design Museum (<http://www.cooperhewitt.org>), where we can find, within the online collection that the museum provides, a link to a set of information repositories that connect their users to other universes, to different collections and additional information about the objects and entities that are made available there. On the page related to Pablo Picasso (<https://collection.cooperhewitt.org/people/18047293/> accessed on 12-04-2015), e.g. they firstly used Wikipedia as a direct source used for the description of that author, indicating the origin of that information, but also, under the motto “*We’re also pretty confident they know who Pablo Picasso is at...*”, we could find in the past the reference to different open repositories such as that of the Victoria and Albert Museum (<https://www.vam.ac.uk/collections>) or the Virtual International Authority File (<https://viaf.org/>) where we can also find objects from that author and information about his production.⁶

Some of these examples are used by museums in concrete projects aiming at social change or solving today’s social problems. It is within this framework that Historypin (<http://historypin.org>) is inserted. A project that seeks, within the scope of its partnership with museums and cultural institutions in the United Kingdom, to promote accessibility to museum collections and, at the same time to be a contribution

⁵ See the case of the United States Federal Government portal at <https://www.data.gov> (accessed on 01-03-2023) and the one made available by the European Union at <https://data.europa.eu/en> (accessed on 25-02-2023) where different sources of information relevant to the study of various topics can be found.

⁶ The Cooper Hewitt website has change on recent years and those connections are not present today. We couldn’t find out a reason for the changes.

significant to reducing the social isolation of some age or social strata, through the active participation of these fringes of society in curating cultural information and georeferencing it through the technological tool created for this purpose.

We could continue to list a set of initiatives that have recently used the documentation created by museums as an instrument of change. Likewise, we could list a group of entities that do not do so for various reasons, among which we would highlight the need for more investment in the museological sector that allows the medium and long-term implementation of information systems capable of responding to current challenges. However, we also must be clear that the investment in this work represents a considerable effort⁷ for the institutions and cannot be assumed, by museum management, as something that can be resolved in the short term.

It is required for its success, in our opinion, the creation of a permanent team, solid from the scientific and technical point of view, that can lead to the creation of an information system that should be one of the essential foundations of the construction of the museum of the future.

22.5 Conclusions

Therefore, with this framework, we launch the provocation of using museum documentation as a “tool” or instrument at the disposal of the concept advocated by Nye. A “tool” that creates the conditions for the heritage stored in museums to be known or broadcast on different channels, thus reaching a broader spectrum of audiences who can use it to interpret the current world according to their political positions, social, religious and cultural or, if possible, expanding this universe to include the perspectives of other places, peoples and cultures.

Joseph (2015, p. 81) mentions the blockbuster effect with the cases of the great projects of the *Museu do Amanhã* or the *Museu da Imagem e Som*, which will be another instrument available to museums and cities for activating soft power.

As Lord and Blankenberg mention in chapter thirty-two, *Ways for Museums to Activate Their Soft Power* (2016, p. 212) of the work mentioned above:

Today museums help people adapt to change by revealing the many facets of meaning in their collections and by stimulating a deeper understanding of the complex historical and contemporary processes these collections represent. The broader the collection, the greater the range of collection documentation. The more research that is conducted into museums collections, the more evident it becomes that there are many stories to be told about each object.

Therefore, museums and museum professionals must pursue this goal and seek to place collection documentation at the top of museum priorities to resolve, once

⁷ For a clearer idea of the values required for the ongoing digitization processes in museums, we recommend consulting Nick Poole’s important work on the cost of digitizing European cultural heritage entitled *The Cost of Digitizing Europe’s Cultural Heritage: A Report for the Committee des Sages of the European Commission* available at http://nickpoole.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/digiti_report.pdf (accessed on 22/02/2023).

and for all, and even if in a phased manner and according to resources, the lack of accessible documentation for most collections in museums. We recall that in the study published on the reality of Portuguese museums (Neves 2013), only 11.9% of the objects held by museums are registered in a database. Also, according to the ENUMERATE project, coordinated by *Europeana*, only 17% of the collections of European cultural institutions had been digitised by 2014 (Stroker and Vogels 2014).

It is used as a “tool” and also depends on the capacity that museums and their professionals have, or should have, to influence political and financial decision-making centres in the different added values of a silent work with little visibility beyond the public, which is demonstrated in the production of exhibitions and catalogues.

The task is arduous and complex, but it will be necessary, in our understanding, for museums to continue as institutions of reference for their audiences. The information we produce, the way we produce it, is decisive for the recognition of museums as a fundamental vehicle in creating knowledge and promoting creativity.

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Chapter 23

Soft Power and the Rise of the Global South: Chinese Investments in Renewable Energy in Brazil



Mateus de Almeida Prado Sampaio and Elisa Pinheiro de Freitas

Abstract This paper addresses the relationship between China and Brazil in the international energy scenario in the decade of 2010. In a context of preventing Global Warming and Climate Change, the relationship between these two countries seems to increase mainly in function of the investment flows that occur in the direction of East to West. Brazil is the country that generates more energy containing Chinese investments, and this generation is characterized mainly by the participation of renewable sources, especially hydroelectric, wind and solar. Through literature review, data tabulation and cartographic analysis, we present some of the recent directions of Chinese investments in energy production abroad. In the eastern hemisphere, Chinese investments are concentrated in the production of fossil energy from coal, carried out in neighboring countries. In the western hemisphere, they concentrate on renewable energy generation, notably hydraulics in South America and Africa. Brazil in place of primacy.

Keywords Soft power · China · Brazil · Energy production · Export of capital

23.1 Introduction

The period from 1945 to 1970 approximately became marked as one of the fastest growing phases of world capitalism and constituted what different economists called the “30 glorious Years”, or even the “golden Years”. Throughout that cycle, the US, through the Marshall Plan, provided Western Europe and some Asian countries,

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such as Japan, with large investments. These enabled the Allied countries to rebuild their infrastructure that had been destroyed during World War II. However, as noted by Morgenthau (2003), the main objective of the Marshall Plan was to contain the advances of socialist ideas in western countries and in the so-called Third World, reinforcing the capitalist bloc in a context of Cold War.

According to Agnew and Corbridge (1995), the end of the Second World War meant the advent of a geopolitical order¹ whose characteristics were noted, among other issues, by an ideological and geopolitical discourse centered, on the one hand, in the superiority of free trade and the capitalist mode of production, and on the other hand, in socialism as a counterpoint to capitalist exploitation. Thus, under the geopolitical order of the Cold War (1945–1989), both the US and the USSR began to influence extensive regions of the globe that were previously under the control of European powers. In other words, both countries sought to exercise soft power. As the political scientist Joseph Nye (2004, p. 5) explained, soft power means:

[...] the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.

Assuming that soft power is the ability of a state or non-state actor to attract allies without the need for the use of force or military power—hard power—in the context of the cold war, several regional conflicts were contained in by the two superpowers that polarized the international system at this time: USA and USSR. These two countries disputed with each other the sovereign zones in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Under American hegemony, the capitalist bloc was organized by articulating the Fordist mode of accumulation of capital with democratic political regimes. On the other hand, under the preponderance of the USSR, parts of Africa and Asia, with particular emphasis China, were constituted in areas where the real experience of socialist political regimes unfolded, as explained Freitas (2022).

Lipietz (1988), Arrighi (1996), Benko (1999), among others, observed, however, that in the late 1970s, the Fordist model of capital accumulation began to give signs of exhaustion, a fact that was evidenced with the reduction of profitability rates, productivity and the territorial fixity of the production chain. For economists at the Chicago School, such as Milton Friedman, this profitability crisis in the 70 s of the twentieth century was caused by excess of state interventionism in the economy. Soon, the neoliberal paradigm, based on the flexible model of accumulation, was adopted by the main capitalist countries of the rich and developed North that, in turn, persuaded the peripheral and semi-peripheral countries to adopt the same prescription, as Stiglitz pointed out (2004).

In addition to these facts, the economic, political and social crisis experienced by the USSR was exacerbated by the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, as well as by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. This event, therefore, accelerated the dismantling of the Soviet Union, one of the main territorial pillars of the socialist experience in

¹ According to Agnew and Corbridge (1995), a geopolitical order refers both to the geographical characteristics of a given historical period and to how the political economy of territorial states can be read and understood.

the real world. As explained by Agnew and Corbridge (1995) and Arrighi (1996), this systemic chaos that struck both the core of capitalism and socialism, foreshadowed the beginning of a new geopolitical order which reconfigured the international system. We highlight the role of new industrialized countries, such as Brazil, India, Russia and China, whose territorial economies cannot be underestimated in international relations.

Given these initial considerations, the objective of this paper is to show that with the emergence of the geopolitical order of transnational liberalism, which took place from the 1990s, the world has become increasingly economically interdependence. The process of homogenization of the spaces appropriated by capital is manifested in what Santos (2002) called the “technical-scientific-informational milieu”. In this context, large territorial countries such as China, India and Brazil challenged US hegemony, but not necessarily by the use of military power (hard power), but through the exercise of soft power. The recent expansion of Chinese financial resources to finance energy production abroad attests to this premise.


The data worked in this paper indicate that the Chinese capital participation—either in the condition of Direct Foreign Investment, or via operations of the China Development Bank (CDB) or the Export–Import Bank of China—was present and in operation at the end of 2020 in 69 countries, spread across all continents of the globe. It totaled 104,000 MW, of which 66,000 MW from non-renewable sources and 38,000 MW from renewable sources. The contributions of Chinese capital in Brazil are striking.

Methodologically, we collect data on recent investments made by China in fossil and renewable energies in different regions of the world, aiming to promote the low-carbon energy transition and also seeking to expand its soft power, to counter the criticism that the country receives in matters of human rights and environmental degradation, as explained by Nye (2008). These data were presented as maps.


Regarding the cartographic elaboration, the first set of maps (Maps 23.1, 23.2, 23.3, 23.4 and 23.5), which represent the global planisphere, were elaborated from the data provided by Gallagher et. al (2019a), available in the portal “China’s Global Power Database” of Boston University. The second set of maps (Maps 23.6, 23.7 and 23.8), referring to Brazil, are based on the correlation between the data collected by BUGDPC (2022) and those provided by WEBMAP EPE, the Energy Research Company of the Ministry of Mines and Energy of Brazil, thus producing a double-checked information.

Bibliographic support was used through scientific articles, books, business reports, laws and decrees. Regarding the epistemological perspective, the analysis of facts considers the historical and geographical aspects as fundamental to understand the dialectic that involves the relations between countries and how tensions and conflicts are dimensioned in a globalized world.

The text is divided into three sections, in addition to this Introduction and the Final Considerations. The first section deals with how the energy transition has been outlined aiming to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels in order to combat climate change on a global scale. The second section with an emphasis on China’s initiatives—and its capital contributions abroad—presents the distribution of Chinese




Map 23.1 World—electricity production in which there is Chinese capital participation, in MW (2019)




Map 23.2 World—energy production from coal in which there is Chinese capital participation, in MW (2019)

investments in global energy production, both in renewable and non-renewable matrices. The third section presents specifically the Chinese investments made in Brazil, focusing on the generation of electricity primarily from renewable energies (notably hydraulics, but also wind and solar). Finally, in the final considerations, we seek to resume the relevant points of the discussion presented in this work.




Map 23.3 World—energy production from gas and oil in which there is Chinese capital participation, in MW (2019)



Map 23.4 World—hydroelectric power production in which there is Chinese capital participation, in MW (2019)

23.2 Climate Change and Energy Transition: In Search of a Low-Carbon Economy

For at least 15 years, several authors have been working daily to follow the facts related to climate change, the development and use of renewable energies, among other issues, and the position of Brazil in these agendas. In 2011, e.g., the International




Map 23.5 World—production of solar and wind energy in which there is Chinese capital participation, in MW (2019)

Energy Agency (IEA) announced that Greenhouse Gases (GHG) emissions in 2010 had reached a critical level and that it would be impossible to limit the increase in the planet’s temperature by a maximum of 2°C by 2100.

In 2009, due to the financial crisis that hit Europe and the US, GHG emissions had stabilized at 2008 levels, around 29.3 gigatons (Gt). Nevertheless, in 2010, there was an increase of 5% in emissions and the level reached 30.6 Gt, a historical record. To prevent the temperature from rising beyond 2° C by the end of 2100, it is necessary that the amount of carbon dioxide (CO₂) in the atmosphere does not exceed 450 parts per million (ppm). In 2000, the volume of CO₂ was already close to 400 ppm and the average temperature of the planet had risen 1° C.

However, the third decade of this century is undoubtedly a period of inflection for heads of states, whether developed or developing nations, to lead effective actions to reduce the emissions of the GHG, responsible for global warming and climate change as asserted by Collotta et al. (2019). Extreme weather events have occurred more frequently in different parts of the world and, according to the World Meteorological Organization, the period between 2015 and 2021 was the hottest in the history of the planet (WMO 2021). According to the data published in the WMO Annual Bulletin in 2021, the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere reached 416.62 ppm, equivalent to the increase of 49.9% compared to previous years.

As has been observed, multilateral forums dealing with climate change are seen as platforms for the exercise of soft power in emerging countries. Since the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol (1997), a new energy geopolitics has emerged and




Map 23.6 Brazil: Chinese investments in energy, by biennium, 2010–2019

the use of new and cleaner energy sources has become an imperative. The US did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol and left the agreement in 2000, arguing that will only accept the negotiations if emerging countries (Brazil, India, China and South Africa) committed to cutting their emissions.

As Lago (2006) explained, the condition of world leader causes the US to influence international agreements so that they meet their interests. It should be noted that the US oil industry exerts powerful lobbying in both domestic and foreign policies of countries. As warned Houtart (2010), the oil industry has long prevented the research and production of non-polluting energy.

In this sense, the transition from a structured economy in oil, coal and gas—non-renewable energy sources—to a structured economy in renewable energy sources (biomass, hydroelectric, wind, solar and others) will require a period of adaptation for the economies of developed countries, notably for the US and other economies such as Japan, Russia, India and China, that have energy matrices based on fossil




Map 23.7 Brazil: presence of Chinese capital in energy generation, 2019

fuels, as explained by Houtart (2010). Only as reference, the US is simultaneously, according to data from the US Energy Information Administration, the third largest producer and the largest importer and consumer of oil in the world. In turn, China is the largest producer, importer and consumer of coal in the world.

The fact that the US has a structured economy in primary and polluting energy sources and has not formulated legislation that fosters greater investment in alternative energy has enabled the EU to take the lead in the Kyoto Protocol. Betting on renewable energies, the EU has created a set of standards and directives to meet the obligations to reduce GHG emissions as shown by Queirós and Freitas (2012).

However, it was still essential for the strengthening of the climate agreement that the US ratify the Kyoto Protocol. In this sense, the mega Conference of the Parties (COP 13/MOP 3) that took place in Bali (2007) was a key milestone for the advancement of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations because Brazil, China, India and



Map 23.8 Brazil: presence of Chinese capital in energy generation per type, 2019

South Africa (Non-Annex I) voluntarily committed to reducing their emissions, to force the US into the agreement.

The Kyoto Protocol (1997), with all the controversies surrounding it and the asymmetries between the countries associated with it, had the merit of inserting the concerns about climate change and global warming in the various national development agendas, unleashing a global race for cleaner and more viable energy alternatives sources to fossil fuels. The Paris Agreement (2015), although not fully implemented, reinvigorated these premises and the US president Joe Biden signaled that his country will be a signatory.

Given the prospect of new economic and environmental goals, we understand that Brazil is one of the most promising countries when it comes to renewable energy,

as demonstrated by Freitas et al. (2020). In this regard, China, which has sought to expand its soft power, has invested heavily in the energy transition process. As one of the largest emitters of the GHG for having an energy matrix focused on coal, China has committed to reducing emissions and this is revealed in the number of investments made in several regions of the globe. In the next section, we will present the Chinese investments recently made in the world, focusing on the generation of electricity from non-renewable energies (oil, coal and gas) and renewables (hydroelectric, solar and wind).

23.3 Soft Power and Chinese Investment in Energy in the World

According to Agnew and Corbridge (1995, p. 140), the crisis of accumulation and the decline of US economic growth has led some International Relations scholars to project a shift from the epicenter of the world economy, from the North Atlantic axis to the Pacific. Thus, the theory of “Pacific Destiny” refers to a future of the world economy centered around the Pacific instead of the North Atlantic, with China as one of its main geopolitical pillars. Within this theoretical perspective of hegemonic succession, China would figure among the great powers. By the late 1990s, China was already the fourth largest economy in the world, after the US, Japan and Germany. It has now become the second largest global economy.

This process of Chinese economic growth was largely based on the expansion of its energy consumption, notably the fossil, playing the coal a central role (Sampaio and Freitas 2013). Data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) attests that China has become the epicenter of global coal consumption for energy purposes in the transition from the twentieth to the twenty-first century. Between 1980 and 1986, the country accounted for just under 20% of total world consumption of coal. Between 1987 and 2001, it accounted for under 30% of the world total. Between 2002 and 2005 for just under 40% and between 2006 and 2010 for just under 50% of the world total. Finally, between 2011 and 2021, China was notable for consuming more than 50% of the world total.

It is noteworthy that the Chinese economic growth has been concentrated in the coastal regions of its territory, with emphasis on the areas near Shanghai and Hong Kong, which were progressively opened for foreign investments. As explained by Agnew and Corbridge (1995, p. 142), the Communist Party bureaucracy “tried to work out a new model for absorbing foreign capital, technology and management practices, the Special Economic Zones, such as Shenzhen on the border with Hong Kong, have become the nodal points for reforming the Chinese economy as a whole”.

Even with the strong growth seen in the last 40 years, China faces many internal challenges. With a population of over 1.3 billion, strong growth in the future depends on how the demographic structure behaves. Indeed, China is moving toward strengthening itself much more as a regional power than a world power, as it tries to solve

problems with its neighbors (territorial sovereignty), natural resources of the oceans, etc. At the same time, China seeks to expand its economic cooperation around the world, since “it is the largest economic and population power of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), which makes the country a catalyst for initiatives, especially in areas such as direct foreign investment, trade and energy” (Losekann and Tavares 2019, p. 8, free translation made by the authors).

In 2021, China was the main country in the world in terms of energy production and consumption (EIA), being its energy base mostly fossil and non-renewable. It also presented a deficit in the relation between energy production and energy consumption. For its indication of adherence to the Paris Agreement (Gallagher et al. 2019b), as well as for being able to make direct investments abroad (Li et al. 2020), the country drives a new wave of energy production on a planetary scale. One of its strategies is to decarbonize and expand electrification. That is why China is investing heavily in hydro, wind and solar power abroad. Its commitment to mitigating the effects of climate change can be better understood as explained by Losekann and Tavares (2019, p. 13, free translation made by the authors):

In addition to meeting international commitments to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, the Chinese challenge includes tackling local pollution from fossil fuel combustion without compromising economic growth. To this end, the renewable investment strategy seeks to address environmental problems while allowing it to launch itself as one of the main producers and exporters of clean technologies.

Li et al. (2020) corroborate this premise:

Chinese firms hold approximately \$115 billion USD in electric power assets globally, with an average of 73% ownership stake in a total capacity of 81 GW. Chinese power investments span the globe but are largely found in developing countries, particularly in Asia and Latin America. The vast majority of Chinese investment goes to coal (24.5 GW), gas (20.5 GW) and hydropower (18.1 GW), while the share of wind (7.2 GW) and solar (3.1 GW) is relatively small but may be rising.

In addition to power generation, the realization of Chinese foreign direct investment as exportation of productive capital also involves the attribution of financial stimulus to Chinese national development banks and the creation of new markets for export-derived technologies and services of power equipment. In the 13th Five Year Plan (2016–2020), China foresees strong investment in renewable energy with a view to leading the global market in innovation in renewable energy technologies:

In this last point, its positioning is to continue to support the development of the renewable energy equipment industry, increasing the share in the global market. Thus, the Chinese government explains that its plans are to make the country a technological leader in renewable energies, electric cars, artificial intelligence and robotics (Losekann and Tavares 2019, p. 33, free translation made by the authors).

An interesting aspect to be highlighted is that fossil energy commodities imply a huge trade flow, whereas renewable energies are produced and consumed locally, optimizing their energy balance:

Unlike fossil sources, which are commodities with immense commercial flow, renewable energy sources are generated locally and the trade flow occurs through the sale of equipment, renewable production systems and others technological flows (Losekann and Tavares 2019, p. 13, free translation made by the authors).

China imports energy and exports system equipment mainly for the production of solar and wind energy. According to Losekann and Tavares (2019, p. 29, free translation made by the authors), China, among the BRICS, has invested the most in the energy transition:

[...] China stands out for its greater impetus towards an energy transition, with its large-scale initiatives. The decades of high economic growth resulted in environmental degradation, affecting the health of its population, especially in large urban centers. Currently the Chinese strategy associates more modest economic growth, relative to the pace of the past, and mitigation of environmental impact.

The energy transition requires investment in energy production and distribution infrastructure:

Among the common factors associated with a transition, the search for greater efficiency, the construction/modernization of infrastructure and the addition of production capacity by renewable sources are the main axes of transformation. These create new investment cycles, moving the financial and labor markets, bringing new dynamics to economies (Losekann and Tavares 2019, p. 44, free translation made by the authors).

In this regard, China's state-owned companies have the greatest potential to act in this transition process, given the demand for large investments. Hence, China is the country that has invested the most in low-carbon energy production in the BRICS countries:

As a major global locomotive of financial resources, China emerges as the main investor and creditor of the group, largely from public resources. Among the BRICS countries, Russia received more direct Chinese investments (60%), especially in the mineral sector. In Brazil, the Chinese made large investments through state-owned enterprises (e.g., State Grid and China Three Gorges) in hydroelectric plants and transmission lines, acquiring assets of Brazilian and foreign companies active in the energy area. In the oil and gas area, companies such as China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) also obtained participations in blocks to be explored. In 2017, of the Chinese projects confirmed in Brazil, US\$ 6 billion was for the electricity sector, and US\$ 155 million for oil and gas. In the same year, 69% of all confirmed Chinese investments in the country went to mergers and acquisitions (Losekann and Tavares 2019, p. 45, free translation made by the authors).

Map 23.1 shows the countries (and quantities in MW) where Chinese capital is present in power generation. This map, as well as the others that follow, was elaborated according to the analytical category "own Chinese capital participation" and have status "in operation". Globally, it is perceived that there is Chinese capital participation in all continents of the world. The largest presence is located in the regional surroundings of the country itself: in Southeast Asia (especially Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore), in the Indian Subcontinent (especially Pakistan, India, Bangladesh) and in the Sea of Japan (mainly South Korea). It is also present

in several countries in Europe (United Kingdom, Netherlands, among others) and Africa (South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, etc.); in North and South America (Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, USA, etc.) and in the Arabian Peninsula (mainly United Arab Emirates). Individually, the main highlight is Brazil, where there is more MW of energy generated with the participation (exclusive, majority or minority) of Chinese capital.

Next, we will address Chinese investments in energy generation overseas in a particular way, treating first the main non-renewable sources (coal, gas and oil) and then the main renewables (hydro, wind and solar). In addition to the energy sources mentioned above, but which will not be analyzed in this work, China still has a participation in non-renewable nuclear-based energy generation in Pakistan and renewable energy from sugarcane biomass in Brazil, source that Brazilian technologies stand out (Sampaio 2015a, b).

23.3.1 Chinese Investments in Non-renewable Energy

The presence of Chinese investments in traditional non-renewable energy sources, known to be the most polluting, appears on Maps 23.2 and 23.3. These indicate, respectively, the total volume of non-renewable energy production made from the main sources: Coal (Map 23.2), Gas and Oil (Map 23.3). The sum of energy generated from these three sources totals 64,950 MW.

Regarding the Chinese participation in the generation of energy from the burning of coal, highly polluting, this is concentrated mainly in the countries neighboring China itself, to the South and West. Vietnam, Indonesia, India and Pakistan, and to a lesser extent also Malaysia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Cambodia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Beyond this more immediate environment, there is also important Chinese participation in South Africa, Australia and Brazil. The coal-based energy projects with Chinese capital participation, totaling 40,905 MW, are spread over 17 countries. This is the highest amount among all sources analyzed.

With regard to energy production derived from gas and oil, the projects in operation with Chinese participation totaled, respectively, 20,669, 3376 MW, distributed among 20 and 13 different countries. The energy generated by gas burning highlights the United Kingdom, Malaysia and Mexico, followed by Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Egypt, Netherlands, Bangladesh and Nigeria. As noted, such investments are widely dispersed across all continents of the globe. From the burning of oil, Singapore stands out, followed by South Korea, Brazil, Malta, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sudan and South Sudan. Although composing a much more modest amount, it is also quite scattered.

23.3.2 Chinese Investments in Renewable Energy

At the present time, when environmental issues related to the mitigation of global warming and climate change are central in the discourses and theories of development, become more valued and desired the so-called renewable sources, such as hydraulics, wind, solar, tidal and geothermal, among others. China, as a large productive and polluting nation, shown interest in developing new energy generation forms from renewable sources in territories outside its own country. Maps 23.4 and 23.5 indicate, respectively, the total volume of renewable energy production made from the main sources: Hydroelectric (Map 23.4), Wind and Solar (Map 23.5). The sum of energy generated from these three sources totals 37,508 MW.

With regard to hydroelectric production, the presence of Chinese capital is territorialized as a priority in Brazil, followed by Ecuador, both on the continent of South America. In the immediate vicinity of Chinese territory, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia in the South and Pakistan and Kazakhstan in the West also have high production. Finally, on the African continent, South Africa is the main regional highlight, followed by Ghana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Cameroon, Uganda, Gabon, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia. China has 28,701 MW of hydropower currently in Generation, distributed in 28 different countries.

With regard to wind and solar power, the enterprises with Chinese participation total, respectively, 4825 MW 3.982 MW, distributed in 19 and 21 different countries. For wind power, Australia, Brazil and Portugal stand out, followed by Poland, Pakistan, Germany, South Africa, United Kingdom and Ethiopia. For solar energy, United Arab Emirates, United States and Pakistan stand out, followed by Brazil, Ukraine, Japan, United Kingdom and Canada.

23.3.3 Chinese Investments in Brazilian Energy Production

As is well known, every energy policy aims to achieve security of supply, ensure access to energy at reasonable prices and obtain the use of energy in an environmentally appropriate way. As placed in the first section of the text, the Kyoto Protocol meant a watershed and accelerated the race for low-carbon energy sources in order to overcome the global dependence on using non-renewable and highly polluting energy matrices. In this regard, China “has shown a strong commitment to reducing emissions, and the scale of renewable sources expansion programs is highlighted”, as pointed out by Losekann and Tavares (2019, p. 7, free translation made by the authors). Brazil, in turn, is the priority destination of such Chinese initiatives.

In the last 14 years, China has become one of the leading foreign investors in Brazil, with investments reaching US\$66 billion between 2007 and 2020. Brazil concentrated 47% of Chinese investments in South America and 48% of these investments went to the electricity sector, according to a survey by Cariello (2021). As for

the predominant investment modality in Brazil (across all sectors), the highlight goes to mergers and acquisitions, with 70% of the total, followed by greenfield investments with 24% and joint venture with 6%.

For the Chinese government, Brazil is regarded as a major supplier of raw materials and a recipient of investments in the infrastructure sector, in particular in the energy segment:

It was in line with this exponential growth of trade and in the wake of the process of global extroversion of Chinese companies that Brazil began to be perceived by the Asian country not only as a vast source of raw materials, but also as a potential destination for new investments abroad. Especially since 2010, the sudden entry of a large volume of Chinese enterprises became evident, with a growing presence in the most diverse sectors, such as electricity, mining, infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing and information technology (Cariello 2021, p. 16, emphasis added, free translation made by the authors).

Chinese investments in Brazilian energy production were increasing throughout the decade of 2010 (Map 23.6). Only between 2011 and 2019 were 201 investments made in establishments that are currently operating. Of this total, in 186 energy enterprises, the Chinese economic groups are now the only owners or the majority partners in the business. Chinese companies hold 100% of the capital in 85 Brazilian energy plants and in another 95 they have more than 95% of the capital (BUGDPC 2022). More than half of these investments (118) occurred in 2017.

Altogether, investments of Chinese origin in the decade of 2010 total 20,713 MW of energy generated in Brazil (BUGDPC 2022), which corresponds to approximately 12.2% of the national total, estimated for the year 2019 at 170,118 MW (EPE 2022). Map 23.7 indicates the relative weight of Chinese participation (exclusive, majority or minority) in Brazilian energy generation for the year 2019.

Half of the volume of energy generated with Chinese capital in Brazil belongs to the “China Three Gorges Corporation” (owner of 33 units totaling 10,460 MW of installed capacity). Following appear “State Grid Corporation of China” (with 101 units and 6577 MW); “State Power Investment Corporation” (11 units and 1689 MW) and “China General Nuclear Power Group” (41 units and 1032 MW) (BUGDPC 2022).

Regarding the type of source, Chinese capital is much more present in Brazil in the generation of renewable energy than fossil fuels. Altogether there are 196 renewable projects, totaling 19,301 MW and 5 projects in non-renewable, totaling 1430 MW. The hydroelectric matrix, with 73 projects and 15,543 MW is the main one, followed by wind (respectively 98 and 2774), coal (3 and 1070), sugarcane biomass (14 and 683), petroleum (2 and 360) and solar (11 units and 301 MW). Map 23.8 presents the spatialization of this production over the Brazilian national territory.

23.4 Final Considerations

The data analyzed attest to the unique condition performed by the great “Asian Dragon”, confirming the Chinese presence in energy production, to a greater or lesser degree of participation, in all corners of the world. In this sense, it reaffirms the presented concept of “Pacific Destiny”. We can say that China has two strategies for investment in energy production abroad in the early 2020s. When it comes to fossil energy, it prioritizes its immediate environment. Thus, part of the investments listed in the surroundings of the “Asian Giant” itself would aim to contain possible conflicts in its vicinity and stimulate the continuity of regional economic activities.

Around the globe, its presence stands out in the development of alternative, less polluting sources, such as hydraulics, wind, solar and even sugarcane biomass, as verified in Brazil. These fall within the targets for mitigating the effects of air pollution linked to global warming and combating climate change.

As noted, the China-Brazil relationship in this process is configured as something quite new, current, voluminous and essentially renewable. Although since the beginning of 2010, the acquisition and/or construction of new energy projects in Brazil with Chinese capital is present, 2017 can be considered the year that most unequivocally marks the beginning of an aggressive energy policy between the two countries.

The combined analysis of data from BUGDPC (2022) and WEBMAP EPE allows us to reach some conclusions. The first is that the main focus of Chinese direct investment in energy production in the world is Brazil. Of all the amount of energy produced with Chinese capital contribution outside China, 18% occurs in Brazil and 82% in the other 68 countries that have this type of investment. After Brazil, there are four Asian neighbors and one African BRIC member: Vietnam (9.2%), Indonesia (8.4%), Pakistan (8.0%), India (7.9%) and South Africa (4.6%).

The second conclusion we draw is that the focus of Chinese energy generation in Brazil lies on renewable matrices. Of all the amount of renewable energy produced with Chinese capital contribution outside China, 45% occurs in Brazil and 55% in the other 50 countries that have this type of investment. Altogether 92% of the energy produced with Chinese capital in Brazil is renewable. Hydroelectricity (82.2% of the total) is the main product, followed by coal (5.7%), sugarcane biomass (4.1%), wind (3.7%), petroleum (2.1%) and solar (1.6%).

It is important to remember that we have only worked with the categories of “operating” enterprises, whose Chinese participation in the business was essentially due to the acquisition of already existing plants. For the coming years, the perspective is that the “under construction” projects, of greenfield character, will also come into operation, thereby expanding Chinese power generation in Brazil. Historically, the periods of greatest economic growth were related to stability and balance of power. In this regard, China seeks to broaden strategies that enable it to develop future soft power skills.

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Chapter 24

Creating and Using *Tais* in Timor-Leste: An Intangible Heritage



Thaísa Bravo-valenzuela e Silva

Abstract In a country where there are many competing development priorities, the need to preserve cultural heritage faces imminent difficulties. It is noted, however, based on Timor-Leste's Strategic Development Plan 2011–2030, that culture and preservation of cultural heritage have been considered priorities to achieve development. Described in the social capital section of the document, and in line with the UN Millennium Goals, the Plan points out the need to celebrate and promote the unique culture and important role of traditional arts, such as weaving *Tais*. These are traditional fabrics used to welcome newborns, as well as for traditional ceremonies and festivals. The colors and motifs used in its manufacture may include several colors, bear geometric designs, and represent anthropomorphic figures, and are also symbols of representativeness. In March 2020, the Government of Timor-Leste registered the appointment of *Tais* as an Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity and obtained its recognition in December 2021. Due to the positive result, the Executive Secretary of Timor-Leste for UNESCO, Francisco Barreto, promised to carry out training activities for *Tais* weaving, to foster the creative industry of the country and disseminate this technique internationally. So, what we want to do in this chapter is to understand some uses of *Tais* fabric, in the post-restoration period of independence, as the first intangible heritage of humanity registered by Timor-Leste and its potential as Timor's soft power instrument internationally.

Keyword Timor-Leste · Intangible cultural heritage · Soft power · UNESCO · Development

24.1 First Words...

In the field of arts and humanities, it is impossible to conceive a discipline that does not consider culture. However, conceptualizing it is not and has never been unanimous. When referring to the term, a layperson usually has in mind the most

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erudite concept: the one linked to the Fine Arts, such as Painting, Sculpture, Music, Dance, and Architecture. After all, it is relatively common to hear that someone is acculturated when they have no contact with any of these activities. In anthropology, on the other hand, culture can be understood as a set of meanings that gives an explanation to the world surrounding an individual, that is, society.

The concept, therefore, is elusive and cannot be restricted to a specific category (Pogodda 2014). As a broad concept, culture encompasses shared values such as meanings, symbols, and customs of a people (Sewell 1999, *apud* Pogodda 2014). It reveals itself through sharing (Pogodda 2014) among other situations, present in rituals and ceremonies, in which a system of signs and meanings created by the social groups to which they belong are manifested and shared.

Precisely because no conceptualization suffices, by itself, to the concept of culture, here we understand it from three fundamentals, being: a. ways of life that characterize a collectivity; b. works and practices of art, intellectual activity, and entertainment; and c. as a factor in human development (Canedo 2009, p. 04).

In the first conception, culture is understood as a system of signs and meanings created by social groups (Canedo 2009, p. 04). Being produced from the social interaction of individuals, who elaborate their ways of thinking and feeling (Canedo 2009, p. 04; Botelho 2001, p. 02), culture manages identities and differences and establishes its routines (Canedo 2009, p. 04; Botelho 2001, p. 02). It is, therefore, a collective invention of symbols, values, ideas, and behaviors (Canedo 2009, p. 04; Botelho 2001, p. 02), so it is not possible to establish a hierarchy among the different cultures existing in the world.

In this conception, according to Canedo (2009, p. 04), the intangible cultural heritage is valued, that is, the ways of doing things, the oral tradition, the social organization of each community, the customs, the beliefs, and the cultural manifestations.

The second conception presents a more restricted idea of culture, referring to artworks and practices, intellectual activity, and entertainment, seen mainly as an economic activity (Canedo 2009, p. 05). In this case, culture is understood less as a system of symbols that unites communities among themselves, and more as being connected to a kind of organized circuit (Canedo 2009, p. 05), in which the cultural industry proliferates and is concentrated in specific means of expression, as Isaura Botelho (2001, p. 02) points out, being cited by Daniele Canedo (2009 p. 05).

Besides what is traditionally read as arts, such as the fields of Literature, Fine Arts, Sculpture, and Crafts, this conception of culture includes cultural industries (Canedo 2009, p. 05), which move a productive chain that encompasses other sectors such as fashion, *marketing*, sports, advertising, and electronic games, for example (Canedo 2009, p. 05).

This conception is interesting, because for a long time, especially in developing countries, culture was understood as a superfluous sector when compared to other activities such as Economy, Health, and Education, being identified, therefore, as an accessory activity (Miranda 2002). In the current discourses on culture, however,

the tendency to approach culture as a mechanism for economic development is evident (Miranda 2002) and, consequently, as a lever for social transformation (Miranda 2002).

On this specific point, Canedo (2009, p. 06) highlights that, in the relationship between culture and market, two distinct processes occur. The first refers to the commodification of culture, when:

[...] cultural activities are conceived aiming at mass distribution and, consequently, the generation of commercial profit; and the culturalization of merchandise, which occurs through the attribution of symbolic value to objects of everyday use (Canedo 2009, p. 06).

This implies that even the cultural characteristics of certain people can be transformed into saleable goods (Canedo 2009, p. 06).

In short, we assume that cultural industries, currently governed by a capitalist conception, also transform into merchandise some goods of cultural nature (Saraiva 2009, p. 32), subordinating their symbolic character to their monetary value (Saraiva 2009, p. 32).

Concerning the third conception, we notice that there is a certain approximation with the previous one. In this case, culture is related to the role it can assume as a social development factor (Canedo 2009, p. 06).

From this point of view, cultural activities are carried out to achieve various socio-political ends: from stimulating critical activities to awakening interest in involvement in politics (Canedo 2009, p. 06). Although this view is criticized for being endowed with a utilitarian perspective (Canedo 2009, p. 06), it is relevant to keep in mind that culture can indeed, in our opinion, raise political awareness and contribute to the human development of a given society.

Therefore, we state that, nowadays, and based on a study by Canedo (2009, p. 06), culture can be understood through three fundamental conceptions. The first, resulting from a broader concept, puts in vogue that all people are producers of culture (Canedo 2009, p. 06), which should be understood in its broad sense as the set of symbols and meanings that is shared by members of a given community (Canedo 2009, p. 06). This view fails on the assumption that all culture is universalizing and that all individuals in the same community will share common values and signs.

The second, a less broad view than the previous one, is inserted in a logic of commodification of culture, in which cultural activities are transformed into products (Canedo 2009, p. 06). In this case, therefore, cultural activities operate from a market relationship, in which some people have more favorable economic conditions to acquire cultural goods, while others have difficult access.

The third concept, which has been criticized by some researchers in the Human and Social Sciences (Canedo 2009, p. 06), attempts to link culture to social development, that is, the field of culture is, from this point of view, confused with social issues.

In addition to the conceptions mentioned above, some argue that it is necessary to treat culture as a value in itself (Canedo 2009). In other words, for the defenders of this position, culture is seen as fundamental in the process of humanization and

socialization of man, since it impacts the interaction of an individual with another, and in the community where he is inserted. Culture has, therefore, a humanizing dimension.

Moreover, being a social activity per se, culture suffers, therefore, changes in perception over generations, and can be mobilized according to specific purposes, demonstrating that some operations can circulate through different exchange regimes.

For Kelly Silva (2016, p. 131), exchange regimes can be understood as:

[...]analytic categories coined to make sense of the various rules, expectations, and effects through which people and social collectives transact goods, rights over persons, or signs of recognition. I consider such exchanges to be the basis of sociality. The epistemological efforts undertaken to understand such phenomena have allowed the construction of three ideal types of exchange regimes: the barter, the market (*commodity*), and the gift. Each of these regimes is often associated with specific spheres of exchange.

(Silva 2016, p. 131, *my translation*).

In other words, the regimes of exchange concern, in a very summarized way, how sociabilities are conducted, and guide interpretations and paths, through a network of relations. Very briefly, Silva (2016, p. 131) understands the gift regime as: “one in which through the exchange of goods, words, and gestures, people negotiate relationships that are outside the act of transaction” (Strathern 1992, *apud* Silva 2016, p. 131, *my translation*).

In this regime, “people and things are treated as people, with objects of value being supports for producing and reproducing long-term relationships” (Silva 2016, p. 131, *my translation*). In the gift regime, the value of things is not measured by their monetary value (Silva 2016, p. 131), but rather by the asymmetrical exchanges that occur between people.

The barter regime, although it can be confused with the previous one, differs because of the relevance granted to the exchanged goods (Silva 2016, p. 31, *apud* Ferreira 2015). It is marked by the attempt of people to access other objects of consumption, different from those they own or produce (Silva 2016, p. 131). In this case, the relationships between people are usually more symmetrical and the value of the goods exchanged is defined contextually (Silva 2016, p. 131).

Finally, the market regime is characterized “by the great interdependence between the actors involved in the operations and the presence of currency as a means of quantifying value” (Silva 2016, p. 132, *my translation*). The value of things is measured by price and equivalence to that price must be immediate (Gregory 1982, p. 41–70, *apud* Silva 2016, p. 132). It is worth noting that these regimes coexist in social dynamics (Silva 2016, p. 132) and that:

Contemporary developments in anthropological theory have shown that some transactions can begin guided by the market regime and be transformed into gift exchanges, as Valeri (1994) suggests. In the case of the market regime, it also implies saying that a cultural and symbolic good can be transformed into a market good. (Silva 2016, p. 132)

This is the case of *Tais*, a *traditional* fabric that is very relevant to Timorese sociability, and which is the object of study of this chapter.

24.2 Tais: Intangible Heritage of Timor-Leste

Weaving appears as an element that intensely surrounds the universe of Timorese culture. Being an icon of local material culture, weavings produced in a *traditional* way, known as *tais*, are present in various ceremonies throughout the life of an East Timorese (Ferreira 2015).

From birth celebrations to mortuary ceremonies, *tais* stands out for being made from wefts of intertwining fibers, forming designs and colors that represent unique patterns for each of the country's districts, and can represent animalistic beliefs, family stories, and social events (Silva 2018, pp. 99–100). Among the motifs evoked, those related to animals and elements of nature linked to *traditional myths* and rituals can be highlighted, such as anthropomorphic figures with outstretched arms and hands, as well as zoomorphic representations of birds, roosters, crocodiles, horses, fish, and aquatic animals; and plants, trees, and leaves, symbolizing the origin of life and the center of the world (Silva 2018, p. 99–100). In the official Tetum language, it can be referred to as *tais mane*, when worn by men, and as *tais fetu*, when worn by women (Lourenço 2011, p. 38).

As a social practice, the circulation and production of *Tais* were intrinsically connected and linked to the creation, maintenance, and establishment of relationships, figuring among “Timorese gifts” (Ferreira 2015). Within this scenario, weaving was an activity that used to happen within a domestic universe (Ferreira 2015), composed mostly by women.

However, as Andreza Carvalho Ferreira (2015, p. 11) notes, since the country's independence, *tais* has gained new breath and meaning, being intended, among other things, for foreign consumption (or *malae*, meaning “foreigner” in Tetum).

At this point, we consider it relevant to highlight that the restoration of independence in Timor-Leste is still very recent. In 2002, after a Portuguese colonial period that lasted until 1975, added to more than twenty years of Indonesian occupation and a 30-month period of United Nations transitional administration (Silva 2008; Ferreira 2015), Timor-Leste would finally come to restructure itself politically, inaugurating a period in which the appreciation of culture would emerge as an element of cohesion of Timorese identity.

At that time, it was essential to identify the damage caused by years of occupation of the territory and thus effectively organize the administration of Timor. The presence of international cooperation organizations (especially Portuguese, Brazilian, and Australian), both state and non-state, secular and religious (Ferreira 2015), which had settled in the country to provide humanitarian aid and development to Timorese society, was also clear. Some of these organizations, such as the Alola Foundation, founded in 2001 by Kirsty Gusmão, first lady of the country between 2002 and 2007 (Ferreira 2015, pp. 11–12), emerged with the purpose of assisting the professional insertion of women through various projects, such as income generation.

The institution's *website* states that the Alola Foundation was created in order to “raise awareness of the widespread sexual violence against women and girls in Timor-Leste during the militia attacks in 1999” (Alola Foundation 2022), a period

just after then-Indonesian President Jusuf Habibie announced that he would give Timorese people the option of choosing autonomy under Indonesian sovereignty or separation and that left traces of violence and sexual abuse in East Timorese society.

The Foundation (*Fundasaun Alola*, in Tetum) was particularly active in the case of the victim Juliana Santos (Alola). Forcibly taken to West Timor (a region of Indonesia), Juliana was coerced into marrying her abductor and was raped several times, suffering mental, physical, and emotional abuse, and being denied access to financial resources and the ability to earn her own money. Subsequently, Juliana gave birth to three children. Upon the death of one of her relatives, she was allowed to return to Timor-Leste on the condition that her children would remain in Indonesian territory to ensure her return.

Currently, the Alola Foundation provides a wide range of projects in which it operates, mainly developing activities aimed at the economic insertion of women, such as promoting training sessions, and developing an action plan aimed at strengthening the family economy and child health care (Foundation Alola 2022).

Among the training sessions, the Foundation has been developing income generation work through the production of handcrafted goods, including *Tais*.

Commenting on the subject, Ferreira (2015), in her award-winning final paper in Social Sciences from the University of Brasília, narrates the experience of having worked as a volunteer at *Sentru Suku Fundasaun Alola* or Galpão, one of the projects aimed at income generation undertaken by the Foundation. Because of this experience, she followed very closely the production, commercialization, and circulation of *tais* and understood the transformations undergone by *tais* to adapt to the market regime. Because we believe that the researcher's fieldwork was very well done, and because we consider the mobilization of her monograph to be fundamental to understanding *Tais*' passage from a gift regime to a market regime, we refer to the author at many moments in this chapter.

According to her, this passage [from the gift regime to the market regime] is the result of the establishment of modernization projects that went step by step "with the establishment of new modes of production of objects and reproduction of people" (Ferreira 2015, p. 13), which have been significantly amplified in Timor-Leste due to the presence of numerous institutions in Timorese territory (Ferreira 2015, p. 13), such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), nation-states, and institutions that self-determine themselves as religious (Ferreira 2015, p. 13), in particular organizations of Portuguese, Brazilian, and Australian origins.

The presence of these institutions contributes to the promotion of a creative cultural industry aimed at selling to foreigners (*malae*, in Tetum), thus articulating local culture and its potential as a market good for foreigners, which potentially indicates that *Tais* production could in the future be used to promote the country internationally. Based on the study of Ferreira (2015), we believe that one of the main difficulties of these institutions is dealing with the differences of production between the districts. After all, each *Tais* fabric is unique, with patterns and colors that represent the history and culture of each one of Timorese districts, and each one tells a unique story about the culture and history of its people.

To be taken as an example, *Tais* of the Special Administrative Region of Oe-Cusse Ambeno (in Tetum Oe-Kusi Ambenu), a special administrative region of Timor-Leste, located on the north coast of the western half of the island of Timor (thus constituting an exclave of Timor-Leste, since it is separated from the rest of the country by the Indonesian province of West Timor), is characterized by the mixture between geometric and floral motifs (attributed to Western motifs) and indigenous imagery (anthropomorphic, zoomorphic, geometric) (Lourenço 2021, p. 242). Currently, this is one of the main economic and income-generating activities of this community (UNDP Timor-Leste 2018). Bearing in mind the diverse patterns that characterize its production (due to the cultural differences between the districts), *Tais* symbolizes the country's ethnic diversity, while at the same time representing the unity and common commitment to preserve Timorese culture and identity.

Soares (2015, p. 17), being cited by Lourenço (2021, pp. 241–242) highlights this difference “when referring to the cultural value of *tais* and the qualitative hierarchy underlying the structure, technique, color and *design of* each district, subdistrict and community.” Further, she highlights that the European-influenced *tais* is even considered “third-rate” in the Lautém district (Soares 2015, p. 17, *apud* Lourenço 2021, p. 241), reflecting the diversity in the production process.

That said, we can affirm that *Tais* weaving reveals several ambivalences that mark its making: perceptions about the past, present and future intersect in the wefts sewn by the craftswomen, “between the perception that the long Portuguese presence was destructive and did not respect the Timorese ancestral customs, and the evidence showing that the most striking changes occurred with the Indonesian invasion in 1975” (Madeira, p. 2018, 93, *apud* Lourenço 2021, p. 243).

These perceptions are clear in the memories of the artisans and weavers interviewed by Lourenço (2021, p. 244), when they state that the transformations that *tais* has undergone have allowed it to become “a source of profitability but, on the other hand, is lamented by elderly weavers for whom manual weaving represents their own cultural identity” (Madeira, p. 2018), meaning that, at the same time, *Tais* weaving imbricates the past, present, and future. The past as a way of telling stories, particularly considering that, during the period of the Indonesian occupation, many women, read as clandestine activists, provided food for the pro-independence fighting men, as well as weaved *tais* to represent good wishes and to protect them from those who wanted to harm them, the present to create a narrative about what happens daily and may be celebrated (marriage, birth, and national celebrations), and the future, that it is still being built.

And talking about the future, as an indication of this future potential, in December 2021, the Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) classified *Tais* as an intangible cultural heritage of Timor-Leste, becoming the first to be recognized as such.

24.3 Present and Future of *Tais* as a Timorese Soft Power

The Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, adopted by the United Nations in 2003 and ratified by Timor-Leste in December 2015, understands the Intangible Cultural Heritage as expressions of life and traditions that communities, groups, and individuals receive from their ancestors and pass on their knowledge to their descendants (UNESCO 2023). This intangible cultural heritage is transmitted from generation to generation, constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature, and their history, instilling in them a sense of identity and continuity and thus contributing to promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity. The document recognizes the need to ensure better protection of important intangible cultural heritages and to raise awareness about them.

By being approved as Intangible Cultural Heritage, therefore, UNESCO effectively recognized that *Tais* plays “an important role in the life of the Timorese people, from birth to death.” It also reaffirmed that *Tais* is one of the cultural elements that preserve the Timorese national identity root (Silva 2018, pp. 99–100) and thus, awakens the need to improve the protection of cultural heritage.

By deciding that the cultural technique needs to be preserved, UNESCO has also set aside an allocation of \$266,000 for projects to protect the fabric in Timor-Leste (UNESCO 2021). With this in mind, the Timorese government has asked *Tais* producers to preserve the production technique and cultural values of this product (RTTL 2021), and the National Parliament has requested the Government to organize a National Guide to *Tais*, to catalog the different fabric weaves and their production methods (RTTL 2021). As Vice President of the National Parliament, Maria Angelina Lopes Sarmiento noted, this initiative [to produce the Guide] was particularly relevant considering that other types of *Tais* are produced in Indonesia and the Philippines (RTTL 2021), and the lack of cataloging could lead to incorrect practices such as counterfeiting and cultural appropriation.

The deputies acknowledged that industrialization and the younger generation’s preference for modern clothing pose a threat to the transmission of traditional knowledge about this fabric. They identified several gaps in knowledge and documentation of historical and technical aspects of *tais*, including manufacturing processes, types of fibers and cotton used, methods of dye extraction, regional variations, as well as its social and gender roles and practical applications (Rodrigues 2022).

Welcoming the UNESCO recognition, the Parliament considered that the inscription of *Tais* as Intangible Cultural Heritage was not only a “great opportunity,” but also “a strong responsibility for Timor-Leste to commit itself to safeguard ancestral knowledge and to modernize this national product,” so that, on January 18, 2022, the Timorese National Parliament approved the establishment of December 14th as the National Day of *Tais* (in allusion to the day on which the recognition by the United Nations occurred).

As a result, in the same session of the National Parliament, resolutions were also approved regarding measures to protect *tais*, such as the implementation of a certification scheme that “ensures its authenticity, according to its origin and elaboration process, and that allows preventing the commercialization of replicas” unduly advertised as *tais* (Rodrigues 2022). The Parliament also defended a national strategy for the economic valorization and international promotion of the product and support for academic and scientific studies of the production cycle of *tais*, promoting training initiatives, with the participation of women weavers, to “ensure the preservation and transfer of knowledge” (Rodrigues 2022).

The text also recommends that the government adopt measures for the conservation and dissemination of the history of *Tais*, “namely through the creation of a *Tais* Museum with didactic content contributing to the knowledge and preservation of the authenticity of *Tais* production techniques” (Rodrigues 2022).

Support for business incubation at the various stages of production and commercialization—thus fostering the development of the country’s textile industry—and calls for the use of *tais* in official ceremonies are other recommendations. Recapturing what has already been said in this chapter, weaving *Tais* imbricates historical dimensions (past, present, and future), and is being transformed, contemporaneously, as a commercial good.

Tais has also been framed by the emergence of a visual arts movement in Timor-Leste known as *Movimentu Kultura*—“a group of contemporary artistic practices that engages “fragments of traditions” and involves the entire artistic community of Timor-Leste” (Veiga 2015, p. 85).

Movimentu Kultura is an artistic movement that seems to span all the main tendencies and media of contemporary art—[...] By nature, these are profane manifestations, which are imbued with some aspects of traditional values, and often associated with ritualizing trends. For the Timorese, worshipping the ancestral culture is an ongoing practice that is materialized in ceremonial events. The artists of *Movimentu Kultura* often document and/or utilize references in their works such as traditional symbols, imagery, objects, and cultural events as sources of inspiration for their artwork as a shared practice (Veiga 2015, p. 87).

One of its founders is Timorese artist Maria Madeira, who left her country with her family in 1976 and only returned after its independence in 2000 (Veiga 2015, p. 86). Her experience as an exiled citizen shaped her work, which frequently drew upon references to the country from which she had been displaced (Veiga 2015, p. 85). From being a voice of resistance in exile, Madeira’s present-day contemporary approach is directed toward her fellow citizens, with a particular focus on Timorese women (Veiga 2015, pp. 86).

In 1996, occurred Maria Madeira’s first exhibition at the Perth Institute of Contemporary Arts (PICA) (Veiga 2015, p. 90). It garnered significant media attention due to the growing awareness of human rights abuses in Timor-Leste following the global mediation of the Santa Cruz massacre on November 12, 1991 (Veiga 2015, p. 90). During this period, Maria Madeira’s works incorporated fragments of *tais* (Veiga 2015, p. 90), onto her canvases (Veiga 2015, p. 90). *The Movimentu Kultura*, which encompassed artists both within and outside of the country’s borders, incorporated cultural elements exclusive to Timor-Leste, such as *tais* (Veiga 2015, p. 90). Since

independence, the *Movimentu Kultura* has grown to include artists from various backgrounds and practices, including senior artists with solo practices and younger artists living in communal artists' communities known as *sanggars*, which have emerged since the 1990s and remain essential to the communal aspect of art in Timor-Leste (Veiga 2015, p. 90).

The most prevalent trend within the *Movimentu Kultura* is linked to the *Arte Moris* group of artists, including Maria Madeira (Veiga 2015, p. 94) and is distinguished by its social and political commentary (Veiga 2015, p. 90). The incorporation of elements from traditional dance costumes, specifically the *tais*, as well as the *kaibauk* and *morteen*, the crown and necklace worn by both women and men, is a recognizable feature in the group's artistic style (Veiga 2015, p. 90). Assemblages of these materials, alongside other found objects, are seen in works created across different media (Veiga 2015, p. 90).

Artists within the *Arte Moris* social commentary line of the *Movimentu Kultura* tend to focus on reporting various aspects of everyday life (Veiga 2015, p. 90). Their work frequently carries messages that are communicated to diverse audiences, both local and international, often using traditional forms of expression (Veiga 2015, p. 90). Their works also convey historical events such as the Santa Cruz massacre of 1991, the 1999 crisis, and the 2006 conflicts, serving as a reminder of these events to those who view their art (Veiga 2015, p. 90). It can be seen as a way of rewriting her own story, and, at the same time, adapting traditions to the requests of the buyers, which constitutes a response to an emerging market force (Veiga 2015, p. 94).

[...] It shows attentiveness to changing circumstances while displaying a continuity of narrations: the artistic community has been appropriating the various cultures at their disposition and utilizes them symbolically. Thus, in the case of Timor-Leste, 'invented traditions' can be seen as catalysts for expression, while they contribute to the nation-building process and to the writing of its history (Veiga 2015, p. 94).

Madeira's contribution to this artistic movement has also influenced other female artists, including the iconic work of artist and weaver Veronica Maia, which is entitled *Tais Don*, woven over five years (1995–99), "[...] where the names of those killed in the Santa Cruz massacre are inscribed. On five cloths, each two meters long, Maia wove the letters in white on a black background, with the names separated by a crucifix and each line divided by red stripes. The palette has a local meaning: red stands for sacrifice and liberation, black for triumph, and white for peace" (Lourenço 2021, p. 248).

The work was exhibited at *The Elastic/Borracha/Elastic: Timor-Leste/Australia Mobile Contemporary Artists' Residency*, and is particularly innovative, as it was made exclusively from hand-dyed *tais*, woven on the backstrap loom in five parts (Madeira 2022, pp. 116–117), whereas traditional Timorese textiles are usually made as a single piece or in two parts: where both *tais* are combined and accompanied by a *salenda* (traditional Timorese cloth worn as a shawl or scarf). The exhibition resulted from an itinerant residency carried out in eleven districts of Timor-Leste in 2012 by four visual artists (Lourenço 2021). Curated by both the artists and Jo Holder, the

exhibition was launched nearly at the same time in September 2014, taking place in two art spaces—Chan Contemporary Art Space (Darwin) and The Cross Art Projects (Sydney) (Lourenço 2021).

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[...] The conception of the artwork is remarkable as an abstract weaving in an unfamiliar practice and a virtuous technical feat (each horizontal panel measures 3 x 0.64 meters) (Holder 2017, p. 23, *apud* Madeira 2022, pp. 116–117).

Also, Holder (2017, *apud* Madeira 2022, p. 116–117), significantly, highlights that Maia never learned to read or write, but that she was aware of the political role of her work, inscribing *Tais* in a category where the visual side communicates, while the author turns to her origins. Maia, therefore, as well as other Timorese artists have increasingly elevated *Tais* as an organic textile that can be inscribed as contemporary art. Moreover, the work demonstrates the possibility of transforming these textiles into cultural goods inscribed in the market regime (as with other goods, this does not mean to say that the goods cannot circulate in more than one regime at the same time. *Tais*, for example, also circulates in the regime of gift).

The role of women in the promotion of contemporary Timorese art, although not the object of the present chapter, tangents the theme, insofar as they grant new meanings to *Tais*. In these cases, there are transcendental marks in the making of the textiles, and there also seems to us to be a genuine concern with the projections of *Tais* for the promotion of the living memory of Timor-Leste, based on the here and now (and projection into the future).

The transformations of *Tais* (here we choose to use *Tais* instead of “transformations undergone by *Tais*”, because in accordance with Ferreira (2015), we consider that the techniques undergo changes and/or are reified over time and make it evident that, in recent years, the Timorese *Tais* has been undergoing a significant transformation, no longer being an object of value only in ceremonies and rituals, and becoming a commercialized product in the local and international market.

Several initiatives have been created to promote *Tais*, both in its traditional use and in “new” forms of use. An example of this is the making of bags and accessories with *Tais* fabrics. This trend has contributed to a greater appreciation of local craftsmanship and income generation for the women who produce the fabrics.

In terms of product diversity, the range of *Tais* products currently available include higher-design dresses, shirts, skirts, jackets, and uniforms designed and sold by Rui Carvalho [- a pioneer in the industry -] as well as made to order by Alola Esperanza. Equally popular shirts, skirts, and men’s jackets designed using *Tais* are sold at many stores. (The Asia Foundation 2017, p. 07).

This has led to some changes and innovations in *Tais* production. As an example, producers who aim to create higher value *Tais* products search for unique colors in their designs, as well as prioritize the quality of the weave, shape, and overall finishing of the *Tais*. Some producers collaborate directly with weavers to ensure that their specific design and quality standards are met (The Asia Foundation 2017, p. 07), attracting the attention of consumers in search of handmade and exclusive products. The “slow fashion” trend, which values local production and sustainability, has contributed to a greater demand for Timorese *Tais*.

Another important initiative is the “*Tais* Market” project, created by the Timorese government with the support of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The project aims to promote *Tais* as a tourist and cultural product, offering spaces for the exhibition and sale of the fabric in local and international markets. In addition, the project also promotes the capacity building of women weavers, supporting the improvement of the fabrics’ quality and innovation in production.

That said, the Timorese *Tais* can be seen to build and disseminate ideas and values that are related to the Timorese culture and identity. Through the promotion of *Tais*, it is possible to transmit to other countries and international actors the richness of the Timorese culture and its values, such as tradition, solidarity, and unity. Moreover, the promotion of *Tais* can contribute to the strengthening of Timor-Leste’s economy and cultural identity, which can attract investors and tourists to the country.

In International Relations, the capacity of attraction of a State is called *soft power*. Coined by political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. in his book “*Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*,” published in 1990, Nye defined *soft power* as the ability to influence the behavior of others through persuasion, attraction, and seduction, rather than using force or coercion. In other words, it is the ability to influence others through values, culture, institutions, policies, and other forms of attraction, rather than through economic or military power.

Soft power has been widely discussed in the field of International Relations and can be seen as a way of constructing and disseminating ideas and values that can impact the way countries relate to each other. Important to mention that, rather than a theory, *soft power* is an analytical concept that refers to “getting others to want what you want” (Nye 1990, pp. 31–35) and it molds the preferences of others by drawing upon intangible resources like universal popular culture or political unity.

The potential of the Timorese *Tais* as a soft power resource is reinforced by its unique and distinctive characteristics since it is a high-quality product that can be valued for its authenticity and the history it represents. The promotion of the Timorese *Tais* as a soft power resource can be done through various strategies, such as the creation of advertising campaigns, fairs, and international events, the establishment of partnerships with international and national designers, such as Rui Carvalho, e.g., and brands, the creation of online stores and dissemination in social media. The idea is to create a positive and attractive image of the *Tais* and Timorese culture so that people will be interested in learning more about the country and its traditions.

In addition, it is possible to associate *Tais* with other areas of soft power, such as gastronomy, music, dance, and the arts. For example, it is possible to continue promoting *Tais* in music and dance festivals, creating an atmosphere that celebrates

the cultural diversity of Timor-Leste, as it has already been stated by the *Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento de Timor-Leste* (Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan) 2011–2030. There must be the continuation of the policy of preservation and valorization of the intangible cultural heritage of Timor-Leste. This includes promoting the art of the fabric, supporting local artisans, developing training programs, and valuing traditional techniques and knowledge. The protection of cultural heritage is also fundamental to ensure that *Tais* will continue to be produced and valued by future generations.

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Chapter 25

Soft Power and Brazilian Music Diffusion



Bruno Aragão Cardoso

Abstract This chapter is divided into four parts, and the first one is about the Soft Power concept proposed by Nye (Soft power: the means to success in world politics. Public Affairs, New York, 2004). The first part initially focuses on the survey conducted by McClory in 2011, which is cited to measure how Soft Power was exercised by 30 countries. Further on, two researches are addressed: the first one relates Soft Power to the Fulbright Scholar Program, and the second one describes a link between Soft Power and the translation of Brazilian music lyrics into English. At this point, the translations of Bossa Nova lyrics are discussed, and, therefore, some articles published by the New York Times in the 60s about Bossa Nova and Brazilian music are cited. The second part relates Soft Power to cultural diplomacy and reports two diplomatic actions: The Year of Brazil in France in 2005, and a summary of the OCIAA's cultural actions in the 40s. The third part examines the history of Brazil's cultural diplomacy through music between the 30s and 70s, emphasizing musical diffuse.

Keywords Soft power · Diplomacy · Brazilian music

25.1 Soft Power Concept

Nye through the concept of “Soft Power”¹ analyzes the international attraction exerted by a country. Thus, culture, institutions and government policies would be values that, on the world stage, could lead to the projection of countries and represent, according to Nye (2004), decisive sources of Soft Power as they would make others want the same as ourselves. An actor possessing Soft Power would be able to attract others through their ideas, being able to determine the international political agenda according to their preferences (Menezes 2015, p. 35).

¹ Nye, Joseph (2004). *Soft power: the means to. NY Public Affairs, success in world politics.*

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To guide the international agenda, instead of military threats or economic sanctions, Soft Power creates an attraction resulting from eight factors: “(1) culture/cultural identity, (2) ideology/ideals, (3) domestic political values, (4) legitimacy/credibility, (5) moral authority, (6) foreign policy, (7) scientific and technological advances, (8) commercial activity” (Nye 2004² apud Gueraldi 2006: 85). For Nye, the breadth of this attractiveness would be a consequence of the “substance, style and tactics of International Relations policies” promoted by a country (Nye 2004: 68). For Villanova, these policies are dialogically supported through “cultural programs, exchange diplomacy and international radio, television and internet broadcasting” (Villanova 2017, p. 61).

McClory, in turn, wanting to broaden the debate, established 50 metrics to measure Soft Power. The author conducted two surveys carried out in England in 2010 and 2011, and pointed out that it is first necessary for each country to find out which Soft Power they have, and then create strategies to be able to use it (McClory 2011: 06). To collaborate with the construction of this knowledge, the second investigation adopted 43 objective metrics and 7 subjective ones in its analysis. The subjective metrics are: international role, cultural production, global leadership, icons of Soft Power, gastronomy, aviation and commercial brands (McClory 2011: 13). The objective metrics of cultural production are: tourism, tourist spending, reach of communication channels, international press correspondents, language speakers, the Olympics, music, museum, world heritage and football (McClory 2011, p. 31).

Specifically in relation to music, the number of records that are part of the list of the 50 best sellers in the world was analyzed, whose result was informed by the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry.

The 2011 survey analyzed 30 countries and the result was as follows: USA in 1st place with 7.41 points, UK, 2nd, 6.78; and France, 3rd, 6.21. In this ranking, Brazil was in 21st place and obtained 3.55 points (McClory 2011, p. 14). This result consisted of 70% of objective metrics and 30% of subjective ones (McClory 2011, p. 13). The author of the research considered Brazil as a “*rising*” case whose main “*cultural ambassadors*” are football and music (McClory³ in: Tooge 2014, p. 47). Currently, the Brazilian singer who has the most international projection is Anitta who, in 2022, was the most listened to on Spotify in the world for three days, in addition to having won the VMA promoted by the MTV in the USA in the category of best Latin music video, and that is why she is compared to the group BTS that considerably increases the dissemination of Korean culture around the world (Buarque 2022). For the Italian magazine Vanity Fair, Anitta is “*A living legend, Beyoncé made in Rio and the most powerful and influential Latin pop star*” (Folha Press⁴).

² Idem.

³ McClory, Jonathan. The New Persuaders II. In: The New Persuaders II The Global Ranking of Soft Power: Institute Government, 1 Dec. 2011, pp. 5–25.

⁴ FolhaPress 26/09/2022.

In addition, to try to contextualize this rise of Soft Power exercised by Brazil, the research cited the growth of the economy and the increase in the number of Brazilian embassies around the world (McClory apud Tooge 2014, p. 47). It is clear, therefore, that cultural and political actions of Brazilian diplomacy were used to define the size of the national Soft Power. To punctuate the political side, some actions were highlighted, such as the attempt to put the fight against hunger on the international agenda, and the action in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake (Nye 2004 in: Guerardi 2006, p. 76).

In addition to politics and culture, education also contributed to the creation of Soft Power. Toscano researched the educational exchange between the USA and Brazil through the Fulbright program and points out that in addition to diplomacy and context, it is necessary to have interpreters and receivers of the values that will be transmitted. This favorable environment is found in universities; however, the researcher says that to measure the efficiency of the exchange it is necessary to have “(1) *the occurrence of real social interactions abroad*; (2) *the sharing of a sense of community or common identity between the foreigner and the recipient*; (3) *the possibility of influence (political, institutional, academic-scientific position of the graduate in their country of origin)*” (Toscano 2017: 30).

Music, in turn, is a strong agent of Soft Power that is conducted by the performance of musicians, producers and record companies. To illustrate, João Gilberto’s first three albums were released in the USA, but they sold very little, and in view of such low sales, the Verve record company released an album on which João Gilberto and saxophonist Stan Getz, a well-known instrumentalist in the USA, played, and the record won 4 Grammys and “*Girl from Ipanema*” was named song of the year in 1964 (Desouteiro⁵ apud Tooge 2014: 163).

This presence of Brazil around the world is accompanied by a way in which the country is perceived. In Nye’s assessment (apud Pinto⁶ apud Tooge 2014: 47), “*the country’s image is originally positive (...) Brazil has dealt well with issues dear to other countries such as race.*” In addition to the infamous racial democracy, another feature of the Brazilian image abroad that is continually re-signified is the idea of being a “*tropical paradise*” (Tooge 2014: 55).

The relationship between the defining ideas of Brazil’s identity and the way the country is seen internationally was problematized by Tooge (2014) and Guerardi (2006). He analyzed 15 articles published between 2001 and 2004 in the Economist, Financial Times and Le Monde, 5 in each periodical, and concluded that “*the attributes most resonated abroad were political values, followed by attributes of foreign policy and then that of culture and cultural attraction*” (Guerardi 2006, p. 146). Tooge, in turn, researched the translation of Brazilian song lyrics into English, and cited the example of Tom Jobim’s dissatisfaction with the translation of *Girl from*

⁵ Documentário Beyond Ipanema. Direção: Guto Barra, 2009.

⁶ Pinto, Rodrigo. Interesse por cultura brasileira cria chance de fortalecer economia via “soft power”. BBC Brasil, 04 abr. 2012.

Ipanema, which conveyed a touch of exoticism to the American public, which motivated Jobim to translate the lyrics of his compositions on his own (Maximiano⁷ 2012 in: Tooge 2014: 165). This dissatisfaction with the translation contrasts with the perception of part of the press about the influence of Bossa Nova on jazz. John Wilson, a reporter for the New York Times, said that Bossa Nova draws jazz's attention to the melody and provokes it to regain its dancing side (Wilson 1962, p. 147). In another article, the same journalist, two years later, sees Bossa Nova as a mixture of samba and jazz that sounds familiar to American ears, and that is better suited to be played in small venues (Wilson 1964: 53).

This intimacy changes its configuration with the emergence of protest songs. The NYT correspondent in São Paulo wrote about the theatrical show *Vida e Morte Severina* and said that the Girl from Ipanema, a symbol of the leisure world of young people lulled by an urban and intimate rhythm, was replaced by the poor and hungry boy from the sertão that is sung politically. The lyrics, in addition to highlighting the political context of the dictatorship that stimulates political engagement, also perceives the oscillation of the musical taste of the youth between protest songs and Jovem Guarda (Blum 1967, p. 84).

Another Brazilian genre that gained popularity in the USA was the afro-samba that succeeded the samba of Carmem Miranda and the Bossa Nova of João Gilberto and would have the group Tamba 4, led by the pianist Luis Eça, as an important representative (Wilson 1969, p. 27). To continue with the characterization of the group, the reporter makes some comparisons between Tamba 4 and Sérgio Mendes and Brasil 66. This, in 1969, was one of the best known groups in the USA and produced “*extravagant*” music, while Tamba 4 was characterized as having a “*subtle*” approach. For Eça, who lived with Mendes at Beco das Garrafas, a place of musical effervescence in RJ in the 1950s, his colleague made a “*commercial*” sound.

25.2 Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power

In addition to creating this international image, Soft Power helps stimulate economic growth and is therefore the basis of cultural diplomacy which, according to the New Zealand government,⁸ is: “*the international presentation of cultural activities carried out by a State to improve the understanding of their cultural life and to create a favorable image in order to facilitate diplomatic and commercial relations*” (Mark 2009, p. 06). Edgard Ribeiro advances the explanation and states that cultural diplomacy is the use of the cultural relationship to achieve national goals of a political, economic, commercial and cultural nature (Ribeiro 2011, 33). For the ambassador, “*Brazilian cultures must be the raw material for accelerating our processes of bilateral, regional*

⁷ Maximiano, Marina (2012). O Brasil de Tom Jobim na voz de Frank Sinatra. Monografia, Bacharelado em Letras, UFJF, Juiz de Fora.

⁸ Ministry for Culture and Heritage (2000: 04). The Place of Culture in New Zealand's International Relations (Wellington: Ministry for Culture and Heritage).

and international rapprochement with other peoples and their governments” (Ribeiro 2011, p. 26). This view is shared by João Gualberto Marques Porto (in Garcia 2003, p. 42) who stated that when he headed the Brazilian embassy in Nicaragua, “*cultural activity was the main tool he had in bilateral relations with the Central American country.*”

A clear example of this was the holding of the Year of Brazil in France, in 2005, which involved around “2,500 Brazilian artists and intellectuals.” In this project, “104 plastic art exhibitions,” “318 musical performances” and “1,298” projections of “430 films” were held, in addition to other events. This venture was carried out for nine months in the largest French cities, and some of its main consequences were the creation of courses on Brazilian culture at universities in France, and the increase in the number of French tourists in Brazil, who spent “55 million of dollars” in Brazil (Amaral apud Ribeiro 2011, p. 41).⁹

Ribeiro (2011) and Mark (2009) consider, however, that cultural diplomacy is not synonymous with International Cultural Relations. The latter, for Ribeiro, aims to develop, in the long term, understanding and approximation between peoples and institutions for mutual benefit (2011: 33). In addition to this separation, the diplomatic author explains that cultural dissemination actions are carried out through the exchange of people, promotion of art and artists, language teaching, and intellectual and technical cooperation (Ribeiro 2011: 31).

Another concern about cultural diplomacy is lead time. Ribeiro stresses that the objectives are envisaged “*in the very long term*” (Ribeiro 2011, p. 116). This extended period is also viewed positively by Amorim. The Chancellor, when quoting the following sentence by T. Roosevelt: “the USA has no friends, it has interests,” states that foreign policy should be broader and that there should be no contradiction between defending the national interest and promoting solidarity that does not is in line with commercial and industrial pressures (Amorim 2007¹⁰ in: Lopes 2013: 211). Another question is about the importance of receiving foreign artists in Brazil, due to the need to avoid creating a state of “self-hypnosis” (Ribeiro 2011, p. 60).

Nye points out that in the USA, throughout the Cold War, there were two currents on the use of culture at the international level: one, which thought in the longer term, and which acted through art, books and student exchange programs; and another, more immediate, which preferred cinema and broadcasting. This division was accompanied by questioning the degree of state control over this activity (Nye 2004, pp. 102–103). This cultural action had another contour in the context of the Second World War. In 1940, the USA created an agency to promote “*the arts and sciences, education and travel, radio, press and film*” with the aim of strengthening “*the ties between the American nations and the defense of the continent.*” In 1941, this body was renamed the “Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA)” and consisted of “three divisions: Commercial and Financial, Communications and

⁹ Amaral, Rui. *O ano do Brasil na França: um modelo de intercâmbio cultural*. Brasília: 2007. Tese, Centro Altos Estudos (CAE), Instituto Rio Branco.

¹⁰ Amorim, Celso. *A nova política externa independente*. Palestra do II Curso para diplomatas sul-americanos. RJ: abr. 2007.

Cultural Relations” (Tota¹¹ apud da Silva Galdioli 2008, p. 101). Between 1940 and 1946, the OCIAA had a budget of “140 million dollars”, and a staff consisting of “1,100 people in the United States and 200 abroad” (Moura¹² apud da Silva Galdioli 2008, p. 101).

This investment allowed the creation of 12 radio programs that were broadcast in Latin America in Portuguese, English and Spanish (Hirst¹³ apud da Silva Galdioli 2008: 116). *Repórter Esso* was one of them, and, in 1942, it was broadcast by “60 broadcasters in 15 countries” (Klockener¹⁴ in: da Silva Galdioli 2008, p. 116). In addition to producing these extensive programs, the USA also hosted programs made by other countries.

The “News for the Americas,” which promoted tourism in Brazil and encouraged coffee consumption, was sponsored by the Brazilian Embassy and the National Coffee Department (Herz and Silva¹⁵ apud da Silva Galdioli 2008: 118). In addition to radio, another diplomatic tool that stimulated the import and export of cultural goods was cinema. US films exported to Latin America were classified as propaganda films, which sought to promote a positive image of the USA. Latin films that were shown in the USA were classified as “tourism, history and general culture” (da Silva Galdioli 2008, pp. 112–113). The OCIAA was terminated after the end of World War II.

In that decade, Carmen and Heitor were the biggest representatives of the idea of Brazilian music abroad. The United States were essential in the process of creating the nation’s musical identity because they were the ones we desired, envied and opposed. (Rodrigues 2019, p. 283)

This representation of Brazilian music was conducted by cultural diplomacy, which was involved in the relationship between Brazilianness and cosmopolitanism, between what was popular and erudite, which affected and boosted the careers of Carmem Miranda and Heitor Villa-Lobos, who, being representative of Latinity, while diminishing their cultural identity, facilitated the dissemination of Brazilian music in the USA (Rodrigues 2019, pp. 290–292). Carmem, when she died in 1955, received praise and mockery from the press that recognized her value for the international dissemination of music, but at the same time called her a “*café-concert cicada*”¹⁶ (Rodrigues 2019: 301).

The singing and dancing of this “*cicada*” was seen in several films that portray Brazil as a place where there is racial democracy, sensuality, exuberant nature and a

¹¹ Tota, A. P (2000). *O Imperialismo Sedutor: a americanização do Brasil na época da Segunda Guerra*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2000.

¹² Moura, G (1984). *O Tio Sam chega ao Brasil*. São Paulo: Ed. Brasiliense, p. 22.

¹³ Hirst, M. *o Processo de Alinhamento nas Relações Brasil-Estados Unidos: 1942–45*. Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto Universitário de Pesquisa do Rio de Janeiro, 1982.

¹⁴ Klockner, L. *O noticiário radiofônico na Segunda Guerra e a edição brasileira de “O Repórter Esso”*.

¹⁵ Herz, M, e Silva, A. M. *A Política Cultural Norte-Americana Durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial*. Trabalho apresentado no colóquio “Estado Novo e Autoritarismo no Brasil, 1937–45”. IFCS/UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1987.

¹⁶ Cunha, João Itiberê da (JIC) (1940). *A menor pianista na maior sala de concertos*. *Correio da Manhã*, Rio de Janeiro, 3 abr. MVL, L11-2L.

lack of civic order (Amâncio¹⁷ apud Medeiros 2005: 58). The author Bianca Medeiros points out, on the other hand, that the image of Rio de Janeiro as “a space of contrasts, but never of antagonisms” was explored both by Hollywood and by the Brazilian Federal Government (Medeiros 2005: 59).

25.3 History of Cultural Diplomacy in Brazil

Aware of the diplomatic role of culture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil began to institutionalize cultural diplomacy through the creation of the Intellectual Cooperation Service, in 1937, and the Intellectual Cooperation Division, in 1938. This, according to the article 11 of the Oswaldo Aranha Regiment, was responsible for:

- I—the study of intellectual cooperation issues, especially those related to literary, artistic and scientific exchange between Brazil and foreign countries;
- II—the representation of the Ministry, by the respective Head of the Division, in the Brazilian Commission for Intellectual Cooperation;
- III—obtaining data and information about Brazilian culture for dissemination abroad;
- IV—the increase of intellectual exchange with foreign cultural centers;
- V—the negotiation of international acts on matters related to intellectual cooperation;
- VI—the elaboration of the explanatory memorandum concerning these acts;
- VII—monitoring their faithful execution;
- VIII—the organization of files of Brazilian intellectuals, cultural associations in Brazil and similar institutes abroad that are interested in Brazilian affairs;
- IX—the organization of Brazilian libraries offered to foreign universities and cultural institutes;
- X—the exchange of professors and students from universities and other national educational establishments with foreign countries;
- XI—the creation of scholarships and their inspection;
- XII—the organization of cultural conferences to be held at the Itamaraty Palace, and
- XIII—the dissemination of information related to the intellectual movement between Brazil and foreign countries (Garcia 2003, pp. 159–160).

For Garcia (2003, p. 60), the emphasis on cooperation and exchange present in this regiment demonstrates an incipience in the dissemination action, as Brazil was seen more as a recipient than a promoter of cultural actions. For Fléchet (2011, p. 236), despite the shyness, these actions already reveal the intention of making a “*timely advertisement of Brazil abroad*.” Gradually, culture gained space and importance in the structure and agenda of the MRE. In 1945, the Political, Economic and Cultural

¹⁷ Amancio, T. (2000) Brasil dos gringos. Niteroi: Intertexto.

Department was created, which was formed by four divisions: politics, economy and commerce, intellectual cooperation and borders (Castro 2009, p. 401). That year, for the first time, the adjective cultural was used to designate a department. In 1946, there was a change in the structure of the MRE that engendered the Political and Cultural Department, which was formed by five divisions: cultural; policy; ceremonial; international acts, congresses and conferences; and borders (Castro 2009, p. 412). This reformulation created the first division that was called cultural.

In 1961, there was another modification, and the Cultural and Information Department was created, and composed of the divisions of: cultural diffusion, intellectual cooperation and information (Castro 2009, p. 477). From that date until 1984, the name of the Division of Cultural Diffusion (DDC) was maintained, despite four organizational changes having been made in the structure of the MRE (Castro 2009, p. 510) and (Castro and Castro 2009, pp. 34–41). When the DDC was created, it was divided into five sectors: *“plastic arts and exhibition, photography and records, music, cinema, theater and publishing”* (Crespo 2006, p. 116).

For Garcia (2003), the creation of this department gives more importance to culture, and, according to the Organic Regulation of 1961, its role was to:

assist the Secretary-General in planning and executing cultural exchanges with other countries, disseminating information abroad about Brazil in all its aspects, keeping Brazilian offices abroad informed about current affairs in Brazil and clarifying national public opinion on the action international competition in Brazil. (Garcia 2003, p. 61)

The specific attributions of the Cultural Diffusion Division, in turn, according to chapter IV of the Internal Regulations of the Secretariat of State (RISE) of 1969, were: *“to sponsor the exhibition of works abroad, by plastic artists, musicians, and Brazilian filmmakers; distribute cultural dissemination material; support people and entities abroad that are dedicated to the dissemination of Brazilian culture”* (Castro 2009, p. 529). The diffusion of music, specifically, would perform two functions:

In the case of erudite culture, what is basically required of Brazil is to be able to demonstrate that it is “also” capable of producing good culture in this field. As for popular culture, at the same time that our country is presented with the possibility of taking advantage of the positive image it already enjoys abroad, there is, on the other hand, the challenge of undoing limiting clichés that often reduce it to a few images that, despite friendly, end up impoverishing the global image of Brazil. (Garcia 2003, p. 39)

The creation of these images is done through five actions:

(1) the financing of tours for Brazilian musicians; (2) the creation and distribution of musical material (records, sheet music and books) through the network of embassies and consulates; (3) active contribution to international cultural organizations; (4) the production of radio programs for foreign broadcasters; (5) the organization of international musical events in Brazil (...) (Fléchet 2011, pp. 242–3).

These actions therefore created an “original diplomacy” that “has its own time, content and political orientation” (Fléchet 2011, p. 229). The author points out that these measures could be established due to three factors:

First, the continuous expansion of the Itamaraty's cultural sector during the second half of the 20th century. (...) Second, the presence of artists and musicologists in the diplomatic corps. (...) Finally, the creation of new international organizations within the framework of UNESCO, aimed at promoting different musical traditions worldwide. (Fléchet 2011, pp. 242–243)

Due to all these factors, Itamaraty promoted international tours of several artists in the music field, such as Tom Jobim, Tamba Trio and Wilson Simonal who traveled in May 1964 to the USA and some countries in South America (Crespo 2006: 139). In October of that year, taking advantage of the repercussion of “Brazilian jazz,” Rosinha de Valença, Wanda Sá, Carlos Lyra, Sérgio Mendes and Jorge Ben performed in seven cities in the USA and in the capitals of Mexico and Peru (Crespo 2006, p. 140). All these trips were supported by the DDC and helped to create a “specific budget allocation” for the dissemination of musical groups from 1964 onwards (Crespo 2006, 138–139).

Publicity abroad is a reason for a lot of consideration when it comes to choosing the artists to be contemplated. According to Flávia Crespo, who researched the Itamaraty's cultural activity between 1946 and 1964, hiring artists was directly related to the diplomats' personal preferences (Crespo 2006: 82). The author exemplifies when citing the criticism made by José Meira Pena who took over the head of the Cultural Division in 1956, choosing the film “Rio 40 degrees” to be shown at a festival in Czechoslovakia in 1959 (Crespo 2006, p. 101). The absence of standardization may have contributed to Ribeiro's (2011, p. 121) assertion that the diversity of Brazilian culture was “rarely” presented abroad. This, until the 60s, was more represented by more “elite” names such as members of the Brazilian Academy of Letters and opera singers (Ribeiro 2011). This change in the profile of contracted musicians is the subject of the following question:

What are the rhythms and melodies that make up the official repertoire of the country abroad? How to define the scores of national identity¹⁸? (...) Can we discern an “evolutionary line” in the musical policy of the Itamaraty, which would go from opera at the end of the 19th century – and from the underlying image of a European and “civilized” Brazil according to the criteria of the time, to the rediscovery of Afro-Brazilian popular music and the promotion of a multicultural Brazil? (Fléchet 2011: 229–245)

Fléchet points out that this change that began in the 1960s is a consequence of the “*commercial success achieved by Brazilian popular music in European and American countries*,” and not as a pure intention of the Itamaraty to promote national music (Fléchet 2011, p. 250). This success, which should be seen as “*a means to attract foreign investment and develop international tourism to Brazil*,” is inserted in the context of the Independent Foreign Policy inaugurated in 1961, under the administration of President Jânio Quadros (Cervo and Bueno¹⁹ in: Fléchet 2011, 252).

¹⁸ Darré, Alain. *Musique et politique. Les répertoires de l'identité*. Rennes: PUR, 1996: 163.

¹⁹ Cervo, A.; Bueno (2002), C. *História da política exterior do Brasil*. Brasília: UNB.

25.4 Conclusion

The Soft Power measure generates controversy. In the assessment of Toscano (2017, p. 29), the use of such a concept “allows the observation of the “abstract” or immeasurable power of a State in the international scenario.” Measuring the exercise of Soft Power through Music Diffusion sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil is a challenging task. The aforementioned research on the Year of Brazil in France, in 2005, managed to measure the influence of Brazilian Soft Power through the quantification of French tourists who visited Brazil, and the execution of courses on Brazilian culture that were held in French universities, among other actions and numbers. These facts show the consequence of Brazilian cultural diplomacy that aimed, through culture, to stimulate trade and improve international understanding of Brazil.

It is worth remembering that culture was considered the third pillar of foreign policy by the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Willy Brandt, and the fourth paradigm of International Relations by Marcel Merle²⁰ (2011, pp. 51–54). In the 1940s, Carmem Miranda was one of the ambassadors of Brazilian culture and her figure helped to consolidate an understanding of the country that in part lasts to this day. In the 1960s, Bossa Nova managed to show the world a type of music that put Brazil on par with jazz and that helped to overcome the “mutt complex,” an expression by Nelson Rodrigues that describes “an inferiority that Brazilians put themselves voluntarily²¹” that they would not be involved only in sports, but in the whole of society. The playwright coined this expression on the eve of the 1958 FIFA World Cup Sweden, to refer to the feeling provoked by Brazil’s defeat in the 1950 World Cup final and which, in Rodrigues’ opinion, helped to define Brazilian society. Cultural diplomacy, by promoting Brazilian art internationally, tries to collaborate to overcome this “complex.”

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²⁰ Marcel, M (1985). “Forces et enjeux dans les relations internationales”. Paris: Ed. Econômica. Rodrigues, Nelson. À sombra das chuteiras imortais. São Paulo: Cia. das Letras, pp. 51–52.

²¹ Rodrigues, Nelson. À sombra das chuteiras imortais. São Paulo: Cia. das Letras, pp. 51–52: Complexo de vira-latas.

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Chapter 26

Collective Memory of Public Space: A Path for Preservation Through Affective Appropriation



Cesar Bargo Perez

Abstract The city is seen through the prism of its potential effect on human narratives. A humanist view of affective memory integration in a territory in order to generate momentum and promote heritage preservation. Culture as the axis for the breaking of the paradigm of deterioration of urban areas. A visit to semiological methods of equity valuation.

Keywords Affective memory · Preservation · Heritage · Belonging

A scent in the air in a gray, typical working-class city sky, a peanut salesman calling out his sales while pushing his cart down the street, birds chirping on the seemingly century-old tree of the little town square, a glow of light on the wet cobblestone of any given morning. The affective memory of a neighborhood where we spend our childhood is linked to a set of sensory stimuli that are not classifiable, nor at least governed, according to a defined and replicable Cartesian logic. A simple walking tour of an urban stretch, a public space that served as the setting for a given moment in your life, can mean resuming feelings of emotional appeal with every focus of the eye.

This allusion to the memory that each citizen has of the space-scenario of his existence in the city evokes a psychological function of semiotic nature that arises in the common environment of the public space, in the constructions and its unity and, at the same time, in the set of relations built to each new building that is erected in place of another that has not resisted the change of the surrounding grounds. Side by side, buildings of different ages, styles and conservation status coexist, keeping in themselves their individual heritage history and their participation in the surroundings. In

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short, each street, corner, square or even wasteland lives in the passage of a single counting time, different from that which is maintained in the anxious expectations of modern man, a series of transformations of territory that, were not the sensory elements attributable and individualized to each inhabitant and user of space, one could not experience the continuum that memory achieves in this stage of our urban existence.

The understanding of the relationship that is built between the buildings of an urban architectonic set is a challenge that must be approached from several fronts and, preferably, by several professionals who focus on the city and its almost organic pulsation in the interactions with the inhabitants who nourish themselves from its force while simultaneously providing the drive to this aforementioned continuous movement of displacement and territorial transformation.

The inter- and transdisciplinarity that is expected from the current moment of Academic Research finds in the study of urban space and its relationships one of the greatest pieces of evidence of its need as a scientific approach. The city is, in fact, a possible and desired object of historians, anthropologists, social workers, psychologists, geographers, administrators, among many other agents of transformation and study. In this text, and from the perspective proposed for its elaboration, it is up to one of these professionals, however, from the endorsement given by the origin of his academic training, the task of thinking about the space and giving voice to its user: the architect and urban planner. This professional of humanistic basis and an exact-looking bias in his interventions is responsible for several projects of preservation of human relations that take place from the building and the common space. Images and stories. His role as thinker of urban space is mentioned by the late architect Jorge Caron (1995 apud Ruggiero 2006, p. 7):

The architect is a man living the culture of his time and of his city, place of thought. Sullivan is Chicago that grows and renews itself in a framework of romantic democracy. Le Corbusier is the Cartesian Paris, illuminated by industry and war. In the post-war period, in the lyrism of the promises of peace, he expresses Ronchamps. Each city, in turn, establishes in the broad framework of a nation's culture a proper way of expressing itself. We recognize the origin by the singing sound of the speech and the structure of its expression. And the architect expresses himself in this urban accent, however universal and abstract his means are, still sensitive to the subtle changes of that accent.

The task begins by reading the relationships that have been established between the elements of a region of analysis, a neighborhood, or even a specific street. There lies the emotional data that underpin the history of the place. The guardians of this information can be passers-by, who continuously circulate around the place, an elder who has lived there for more than 50 years, or even a child who, unaware of the stories of the buildings, establishes with them a new relationship that will generate, in the future, the same type of emotional rapport common and present in adults who have been there and who have experienced a rupture in their relationship with that space when they leave the place. Attention to the details of these oral narratives can and should generate elements that support interventions and possible adjustments in Master Plans that dealing with the movement of territorial change.

26.1 The Voice of the People

In *New Communication*, Winkin mentions the sociologist Erving Goffman, who in his analysis of the social fabric attentive to the need for an open vision to the details of social interrelations:

To limit ourselves to the study of large social formations resembles the old anatomy, which was restricted to larger, well-defined organs, such as the heart, liver, lungs, and stomach, and disdained the numerous tissues, without scientific or unknown names.

However, without the latter, the most obvious organs could never constitute a living organism. Based only on larger social formations, the traditional object of study in social sciences, it would be equally impossible to reconstitute the real life of society as we find it in our daily experience [...].

Whether people entertain themselves and envy each other, whether they exchange cards or dine together [...], the full range of relationships that happen from one person to another, momentary or permanent, conscious or unconscious ephemeral or severely consequential, [...] ceaselessly binds men together.

Interactions are the atoms of society. They found all the hardness and all the elasticity, all the color and all the uniformity of social life, which is so evident to us and yet so mysterious (Winkin and Samain 1998, p. 97 apud Wolff 1950, p. 9–10).

For Goffman, social interactions constitute the plot of a certain level of social order because they are based on rules and norms, just like the great institutions, such as the Family, the State, the Church, etc. These interactions, however, seem so banal, so “natural,” both for the social actors who “play” them and for the observer who studies them, that only some extraordinary, very ritualized cases, such as weddings or burials, usually draw attention. Now, it is in the most everyday encounters that the social challenges are richer in teachings. It is a matter of observing with a differentiated look and with a toolbox of analysis that allows us to see the discourse beyond these ritualized words and social codes.

Alongside the works of *Urban Ecology*, which made the Chicago Department of Sociology famous in the years 1920 and 1936, another tradition was progressively affirmed and subsequently given the name Symbolic Interactionism. This term seeks to synthesize the fundamental idea of a group of American thinkers, at the same time philosophers, psychologists and sociologists, ahead of whom it is important to pin George Herbert Mead.

Mead, who gave the university a course in *Advanced Social Psychology* in the first quarter of the twentieth century, never wrote a single book. From notes, his most celebrated work was elaborated, published three years after his death: *Mind, self and society*¹ (1934).

George Herbert Mead believed that symbols were the basis of individual identity and social life. In his opinion, individuals only acquired an identity through interaction with other individuals. In doing so, he said, we learn the language of our social lives. Since Mead saw in the symbols the foundation of both private and social

¹ Mead (1967).

life, the theory he developed was called *Symbolic Interactionism*. Although Mead died before baptizing his theory, Herbert Blumer, one of his students created the name. Blumer defines Mead's theory in three main concepts: Meaning, Language, and Thought. By Meaning, we have the construction of the Social Meaning. The human being naturally attributes meaning to people and things. Our social behavior is a direct relationship of the assigned meanings. Language is the source of meaning. The meaning emerges from the social interaction and language used. Meanings arise from people, not objects. The ritualization of the word, as Foucault states, is built on the effectiveness of narrative orality. The repetition of stories, their polishing and evolution far beyond the universe of those who tell them ends up immortalizing creator and creation. In a participatory mimicry, the listener identifies with what he hears, and in his turn to pass on the story incorporates in it his own personal history. Daniel Wallace, author of the romance *Big fish: a novel of mythic proportions* and the screenplay for the homonymous film *Big Fish* (Burton, 2003), expresses such immortalizing characteristic of the narrative repetition: "A man tells his stories so many times that he becomes the stories. They live on after him, and in that way he becomes immortal."

Roland Barthes, in *Mythologies*, states that *myth is a type of speech*. Barthes understands (1982, p. 132), however, that is a generalization: "Of course, it's not just any sort of speech. Special conditions are required for language to become a myth. But what one must solidly establish from the very beginning is that the myth is a communication system, it is a message".

In a narrative discourse, we can easily evidence that the individual is part of a historical-based approach, marked by the documentary reality that is recorded in the media and corroborated by other witnesses of history for a personal discourse, where the individual acts as a protagonist of his reality. In this idealized construction, with a revisionist perspective, *the imaginary of tradition*,

is permeated by discourses, closely linked to each other, which value this or that particular aspect of return to basics: *nature, purity, responsibility*. [...]

Purity is given as the cause and end of a search for identity; the individual, like his group, does not cease to seek to know where he comes from and what his state of origin was (Charaudeau and Maingueneau 2012, p. 213).

Listening to the oral narratives of the citizen, reading the signs implicit in his discourse and translating them into the architecture is the initial step of the action of preservation of urban heritage spaces, their history and relevance for future generations.

26.2 The City of Each One of Us

My relationship with the historical city takes place to the extent that I present myself to it with the curiosity of the new user, who wants to know the space he steps in and who is invited to visit it without questioning its original reason for being.

There was a time when restoring historic buildings was associated with assigning them the function of museums. I do not refer to museums as living organisms, promoters of epistemological reflection on related themes with their social function, as a space that generates knowledge through the experimentation of contact with art, with history, with the civilizing essence that makes us pairs. The “museum” in which such buildings is transformed has to do with the simple and poor depository of disconnected artifacts from the history that created them. They are spaces in which what we have left is to walk through empty rooms or rooms occupied by references that fail to involve us in that “preserved” space. I must also mention the cosmetic “restoration,” devoid of any criteria, knowledge, or technique, capable of altering original architectural solutions in favor of an easy esthetic vision, without any link with the history of the building. For example, place a tiled ceramic floor on an old worn-out altar of a secular church, or even remove walls to increase circulation of the site without at least considering the structural or esthetic impacts of the work. Such misrepresented visions of heritage preservation, regardless of the ignorance of their authors, compromise the life of those buildings and confuse new users of these spaces. An ordinary citizen cannot be expected to acknowledge the erratic and incorrect interventions made to a historic building.

The opposite, however, must be emphasized. Some of these buildings have made use of circumstantial materials, which unsuspecting to the eye may seem inadequate. The Cesáreo Bastos College Building, in the city of Santos, Brazil, dated 1906, used tram steel tracks as structural beams to cover large gaps of interest, such as in the school’s amphitheater. The opportunity to use available materials, since the college is contemporary of the implementation of tram lines, adds to the history of the building and should be made explicit to the visitor’s and user’s eyes. The common citizen is a being who is avid for interaction, even if that happens without him realizing, simply due to a lack of stimulus and disinterest toward his common environment. I cannot help but feel sorry when remembering mobile technology and mobile phones as items that increasingly steal the citizen’s gaze and attention to their urban surroundings.

26.3 A Semiotic Proposal

A possible path for the characterization of urban space as a potential for preservation can undergo a semiotic reading of its relations with the user of this space. The starting point is the creation of criteria for the assessment of the stage of life of the building and its interrelation with the neighboring buildings that make up the architectural ensemble that one wants to assess. An example of this would be the creation of the following application criteria from cross-data with the visual evaluation of the property (Chart 26.1). The assessment, conducted based on the attribution of a chromatic scale to the different levels of each criterion (Chart 26.2), generates in its preparation points of attraction that facilitate the implementation of policies and actions of public power intervention on the area of interest.

SENSITIVE ASSESSMENT IN SEMIOTIC READING	
1. Proper use	a. Coherent Implantation
	b. Incoherent Implantation
2. Improper Use	a. Reversible
	b. Irreversible

Chart 26.1 Proposal of a sensitive criterion for semiotic assessment. *Source* Perez (1985, p. 11)

LIFE CONDITION OF BUILDINGS	
	Space of aggression 2 – individual aggression
	Space of aggression 1 – Ensemble aggression
	Disinterest
	Degree 1 – less relevance and/or in ruins
	Degree 2 – closed interest– building on its own / small expression
	Degree 3 – relevant building / open interest – building in the ensemble
	Degree 4 – great heritage potential / bad conservation conditions
	Degree 5 – great heritage potential / good conservation conditions

Chart 26.2 Color patterns for a proposal of sensitive criterion of semiotic assessment. *Source* Perez (1985, p. 14)

The work of collecting territorial data of the properties of an ensemble under analysis should consider the relationship of one property with the other. A property in a state of proper use surrounded by properties with advanced state of decay and abandonment implies a lower classification for the first property. With a mapping indicative of these potentialities, the reading validation is given, adding to the data an anthropological approach with the visit and subsequent testimonial statements on the history of those who inhabit the place.

The collection of such testimonial statements, plus an analysis of the preferential land use and its adequacy to the current Master Plan for the area, provides sufficient data for the decision to intervene in the area directly, either with possible changes in the road system or with changes in law, code of works, which may restrict actions

considered derogatory of the architectural ensemble or, further, through incentives for owners, exemptions or benefits, that encourage them to preserve or even restore their property.

The resulting intervention from the surveys, analyses and development of proposals can use road redesign as part of the valorization of public space. In the case illustrated in Fig. 26.1, the buildings of the Cesáreo Bastos College, dated 1906, in front of Almeida Restaurant, a building of the late 1920s, plus the building of the Collective Transport Company of Santos—*Companhia Santista de Transportes Coletivos* (CSTC) (outside the image), are highlighted from a layout that values the pedestrian, who transits through the public space interacting with the landscape (Fig. 26.2); which becomes free from the restraining walls and the confusing street light wiring, with a profusion of poles, plates and a series of visual noises imposed to the individual's communication with his surroundings.



Fig. 26.1 Detail of Vila Matias region with color representation for the buildings. *Source* Perez (1985, p. 18)




Fig. 26.2 Vila Matias, Santos. Proposal of urbanistic intervention. *Source* Perez (1985, p. 26)



Fig. 26.3 Santos Central Area in detail over the Map of Insular Santos

26.4 Intervention with Preservationist Perspective

Certain Master Plans try to prevent the development of heavy trades in regions that were once residential. Urban centers, in general, are examples of this change. The reversibility of land use for these regions, seen in the face of the current moment of the city, may not be the viable path, mainly because the characteristic of these urban centers was that of a differentiated social class residence, with traces of socioeconomic status that in no way resembles the aspect of current use. In short, it would be naïve to want to go back to the past in terms of use.

Nothing prevents, however, that new use be attributed, considering the potential and relationships of the inhabitant with this “new” space, more as a common space, of social interest, than as a private space, of specific function. When I mention private space, I speak of residences, but also of the usual attribution of the building to the function of service to the general public, which, if on one hand receives a use that preserves the potential for usefulness of the building, on the other hand generates a distance from an occupation relationship that values its architectural characteristics.

In the 2000s, the city of Santos proposed the Alegria Centro project, still in force, which aims at “promoting urban interventions in the area of coverage interest with the purpose of improving the urban landscape” (Fig. 26.3).² Through tax incentives for homeowners who are willing to revitalize their properties, the idea is to rescue the sustainable use of this historic housing ensemble, promoting the attractiveness of the central region for the ordinary citizen.

The key to the process of historic heritage resignification of these centers lies on the evocation of popular participation. A voluntary participation involves the desire to recognize its history in common places. The collective generating new stories.

The city of Belém, in the state of Pará, brings another example of the Public Power intervening in the resignification of a deteriorated space in the port region. This is Estação das Docas. Inaugurated in 2000, the old river port in Belém gave way to a tourist complex that is a national reference, offering in one place options

² Alegria Centro Project. Available at: <http://www.portal.santos.sp.gov.br/alegra/obj.htm>. Accessed on: March 15, 2016.

of gastronomy, fashion, leisure and events, with comfort and safety. Located on the edge of Guajará bay, 500 m long facing the waterfront comprise three warehouses, distributed in 32 thousand square meters, and a terminal for boarding and disembarking passengers. Warehouse 1, named Boulevard of Arts, offers various products such as bio-jewelry, clothing and regional crafts. Warehouse 2, named Boulevard of Gastronomy. And Warehouse 3, Boulevard of Fairs and Exhibitions. In addition, the tourist complex has the Maria Sylvia Nunes Theater and the São Pedro Nolasaco Amphitheater.³ Culture and leisure together have created a point of popular attraction that, in just over 15 years, contributed to the revitalization of a rapidly deteriorating urban central area, bequeathed to prostitution, drug use and resulting criminality.

26.5 Spoliation and Urban Voids

To say that such central urban spaces are not occupied by citizens is not true. It is necessary to understand that the center, when relegated to the condition of old area without urban interest outside business hours, ends up sheltering those residents who, also relegated to a condition of social inferiority, vulnerable, either by economic condition or by the absence of elements that structure their life history, end up finding in more impoverished areas a scenario for his own outcast and spoliated existence. Waste pickers for recycling, families in conditions of underemployment, a whole trade linked to prostitution, inhabitants in temporary conditions that do not contribute to the space they inhabit, do not develop in this space any perennial history of life, regardless of any hope that may be present in their oral discourses.

Rescuing the citizenship status of this resident of the urban center involves rescuing not only this downtown area, its buildings, common spaces, but also meeting the needs of valorization of this individual, incorporating to the proposed change, the resignification of the place where he lives. The mere heritage restoration, although attractive in the eyes of the casual visitor, incurs a real risk of gentrification, a phenomenon that affects a space of the city when changing the dynamics of the relations that make up the place. The valorization of those areas invariably affects the low-income local population. There is an increase in the costs of goods and services and the resulting gradual expulsion of former residents, who now have insufficient income for maintenance on site.

³ Official Website of Estação das Docas. Available on: <http://www.estacaodasdocas.com.br/>. Accessed on: March 15, 2016.

26.6 History and Hidden Patterns

The center of modern cities throughout the twentieth century was becoming increasingly an unattractive area for residential occupation. The aging of properties, which went from high-level residence to rented sites, to commerce, contributed to its deterioration. Irregular occupation affects the maintenance of these spaces, mainly because the property value of these areas is more present in its collective than it is in the building individually.

When a building or a house in a group of edifications of interest is put down, the whole assembly suffers. The tooth missing from this once beautiful denture becomes a harbinger of the loss of more teeth. The action of public authorities only has an effect when considering the whole, its preservation by the proper use, in a partnership with the citizen, both the direct resident of the place and the citizen who should be attracted to use the public equipment of that area of interest, be proud of such piece of equipment and the city, to preserve their history and create new stories in their daily lives.

26.7 Public Power (Action Versus Omission)

The existence of a city Master Plan reflects the initial concern with the paths of urban development, the definition of residential areas, mixed areas and industrial areas suggests that municipal planning teams have a certain understanding about how to encourage certain occupations and restrict others. The definition of construction standards and rules or even the height limit of buildings in certain areas of the city do not guarantee, however, as they are normally measures filled with bureaucracy and technical tricks, that spaces for conviviality and shared common outdoors life activities remain as planned. The human element, the citizen who makes use of these spaces, is the link that reverses the condition of opening a society to the collective space. The appropriation of these spaces as their own directly preserves them against vandalism and against forgetfulness. The vandalism itself, the spray writing on walls and buildings by groups that assume public space is a canvas for the expression of social discontent, is the result of the failure from public authorities to socialize such public spaces, in order to characterize the city and its spaces as the common good of all.

26.8 The Colombian Example

Until very recently, Colombia and its two main cities, Medellín and Bogotá, had their names associated with impressive bad records, with very high crime levels—381 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Those numbers were driven in part by the

power of drug trafficking and partly by a state inoperability to take on a more proactive role in the city. Out of fear, instigated by militias and armed groups, the residents hid, remaining caged at home, behind walls and closed for social life. The urban design itself that follows this process refers to a city without the collective, without contact in common spaces, a cold and frightened city.

After 1995, supported by a federal action to combat drug trafficking, the govern of these two cities went to a paradigmatic change in coping with this uncontrolled situation that, in just over eight years, would bring Bogotá to the condition of reference in terms of urban planning and intervention of public power in the city's relations.

A string of good public administrators literally saved these two cities from the purgatory they were in. Murilo Cavalcanti, a scholar interested in public policy to combat urban violence, comments that "two tools were enough to radically change these two cities: political decision and good public management" (Cavalcanti 2013, p. 13). The success of the urban intervention action is evidenced by the fall in homicide numbers to 22 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2011. By the way, the Brazilian average for the very same period.⁴

A representative indicator of the vision undertaken in the breaking process of the paradigm of violence and descale that beset Bogotá was the coming to power of a university professor, the mathematician and philosopher Antanas Mockus, who, under the concept of citizen security, initiated the urban revolution. Added to this role is the performance of sociologist Hugo Acero, in the Sub-Secretariat of Security of the City of Bogotá.

A team of notables focus on the collective and a plan. It was not about inventing miraculous or expensive plans. Intelligent urban solutions, such as those made of the city of Curitiba, capital city of the state of Paraná, a reference in urban mobility, were encamped by this multidisciplinary team that believed that the citizen should not turn his back on the city, to the common spaces.

The secret also went through the investment in Culture. How can one make, then, a frightened population go out of their homes to visit a Library, or a Cultural Center? What attraction a public equipment as connected to the cultural issue as a library could exert on the ordinary citizen? The answer came from architecture. Cultural spaces were created with quality and innovation in style and architectural lines, in an investment to make them become decentralized poles of attraction. There was a reversal of priorities, which placed investment in the most deprived regions of the city.

⁴ Department of Public Security. Available on: http://www.ssp.sp.gov.br/acoes/acoes_taxa-homicidios.aspx. Accessed on: March 15, 2016.

26.9 And What We Have Left

The citizen, recognizing the public equipment, its relevance and usefulness as a cultural pole, place for meeting and effective discussion of the directions of the city, the region, and the country, adopted these buildings as bastions of their hope for better days. In just over a decade, the paradigm of violence and exclusion has been broken. It is not, of course, a panacea without contraindication. Replicated in several cities in the country, Medellín being the most successful case, the change of management paradigm still depends heavily on governors that show boldness and commitment to the common good. There are also major issues of a political nature and levels of investment.

Here, I can only focus on the effective use of a formula that functions as a social medicine to the issues of exclusion, violence and decay of urban centers by inappropriate use and abandonment. The doses of this remedy depend heavily on the degree of development and popular support for the correct actions of the public manager. We know that years of political alienation and manipulation of the image of traditional politicians, with their short leash and populist approaches, both in Colombia and in Brazil, make the path arduous and the challenge quite dismaying. There are, however, ways to rewrite the history of the treatment given to the issue and provide the citizen with a stage for his existence that generates perennial and instilling sensitive memories of a sense of belonging to the city.

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Chapter 27

Soft Power, Global Governance and the International Role of Brazilian Youth Against the Climate Crisis



Patricia Silva Zanella 

Abstract This chapter aims to discuss the movements of Brazilian youth to face the climate crisis and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at national and international level, based on the soft power and global governance, putting globalization into perspective, the context of the Global South, the barriers faced by Brazilian youth and the impacts of the environmental dismantling that took place in Brazil during the years of the Bolsonaro government (2018–2022). The analysis focuses on how youth organizations and mobilizations are gaining prominence in the mainstream media and implementing communication tools, such as social networks to guide decision-making, influence organizations, companies and governments and, above all, act on the international stage in international UN conferences such as the Conference of the Parties (COP). This chapter is not intended to make a scientific assessment of the climate emergency we are experiencing, but to focus on the social and political role that Brazilian youth are playing in raising awareness about the climate crisis and with national and international pressure from governments, companies and institutions.

Keywords Brazilian youth · Climate crisis · Globalization · International climate agenda · Youth organizations

27.1 Introduction

Globalization has brought about many changes in economics, politics, and the environment, and the challenges of sustainable development have been one of the most pressing issues of our time. Bauman's perspective (2001) shows how globalization has unequal effects on societies, creating a new form of social exclusion. However,

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youth leaders have been an important force in promoting climate change and justice. This study addresses the international role of Brazilian youth in advancing the Sustainable Development Goals, with a focus on climate justice.

Soft power, a term coined by Nye (2005), consists of the power, which considers the importance of policies aimed at increasing economic exchanges and cultural dissemination, as it understands that currently, it is not possible to restrict oneself to the known hard power that represents the tangible power, as the military power. In the context of sustainable development, soft power can be seen as a way for countries to lead by example and encourage others to adopt sustainable practices and policies.

This study aligned soft power with global governance mechanisms as a strategy to coordinate efforts, ensure accountability and enforce compliance, once the soft power alone is not effective enough to solve the complex challenges posed by environmental problems such as climate change because the actions of one state are continuously affecting the others on the environmental science.

The young generation of the Global South faces significant challenges in advancing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). They often experience social exclusion, poverty, lack of education and political representation. These challenges are compounded by the adverse effects of climate change, which disproportionately affect Southern communities. In this context, leaders in Europe and the Global North must recognize the importance of listening to the voices and experiences of indigenous youth and activists from the South. Young activists from the Global South are able and willing to provide insights and solutions to the challenges they face, including strategies to mitigate the effects of climate change and promote sustainable development.

Brazilian youth is organizing itself to occupy more decision-making spaces in a different way, since it has become clear that it is not enough to be in spaces being represented by European leaders, as we saw with the rise of Greta Thunberg in 2018, the Scottish which intensified the reach of the climate crisis to the mainstream media and youth with its global movement Fridays for Future, of strikes on Fridays that took on a worldwide proportion, as a wave of historic world activism.

However, something symptomatic happened, in practice, Brazilian, black and indigenous activists, leaders of their communities began to be referred to by the media as Brazilian “Gretas”. For those who are on the front line, acting in the climate crisis, this creates a nuisance, because many activists were acting even before Greta’s rise and fame, which began to erase history and the local Brazilian struggle as if we had mattered a fight that, in fact, is ours historically and that the Brazilian people are among the most affected.

According to Professor Dr. Benjamin F. Chavis Jr., the discrepancy in the situation that racial and ethnic communities experience in relation to the environment can be related as the institutionalization of racism, naming it “environmental racism”,¹ identifying as the historical matter of racial justice and the need to claim spaces.

In fact, the peripheral communities, indigenous peoples, black women and children, are the ones that pay the most for the climate crisis, being the first directly

¹ Chavis (1987).

affected by disasters, landslides, rains and floods, even though they are the people who contribute least to the cause. That is why this chapter was written, due to the need to shed light on the climate movements of Brazilian youth and how they are acting to see more black, indigenous, quilombola and peripheral people acting in the climate debate.

Therefore, this study aims to bring together practice and theory, as a game of cause and effect in which one is able to explain or show the gaps of the other, with a view to empirical participation in climate movements, the analysis of the repercussions that these movements are causing in the national and international media and Zygmunt Bauman's theoretical view of postmodernism, presented in "liquid modernity" to clarify the society that we are inserted in the context of globalization, in addition to "in search of politics" to discuss the relationship between liquid society and politics and the dialogues "on education and youth" which presents the role of young people for adults and the current system we are part of.

27.2 Youth and the Climate Crisis

The current global context is marked by the process of globalization, which generates profound changes in the social, economic and cultural aspects of society. The world is facing a critical environmental crisis, and climate change is at the forefront of this challenge. As the impacts of climate change continue to worsen, the younger generation has emerged as a powerful voice in the fight for environmental justice.

Globalization has had a significant impact on the world, with the spread of technology, ideas and information creating new opportunities for social and economic development. At the same time, globalization has also contributed to environmental degradation, inequality and other global challenges. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)² represent a framework for meeting these challenges, and youth movements have emerged as a driving force in advancing these goals.

In this scenario, youth became an agent of social change, especially in the fight against climate change, with their strikes and mobilizations, which stood out globally. Based on Bauman, I understand youth as a representation of a fluid and dynamic force that can challenge the established order and transform social and political reality. In his book, "In Search of Politics", he points out

There are noble exceptions like Amnesty International or Greenpeace, but on the whole the few idealistic efforts to break through the wall of indifference get at best a signal or superficial support from a few governments (but covert or overt hostility from many others) and virtually no movement. Popular support the attitude they altruistically promote and exemplify.³

Bauman's vision brings us clarity on the level of youth challenges in today's society, particularly in relation to the policy and decision-making spaces that are

² UN (2015).

³ Bauman (2000).

needed to tackle the climate crisis. This even brutal vision of the reality presented, shows us in theory how to understand what happens in practice, because, with the same speed that the movement manages to occupy the world in a few weeks, it is as if we were going back to square one.

Therefore, while *The Guardian* addressed that during the climate strikes, the youth had responses from the UN, Oxfam International, and education ministers, thus the objective of giving visibility to the agenda and listening to youth, began to be achieved, now the challenge is to transform this into real actions to stop the climate crisis.⁴

The concept of liquid modernity emphasizes the fluidity and unpredictability of contemporary society,⁵ and the young generation represents a force that is not tied to traditional structures and institutions and that can challenge the established order. In this sense, this analysis understands youth as a dynamic and transformative force that can drive social and political changes. The role of youth has become relevant to the current climate crisis, as it emphasizes the need for transformative action and challenge to the established order. Many young people are taking up climate activism, demanding that society take urgent action to address the environmental crisis. Their activism is driven by a sense of urgency and the belief that the current order is unsustainable and must be transformed.⁶

In this study, young people between 15 and 29 years old are considered as youths, according to the research methodology used in the Youth 2030 of Latin America and the Caribbean carried out by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)⁷ to develop cooperation to advance the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the region. Aiming to understand the international role of youth in advancing the SDGs with a focus on climate justice, we will also discuss the challenges faced by the young generation from the Global South and how leaders from the Global North/Europe can learn from and collaborate with young activists in Brazil.

The “Greta” movement, as some approach the phenomenon of youth acting for the climate struggle, eurocentricizes the theme and devalues the ancestral struggle of the youth of the Global South, led in Brazil for decades by revolutionary youth, who grew up having great leaders as examples who started young people as environmental

⁴ Carrington (2019).

⁵ Bauman (2001).

⁶ Monteiro et al. (2021).

⁷ UNFPA (2023).

activists and internationally recognized leaders such as Marina Silva⁸ and Ailton Krenak.⁹

In any case, it is undeniable that globalization and technology have enabled young people to reach surprising levels of organization at the political level. Through strikes, initiated by Greta in 2018 against climate change, youth have gained strength in the fight for environmental justice. Her activism has taken many forms, from participating in protests and marches to advocating for political change and engaging on social media. Youth have been particularly influential in raising awareness of the impacts of climate change and challenging the established order that has failed to adequately deal with the crisis.

The youth strike against climate change has been a global phenomenon, with young people around the world demanding that action be taken to address the environmental crisis. One of the most significant examples of Fridays for Future activism was the mobilization for the Global Climate Strike, which took place in September 2019 and mobilized 7.6 million young people around the world.¹⁰ This strike demonstrated the power and influence of youth coming together to demand social and political change.

27.3 The Challenges of Brazilian Youth in the Fight Against the Climate Crisis

Brazil plays an extremely important role in the fight against the climate crisis, due to “the importance of the Amazon for maintaining the world’s climate and the environmental problems played out in the biomes, such as fires and deforestation”.¹¹ Brazil has a continental dimension full of biodiversity, which “results in 23% of the world’s freshwater fish, 16% of the planet’s birds, 12% of mammals and 15% of all species of animals and plants”,¹² placing Brazil as a central country in the discussion, in addition to the Brazilian role in the historical context of international conferences, for having hosted Eco +92 and Rio +20.

The growth of the international role of Brazilian youth in the climate struggle in Brazil is led by Engajamundo, due to its performance since 2012 in the international spaces of the United Nations (UN).¹³ Other organizations that have played relevant

⁸ Marina Silva, was elected state deputy at the age of 32 and the youngest senator elected in Brazil (36 years), received the Champions of the Earth award from the United Nations (2007), was Minister of the Environment in Brazil (2003–2008), founded the REDE Sustentabilidade party (2013) and is currently Minister of the Environment and Climate Change (2023).

⁹ Ailton Krenak (2020) adapted two lectures and an interview held in Portugal between 2017 and 2019 for the book “Ideas para postponing the end of the world”, a Brazilian bestseller that shows the urgency of listening and fighting for indigenous rights.

¹⁰ 350.org Team (2019).

¹¹ UNICEF (2022).

¹² BBC (2018).

¹³ Engajamundo (2012).

roles in the global protagonism of Brazilian youth since 2010 and I am honored to be part of history is Instituto Limpa Brasil,¹⁴ representing the international movement of the Let's Do It Foundation¹⁵ and Instituto Ecosurf, founded in 2000, partner of the All at Once initiative¹⁶ in 2017 and 2019, officially institutional partner of the UN Clean Seas Beach Cleaning methodology.¹⁷

Being part of the Ecosurf Institute led me to be the first woman in South America to be part of the Youth Advisory Council of the World Oceans Day in 2018, when I was studying for a masters in International Law and also worked in the organization of the World Economic Forum on Latin America, which took place in São Paulo/SP. As previously mentioned, this chapter navigates between the practical and theoretical issues of youth activism and the episode of São Paulo hosting the regional economic forum in the same year that Brasilia hosted the 8th World Water Forum, warmed up youth to participate more in international spaces and I was able to closely follow these movements.

It is important to highlight these initiatives because when Greta Thunberg's movement, Fridays for Future, emerges, Brazilian youth manages to organize themselves around a proposal that has a clear call to action, which are strikes on Fridays and facilitate mobilization along the way, around the country, in view of the climate agenda, at a time when young people are engaging in different groups to act for the environment.

That same year, elections took place in Brazil, with the rise of the extreme right and the election of former President Jair Bolsonaro, who gave statements to the media denying science during his term, as well as acting to intensify the climate crisis with the dismantling of Brazilian environmental departments,¹⁸ with budget cuts, layoffs and lack of assistance for indigenous communities, including during the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in the deaths of more than 700,000 Brazilians,¹⁹ scandals such as one of the employees of the National Foundation of Indigenous Peoples (FUNAI) being arrested for selling indigenous lands and embezzlement and receiving support from the President of the body after arrest.²⁰ Four years of horror for any environmental activist who has lived or been to Brazil because it was the period in which the country became the country that most killed environmental activists and community leaders in the last decade.²¹

¹⁴ Instituto Limpa Brasil (2010).

¹⁵ Let's do it Foundation (2011).

¹⁶ All at Once (2008).

¹⁷ UNIC Rio de Janeiro (2018).

¹⁸ Scantimburgo (2020).

¹⁹ CNN (2021).

²⁰ Carta Capital (2022).

²¹ Correio Braziliense (2022).

The climate crisis affects the peripheries more,²² with rains that cause floods, landslides, leaving people injured, who lose all their belongings and who have been submerged in the lack of policies for the climate crisis in the last four years. Indigenous communities, who are the true protectors of the forest, have suffered from helplessness during COVID-19 and illegal miners approaching to infect people and illegally occupy land.

Through the practical and theoretical study of the agenda, I will discuss the performance of Brazilian youth, on four specific fronts to address these challenges: climate movements, advocacy, political parties and international conferences, thus seeking to face these four years with a president in power who did not act on environmental disasters and allowed the increase in deforestation with impunity, taking the country to the extreme in several regions during COVID-19 with scientific denialism and exempting itself from responsibility in the midst of environmental disasters and the lack of budget for cities to act in cases of flooding. Thus, the victory of President Lula and the return of Marina Silva as Minister of the Environment and Climate Change, a change in the name of the ministry that points to the government's responsibility for the climate crisis, demonstrates the possible return of the country as a defender of the cause environmental.

However, changing the president will not be enough for the Brazilian youth to act and seek improvements, because our fight is for survival. During the carnival of 2023, the Brazil faced the environmental disaster on the North Coast of the State of São Paulo, which affected over 4000 people who are displaced, and which could have been avoided,²³ either by the notification of the rain that was not unexpected to empty the place or by actually more effective housing policies.

Another serious fact in the face of this situation was the issue of the low volume of resources for environmental disasters, more precisely R\$25,000 provided by the Bolsonaro government (around U\$5000), which has been denounced by parliamentarians from REDE Sustentabilidade since November 2022 in Brazil, in addition to de in the country, there is already a survey of 14 thousand points of very high risk of landslides, with approximately 4 million people who live in risk regions already mapped by the government.²⁴

The increase in access to the Internet and information reaching the mainstream media can support the raise of awareness among young people who are organizing themselves to change this scenario, but it takes collaboration with governments, institutions, and decision-makers to obtain effective results. This is part of the struggle of Brazilian youth against the climate crisis, a struggle for survival, especially for the majority of youth living in risk areas.

²² Metropolis (2022).

²³ Granchi (2023) and USP Journal (2023).

²⁴ Carta Capital (2023).

27.4 Climate Movements in Brazil

In Brazil, there are a number of climate movements that stand out, such as the movement of people affected by dams (MAB), the landless rural workers movement (MST) and the association of indigenous peoples of Brazil (APIB). These movements have been working to promote climate justice and human rights even before the climate crisis was so publicized. Among the achievements, we can mention the creation of indigenous reserves, the fight against the destruction of tropical forests, access to food free of pesticides, agroforests and safeguarded for families protected by rains resulting from the environmental crisis.

Among the youth climate movements, the NGO Engajamundo, the NGO Youth Climate Leaders²⁵ and the Fridays for Future Brasil²⁶ are working on climate education, mobilization and the international role of Brazilian youth in the climate struggle, with participation in the Conferences of the Parties and engagement campaigns so that the message reaches as many people as possible.

27.5 Advocacy

In addition to producing content on social networks, climate activists are mobilizing to exert pressure through online petitions, popular actions and actively participating in popular law initiatives, a legal instrument in Brazil that allows presenting laws to the National Congress coming from the civil society, an example is the Amazônia de Pé Popular Law Initiative, whose mobilization coordinator is the young activist Karina Penha and has more than 134,000 signatures.²⁷

A case that had national repercussions during the Bolsonaro government was the popular action against the government for “climate pedaling” in which six young people went to court to denounce the actions of the Bolsonaro government to undermine the fight against global warming, with the support of eight former environment ministers.²⁸

Other coordinated youth actions included denouncing the positions of the Minister of the Environment Ricardo Salles (2019–2021) with actions on social networks using the hashtag #ForaSalles, arguing for the departure of the minister appointed by former President Jair Bolsonaro, mainly after the government meeting disclosed in which the minister claimed to use the moment of COVID-19 to “pass the cattle”.²⁹ He asked for his resignation from office and was the target of a criminal investigation for allegedly illegally acting in favor of loggers.³⁰

²⁵ Youth Climate Leaders (2018).

²⁶ Fridays for Future Brasil (2018).

²⁷ Amazônia de Pé (2022).

²⁸ G1 (2021).

²⁹ G1 (2020).

³⁰ BBC (2021).

Even if in most cases, youth do not see immediate results from their actions, it is relevant to identify that in a moment of disinformation, lack of interest in politics by a large part of the population, there is a youth studying, developing, claiming and willing to question those who threaten their future and that of future generations.

27.6 Political Parties

Youth engaged in the climate crisis are also organized in partisan political movements, i.e., movements of political parties. Mainly, with the rise of the agenda, in which more parties began to position themselves and open spaces for youth willing to dialogue about sustainable development, ecosocialism, progressive sustainability, among other aspects.

I emphasize that the current Minister of the Environment and Climate Change, Marina Silva, founded her political party in 2015,³¹ which is relevant for Brazilian youth, since the emergence of REDE Sustentabilidade creates, at the statutory level, a political party in the country with the obligation to have young people in decision-making spaces of the party, from the presidency (called “spokesperson”), party coordination and leadership, following the principle of intergenerationality.

At the same time, the rise of ecosocialist movements takes place in the Psol party, with the organization of the Subverta group and candidacies in the form of collective mandates that increase the participation of young people in party political spaces in an innovative way, demonstrating yet another path for youth who want to act on the climate agenda, do it in the party and elective environment.

27.7 International Conferences

The Engajamundo youth climate movement with the aim of actively participating in international spaces became known for its actions during the Conferences of the Parties (COPS):

The group is recognized for its activism actions at COPS, such as the action in Paris, “[...] in 2015, when the group delivered the “face of wood” Award to the then Minister Isabela Teixeira. Our action had repercussions on social networks and in the press when she presented a proposal for illegal deforestation, which already existed in the Brazilian forestry code.”³²

Leaders emerge from the movement, and I want to highlight two women who stood out in the COPs and who have an essential job for Brazilian youth in the fight against the climate crisis. The first is Leader Amanda Costa, a black woman and young climate activist, from Brasilândia, a peripheral neighborhood in the city of

³¹ TSE (2015).

³² Filippe (2021).

São Paulo, Amanda holds a degree in International Relations, founder and executive director of the Sustainable Perifa Institute³³ which aims to democratize the debate on the climate crisis. As a leader, she represents Brazil participating in COPs, she was the UN Youth Ambassador in Brazil and participates in conferences with a clear objective:

“My job is to take young people from the hood to these spaces, I do this with the Sustainable Perifa and other volunteer programs. At COP26 I will reinforce the importance of the presence of black, indigenous, quilombola and peripheral people in climate debates”, says Amanda.³⁴

The second leader is Txaí Suruí, indigenous leader of the Paiter Suruí people, creator of the Indigenous Youth of Rondônia movement and activist who, during the pandemic, was one of the executive producers of the documentary “O Território”³⁵ in partnership with National Geographic, which shows the reality of indigenous peoples who are on the front lines of defending the Amazon.

Txaí was the only Brazilian to speak at COP 26 in Glasgow,³⁶ speaking about indigenous peoples being the front line in the climate emergency and therefore, they must be at the center of decisions at international conferences, because they have the ancestral knowledge to preserve the forests and fight for a future that is the future of the Earth.

These initiatives are not mentioned and happen simultaneously by coincidence, but because they represent the numerous initiatives led by women climate activists who are willing to act on different national and international fronts to guarantee the future we deserve. I say we, because as an activist, affiliated with the same party as Txaí and resident of the same region of São Paulo as Amanda Costa, I am immersed in this group of women willing to change this scenario.

This is the beginning of a chain of leaders who represent the ancestral force necessary for the climate crisis to be fought, with data, evidence, but something much deeper, i.e., knowledge of the territory, community and local leadership, creating a leadership model that deserves to be celebrated and disseminated in international studies to serve as an example.

For this really to happen, it is necessary to build the paths that need knowledge of global governance to be able to be at conferences, in addition to having this effort recognized by national governments, so that it becomes an effective soft power action aligned to the development of a foreign policy that considers the role of youth as relevant, necessary and essential for the construction of global and national solutions.

³³ Instituto Perifa Sustentável (2021).

³⁴ Filippe (2021).

³⁵ National Geographic (2022).

³⁶ Greenpeace (2021) and Instituto Socioambiental (2021).

27.8 Soft Power and Global Governance Analysis

Soft power is based on the concept that a country's culture, values, and policies can be attractive to others, leading them to emulate and adopt these practices. Soft power can be expressed through a variety of means, including media and entertainment, education and exchange programs, and diplomatic and cultural outreach. In the context of the international role of Brazilian youth in the climate struggle, we verify this practice with the participation of youth in international conferences claiming more concrete state practices to prevent the advances of the climate crisis. The Brazilian youth during the climate conferences was able to reach the mainstream media and build recognized organizations and movements, such as Engajamundo, Perifa Sustentável and the Instituto Criola with the articulation to raise funds and participate in international conferences. At the same time, the raise of exchange programs for environmental leaders, such as UPG Sustainability Leaders,³⁷ which Amanda Costa and I, for example, were selected alongside more 5 Brazilians in 2019 and the Brazilian participation every year only increases because we build relevance to guarantee each year spots to Brazilian youth.

Soft power is being a powerful force for promoting global sustainability and addressing environmental challenges because these initiatives are contributing to change the awareness of the society and democratize the access about the environmental issues and the climate crises. The soft power by Nye (2005) shows that by leading by example and promoting sustainable practices and policies, countries can attract and influence others to adopt similar practices. So the youth leadership by organizing themselves and advocating for spaces and changes are able to contribute to pressuring the states to act. However, soft power alone cannot solve the challenges posed by global environmental issues such as climate change. Effective global governance is also needed to coordinate efforts, ensure accountability, and enforce compliance with international agreements and standards.³⁸ This is particularly important in light of the transnational nature of environmental problems, which require cooperation and collaboration among countries and other stakeholders. Despite the potential benefits of global governance, it faces significant challenges. One of these challenges is the lack of effective mechanisms for enforcing international agreements and holding countries accountable for their commitments. Another challenge is the unequal distribution of power and resources among countries, which can lead to conflicts and hinder cooperation on sustainability issues.

To overcome these challenges, it is necessary to promote inclusive and participatory global governance processes that allow for the meaningful participation of all stakeholders, including youth and marginalized communities. It is also important to foster international cooperation and solidarity, particularly among countries from the Global South, which often bear the brunt of environmental problems but have limited influence in global decision-making processes.

³⁷ United People Global (2023).

³⁸ United Nations (2014).

27.9 Conclusion

In conclusion, while soft power can be a powerful tool for advancing sustainability goals, it must be coupled with effective global governance mechanisms prioritizing inclusivity, cooperation and accountability. By working together toward a shared vision of a sustainable and equitable future, countries and stakeholders can make progress toward achieving the SDGs and creating a better world for future generations.

The Brazilian youth leadership builds a new pathway by leading organizations, and movements and increasing the awareness of the society that allowed them to raise funds and be in international spaces. At the same time, this is not a reality for all Global South youth because of the inequality and lack of access that ranges from water in extreme cases to the lack of knowledge of these international opportunities, preventing their participation from actively contributing to the debate, even being what more is being affected by the climate crisis.

This shows that initiatives from vulnerable communities to their own community are essential to overcome these challenges. Because we need to empower communities with funds, opportunities, and public policies for them to be part of the solution, one time that who are really facing the challenge with the tools and structure to overcome them are able to develop a real sustainable solution that will work on their reality. It is an important thought when we only see one Global South youth “in the room” as a representative of some continent or even just one country. Because the complexity of a continent’s struggle cannot be represented by just one young person. Therefore, it is necessary to claim access to these spaces to qualify the debate at an intersectional level, considering gender, race and class inequality to build a decision-making space with a real representation of reality.

In cases such as Brazil, we would need at least one youth of each indigenous community and city to really represent the whole country. Even when it is not possible to be all in the decision-making spaces, it is possible to create the process of listening and guarantee the alternation of power in international spaces, even in youth delegations. And we saw this in Brazilian youth movements that are focused on increasing opportunities based on those pillars.

To increase the soft power of a country, it is necessary for more young people to experience cultural exchanges, participate in international conferences and be able to return to their communities to educate and raise awareness about the existence and dynamics of global governance. So they can turn this into advocacy and political and social change to effectively active soft power.

Based on all this study aligned with activism practice, the international role of Brazilian youth in the fight against the climate crisis is significant, since the challenges faced by young people in the Global South require survival strategies, which include building daily climate movements, being alert to advocate in defense of the environment, gain access to partisan political spaces and participate in international conferences.

Brazilian youth has actively participated in international climate conferences, such as the Conference of the Parties (COP), organized by the United Nations. At these conferences, youth delegations advocate for climate justice and environmental sustainability, sharing their experiences and perspectives with other delegates. At COP 26, we had the indigenous leader Txai Suruí as the only Brazilian to speak on the main stage of the conference, this participation highlights the relevance of youth leadership in climate action and sustainable development.

However, it is clear that even with the protagonism of Brazilian youth, leaders from Europe and the Global North stand out and have more decision-making spaces, therefore, a collective effort is necessary for the youth of the Global North to learn from young people indigenous, peripheral, quilombola and activists from the South.

To change this reality, the youth movements from Brazil need government support, companies sponsorships and international organizations, enabling the increase of Global South participation in global governance with autonomy to think and develop collaborative solutions to the current challenges.

Prioritizing the increase of Global South youth participation in the international rule of climate crises consists of listening to who is suffering and on the front line of affecting by environmental deforestation, species extinction, sea level rise, pollution of air, use of fossils combustive, floods, waste, besides many other issues connected to social income, gender and race.

Climate movements in Brazil and youth participation in international climate conferences demonstrate the relevance of youth leadership in promoting sustainable development. For the construction of a fair and sustainable world, it is essential to recognize the importance of youth protagonism, enabling them to participate in decision-making processes and disseminate their ideas and proposals. Only then can we achieve the SDGs and face the challenges of climate change in a fair and sustainable way.

These movements are able to democratize global governance and open the doors of international awareness about the barriers faced by the youth that is already living with the negative impact of the climate crisis. When the climate crisis may be a distant reality for developed countries are being the daily routine of the Brazilian youth that grow up seeing the destruction and its impact on our lives with the lack of infrastructure to lead with the raise of rains turn cities on floods, turning indigenous communities without food and peripheral communities without sanitation.

Building a safe place to live is just possible when facing a global crisis such as the climate crisis when the efforts are put based on being in a crisis and supporting all of society to be part of the solution. For this we need more than just data, we need to know the reality of who is being affected.

The conclusion of this chapter is that soft power increases opportunities to youth to have access to international spaces and cultures, but to transform this into action against the climate crisis, there is the relevance of global governance that allowed leaders to become actors of structural changes and the youth Brazilian efforts to share their reality on international spaces. The youth Brazilian climate movements are becoming actors in participating in decision-making spaces such as social movements, advocacy procedures, political parties and international conferences.

Thus the international role of the Brazilian youth in the fight of climate crisis is to show the reality of the climate crisis, occupy decision-making spaces and increase the awareness of the society with communication being able to democratize the reality.

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